# Abbas Ansari & Anr v. State of U.P. & Ors

- **Citation:** (2023) 5 ILRA 398
- **Court:** High Court of Judicature at Allahabad
- **Decided:** 2023-02-01
- **Case number:** Application U/S 482. No. 25838 of 2022
- **Bench:** Dinesh Kumar Singh
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/allahabad-high-court/abbas-ansari-anr-v-state-of-u-p-ors-50213
- **Pages:** 8

## Headnote

A. Criminal Law - Indian Penal Code -
Section 153-A - Offence of promoting
enmity on the ground of religion, race etc.
- Constitution of offence - Intention -
Relevance - Offending words were spoken
in public meeting - Effect - Quashing of
proceeding sought - Permissibility - Held,
the question of proving mens rea to incite
people to violence or cause disorder is to
be proved during trial by leading evidence
by the prosecution. However, if prima
facie,
the
act,
sign
or
words
has
propensity to disturb the public order or
incite
the
people
to
violence,
the
proceedings cannot be quashed at the
threshold - Further held, considering the
context and the intention with which the
offending words were spoken in a public
meeting, at this stage it cannot be said
that the offence under Section 153-A IPC
is not attracted against the petitioners.
(Para 14 and 20)

B. Constitution of India,1950 - Preamble -
Unity
and
Integrity
of
nation
-
Significance
in
dealing
with
criminal
proceeding - Held, Preamble to the
Constitution consciously puts together
fraternity
assuring
dignity
of
the
individual and the unity and integrity of
the Nation which are linked; one in the
form of rights of individuals; and other in
the form of individual's obligation to
others to ensure unity and integrity of the
Nation - The unity and integrity of the
Nation cannot be overlooked and slighted,
as acts that promote or are likely to
promote
divisiveness,
alienation
and
schematism. (Para 17)

Application dismissed. (E-1)

List of Cases cited:

## Text

398 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES

36. It goes without saying that the
subject
matter
of
Criminal
Misc.
Application U/S 482 No. - 6688 of 2022 as
well as Criminal Revision No. - 2363 of
2021 are different from the aforesaid
applications and it appears that due to
inadvertence both of them have been
wrongly connected and thus the same are
being un-tagged and are directed to listed
as fresh on 13.04.2022 before appropriate
Court.
----------
(2023) 5 ILRA 398
ORIGINAL JURISDICTION
CRIMINAL SIDE
DATED: ALLAHABAD 01.02.2023

BEFORE

THE HON'BLE DINESH KUMAR SINGH, J.

Application U/S 482. No. 25838 of 2022

Abbas Ansari & Anr. ...Applicants
Versus
State of U.P. & Ors. ...Opposite Parties

Counsel for the Applicants:
Sri Upendra Upadhyay, Sri Anil Tiwari (Sr.
Advocate)

Counsel for the Opposite Parties:
G.A.

A. Criminal Law - Indian Penal Code -
Section 153-A - Offence of promoting
enmity on the ground of religion, race etc.
- Constitution of offence - Intention -
Relevance - Offending words were spoken
in public meeting - Effect - Quashing of
proceeding sought - Permissibility - Held,
the question of proving mens rea to incite
people to violence or cause disorder is to
be proved during trial by leading evidence
by the prosecution. However, if prima
facie,
the
act,
sign
or
words
has
propensity to disturb the public order or
incite
the
people
to
violence,
the
proceedings cannot be quashed at the
threshold - Further held, considering the
context and the intention with which the
offending words were spoken in a public
meeting, at this stage it cannot be said
that the offence under Section 153-A IPC
is not attracted against the petitioners.
(Para 14 and 20)

B. Constitution of India,1950 - Preamble -
Unity
and
Integrity
of
nation
-
Significance
in
dealing
with
criminal
proceeding - Held, Preamble to the
Constitution consciously puts together
fraternity
assuring
dignity
of
the
individual and the unity and integrity of
the Nation which are linked; one in the
form of rights of individuals; and other in
the form of individual's obligation to
others to ensure unity and integrity of the
Nation - The unity and integrity of the
Nation cannot be overlooked and slighted,
as acts that promote or are likely to
promote
divisiveness,
alienation
and
schematism. (Para 17)

Application dismissed. (E-1)

List of Cases cited:

1. Balwant Singh & anr. Vs St. of Pun.; (1995) 3
SCC 214;

2. Bilal Ahmed Kaloo Vs St. of A.P.; (1997) 7
SCC 431;

3. Manzar Sayeed Khan Vs St. of Mah. & anr.;
(2007) 5 SCC 1;

4. Amish Devgan Vs U.O.I.& ors.; (2021) 1 SCC
1; and

5. Shreya Singhal Vs U.O.I.; (2015) 5 SCC 1

(Delivered by Hon'ble Dinesh Kumar
Singh, J.)

1. Heard Sri Anil Tiwari, learned
Senior Advocate, assisted Sri Upendra
Upadhyay,
learned
counsel
for
the
petitioners and Sri M.C. Chaturvedi,
learned
Additional
Advocate
General
5 All. Abbas Ansari & Anr. Vs. State of U.P. & Ors.
399
assisted Sri Ratnendu Kumar Singh,
learned AGA for the State.

2. The present petition under Section
482 Cr.P.C. has been filed seeking
quashing of the charge sheet dated
11.5.2022 under Sections 171-F, 506, 186,
189 and 153-A and 120-B IPC in pursuance
to the FIR dated 3.3.2022 registered at
Crime No.97 of 2002, initially registered
under Sections 506 and 171-F IPC at Police
Station Kotwali Mau, District Mau. Further
prayer has been made for quashing of the
order of cognizance and summoning dated
23.5.2022 passed by the Special Judge
(MP/MLA Court)/Additional Chief Judicial
Magistrate, Mau in Criminal Case No.9720
of 2022.

3. The FIR in question came to be
registered after petitioner no.1 made a
statement in a public meeting during his
election
campaign
for
Member
of
Legislative Assembly from Mau Sadar
Constituency.
Petitioner
No.1
was
contesting the said elicitation on the ticket
of Suheldev Bhartiya Samaj Party in
March, 2022. The offending part of the
statement made by petitioner no.1 would
read "lektoknh ikVhZ ds jk"Vzh; v/;{k Jh vf[kys'k
;kno th ls ;g dgdj vk;k gwW fd 6 eghus rd
fdlh dk VzkUlQj iksfLVax ugha gksxhA Hkb;k tks ;gka
gS oks ;gka gh jgsxk igys fglkc fdrkc gksxk mlds
ckn mlds tkus ds lVhZfQdsV ij eqgj yxk;k
tk;sxkA"

4. The main contention of the learned
counsel for the petitioners is that the said
statement by no stretch of imagination
would constitute an offence under Section
153-A IPC. It has been further submitted
that to constitute an offence under Section
153-A IPC, there must be an intention of
the person making the statement to create
disorder or to incite people to violence.
Even if it is believed that petitioner no.1
had made the said statement, the statement
was directed towards the Government
people and not against any member,
religion, racial, language or regional groups
or castes or communities. It is further
submitted that if the provisions of Section
153-A IPC are considered in proper
perspective, the said offence would not get
attracted against the petitioners for making
the offending statement and, therefore,
taking cognizance for an offence under
Section 153-A IPC against the petitioners is
wholly illegal and to that extent at least the
cognizance order is bad in law and is liable
to be set aside.

5. In support of his said contention,
learned counsel for the petitioners has
placed
reliance
on
the
following
judgments:-

1. Balwant Singh and another
Vs. State of Punjab; (1995) 3 SCC 214;

2. Bilal Ahmed Kaloo Vs. State
of A.P.; (1997) 7 SCC 431;

3. Manzar Sayeed Khan Vs.
State of Maharashtra and another; (2007)
5 SCC 1;

4. Amish Devgan Vs. Union of
India and others; (2021) 1 SCC 1; and

5. Shreya Singhal Vs. Union of
India; (2015) 5 SCC 1."

6. On the other hand, Sri M.C.
Chaturvedi, learned Additional Advocate
General has submitted that the investigating
officer has prepared a report, which was
sent to the Government for sanction of the
prosecution against petitioner No.1 on
3.5.2022. Thereafter, the charge sheet has
been submitted against both the petitioners
on
11.5.2022.
The
Government
had
sanctioned the prosecution against both the
petitioners on 24.8.2022 and the said
400 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
sanction order has been incorporated in the
case diary of Parcha No.CD-11 and
forwarded the same on 02.09.2022.

7. It has been further submitted that
petitioner no.1 is having seven similar
cases, including the present one, and
petitioner no.2 is having to his credit five
criminal case, including the present one.
After making the offending statement by
petitioner no.1, the Returning Officer of
356 Mau Assembly Constituency sent a
notice dated 4.3.2022 to petitioner no.1
calling upon him to furnish his reply as to
why action should not be taken against him
under
the
relevant
provisions
of
Representation of Peoples Act, 1951.
However, petitioner no.1 did not give any
reply to the said notice issued by the
Returning
Officer.
The
Election
Commission of India had barred petitioner
no.1 from holding any public meeting,
public procession, public rallies, road
shows and interviews, public utterances in
media (electronic, print, social media) etc.
in connection with the ongoing election for
24 hours from 7 PM from 4.3.2022.

8. Learned Additional Advocate
General has further submitted that the
offending statement made by petitioner no.1
was not only directed against the Government
machinery, but it was also directed against
the
law
abiding
and
peace-loving
citizens/communities, who were feeling
protected under the then government in the
State from the atrocities and crimes of
petitioner no.1 and his family and other coaccused. He has also submitted that the State
Government had given free hand to the State
machinery to handle law and order without
being influenced from any political pressure.
The Government officials had acted as per
law without being coming under pressure
from any quarter and, therefore, the residents
of the said constituency, who were not
supporters of the petitioners, were threatened
and made insecure by giving threats to the
government
officials.
Not
only
the
Government officials but all those who were
feeling safe and secure, felt tremors and fear
in their spines by the open threat given by the
petitioners. He has, therefore, submitted that
the offence under Section 153-A IPC is
clearly
attracted
in
the
facts
and
circumstances of the case.

9. Learned Additional Advocate
General has also submitted that the gesture,
language and the context are relevant to see
whether the offence under Section 153-A IPC
is attracted or not. If one looks at the video
recording of the statement given by petitioner
no.1 in public meeting, the warning was not
against the Government officials, but it was
against all those who were feeling protected
and saved under the then State government.
Petitioner no.1 was sure that the Government
of Samajwadi Party lead by Sri Akhilesh
Yadav would occupy the seat of power in the
State of Uttar Pradesh and, therefore, he
made the threatening statement, which has
propensity to disturb the public order. He,
therefore, submits that the offence under
Section 153-A IPC is clearly attracted against
the petitioners and no interfere is required by
this Court to quash the proceedings, and the
petition being devoid of merit and substance,
is liable to be dismissed.

10. I have considered the submissions
advanced by the learned counsel for the
parties and perused the record.

11. For the sake of argument, Section
153-A IPC reads as under:-

"153A.
Promoting
enmity
between different groups on ground of
religion, race, place of birth, residence,
5 All. Abbas Ansari & Anr. Vs. State of U.P. & Ors.
401
language, etc., and doing acts prejudicial
to
maintenance
of
harmony.--(1)
Whoever--

(a) by words, either spoken or
written, or by signs or by visible
representations or otherwise, promotes or
attempts to promote, on grounds of
religion, race, place of birth, residence,
language, caste or community or any other
ground whatsoever, disharmony or feelings
of enmity, hatred or ill will between
different religious, racials, language or
regional groups or castes or communities,
or

(b) commits any act which is
prejudicial to the maintenance of harmony
between
different
religious,
racial,
language or regional groups or castes or
communities, and which disturbs or is
likely to disturb the public tranquillity,

(c)
organizes
any
exercise,
movement, drill or other similar activity
intending that the participants in such
activity shall use or be trained to use
criminal force or violence or knowing it to
be likely that the participants in such
activity will use or be trained to use
criminal force or violence, or participates
in such activity intending to use or be
trained to use criminal force or violence or
knowing it to be likely that the participants
in such activity will use or be trained to use
criminal force or violence, against any
religious, racial, language or regional
group or caste or community and such
activity for any reason whatsoever causes
or is likely to cause fear or alarm or a
feeling of insecurity amongst members of
such religious, racial, language or regional
group or caste or community, shall be
punished with imprisonment which may
extend to three years, or with fine, or with
both.

(2) Offence committed in place of
worship, etc.--Whoever commits an offence
specified in sub-section (1) in any place of
worship or in any assembly engaged in the
performance of religious worship or
religious ceremonies, shall be punished
with imprisonment which may extend to
five years and shall also be liable to fine."

12. The offence under Section 153-A
IPC may get attracted where a person by
words, either spoken, or written, or by
signs or by visible representations or
otherwise,
promotes
or
attempts
to
promote, on grounds of religion, race, place
of birth, residence, language, caste or
community
or
any
other
ground
whatsoever, disharmony or feelings of
enmity, hatred or ill will between different
religious, racial, language or regional
groups or castes or communities or
commits any act which is prejudicial to the
maintenance of harmony between different
religious, racial, language or regional
groups or castes or communities, and which
disturbs or is likely to disturb the public
tranquillity. If the statement or the sign or
representation has propensity to incite
people to violence, the offence under
Section 153-A IPC gets attracted.

13. The Supreme Court in the case of
Balwant Singh (Supra) has held that the
intention to cause disorder or incite people
to violence is the sine qua non of the
offence under Section 153-A IPC and the
prosecution has to prove the existence of
mens rea in order to succeed. Paragraph 9
of the said judgment would be apt to
extract, which reads as under:-

"9. Insofar as the offence under
Section 153-A IPC is concerned, it provides
for punishment for promoting enmity
between different groups on grounds of
religion, race, place of birth, residence,
language, caste or community or any other
402 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
ground
whatsoever
or
brings
about
disharmony or feeling of hatred or ill-will
between
different
religious,
racial,
linguistic or regional groups or castes or
communities. In our opinion only where the
written or spoken words have the tendency
or intention of creating public disorder or
disturbance of law and order or affect
public tranquillity, that the law needs to
step in to prevent such an activity. The facts
and
circumstances
of
this
case
unmistakably show that there was no
disturbance or semblance of disturbance of
law and order or of public order or peace
and tranquillity in the area from where the
appellants were apprehended while raising
slogans on account of the activities of the
appellants. The intention to cause disorder
or incite people to violence is the sine qua
non of the offence under Section 153-A IPC
and the prosecution has to prove the
existence of mens rea in order to succeed.
In this case, the prosecution has not been
able to establish any mens rea on the part
of the appellants, as envisaged by the
provisions of Section 153-A IPC, by their
raising casually the three slogans a couple
of times. The offence under Section 153-A
IPC is, therefore, not made out."

14. Thus, the question of proving
mens rea to incite people to violence or
cause disorder is to be proved during trial
by leading evidence by the prosecution.
However, if prima facie, the act, sign or
words has propensity to disturb the public
order or incite the people to violence, the
proceedings cannot be quashed at the
threshold.

15. The Supreme Court in the case of
Bilal Ahmed Kaloo (supra) by placing
reliance on the judgement of Balwant Singh
(supra) has again reiterated that mens rea is
an equally necessary postulate for the
offence under Section 153-A IPC and same
can be discerned from the words "with
intent to create to promote or which is
likely to create or promote". Paragraphs 10
and 11 of the said judgement which would
be relevant, would read as under:-

"10. Section 153-A was amended
by the Criminal and Election Laws
(Amendment) Act, 1969 (Act No. 35 of
1969). It consists of three clauses of which
clauses (a) and (b) alone are material now.
By the same Amending Act sub-section (2)
was added to Section 505 of the Penal
Code, 1860. Clauses (a) and (b) of Section
153-A and Section 505(2) are extracted
below:

"153-A.
Promoting
enmity
between different groups on grounds of
religion, race, place of birth, residence,
language, etc., and doing acts prejudicial
to
maintenance
of
harmony.--(1)
Whoever-

(a) by words, either spoken or
written, or by signs or by visible
representations or otherwise, promotes or
attempts to promote, on grounds of
religion, race, place of birth, residence,
language, caste or community or any other
ground whatsoever, disharmony or feelings
of enmity, hatred or ill will between
different religious, racial, language or
regional groups or castes or communities,
or

(b) commits any act which is
prejudicial to the maintenance of harmony
between
different
religious,
racial,
language or regional groups or castes or
communities, and which disturbs or is
likely to disturb the public tranquillity, or

(c) ***

shall
be
punished
with
imprisonment which may extend to three
years, or with fine, or with both.
5 All. Abbas Ansari & Anr. Vs. State of U.P. & Ors.
403
***

505. (2) Statements creating or
promoting enmity, hatred or ill will
between
classes.--Whoever
makes,
publishes or circulates any statement or
report containing rumour or alarming news
with intent to create or promote, or which
is likely to create or promote, on grounds
of religion, race, place of birth, residence,
language, caste or community or any other
ground whatsoever, feelings of enmity,
hatred or ill will between different
religious, racial, language or regional
groups or castes or communities, shall be
punished with imprisonment which may
extend to three years, or with fine, or with
both."
The common ingredient in both the offences
is promoting feeling of enmity, hatred or ill
will between different religious or racial or
linguistic or regional groups or castes or
communities. Section 153-A covers a case
where a person by "words, either spoken or
written, or by signs or by visible
representations" promotes or attempts to
promote such feeling. Under Section
505(2), promotion of such feelings should
have been done by making and publishing
or circulating any statement or report
containing rumour or alarming news.

11. This Court has held in
Balwant Singh v. State of Punjab [(1995) 3
SCC 214 : 1995 SCC (Cri) 432] that mens
rea is a necessary ingredient for the offence
under Section 153-A. Mens rea is an
equally necessary postulate for the offence
under Section 505(2) also as could be
discerned from the words "with intent to
create or promote or which is likely to
create or promote" as used in that subsection."

16. In the case of Manzar Sayeed
Khan (supra), it has been held that the
intention to cause disorder or incite the
people to violence is the sine qua non of the
offence under Section 153-A IPC and the
prosecution has to prove prima facie the
existence of mens rea on the part of the
accused. The question of proof would arise
only at the time of trial and the same can be
proved by leading the necessary evidence.
Paragraph 16 of the said judgement which
would be relevant, would read as under:-

"16. Section 153-A IPC, as
extracted hereinabove, covers a case where
a person by words, either spoken or
written, or by signs or by visible
representations or otherwise, promotes or
attempts
to
promote,
disharmony
or
feelings of enmity, hatred or ill will
between
different
religious,
racial,
language or regional groups or castes or
communities or acts prejudicial to the
maintenance of harmony or is likely to
disturb the public tranquillity. The gist of
the offence is the intention to promote
feelings of enmity or hatred between
different classes of people. The intention to
cause disorder or incite the people to
violence is the sine qua non of the offence
under
Section
153-A
IPC
and
the
prosecution has to prove prima facie the
existence of mens rea on the part of the
accused. The intention has to be judged
primarily by the language of the book and
the circumstances in which the book was
written
and
published.
The
matter
complained of within the ambit of Section
153-A must be read as a whole. One cannot
rely on strongly worded and isolated
passages for proving the charge nor indeed
can one take a sentence here and a
sentence there and connect them by a
meticulous
process
of
inferential
reasoning."

17. Preamble to the Constitution
consciously
puts
together
fraternity
404 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
assuring dignity of the individual and the
unity and integrity of the Nation which are
linked; one in the form of rights of
individuals; and other in the form of
individual's obligation to others to ensure
unity and integrity of the Nation. The unity
and integrity of the Nation cannot be
overlooked and slighted, as acts that
promote
or
are
likely
to
promote
divisiveness, alienation and schematism do
directly and indirectly impinge on diversity
and pluralism. When such acts are done
with the objective and intent to cause
public disorder or to demean dignity of the
targeted groups, they have to be dealt with
as per law and such an act would attract the
offence under Section 153-A IPC.

18. In the case of Amish Devgan
(supra) while explaining the context of
Section 153-A IPC regarding public
tranquillity,
the
Supreme
Court
in
paragraph 98 of the said judgement held as
under:-

"98. In the context of Section 153A(1)(b)
we
would
hold
that
public
tranquillity, given the nature of the
consequence in the form of punishment of
imprisonment of up to three years, must be
read in a restricted sense synonymous with
public order and safety and not normal law
and order issues that do not endanger the
public interest at large. It cannot be given
the widest meaning so as to fall foul of the
requirement of reasonableness which is a
constitutional mandate. Clause (b) of
Section 153-A(1), therefore, has to be read
accordingly to satisfy the constitutional
mandate. We would interpret the words
"public tranquillity" in clause (b) to mean
ordre publique a French term that means
absence of insurrection, riot, turbulence or
crimes of violence and would also include
all acts which will endanger the security of
the State, but not acts which disturb only
serenity, and are covered by the third and
widest circle of law and order. Public
order
also
includes
acts
of
local
significance embracing a variety of conduct
destroying or menacing public order.
Public order in clause (2) of Article 19 nor
the
statutory
provisions
make
any
distinction between the majority and
minority groups with reference to the
population of the particular area though as
we have noted above this may be of some
relevance. When we accept the principle of
local significance, as a sequitur we must
also accept that majority and minority
groups could have, in a given case,
reference to a local area."

19. Further, in paragraphs 104 to 106
of the aforesaid judgement, the Supreme
Court held as under:-

"104. The word "attempt", though
used in Sections 153-A and 295-A of the
Penal Code, has not been defined.
However, there are judicial interpretations
that an "attempt to constitute a crime" is an
act done or forming part of a series of acts
which
would
constitute
its
actual
commission but for an interruption. An
attempt is short of actual causation of
crime and more than mere preparation. In
Aman Kumar v. State of Haryana [Aman
Kumar v. State of Haryana, (2004) 4 SCC
379 : 2004 SCC (Cri) 1266] it was held
that an attempt is to be punishable because
every attempt, although it falls short of
success, must create alarm, which by itself
is an injury, and the moral guilt of the
offender is same as if he had succeeded.
Moral guilt must be united to injury in
order to justify punishment.

105.
Further,
in
State
of
Maharashtra v. Mohd. Yakub [State of
Maharashtra v. Mohd. Yakub, (1980) 3
5 All. Jafar Abbas Zaidi Vs. State of U.P. & Ors.
405
SCC 57 : 1980 SCC (Cri) 513] this Court
observed : (SCC p. 62, para 13)

"13. ... What constitutes an
"attempt" is a mixed question of law and
fact,
depending
largely
upon
the
circumstances
of
a
particular
case.
"Attempt" defies a precise and exact
definition. Broadly speaking, all crimes
which consist of the commission of
affirmative acts are preceded by some
covert or overt conduct which may be
divided into three stages. The first stage
exists when the culprit first entertains the
idea or intention to commit an offence. In
the second stage, he makes preparations to
commit it. The third stage is reached when
the culprit takes deliberate overt act or step
to commit the offence. Such overt act or
step in order to be "criminal" need not be
the penultimate act towards the commission
of the offence. It is sufficient if such act or
acts were deliberately done, and manifest a
clear intention to commit the offence
aimed, being reasonably proximate to the
consummation of the offence."

106. On the scope of proximity, it
was elucidated in State of Maharashtra v.
Mohd.Yakub [State of Maharashtra v.
Mohd. Yakub, (1980) 3 SCC 57: 1980 SCC
(Cri) 513] that the measure of proximity is
not in relation to time and place but in
relation to intention."

20. Considering the context and the
intention with which the offending words
were spoken in a public meeting, at this
stage it cannot be said that the offence
under Section 153-A IPC is not attracted
against the petitioners. The scope of power
under Section 482 Cr.P.C. is limited, and it
should be exercised in exceptional cases
where the complaint or charge sheet does
not disclose any offence. Whether the
offence under Section 153-A IPC gets
attracted or not, would depend on the
quality of evidence lead by the prosecution
during trial. However, at this stage, this
Court does not find any ground to interfere
with the ongoing proceedings or the charge
sheet.

21. Thus, the petition being devoid of
merit and substance, is hereby dismissed.
Interim order, if any, stands vacated. Trial
court to proceed accordingly.
----------
(2023) 5 ILRA 405
ORIGINAL JURISDICTION
CRIMINAL SIDE
DATED: ALLAHABAD 25.01.2023

BEFORE

THE HON'BLE NALIN KUMAR SRIVASTAVA, J.

Application U/S 482. No. 37804 of 2022

Jafar Abbas Zaidi ...Applicant
Versus
State of U.P. & Ors. ...Opposite Parties

Counsel for the Applicant:
Sri Syed Mohammad Jafer Husain

Counsel for the Opposite Parties:
G.A.

A. Criminal Law - Criminal Procedure
Code,1973 - Section 482 - Inherent
power
-
Scope
of
interference
-
Interlocutory
order,
when
can
be
interfered with - Alternative remedy, how
far create bar in exercising inherent power
- Held, there is no total ban on the
exercise of inherent power where abuse of
the
process
of
the
court
or
other
extraordinary situation warrants exercise
of inherent jurisdiction. The limitation is
self-restraint, nothing more - Availability
of alternative remedy of criminal revision
under Section 397 Cr.P.C. by itself cannot
be
a
good
ground
to
dismiss
an
application under Section 482 Cr.P.C. -
Prabhu Chawla's case relied upon. (Para
12 and 14)