# (2014) 3 ILRA 1437

- **Citation:** (2014) 3 ILRA 1437
- **Court:** High Court of Judicature at Allahabad
- **Decided:** 2014-11-13
- **Case number:** First Appeal No. 910 of 2000
- **Bench:** Rajiv Sharma, Dinesh Gupta
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/allahabad-high-court/2014-3-ilra-1437-43033
- **Pages:** 12

## Headnote

Land Acquisition Act-Compensation land
situated near Vasundhara Residential
Scheme-surrounded by Industrial area
adjacent to BHEL, Dover and other well
known
units-Delhi-Lucknow
national
highway-2 km away from Delhi-SLO
ignoring certified copy of sale deed relied
exumpler of builder-awarded @ 50 per
square yard-reference court enhanced
Rs. 90/-held-if the claimants deprived
from
such
rate-would
be
highly
prejudicial-and violative to constitutional
mandate-entitled to Rs. 297 per square
yard-appeal by GDA dismissed-claimants
appeal allowed.
Held: Para-36
In the backdrop of the aforesaid facts, it
would be highly prejudicial to the
interest of the claimants/landloosers to
be deprived of such a rate when they are
placed in similar circumstances. In our
view, such an action would certainly be
the
arbitrariness
and
violative
of
constitutional mandate. Therefore, the
claimants are entitled to Rs.297/- per
square yard in respect of the land
acquired by the aforesaid notification.
Case Law discussed:
[1995(2) SCC 305]; [AIR 2012 SC 446]; AIR
1959 SC 429; [AIR 94 SC 1160]; (2008) 2 SCC
568; 2008 (11) SCC 65:2008(4) Supreme 74;
2009 (4) SCC 402; 2008 (14) SCC 745; 2009
(4) SCC 719; First Appeal No. 34 of 2007;
[(2003) 1 SCC 354]; [(2010) 13 SCC 398].

## Text

3 All]. Ghaziabad Development Authority Vs. Kashi Ram & Ors.
1437
annexed in Annexure 11 to the writ
petition, purporting to be the assessment
orders, we allow the writ petition No.2222
of 2009 and quash all these alleged
assessment orders.
10. We direct the Nagar Palika
Parishad, Mawana to issue a fresh notice
fixing a date intimating the petitioner to
appear before them for disposal of its
objection. Upon hearing the petitioners,
the competent authority will decide the
objections and make an assessment order
under Section 143 of the Act within six
weeks
thereafter.
Based
on
such
assessment order, the petitioner will take
recourse to its remedy as advised to them.
During this period, the interim order
passed by this Court directing the
petitioner to pay Rs.8 lacs will continue to
operate.
11. For the reasons stated aforesaid,
Writ Petition No.745 of 2014, which is
based on identical facts is, accordingly,
allowed. The alleged assessment orders,
for the period 2014 to 2018, are quashed.
The Nagar Palika Parishad, Mawana will
proceed in the same fashion as stated
aforesaid. For this period, the petitioner
will deposit a tentative amount of Rs.10
lacs per annum, which would be subject
to fresh assessment orders.
--------
APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL SIDE
DATED: ALLAHABAD 13.11.2014
BEFORE
THE HON'BLE RAJIV SHARMA, J.
THE HON'BLE DINESH GUPTA, J.
First Appeal No. 910 of 2000
alongwith
W.P. No. 911 of 2000, W.P. No. 912 of
2000 and other connected cases
Ghaziabad Development Authority
...Appellant
Versus
Kashi Ram & Ors.
...Respondents
Counsel for the Appellant:
Sri Mahendra Pratap, Sri Ajay Kumar
Misra
Counsel for the Respondents:
Sri D.P. Singh, Sri Shiv Sagar Singh, Sri
J.N. Sharma, Sri V.B. Singh, Sri Vijai Sinha
Land Acquisition Act-Compensation land
situated near Vasundhara Residential
Scheme-surrounded by Industrial area
adjacent to BHEL, Dover and other well
known
units-Delhi-Lucknow
national
highway-2 km away from Delhi-SLO
ignoring certified copy of sale deed relied
exumpler of builder-awarded @ 50 per
square yard-reference court enhanced
Rs. 90/-held-if the claimants deprived
from
such
rate-would
be
highly
prejudicial-and violative to constitutional
mandate-entitled to Rs. 297 per square
yard-appeal by GDA dismissed-claimants
appeal allowed.
Held: Para-36
In the backdrop of the aforesaid facts, it
would be highly prejudicial to the
interest of the claimants/landloosers to
be deprived of such a rate when they are
placed in similar circumstances. In our
view, such an action would certainly be
the
arbitrariness
and
violative
of
constitutional mandate. Therefore, the
claimants are entitled to Rs.297/- per
square yard in respect of the land
acquired by the aforesaid notification.
Case Law discussed:
[1995(2) SCC 305]; [AIR 2012 SC 446]; AIR
1959 SC 429; [AIR 94 SC 1160]; (2008) 2 SCC
568; 2008 (11) SCC 65:2008(4) Supreme 74;
2009 (4) SCC 402; 2008 (14) SCC 745; 2009
(4) SCC 719; First Appeal No. 34 of 2007;
[(2003) 1 SCC 354]; [(2010) 13 SCC 398].
(Delivered by Hon'ble Rajiv Sharma, J.)
1438
 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
1. Heard Mr. Mahendra Pratap,
learned
Counsel
for
Ghaziabad
Development Authority and Mr. D.P.
Singh and Mr. Shiv Sagar Singh, learned
Counsel for the claimants.
2. At the outset, it is relevant to
mention here that in some of the First
Appeals, the appellants/claimants left for
heavenly abode and as such, substitution
applications were filed on their behalf for
bringing on record their legal heirs. There
is no objection to these applications.
Accordingly,
all
the
substitution
applications are allowed, after condoning
the delay, if any, in preferring the
substitution applications.
3. Let them be substituted in place
of claimants during the course of the day.
4.
In short, the facts of the case are
that the land of the claimants pertaining to
the village Makanpur, Pargana Loni, Tehsil
Dadri, District Ghaziabad was acquired by
the State of U.P. for planned development
by the Ghaziabad Development Authority
[in short referred to as 'GDA']. The
notification under Section 4 (1) of the Land
Acquisition Act was issued on 12.9.1986,
which was published in the Gazettee on
28.2.1987, whereas notification under
Section 6 (1) of the Act was issued on
24.2.1988. The possession of the land in
question
was
taken
by
the
State
Government on 14.6.1988 and 29.6.1988.
The Special Land Acquisition Officer
(SLAO)
pronounced
the
award
on
30.12.1989 and granted compensation at
the rate of Rs.50/- per square yard relying
on the exemplar of plot No.582, area 5
Bigha executed on 28.9.1987 by one Smt.
Amarjeet Kaur in favour of GDA @
Rs.50/- per square yard. The respondents
and other persons whose land was acquired
had
filed
objections
to
the
said
determination of compensation by the
SLAO and the matter was referred to the
District Judge under Section 18 of the Land
Acquisition Act. The IV Additional District
Judge, Ghaziabad and VI Additional
District Judge, Ghaziabad [hereinafter
referred to as the "Reference Court"] passed
separate
awards dated 19.4.1999 and
31.5.2000, whereby the Reference Court
enhanced the amount of compensation from
Rs.50/- per Square Yard to Rs.90/- per
square yard.
5. Feeling aggrieved, the GDA has
filed the above-captioned first appeals
description of which is given from Sl.
Nos. 1 to 60. In contrast, Appeals
mentioned at Sl. Nos.61 to 96 have been
filed by the tenure holders-claimants for
enhancement
of
compensation
and
lowering the deductions from 33% made
towards development cost.
6. Since the land of all claimants
was acquired by the same Notification,
facts pertaining to the said Notification
apply to all these respondents. The only
difference is in the area of land which was
owned by these respondents and has been
taken away by the State in acquisition.
Therefore, taking general note of the
particulars of acquisition and the nature of
land, would serve the purpose.
7. From perusal of the impugned
award dated 19.4.1999, it reflects that the
Reference
Court,
on
the
basis
of
pleadings, had framed five issues, which
are as under :
"(1)
Whether
the
compensation
awarded by S.L.A.O. is inadequate? If so
to what amount of compensation are the
petitioners entitled?
3 All]. Ghaziabad Development Authority Vs. Kashi Ram & Ors.
1439
(2) Whether the reference is time
barred?
(3) Whether the reference is barred
by section 9 of Land Acquisition Act?"
(4) Whether the reference is barred
by principles of estopple?
(5)
To
what
amount
of
compensation, if any, are the petitioners
entitled?
8. While deciding issue No. 1, the
Reference Court had recorded specific
findings of fact that the present claimants
seem to be very unfortunate because the
land of the same village was acquired for
'Avas Vikas Parishad' and NOIDA and
those farmers got higher rates, while the
land of present claimants acquired for
GDA got less compensation. Some land
of village Makanpur was acquired for
NOIDA and partly acquired for Avas
Vikas Parishad and the remaining part
was acquired for GDA. Therefore, the
Reference Court was of the view that the
compensation awarded by the SLAO was
inadequate
and
enhanced
the
compensation from Rs.50/- to Rs.90/- per
square yard.
9. As the appellants have not pressed
the issue nos.2 and 3, the Reference Court
decided the said issues in favour of the
claimants.
10. As regard issue No.5, the
Reference
Court,
after
taking
into
consideration
the
totality
of
the
circumstances, came to the conclusion
that the claimants are entitled to get
solatium @ 30% on the market rate and
12% per annum additional amount
together with interest @ 9% per annum on
the enhanced amount of compensation for
the first year from the date of taking the
possession and thereafter 15% per annum
till the date of payment.
11. The main contention of the GDA
is that the claimants accepted the
compensation without protest and as such,
it was not open for the tenure holders to
file Reference under Section 18 of the
Act. In this regard, he submits that on
some applications, the word 'protest' was
written by one different handwriting
without signature appended thereto. Since
there is an interpolation, it has to be
considered
that
the
claimants
have
accepted
the
compensation
without
protest.
12. Further, he submits that certified
copies of sale exemplers, relied by the
Collector, were produced before the
Reference Court, but the Court concerned
rejected the same for want of examination
of witness. According to him, it is
contrary to law as has been held by the
Apex Court in P. Rama Reddy v. Special
Land Acquisition Officer [1995 (2) SCC
305]. In this judgment, the Apex Court
held that in any proceeding under this
Act, a certified copy of a document
registered under the Registration Act,
1908 (16 of 1908), including a copy given
under Section 57 of that Act, may be
accepted as evidence of the transaction
recorded in such document.
13.

While
determining
the
compensation, the Reference Court relied
on the sale deeds executed by the Tripati
Builders in favour of Subhash Chand and
Chandra Mohan. As the sale deeds were
executed by the builders instead of the
farmers, naturally the value of the land is
on higher side and as such the same is
liable to be set aside.
1440
 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
14. Next, he contended that in the
impugned order dated 19.4.1999, the
Reference
Court
determined
the
compensation as Rs.90/- per sq. yard,
after deducting 33% from Rs.135/-,
whereas in the impugned order dated
31.5.2000, the Reference Court fixed the
compensation as Rs.90/- per square yard
without any deduction. Since there is
variance
in
determination
of
compensation, this Court's interference is
required in setting aside the impugned
order.
15. Lastly, it has been vehemently
contended by the counsel for the GDA
that the Reference Court erred in
deducting 33% towards development cost
overlooking the fact that the large chunk
of land was acquired and sufficient land
was to be left for internal developments,
like road, sewerage, overhead water tank,
water lines, parks, etc. According to him,
deduction of at least 70% should have
been
allowed.
To
substantiate
the
aforesaid assertion, reliance has been
placed upon Chandrashekar (D) by LRs
and others v. Land Acquisition Officer
and another [AIR 2012 SC 446]. In para
15 of the report, it has been observed by
the Apex Court as under:-
"15. The present controversy calls
for our determination on the quantum of
the deductions to be applied, to the market
value assessed on the basis of the
exemplar sale transaction, so as to
ascertain the fair compensation payable to
the
land
loser.
The
only
factual
parameters to be kept in mind are, the
factual inferences drawn in the foregoing
paragraph. On the issue in hand, we shall
endeavor to draw our conclusions from
past
precedent.
In
the
process
of
consideration
hereinafter,
we
have
referred to all the judgments relied upon
by the learned counsel for the appellants,
as well as, some recent judgments on the
issue concerned:
(i) In Brigadier Sahib Singh Kalha &
Ors. v. Amritsar Improvement Trust &
Ors., (1982) 1 SCC 419, this Court
opined, that where a large area of
undeveloped land is acquired, provision
has to be made for providing minimum
amenities of town-life. Accordingly it was
held, that a deduction of 20 percent of the
total acquired land should be made for
land over which infrastructure has to be
raised (space for roads etc.). Apart from
the aforesaid, it was also held, that the
cost of raising infrastructure itself (like
roads, electricity, water, underground
drainage, etc.) need also to be taken into
consideration.
To
cover
the
cost
component, for raising infrastructure, the
Court held, that the deduction to be
applied would range between 20 percent
to 33 percent. Commutatively viewed, it
was held, that deductions would range
between 40 and 53 percent.
(ii)
Noticing
the
determination
rendered by this Court in Brigadier Sahib
Singh Kalha's case (supra), this Court in
Administrator General of West Bengal vs.
Collector, Varanasi, (1988) 2 SCC 150,
upheld deduction of 40 percent (from the
acquired land) as had been applied by the
High Court.
(iii) In Chimanlal Hargovinddas vs.
Special Land Acquisition Officer, Poona
& Anr., (1988) 3 SCC 751, while
referring to the factors which ought to be
taken
into
consideration
while
determining the market value of acquired
land, it was observed, that a smaller plot
was within the reach of many, whereas for
a larger block of land there was implicit
disadvantages. As a matter of illustration
it was mentioned, that a large block of
3 All]. Ghaziabad Development Authority Vs. Kashi Ram & Ors.
1441
land would first have to be developed by
preparing its lay out plan. Thereafter, it
would require carving out roads, leaving
open spaces, plotting out smaller plots,
waiting for purchasers (during which the
invested money would remain blocked).
Likewise, it was pointed out, that there
would be other known hazards of an
entrepreneur. Based on the aforesaid
likely disadvantages it was held, that
these factors could be discounted by
making deductions by way of allowance
at an appropriate rate, ranging from 20
percent to 50 percent. These deductions,
according to the Court, would account for
land required to be set apart for
developmental activities. It was also
sought to be clarified, that the applied
deduction would depend on, whether the
acquired land was rural or urban, whether
building activity was picking up or was
stagnant, whether the waiting period
during which the capital would remain
locked would be short or long; and other
like entrepreneurial hazards.
(iv) In Land Acquisition Officer
Revenue Divisional Officer, Chottor vs.
L. Kamalamma (Smt.) Dead by LRs. &
Ors., (1998) 2 SCC 385, this Court
arrived at the conclusion, that a deduction
of 40 percent as developmental cost from
the market value determined by the
Reference Court would be just and proper
for ascertaining the compensation payable
to the landowner.
(v) In Kasturi and others vs. State of
Haryana, (2003) 1 SCC 354, this court
opined, that in respect of agricultural land
or undeveloped land which has potential
value
for
housing
or
commercial
purposes, normally 1/3rd amount of
compensation
should
be
deducted,
depending upon the location, extent of
expenditure involved for development,
the area required for roads and other civic
amenities etc. It was also opined, that
appropriate deductions could be made for
making
plots
for
residential
and
commercial purposes. It was sought to be
explained, that the acquired land may be
plain or uneven, the soil of the acquired
land may be soft and hard, the acquired
land may have a hillock or may be low
lying
or
may
have
deep
ditches.
Accordingly, it was pointed out, that
expenses involved for development would
vary keeping in mind the facts and
circumstances of each case. In Kasturi's
case (supra) it was held, that normal
deductions on account of development
would be 1/3rd of the amount of
compensation. It was however clarified
that in some cases the deduction could be
more than 1/3rd and in other cases even
less than 1/3rd.
(vi) Following the decision rendered
by this Court in Brigadier Sahib Singh
Kalha's
case,
this
Court
in
Land
Acquisition
Officer,
Kammarapally
Village, Nizamabad District, A.P. vs.
Nookala Rajamallu & Ors., (2003) 12
SCC 334, applied a deduction of 53
percent, to determine the compensation
payable to the landowners.
(vii) In V. Hanumantha Reddy
(Dead) by LRs. vs. Land Acquisition
Officer & Mandal R. Officer, (2003) 12
SCC 642, this Court examined the
propriety of compensation determined as
payable to the land loser by the High
Court.
The
Reference
Court
had
determined the market value of developed
land at Rs.78 per sq. yard. The Reference
Court then applied a deduction of 1/4th to
arrive at Rs.58 per sq. yard as the
compensation payable. The High Court
however concluded, that compensation at
Rs.30 per sq. yard would be appropriate
(this
would
mean
a
deduction
of
approximately 37 percent, as against
1442
 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
market value of developed land at Rs.78
per sq. yard). This Court having made a
reference to Kasturi's case (supra) did not
find any infirmity in the order passed by
the High Court. In other words, deduction
of 37 percent was approved by this Court.
(viii) In para 21 of the judgment in
Viluben Jhalejar Contractor (Dead) by
LRs. vs. State of Gujarat, (2005) 4 SCC
789, it was held that for development, i.e.,
preparation of lay out plans, carving out
roads, leaving open spaces, plotting out
smaller plots, waiting for purchasers, and
on account of other hazards of an
entrepreneur, the deduction could range
between 20 percent and 50 percent of the
total market price of the exemplar land.
(ix) In Atma Singh (Dead) through
LRs & Ors. vs. State of Haryana and Anr.,
(2008) 2 SCC 568, this Court after
making a reference to a number of
decisions on the point, and after taking
into consideration the fact that the
exemplar sale transaction was of a smaller
piece of land concluded, that deductions
of 20 percent onwards, depending on the
facts and circumstances of each case
could be made.
(x) In Lal Chand vs. Union of India
& Anr., (2009) 15 SCC 769, it was held
that to determine the market value of a
large tract of undeveloped agricultural
land (with potential for development),
with reference to sale price of small
developed plot(s), deductions varying
between 20 percent to 75 percent of the
price of such developed plot(s) could be
made.
(xi) In Subh Ram & Ors. vs. State of
Haryana & Anr., (2010) 1 SCC 444, this
Court opined, that in cases where the
valuation of a large area of agricultural or
undeveloped land was to be determined
on the basis of the sale price of a small 12
developed plot, standard deductions ought
to be 1/3rd towards infrastructure space
(areas to be left out for roads etc.) and
1/3rd
towards
infrastructural
developmental costs (costs for raising
infrastructure), i.e., in all 2/3rd (or 67
percent).
(xii) In Andhra Pradesh Housing
Board vs. K. Manohar Reddy & Ors.,
(2010) 12 SCC 707, having examined the
existing case law on the point it was
concluded, that deductions on account of
development could vary between 20
percent to 75 percent. In the peculiar facts
of the case a deduction of 1/3rd towards
development charges was made from the
awarded
amount
to
determine
the
compensation payable.
(xiii) In Special Land Acquisition
Officer & Anr. vs. M.K. Rafiq Sahib,
(2011) 7 SCC 714, this Court after having
concluded, that the land which was
subject matter of acquisition was not
agricultural land for all practical purposes
and no agricultural activities could be
carried out on it, concluded that in order
to determine fair compensation, based on
a sale transaction of a small piece of
developed land (though the acquired land
was a large chunk), the deduction made
by the High Court at 50 percent, ought to
be increased to 60 percent.
16. According to the GDA, if the
aforesaid case laws are applied to the
instant case, deduction of 70% would
serve the purpose.
17. In contrast, learned Counsel for
the
claimants
submits
that
the
compensation is totally based on situation
of the land and he has drawn our attention
towards the replication filed by Trilok
Chand and others [paras 3 to 6 of the
replication]. Further, he has relied upon
the oral statement of Sri Krishna Tyagi
3 All]. Ghaziabad Development Authority Vs. Kashi Ram & Ors.
1443
(PW1), who has stated that if the land was
not acquired, he could have easily sold the
land in the year 1987 at the rate of
Rs.500/- per square yard in open market.
By no stretch of imagination, the
valuation of the land acquired can be said
to be Rs.135/- per square yard less 33%
equivalent to Rs.90/- per square yard, as
held by the Reference Court. Suffice to
say that the valuation of the land should
have been fixed by the Reference Court
something between Rs.135/- per square
yard to Rs.500/- per square yard in view
of the statement of PW1 Krishna Tyagi.
18. Next, he contended that the
Reference Court has not considered the
Exhibit Paper No.37-Ga, the judgment of
the Reference Court dated 27.5.1993
passed in L.A.R. No.495 of 1990 in the
case of Satish Takural v. State, wherein
the Reference Court had determined the
value of the land after 20% deduction at
the rate of Rs.138/- per. square yard for
the
land
which
was
acquired
on
26.6.1982, whereas in the instant case the
land in question was acquired in the year
1987 and the Reference Court determined
the value of the land as Rs.90/- per square
yard. Therefore, the claimants are entitled
for enhancement of compensation.
19.

Before
concluding
his
submissions, he has relied upon the case
of Mohinder Singh and others versus
State of Haryana [(2014) 8 SCC 897],
wherein the Apex Court held that the
deduction of 40% towards development
cost as determined by the High Court was
unjustified and the deduction of 1/4th of
market value made by the Reference
Court was appropriate.
20. Next he has drawn our attention
towards the findings of Reference Court,
wherein it has been stated that the Hon'ble
Court in the case of Baburam and others
v. State of U.P. reported in A.I.R. 1980
Allahabad
324
has
observed
that
determining compensation is not an exact
science.
The
question
of
fair
compensation is not algebraic problem
which could be solved by abstract
formula. There is an element of guess
work inherent in most cases involving
determination of market value of the
acquired land.
21. As regard the assertion of the
GDA's Counsel that the claimants had
accepted compensation without protest
and as such, the Reference was not
maintainable, we would like to mention
that while deciding issue No.4, the Court
below recorded a finding of fact that if the
claimants have received the amount of
compensation under protest then it cannot
be said that they are estopped and cannot
raise the plea for enhancement of
compensation. In other words, if some of
the claimants have received their amount
without protest, then they cannot be
estopped because mere filing of reference
amounts to protest.
22. Before dealing with the
controversy involved in the present batch
of appeals, it would be apt to refer some
of the relevant cases of the Apex Court
and this court on the subject, for proper
adjudication of the matter.
23. In Special Land Acquisition
Officer, Bangalore v. T. Adhinarayan
Setty, AIR 1959 SC 429, it was held that
in awarding compensation under the Act,
the Court has to ascertain market-value of
the land on the date of notification under
section 4 (1) of the Act. It was also
observed that there are several methods of
1444
 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
valuation, such as (1) opinion of experts,
(2) the price paid within a reasonable time
in bona fide transactions of purchase of
the land acquired or the lands adjacent to
the lands acquired and possessing similar
advantages, and (3) a number of years
purchase of the actual or immediately
prospective profits of the land acquired.
24. Hon'ble Supreme Court in the
cases of M/s Printer House Private
Limited Vs .Saiyadan reported in [AIR 94
SC 1160], and P. Ram Reddy and others
Vs. Land Acquisition Officer, Hyderabad
Urban Development Authority reported in
1995
All
India
Acquisition
and
Compensation Cases 184 and Atma Singh
v. State of Haryana : (2008) 2 SCC 568
has discussed the principles on the basis
of which the market value has to be
determined. It is now settled law that the
building potentiality of the acquired land
existing on the date of notification under
Sub-section (1) of Section 4 of the Land
Acquisition Act, is the correct market
value of the acquired property, which has
to be judged on consideration of various
factors and material which are brought on
the record and such building potentiality
is not only to be judged merely on the
basis of its existing value but also after
taking into consideration the future
advantages.
25. In 2008 (11) SCC 65 : 2008 (4)
Supreme 174 [State of Haryana Vs.
Gurbax Singh (Dead) by Lrs. & anr. etc.]
it has been considered by the Supreme
Court that commercial potentiality of the
land is important factor for deciding
compensation.
26. Again in 2009 (4) SCC 402
[Mummidi Apparao (Dead) through LRs.
Vs. Nagarjuna Fertilizers and Chemicals
Limited and another] the Supreme Court
has given an emphasis over the location
and development all around and its full
potential value of developing into housing
sites and fast taking up the character. In
2008 (14) SCC 745 (General Manager,
Oil and Natural Gas Corporation Limited
Vs. Rameshbhai Jivanbhai Patel and
another) the Supreme Court held that
primarily, the increase in land prices
depends on four factors: situation of the
land,
nature
of
development
in
surrounding area, availability of land for
development in the area, and the demand
for land in the area. In rural areas, unless
there is any prospect of development in
the vicinity, increase in prices would be
slow, steady and gradual, without any
sudden spurts or jumps. On the other
hand, in urban or semi-urban areas, where
the development is faster, where the
demand for land is high and where there
is construction activity all around, the
escalation in market price is at a much
higher rate as compared to rural areas. In
2009 (4) SCC 719 (Faridabad Gas Power
Project,
National
Thermal
Power
Corporation Limited and others Vs. Om
Prakash and others) close vicinity of the
planned
development
area
was
determined as one of the factor for
fixation of higher compensation. Thus,
these judgements are supporting the
contention of the land loosers/tenure
holders.
27. Thus, the relevant factors for
determination
of
the
amount
of
compensation are the nature and quality
of land, whether irrigated or unirrigated,
facilities for irrigation, presence of fruit
bearing trees, location of the land,
closeness to any road or highway,
evenness of the land, existence of any
building or structure and a host of other
3 All]. Ghaziabad Development Authority Vs. Kashi Ram & Ors.
1445
factors bearing on the valuation of the
land. The learned Court below while
determining the rate of compensation of
the acquired land in his impugned order
has considered all these relevant factors
and also took into consideration the
evidence adduced by the parties.
28. It may be noted that in bunch of
First Appeals led by First Appeal No.564
of 1997, Khazan and others Vs. State of
U.P. and others pertaining to adjoining
villages of Bhangel Begumpur, Nagla and
Geha Tilpatabad of Dadri Tehsil relating
to land acquisition was decided by this
Court granting compensation at the rate of
Rs.297/- per square yard, in terms of
decision of this Court rendered in First
Appeal No.1056 of 1999, Raghuraj Singh
and others vs. State of U.P. and others.
29. Again this Court while dealing
with a First Appeal No. 644 of 2012,
Amar Singh and another Vs State of U.P.
and others pertaining to adjacent Village
Gejha Tilpatabad, followed the several
judgements,
passed
by
this
Court
including the judgment rendered in the
bunch of First Appeals, led by First
Appeal No. 564 of 1997, Khazan and
others v. State of U.P. and others and this
Court enhanced the compensation to
Rs.297/- per square yard.
30. Similarly, by means of a detailed
and
well-considered
judgment
dated
19.5.2010 passed in First Appeal No.1056
of 1999, a Division Bench held that the
claimants are entitled to compensation @
Rs.297/- per square yard alongwith other
statutory dues. In this case, the acquired
land situates in Tehsil Dadri, District
Ghaziabad.
The
enhancement
of
compensation to Rs.297/- per square yard
in respect of the land situates in village
Bhangel Begumpur has been followed by
another Division Bench in its judgment
and order dated 11.10.2012 passed in First
Appeal No. 564 of 1997.
31. The Apex Court in Civil Appeal
No.6775 of 2013 Harbhajan Kumar and
others Vs. Collector, Land Acquisition
and another while deciding similar Civil
Appeal, extended the benefit of enhanced
compensation made in previous Civil
Appeal of similar nature.
32. Recently, a Coordinate Bench of
this
Court,
following
the
aforesaid
judgment, allowed the compensation to
the tune of Rs.297/- per square yard vide
its judgment and order dated 23.5.2014
passed in First Appeal No.336 of 1998.
33. We would like to point out that
in First Appeal No.34 of 2007, Ganeshi
Singh and others vs. State of U.P. and
others decided on 9.5.2008, a Division
Bench of this Court has held that the land
owners of a particular land in a
subsequent notification are entitled to at
least the same rate of compensation as
awarded to similarly placed land owners
in an earlier notification when the same
has been brought to the notice of the
Court.
34. There is no dispute to the fact
that the land in question falls within the
territory of Tahsil Dadri and situates near
Delhi, close to Hindan River on Mohan
Nagar-Delhi Link Road surrounded by
industrial
area
declared
by
U.P.
government - Bharat Electricals, CEL,
Dover and other well known units and
Delhi-Lucknow National Highway and
just 2 kms. away from Delhi border. On
one side Vasundhara Residential Scheme
developed by Avas Evam Vikas Parishad
1446
 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
situates near to the developed Kaushambi
Residential Colony. On the other side of
the National Highway, the area known as
NOIDA situates with all civic amenities
on the acquired land.
35. As regards the potentiality of the
land, the Reference Court has observed as
under:-
"In the present case, at my hand, it is
established by the evidence and may be
noticed by the Court that the land situated
at very important point from where Delhi
boarder is about 2 kms. It is adjacent to
link road, which leads from Mohan Nagar
to Delhi and other side National High
Way leads from Delhi to Lucknow. At
some distance there is an Industrial Area
having all the facilities. There are the
surrounding circumstances on the basis of
which it can be guessed that land in
question has much potential value for the
abadi purpose and it can also be noticed
that subsequently the land was being sold
at very high rates. The State acquired the
land for G.D.A. to facilitate the people,
but G.D.A. is not supposed to act in the
manner like Property Dealer."
36. In the backdrop of the aforesaid
facts, it would be highly prejudicial to the
interest of the claimants/landloosers to be
deprived of such a rate when they are
placed in similar circumstances. In our
view, such an action would certainly be
the
arbitrariness
and
violative
of
constitutional mandate. Therefore, the
claimants are entitled to Rs.297/- per
square yard in respect of the land acquired
by the aforesaid notification.
37. As regard the deduction, it has
been argued by the counsel for GDA that
33% deduction is very low and in view of
the decision rendered in Chandrasekhar's
case (supra) it should be atleast 70%. On
the contrary, claimants have argued that
deduction @ 33% is highly excessive and
wholly unjustified looking to the overall
situation of the land and other evidence
on record.
38. In Chandrashekhar's case
((supra)) which has been relied upon by
the counsel for the GDA the Court took
into consideration the two components for
deduction. The first component relates to
area to be left out for providing basic
amenities, like, roads, sewerage, water
lines, adjoining pavements, street light,
electric sub-stations etc. Besides the
aforesaid, land has also to be kept apart
for parks, gardens and playgrounds.
Additional
development
includes
provision
of
civic
amenities,
like
educational institutions, dispensaries and
hospitals, police stations, petrol pumps
etc. The second component is deduction
towards expenditure/expenses which is
likely to be incurred in providing and
raising
the
infrastructure
and
civic
amenities referred to above.
39. At this juncture, we would like
to point out that a Division Bench of this
Court in Ganeshi Singh's case (supra) has
held that there is no legal provision for the
deduction
from
the
amount
of
compensation under the Land Acquisition
Act, 1894. Various Courts normally pass
such order of deduction on the subjective
satisfaction of each case. Therefore, there
is no hard and fast rule for making
deductions.
40. It may be noted that learned
Counsel for the GDA has failed to point
out that before the Reference Court it has
brought on record the indispensable
3 All]. Ghaziabad Development Authority Vs. Kashi Ram & Ors.
1447
amenities and civic amenities which they
would provide on the acquired land.
Further, when confronted with the question
that whether they have demanded excess
deduction, as claimed here, before the
Reference Court, the answer was in
negative and they failed to point out any
material in this regard. Since no such plea
has been raised at the initial stage, it is not
open for them to raise such a plea before
this Court at a belated stage.
41. The Apex Court in the case of
Kasturi and others vs. State of Haryana
[(2003) 1 SCC 354] held that a cut of
20% to the development charges which
was lower than the normal 1/3rd was
understandable and could be justified.
Subsequently, in Charan Dass v. H. P.
Housing
and
Urban
Development
Authority [(2010) 13 SCC 398], the Apex
Court observed that any deduction made
should be made on the situation of the
land and the need for development and
where the acquired land is in the midst of
already developed land with amenities of
roads, drainage, electricity, etc. then
deduction of 40% would not be justified.
42. Recently, in Mohinder Singh's
case (supra), the Apex Court held that the
deduction of 40% towards development
cost as determined by the High Court was
unjustified and the deduction of 1/4th of
market value made by the Reference
Court was appropriate.
43. It may be added that counsel
appearing in First Appeal No.700 of 2002
has filed an application brining on record
the notification dated 7.11.1977 issued by
the
District
Magistrate,
Ghaziabad
whereby the Khasra Plot acquired has
been brought under municipal limits of
Ghaziabad. Therefore, there is no doubt
that the land in question of the claimants
acquired for the Vaishali Scheme of
Village Makanpur has already been
brought under the limit of Nagar Palika
before issuance of notification under the
Land Acquisition Act.
44. In view of the location of land in
municipal limits, nature of soil and other
factors, referred to above, we find no
force in the submissions made by the
counsel for the GDA for enhancing the
deduction to the tune of 75% and held that
33% deduction made by the Reference
Court is fully justified.
45. In view of the aforesaid detailed
discussions, the appeals filed by the GDA
are hereby dismissed and the appeals filed
by
the
claimants/landloosers
for
enhancement of the compensation are
allowed.
The
claimants-private
respondents
shall
be
entitled
for
compensation @ Rs.297/- per square
yard, as held by us above and they shall
be paid the enhanced compensation
together with other statutory dues [like
solatium, interest etc.], as directed by the
Reference Court, within three months
from the date of receipt of a certified copy
of this order.
46. So far defective appeals are
concerned,
any
defect/s
was/were
deficiency of court fees, it is directed that
same will be recovered/adjusted in
accordance with rules, while preparing
final decree by the department.
47. All the pending applications
shall also stand disposed of accordingly.
48. Parties shall bear their own
costs.
--------
1448
 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL SIDE
DATED: ALLAHABAD 10.11.2014
BEFORE
THE HON'BLE DR. DHANANJAYA YESHWANT
CHANDRACHUD, C.J.
THE HON'BLE PRADEEP KUMAR SINGH
BAGHEL, J.
Special Appeal No. 961 of 2014
Satya Prakash Chaudhary
...Appellant
Versus
State of U.P. & Ors.
...Respondents
Counsel for the Appellants:
Sri Jai Krishna Tiwari, Sri Radha Kant
Ojha
Counsel for the Respondents:
C.S.C.
Constitution of India, Art.-226-Suspensionon demand of illegal gratification from the
attendant
of
emergency
patientconsidering gravity of charges-Single Judge
declined to interfere-held-view taken by
Single Judge not sustainable-gravity of
charges can not take way the Rule of lawwhere suspension as major of punishmentprinciple of Natural Justice can not be
denied-petition allowed-suspension
order
quashed.
Held: Para-5
In either view of the matter, the order of
suspension that was challenged before the
learned Single Judge was unsustainable in
view of the flaw which has been noticed
above. The learned Single Judge declined
to entertain the petition under Article 226
of the Constitution, having due regard to
the gravity of charge against the appellant.
On this aspect, we need only observe that
irrespective of the gravity of an allegation,
the rule of law has to be observed and an
order of suspension must necessarily abide
by the fundamental principles of service
jurisprudence
as
embodied
in
the
applicable service rules.
(Delivered by Hon'ble Dr. Dhananjaya
Yeshwant Chandrachud, C.J.)
1. The appellant had moved a writ
petition, under Article
226 of the
Constitution, challenging an order dated 9
September 2014 passed by the fifth
respondent namely, the Principal, B.R.D.
Medical College, Gorakhpur. By the order
of the fifth respondent, the appellant was
suspended on the ground that he had
demanded an illegal gratification from the
attendant of a patient in the emergency
ward. A direction has been issued to the
effect that a reference to the order of
suspension be made in the service book of
the appellant and that an adverse entry be
recorded in his character roll.
2. The learned Single Judge has
declined to interfere with the order of
suspension, having due regard to the
gravity of the charge. However, the
second
respondent-Director
General,
Medical Health Services as well as the
fifth
respondent-Principal,
B.R.D.
Medical
College,
Gorakhpur
were
directed to look into the matter and take a
decision on the issue as to who is the
authority competent to suspend the
appellant.
3. Two submissions have been urged
on behalf of the appellant. Firstly, the
order dated 9 September 2014 is not an
order
of
suspension
passed
in
contemplation of a disciplinary enquiry. If
this is an order by way of punishment, it
ought to have been proceeded by a notice
to show cause and a departmental
enquiry. Secondly, the direction to make
an entry in the service book and to record
an adverse entry in the character roll, on
the basis of the same order, would be
consequently unsustainable since the