# A.G.M. Uttarkhand State Road Transport Corp. Kotdwar v. Ram Sumer Singh & Ors

- **Citation:** (2021) 10 ILRA 212
- **Court:** High Court of Judicature at Allahabad
- **Decided:** 2021-09-30
- **Case number:** FAFO Defective No. 178 of 2021
- **Bench:** Ravi Nath Tilhari
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/allahabad-high-court/a-g-m-uttarkhand-state-road-transport-corp-kotdwar-v-ram-sumer-singh-ors-46248
- **Pages:** 8

## Headnote

(A) Civil Law - Review - Motor Vehicle Act,
1988 - Motor Vehicle Rules, 1998 -
Although there may be no power of review
under the Act of 1988 like the power
vested in a court under Section 114 r/w
order 47 C.P.C. or under any other
provision but, in the case of dispute with
respect to statement of fact in the
judgment and award of the Tribunal, the
only way to have the record corrected is to
approach the same Tribunal. If no such
step is taken then the matter must
necessarily end there.
 If the party
approaches the Tribunal raising the grievance,
contradicting the statement in the judgment,
the Tribunal shall have the limited power to
review, to that limited extent, on the principle of
'actus curiae neminem gravabit' which means
that no act of the Court, in the course of the
proceedings does an injury to the suitors in the
Court. (Para 22)

Appeal Rejected. (E-10)

List of Cases cited:

## Text

212 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
adjustment in proceedings under Section 24
of the Act.

17. In view of the aforesaid, the
family court had no occasion to consider
that aspect of the matter.

18. We however proceed to consider
the above aspect.

19. The interim maintenance awarded
to the respondent-wife is Rs. 1500/- per
month under Section 125 Cr.P.C. In the
proceedings under Section 24 of the Hindu
Marriage Act, the maintenance has been
awarded @ Rs. 2500/- per month. Thus the
total amount of monthly maintenance comes
to Rs. 4000/- to the wife. Undisputedly, she is
also having two minor daughters of growing
age
to
maintain
as
well,
to
whom
maintenance @ Rs. 1000/- per month each
has been awarded under Section 125 Cr.P.C.
Thus, in totality, Rs. 6000/- per month would
be available to the respondent-wife to
maintain herself and two minor daughters.

20. We are satisfied that any adjustment
of an amount of Rs. 1500/- awarded to the
respondent under Section 125 Cr.P.C., would
not be in the interest of justice considering
the total amount being received by the
respondent towards maintenance and the
number of children, which deserves no
adjustment or set off.

21. No other point was argued.

22.

The
appeal
is
accordingly
dismissed.
----------
(2021)10ILR A212
APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL SIDE
DATED:LUCKNOW 30.09.2021

BEFORE
THE HON'BLE RAVI NATH TILHARI, J.

FAFO Defective No. 178 of 2021

A.G.M. Uttarkhand State Road Transport
Corp. Kotdwar ...Appellant
Versus
Ram Sumer Singh & Ors. ...Respondents

Counsel for the Appellant:
Prabhakar Tiwari

Counsel for the Respondents:

(A) Civil Law - Review - Motor Vehicle Act,
1988 - Motor Vehicle Rules, 1998 -
Although there may be no power of review
under the Act of 1988 like the power
vested in a court under Section 114 r/w
order 47 C.P.C. or under any other
provision but, in the case of dispute with
respect to statement of fact in the
judgment and award of the Tribunal, the
only way to have the record corrected is to
approach the same Tribunal. If no such
step is taken then the matter must
necessarily end there.
 If the party
approaches the Tribunal raising the grievance,
contradicting the statement in the judgment,
the Tribunal shall have the limited power to
review, to that limited extent, on the principle of
'actus curiae neminem gravabit' which means
that no act of the Court, in the course of the
proceedings does an injury to the suitors in the
Court. (Para 22)

Appeal Rejected. (E-10)

List of Cases cited:

1. Bijoy Kumar Dugar Vs Bidyadhar Dutta &
ors.. AIR 2006 SC 1255 (distinguished)

2. United India Insurance Co. Ltd. Vs Smt.
Meena & ors. 2010 (1) ALJ 112

3. Patel Narshi Thakershi & ors. Vs Shri
Pradyumansinghji AIR 1970 SC 1273

4. Lily Thomas, Etc. Vs U.O.I. (2000) 6 SCC 224
10 All. A.G.M. Uttarkhand State Road Transport Corp. Kotdwar Vs. Ram Sumer Singh & Ors.
213
5. S. Nagraj Vs St. of Karn. (1993) Supp. 4 SCC
595

6. St.of Mah.Vs Ramdas Shrinivas Nayak & ors.
(1982) 2 SCC 463 (followed)

7. Bhavnagar University Vs Palitana Sugar Mill
(P) Ltd.& ors. (2003) 2 SCC 111 (followed)

8. Usha Rajkhowa & ors. Vs Paramount
Industries & ors.. (2009) 14 SCC 71

(Delivered by Hon'ble Ravi Nath Tilhari J.)

1. Heard Ms. Pooja Arora, holding
brief of Sri Prabhakar Tiwari, learned
counsel for the appellant.

2. Instant appeal under Section 173 of
the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 has been
filed against the judgment and award dated
24.03.2021 passed by the Motor Accident
Claims Tribunal (South), Lucknow (in
short ''the Tribunal') in Motor Accident
Claims No. 134/2018 (Ram Sumer Singh
and Ors. vs. Assistant General Manager,
Uttrakhand,
State
Road
Transport
Corporation,
Kotdwar,
Garhwal,
Uttrakhand and Anr.).

3. By award dated 24.03.2021, the
Tribunal has awarded compensation of Rs.
9,26,800/- along with interest @ 7 per cent
from the date of filing claim petition till the
date of payment to the claimant/respondent
nos. 1 to 3.

4. The facts of the case are that the
claimant-respondents filed claim petition
no. 134/18 before the Motor Accident
Claims
Tribunal,
Lucknow
claiming
compensation of Rs. 1,00,20,000/- on
account of death of late Sujit Singh, in the
accident dated 10.11.2016, near Shyampur
on
Najeebabad-Haridwar
National
Highway no. 74 caused due to rash and
negligent driving of Driver of the Bus
bearing Registration No. UK 07 PA 3177
of the Uttrakhand State Road Transport
Corporation,
Kotdwar,
Garhwal,
Uttrakhand (in short ''the Corporation').

5. The appellant/opposite party no. 1
in the claim petition, denied the claim of
the claimant-respondent and pleaded inter
alia that the accident was caused due to
contributory negligence of the driver of the
Maruti Car No. UP 32 FM 1777.

6. The respondent no. 4/opposite
party no. 2 in the claim petition, the driver
of
the
Bus
also
filed
reply-written
statement to the same effect as of the
present appellant.

"1. क्या कदनांि 10.11.2016 िो िब
मृिि सुिीि अपने दोस्तों िे साि हररद्वार गंगा
स्नान िरने िे कलए िा रहा िा कि रास्ते में िाना
श्यामपुर से पहले हररद्वार िी ओर से आ रही
उिराखंि पररवहन कनगम िोटद्वार िी बस
संख्या यू िे - 0 7 पी ए - 3177 िो उसिे
चालि द्वारा िाफी िेिी व लापरवाही से चलािे
हुए सुिीि कसंह िी िार संख्या यू पी 32 एफ
एम 1777 में सामने से िोरदार टक्कर मार दी
किससे सुिीि कसंह िी मौिे पर ही मृत्यु हो गयी
?

2. क्या उक्त दुर्गटना याची िी
योगदायी उपेक्षा िे िारण र्कटि हुई ?

3. क्या दुर्गटना िे समय दुर्गटना
िाररि िरने वाली बस संख्या यू िे - 0 7 पी ए -
3177 िे चालि िे पास वैध एवं प्रभावी
िराइकवंग लाइसेंस िा ?

4. क्या दुर्गटना से समय दुर्गटना
िाररि िरने वाली बस संख्या यू िे - 0 7 पी ए -
214 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
3177 बीमा ििों िे उल्लंर्न में चलायी िा रही
िी ?

5. क्या याचीगण िोई प्रकििर प्राप्त
िरने िा अकधिारी है यकद हाुँ िो कििनी और
किससे ?"

8. In evidence the claimants examined
Ram Sumer as P.W. 1 and Srikant Singh as
P.W. 2 and filed documentary evidence. In
the evidence on behalf of the appellants,
any witness was not examined, which is
clear from the judgment/award at page 2
thereof, which fact has also not been
disputed.

9. The Tribunal vide judgment and
award under challenge allowed the claim
petition
in
favour
of
the
claimantrespondents.

10. On issue no. 1, the Tribunal
recorded the finding that the accident was
caused due to rash and negligent driving of
the Driver of the bus of the appellant;
resulting into the death of Sujit Singh, on the
date, time and place mentioned in the claim
petition. On Issue nos. 3 & 4, it was recorded
that the Bus of Corporation was exempted
from the insurance policy and on the date of
the accident, the Driver of the appellant's Bus
had effective and valid driving licence. On
Issue no. 5, the Tribunal awarded an amount
of Rs. 9,26,800/- with interest @ 7 per cent
from the date of filing of the claim petition
upto the date of payment.

11. On Issue no. 2, ''if the accident
was caused due to contributory negligence
of the deceased', the Tribunal, specifically
recorded that the opposite parties in the
claim petition (the appellant and respondent
no. 4 herein) did not press Issue no. 2,
which was decided accordingly.

12. Ms. Pooja Arora submitted that
the Issue no. 2 was pressed before the
Tribunal by the appellant but has not been
decided and it has been incorrectly
recorded in the judgment/award that the
Issue no. 2 was not pressed.

13. She submits that the evidence in
the form of the site plan of the place of
accident,
established
contributory
negligence of the deceased in causing
accident which was head on collusion. If
Issue no. 2 had been tried, the finding
would have been in favour of the appellant
and consequently, the liability of the
appellant for the amount of compensation,
would not have been same as determined
by the Tribunal but would have been
reduced.

14. L earned counsel has placed
reliance on the judgments in the case of
Bijoy Kumar Dugar v. Bidyadhar Dutta &
Ors. [AIR 2006 SC 1255] and United
India Insurance Co. Ltd. vs. Smt. Meena
& Ors. [ 2010 (1) ALJ 112] of which
reference shall be made shortly.

15. The points that arise for
consideration are (i) when the judgment of
the Tribunal records that Issue no. 2 was
not pressed, if plea to the contrary can be
raised in this appeal ? (ii) if there was any
contributory negligence on the part of the
driver of the Maruti Car ?

16. I have considered the submissions
advanced and perused the material on
record.

17. On the first point, Mr. Pooja
Arora, when confronted that in a case, as is
here, disputing the statement in judgment,
the appellant should have approached the
Tribunal
itself,
which
could
have
10 All. A.G.M. Uttarkhand State Road Transport Corp. Kotdwar Vs. Ram Sumer Singh & Ors.
215
determined if the appellant pressed Issue
no. 2 or not, submitted that there is no
provision of review, before the Tribunal
under the Motor Vehicle Act, 1988 and
only appeal is maintainable against the
award under Section 173 of the Act, 1988.
She also referred to Rule 221 of the Uttar
Pradesh Motor Vehicles Rules, 1998
(hereinafter referred to as ''the Rules, 1988')
to submit that Section 114 r/w Order 47
C.P.C. does not apply before the Tribunal.

18. It is true that the power of review
is not an inherent power. In Patel Narshi
Thakershi
and
Ors.
vs.
Shri
Pradyumansinghji, [AIR 1970 SC 1273],
the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that "it is
well settled that the power to review is not
an inherent power. It must be conferred by
law either specifically or by necessary
implication." In Lily Thomas, Etc. vs.
Union of India & Ors. [(2000) 6 SCC 224]
also it has been held that "the dictionary
meaning of the word "review" is "the act of
looking; offer something again with a view
to correction or improvement. It cannot be
denied that the review is the creation of a
statute. Therefore, the power of review
unless conferred by the statute cannot be
exercised
by
a
Court,
Tribunal
or
authority". But the power of review is
necessitated by way of invoking the
doctrine ''actus curiae neminem gravabit'
which means that no act of the court in the
course of whole of the proceedings does an
injury to the suitors in the court.

19. It is also well settled that the
procedural review inheres in every judicial,
quasi judicial or even an administrative
authority, if the order is passed under an
erroneous assumption of one's own power
going to the root of the matter or if it is
found that a fraud has been practiced or
there was willful suppression. Besides, in
the case of S. Nagraj vs. State of
Karnataka [(1993) Supp. 4 SCC 595], the
Hon'ble Apex Court has observed that it is
the duty of the Court to rectify, revise and
recall its orders as and when it is brought to
its notice that certain of its orders were
passed on a wrong or mistaken assumption
of facts and that implementation of those
orders would have serious consequences.

20. In State of Maharashtra vs.
Ramdas Shrinivas Nayak and Ors. [(1982)
2 SCC 463], the Hon'ble Supreme Court
held that the principle is well settled that
the statements of fact as to what transpired
at the hearing, recorded in the judgment of
the court, are conclusive of the facts so
stated and no one can contradict such
statements by affidavit or other evidence. If
a party thinks that the happenings in court
have been wrongly recorded in a judgment,
it is incumbent upon the party, while the
matter is still fresh in the minds of the
Judges, to call the attention of the very
Judges, who have made the record to the
fact that the statement made with regard to
his conduct was a statement that had been
made in error. That is the only way to have
the record corrected. If no such step is
taken, the matter must necessarily end
there.

21. In Bhavnagar University vs.
Palitana Sugar Mill (P) Ltd. And Others
[(2003) 2 SCC 111], Hon'ble Supreme
Court referred to the case of Ramdas
Shrinivas (supra) and held as under in
paragraph 61:-

61. Before parting with the case,
we may notice that Mr Tanna appearing on
behalf of South Gujarat University in CA
No. 1540 of 2002 submitted that various
other contentions had also been raised
before the High Court. We are not
216 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
prepared to go into the said contentions
inasmuch as assuming the same to be
correct, the remedy of the appellants would
lie in filing appropriate application for
review before the High Court. Incidentally,
we may notice that even in the special leave
petition no substantial question of law in
this behalf has been raised nor has any
affidavit been affirmed by the learned
advocate who had appeared before the
High Court or by any officer of the
appellant who was present in court that
certain other submissions were made
before the High Court which were not
taken
into
consideration.
In State
of
Maharashtra v. Ramdas
Shrinivas
Nayak [(1982) 2 SCC 463 : 1982 SCC
(Cri) 478 : AIR 1982 SC 1249] this Court
observed: (SCC p. 467, para 4)

"4. When we drew the attention of
the
learned
Attorney-General
to
the
concession made before the High Court,
Shri A.K. Sen, who appeared for the State
of Maharashtra before the High Court and
led the arguments for the respondents there
and who appeared for Shri Antulay before
us intervened and protested that he never
made any such concession and invited us to
peruse the written submissions made by
him in the High Court. We are afraid that
we cannot launch into an inquiry as to
what transpired in the High Court. It is
simply not done. Public policy bars us.
Judicial decorum restrains us. Matters of
judicial record are unquestionable. They
are not open to doubt. Judges cannot be
dragged into the arena. ''Judgments cannot
be treated as mere counters in the game of
litigation.'
(Per
Lord
Atkinson
in Somasundaram
Chetty v. Subramanian
Chetty [AIR 1926 PC 136] .) We are bound
to accept the statement of the Judges
recorded in their judgment, as to what
transpired in court. We cannot allow the
statement of the Judges to be contradicted
by statements at the Bar or by affidavit and
other evidence. If the Judges say in their
judgment that something was done, said or
admitted before them, that has to be the last
word on the subject. The principle is well
settled that statements of fact as to what
transpired at the hearing, recorded in the
judgment of the court, are conclusive of the
facts so stated and no one can contradict
such statements by affidavit or other
evidence. If a party thinks that the
happenings in court have been wrongly
recorded in a judgment, it is incumbent
upon the party, while the matter is still
fresh in the minds of the Judges, to call the
attention of the very Judges who have made
the record to the fact that the statement
made with regard to his conduct was a
statement that had been made in error (Per
Lord
Buckmaster
in
Madhu
Sudan
Chowdhri v. Chandrabati
Chowdhrain
[AIR 1917 PC 30 : 21 CWN 897] .) That is
the only way to have the record corrected.
If no such step is taken, the matter must
necessarily end there. Of course a party
may resile and an appellate court may
permit him in rare and appropriate cases to
resile from a concession on the ground that
the concession was made on a wrong
appreciation of the law and had led to
gross injustice; but, he may not call in
question the very fact of making the
concession as recorded in the judgment."

22. In view of the aforesaid
judgments, this Court is of the considered
view that although there may not be power
of review in the Motor Accident Claims
Tribunal under the Act, 1988 and the Rules,
1998, like the power of review as is vested
in a court under Section 114 C.P.C. r/w
order 47 C.P.C. or for that reason under any
other specific provision, but, in the case of
dispute with respect to statement of fact in
10 All. A.G.M. Uttarkhand State Road Transport Corp. Kotdwar Vs. Ram Sumer Singh & Ors.
217
the judgment and award of the Tribunal, as
is in the present case, if any issue was
pressed or not and such statement in
judgment is contradicted, then in view of
Ramdas Shrinivas Nayak (supra) and
Bhavnagar University (supra), ''the only
way to have the record corrected is to
approach the same Tribunal, and if no such
step is taken, the matter must necessarily
end there. If the party approaches the
Tribunal
raising
the
grievance,
contradicting
the
statement
in
the
judgment, the Tribunal shall have the
power to review, to that limited extent, on
the principle of ''actus curiae neminem
gravabit' which means that no act of the
Court, in the course of the proceedings
does an injury to the suitors in the Court.

23. On point no. 2, the submission of
Ms. Pooja Arora is that in view of the site
plan, there was contributory negligence of the
deceased, which was not considered by the
Tribunal.

24. There can be no Rule of thumb that a
head on collision must always be taken as
resultant to contributory negligence of both
vehicles. It depends on facts of each case
which are required to be proved like any other
fact. A finding of contributory negligence
turns on a factual investigation whether the
deceased contributed to his or her own loss by
failing to take reasonable care of his or her
own person or property. What is reasonable
care, depends on the circumstances of the case.
There are variable factors in determining
whether contributory negligence exists, and if
so, to what degree. The breach or failure on the
part of the deceased, if any, has to be proved
by the Insurance Company, as it was its
burden to prove that.

25. The Tribunal has recorded finding
on Issue no. 1 that the driver of the
appellant's bus was negligent. The accident
was caused as resultant to a rash driving of
the Bus. Nothing could be pointed out even
from the evidence of P.W. 1 or P.W. 2 that
there was any negligence on the part of the
driver of the Maruti Car which contributed,
to the happening of the accident. As
mentioned above, no oral evidence was
produced to prove that fact. The Insurance
Company failed to discharge its burden.

26. So far as the site plan, prepared by
the Police is concerned, it only has its face
value for the purpose of satisfaction of the
Tribunal in the summary proceedings for
the
purpose
of
determination
of
compensation, as has beeen observed in the
case of Smt. Meena (supra), upon which
reliance was placed by Ms. Pooja Arora.
Merely on the basis of the site plan, the
finding of contributory negligence cannot
be arrived, as for determining contributory
negligence, various factors are required to
be proved. The site plan may prove the spot
of accident, where the vehicle colluded but
that by itself cannot prove the contributory
negligence, as the possibility of the
vehicles, in the accident going to a wrong
direction or side during accident cannot be
ruled out. The contributory negligence has
to be proved by positive evidence and it
would not be safe to draw inference merely
on the basis of site plan.

27. In the case of Usha Rajkhowa
and Others vs. Paramount Industries and
Others [(2009) 14 SCC 71], the Hon'ble
Supreme Court has held in paragraph nos.
20, 21 & 22, as under:-

"20. The question of contributory
negligence on the part of the driver in case
of collision was considered by this Court in
Pramodkumar
Rasikbhai
Jhaveri
v.
Karmasey Kunvargi Tak [(2002) 6 SCC
218 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
455: 2002 SCC (Cri) 1355] . That was also
a case of collision between a car and a
truck. It was observed in SCC p. 458, para
8:

''8.
...
The
question
of
contributory negligence arises when there
has been some act or omission on the
claimant's part, which has materially
contributed to the damage caused, and is of
such a nature that it may properly be
described as ''negligence'. Negligence
ordinarily means breach of a legal duty to
care, but when used in the expression
''contributory negligence' it does not mean
breach of any duty. It only means the
failure by a person to use reasonable care
for the safety of either himself or his
property, so that he becomes blameworthy
in part as an ''author of his own wrong'.'

21. This Court further relied on
an observation of the High Court of
Australia in Astley v. Austrust Ltd. [(1999)
73 ALJR 403] to the following effect:

''A
finding
of
contributory
negligence turns on a factual investigation
whether the plaintiff contributed to his or
her own loss by failing to take reasonable
care of his or her person or property. What
is
reasonable
care depends
on
the
circumstances of the case. In many cases, it
may be proper for a plaintiff to rely on the
defendant to perform its duty. But there is
no
absolute
rule.
The
duties
and
responsibilities of the defendant are a
variable factor in determining whether
contributory negligence exists and, if so, to
what degree. In some cases, the nature of
the duty owed may exculpate the plaintiff
from a claim of contributory negligence; in
other cases, the nature of the duty may
reduce the plaintiff's share of responsibility
for the damage suffered; and in yet other
cases, the nature of the duty may not
prevent a finding that the plaintiff failed to
take reasonable care for the safety of his or
her person or property. Contributory
negligence focuses on the conduct of the
plaintiff. The duty owed by the defendant,
although relevant, is one only of many
factors
that
must
be
weighed
in
determining whether the plaintiff has so
conducted itself that it failed to take
reasonable care for the safety of its person
or property.'

22. Keeping these principles in
mind, we find that there was absolutely no
evidence to suggest that there was any
failure on the part of the car driver to take
any particular care or that he had
breached his duty in any manner. Such
breach on his part had to be proved by the
insurance company as it was its burden and
for that, the panchnama of the spot,
showing tyre marks caused by brakes, and
the panchnama of the damaged car and the
truck could have been brought on record.
The insurance company has obviously
failed to discharge its burden. We,
therefore,
respectfully
follow
the
abovementioned judgment."

28. In Bijoy Kumar Dugar (supra), the
accident was head on collision but, there,
the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal, had,
on the basis of evidence and material on
record, recorded a finding of contributory
negligence. In the present case, finding is
that the Driver of the Bus was negligent.
The judgment in Bijoy Kumar Dugar
(supra) is of no help to the appellant.

29. For the aforesaid, on point no. 2,
it is held that the appellant failed to
discharge its burden to prove contributory
negligence on the part of the driver of the
Maruti car.
10 All. Nirali Dixit Vs. State of U.P. & Anr.
219

30. For the aforesaid reasons, the
appeal has got no force and is dismissed at
the admission stage.
----------
(2021)10ILR A219
APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL SIDE
DATED:LUCKNOW 04.10.2021

BEFORE

THE HON'BLE RAVI NATH TILHARI, J.

FAFO No. 190 of 2021

Nirali Dixit ...Appellant
Versus
State Of U.P. & Anr. ...Respondents

Counsel for the Appellant:
Ashok Kumar Singh, Mahima Pahwa

Counsel for the Respondents:

(A) Civil Law - The Guardians and Ward
Act, 1890: Section 7 - Civil Procedure
Code, 1908 - Section 107 r/w Order 41
Rule 33 -Practice & Procedure - Custody -
Merely by making amendment by adding the
name of the appellant before the name of the
deceased-Aditya Singh in the order dated
15.12.2020, in which the guardianship was
ordered in favour of Aditya Singh, guardianship
could not have been converted in favour of the
appellant. A fresh application is required to be
moved for fresh consideration in the light of
provisions of Section 17 of the Act which inter
alia provides the factor of age and sex of the
proposed guardian to which the courts have to
give due regard.(Para 41)

Nevertheless, after the death of the guardian, in
view of Section 42 of the Act the courts have
the power to appoint a guardian on the
application filed under Chapter II as well as on
its own motion by exercising its parens patriae
jurisdiction. (Para 48)

The
welfare
of
the
minor
requires
consideration also qua, the proposed
guardian. The welfare of the minor if
already determined qua , one guardian
cannot necessarily and automatically be
read, with respect to the new proposed
guardian, for which the court has to
consider the welfare. (Para 50)

Appeal Disposed of. (E-10)

List of Cases cited:

1. Saiyad Mohanmmad Bakar El-Edroos Vs
Abdulhabib Hasan Arab & ors. (1998) 4 SCC 343

2. Smriti Madan Kansagra Vs Perry Kansagra
(2020) SCC (online) SC 887 (followed)

3. ABC Vs State (NCT of Delhi) 2015 10 SCC 1

4. Laxmi Kant Pandey Vs U.O.I .1984 AIR 469

5. Nil Ratan Kundu & ors. Vs Abhijit Kundu
(2008) 9 SCC 413 (followed)

6. Lachmi Narain & ors. Vs U.O.I. (1976) 2 SCC
953

7. Nasiruddin & ors. Vs Sita Ram Agarwal (2003)
2 SCC 577

8. Dhaninder kumar Vs Deep Chand (1991) ALJ
25 (followed)

9. Narottam Vs Tapesra (1934 ALJ 652

10. V. Ravi Chandran Vs U.O.I. & ors. (2010) 1
SCC 174 (followed)

11. Charan Lal Sahu Vs U.O.I. (1990) 1 SCC
613

(Delivered by Hon'ble Ravi Nath Tilhari, J. )

1. Heard Sri Prashant Chandra,
learned Senior Counsel, assisted by Ms.
Mahima Pahwa, learned counsel for the
appellant.

2. This appeal has been filed under
Section 47 of the Guardians and Wards
Act, 1890 (hereinafter referred to as ''the