# Abbas Ansari v. State of U.P

- **Citation:** (2023) 11 ILRA 343
- **Court:** High Court of Judicature at Allahabad
- **Decided:** 2023-11-20
- **Case number:** Crl. Misc. Bail Application No. 3121 of 2023
- **Bench:** Subhash Vidyarthi
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/allahabad-high-court/abbas-ansari-v-state-of-u-p-49460
- **Pages:** 18

## Headnote

Criminal Law - Indian Penal Code, 1860 -
Sections 420, 467, 468 & 471 - Arms Act,
1959 - Section 30 - Arms Rules, 1962 -
Rule 54(6) - Allegation against applicant
that he initially granted licence by District
Magistrate for single DBBL gun, which did
not bear UID number - Under Rule 54(6)
of Arms Rules, 1962 (effective from
24.07.2012), no arms licence is valid
without UID allotted through electronic
automated system as developed by NIC
w.e.f. 01.10.2015 - Applicant's plea that
UID introduced in 2016 and prior to that,
there was no prescription for issuance of
UID, rejected - No steps taken to obtain
UID, licence became invalidated - Despite
his licence of Lucknow having lapsed on
01.10.2015, he obtained licence of Delhi
on
01.06.2017
and
acquired
seven
firearms - He imported pistol, rifle and six
barrels in breach of NRAI import permit,
including two prohibited-bore barrels and
pistol with three spare barrels without
NRAI permit, not permissible for shooter -
Case against applicant rests on NRAI
Secretary's letter and cancellation order
by
Joint
Commissioner
of
Police,
Licensing, New Delhi - Large quantities of
arms and ammunition recovered from his
Delhi premises - His past influence over
jail authorities, enabling unauthorised
visits by his wife with mobile phone,
indicates risk of witness influence and
evidence
tampering
-
Thus,
bail
application rejected. (Para 52, 53, 54, 58)

Bail application rejected. (E-13)

List of Cases cited:

## Text

_Characters 0–39,889 of 58,302. This is a partial read: ask again with offset=39889 for what follows._

11 All. Abbas Ansari Vs. State of U.P.
343

The applicant or his surety shall move
an
application
in
the
light
of
the
observations as above apprising the court
concerned of the difficulty if any, faced by
him in arranging different persons as
sureties and the court concerned shall
decide the same applying his judicial
discretion. The court concerned shall,
before
accepting
the
sureties,
keep
provisions of Section 441-A Cr.P.C. in
mind.

13. Accordingly, this application is
finally disposed of.
----------
(2023) 11 ILRA 343
APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CRIMINAL SIDE
DATED: LUCKNOW 20.11.2023

BEFORE

THE HON'BLE SUBHASH VIDYARTHI, J.

Crl. Misc. Bail Application No. 3121 of 2023

Abbas Ansari ...Applicant
Versus
State of U.P. ...Respondent

Counsel for the Applicant:
Pranjal Krishna, Arun Sinha, Siddhartha Sinha

Counsel for the Respondent:
G.A.

Criminal Law - Indian Penal Code, 1860 -
Sections 420, 467, 468 & 471 - Arms Act,
1959 - Section 30 - Arms Rules, 1962 -
Rule 54(6) - Allegation against applicant
that he initially granted licence by District
Magistrate for single DBBL gun, which did
not bear UID number - Under Rule 54(6)
of Arms Rules, 1962 (effective from
24.07.2012), no arms licence is valid
without UID allotted through electronic
automated system as developed by NIC
w.e.f. 01.10.2015 - Applicant's plea that
UID introduced in 2016 and prior to that,
there was no prescription for issuance of
UID, rejected - No steps taken to obtain
UID, licence became invalidated - Despite
his licence of Lucknow having lapsed on
01.10.2015, he obtained licence of Delhi
on
01.06.2017
and
acquired
seven
firearms - He imported pistol, rifle and six
barrels in breach of NRAI import permit,
including two prohibited-bore barrels and
pistol with three spare barrels without
NRAI permit, not permissible for shooter -
Case against applicant rests on NRAI
Secretary's letter and cancellation order
by
Joint
Commissioner
of
Police,
Licensing, New Delhi - Large quantities of
arms and ammunition recovered from his
Delhi premises - His past influence over
jail authorities, enabling unauthorised
visits by his wife with mobile phone,
indicates risk of witness influence and
evidence
tampering
-
Thus,
bail
application rejected. (Para 52, 53, 54, 58)

Bail application rejected. (E-13)

List of Cases cited:

1. Satender Kumar Antil Vs CBI, (2022) 10 SCC
51

2. Siddharth Vs St. of U.P. & anr., (2022) 1 SCC
676, (Paras 9 to 11)

3. Dr. Shivinder Mohan Singh Vs Directorate of
Enforcement, 2020 SCC OnLine Del 766, (Paras
24 to 26)

4. Moti Ram Vs St. of M.P., (1978) 4 SCC 47,
(Para 2)

5. Babu Singh Vs St. of U.P., (1978) 1 SCC 579,
(Paras 16, 19, 20)

6. Ash Mohammad Vs Shiv Raj Singh @ Lalla
Babu & anr., (2012) 9 SCC 446

7. Chaman Lal Vs St. of U.P. & anr., (2004) 7
SCC 525

8. Masroor Vs St. of U.P. & anr., (2009) 14 SCC
286
344 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
9. P. Chidambaram Vs CBI, (2020) 13 SCC 337,
(Paras 21, 22)

10.
P.
Chidambaram
Vs
Directorate
of
Enforcement, (2020) 13 SCC 791, (Para 23)

11. Prasanta Kumar Sarkar Vs Ashis Chatterjee
& anr., (2010) 14 SCC 496

12. Ram Govind Upadhyay Vs Sudarshan Singh
& anr., (2002) 3 SCC 598, (Paras 3, 4)

13. Sanjay Chandra Vs CBI, (2012) 1 SCC 40,
(Paras 21 to 23)

14. Harjeet Singh Vs Indrapeet Singh & ors.,
AIR 2021 SC 4017

15. Ram Govind Upadhyay Vs Sudarshan Singh,
(2002) 3 SCC 598, (Paras 3, 4)

16. Dataram Singh Vs St. of U.P., (2018) 3 SCC
22, (Paras 4 to 6)

17. Gurcharan Singh Vs St. (Delhi Admn.),
(1978) 1 SCC 118, (Para 29)

18. Ishwarji Nagaji Mali Vs St. of Guj. & anr.,
(2022) 6 SCC 609

(Delivered by Hon'ble Subhash Vidyarthi,
J.)

1. Heard Sri Priyadarhi Manish
Advocate, the learned counsel for the
applicant, Sri Anurag Verma, the learned
Additional Government Advocate-I for the
State and perused the record.

2. The instant application has been
filed seeking release of the applicant on
bail in Case Crime No. 431 of 2019, under
Sections 420, 467, 468, 471 I.P.C. and
Section 30 of Arms Act, registered at Police
Station Mahanagar, District Lucknow.

3. The aforesaid case has been
registered on the basis of an F.I.R. lodged
by the Inspector In-charge, Police Station
Mahanagar on 12.10.2019, alleging that the
applicant was issued a DBBL Gun License
No. 1628/P.S. Mahanagar/Lucknow by the
District Magistrate, Lucknow in the year
2012. The applicant had applied to the Joint
Commissioner of Police, Licensing, New
Delhi for registration of his license at his
Delhi address, i.e., 111/A/9, Ganpati
Niwas, Kishangarh, Vasant Kunj, New
Delhi and he was issued License No.
SDVS/2/2015/1 and UID No. 10675002
1283342015. The applicant purchased
numerous fire arms on the aforesaid license
claiming himself to be a renowned shooter.
He projected that he had got the license
issued at Lucknow transferred to Delhi but
no intimation in this regard had been given
to the concerned police station and the
applicant continued to use both the licenses
issued in two different states on two
different UID's.

4. In the affidavit filed in support of
the bail application, it has been stated that
the applicant is innocent and he has been
falsely implicated in the present case. In
para 29 of the affidavit filed in support of
the bail application, it has been stated that
the applicant has a criminal history of eight
cases but particulars of those cases has not
been disclosed by the applicant in the
affidavit.

5. The State has filed a counter
affidavit opposing bail application and the
following criminal history of the applicant
has been disclosed in the counter affidavit:
-
Sl.
No
.
Case
Crime
No.
Section
P.S.
Distric
t
1
689 / 20 120
B,
420,
323,
356,
467,
Kotwali
,
Ghazip
Ghazi
pur
11 All. Abbas Ansari Vs. State of U.P.
345
468,
471,
474, 477 A
IPC
ur
2
236 / 20 120
B,
420,
467,
468,
471
IPC
and
Prevention
of Damage
To
Public
Property
Act
Hazarat
ganj
Luckn
ow
3
431 / 19 419,
420,
467,
468,
471
IPC
and
Section 30
Arms Act
Mahana
gar
Luckn
ow
4
27 / 22
188, 171 H
IPC
and
Section
133
of
Representa
tion
of
People Act
T. Tola
Mau
5
95 / 22
188, 171 F
IPC
Kotwali Mau
6
97 / 22
171
H,
506,
186,
189,
153
A, 120 B,
IPC
Kotwali Mau
7
106 / 22 171
H,
188,
341
IPC
Kotwali Mau
8
312 / 22 174 A IPC Kotwali
Mahana
gar
Luckn
ow
9
0088
/
23
387,
222,
186,
506,
201,
120
Kotwali
Nagar
Karvi
Chitra
kut
B, 195 A,
34 IPC &
34, 7, 8, 13
P.C. Act

6. A rejoinder affidavit has been filed
on behalf of the applicant in reply to the
counter affidavit filed by the State.

7. The applicant had filed a Criminal
Misc. Writ Petition No. 28833 of 2019 and
by means of an interim order dated
19.10.2019 a Division Bench had stayed
arrest of the applicant. However, the
aforesaid writ petition has been dismissed
as infructuous by means of an order dated
24.01.2022, after a charge-sheet was
submitted and the trial court has taken
cognizance of the case on 24.12.2020.
Thereafter,
the
petitioner
filed
an
Application u/s 482 Cr.P.C No. 1905 of
2022 challenging validity of the chargesheet. The aforesaid application is pending
consideration of this court and no interim
relief has been granted to the applicant in
that case.

8. The learned counsel for the
applicant has submitted that initially the
applicant was granted an Arms license by
the District Magistrate, Lucknow but
thereafter the applicant had shifted his
residence from Lucknow to Delhi and,
therefore, he had applied to the Joint
Commissioner of Police, Licensing Unit,
New Delhi, for registration of the outside
license granted at Lucknow. The Joint
Commissioner of Police, Licensing, New
Delhi had sent a letter dated 10.05.2015 to
the District Magistrate, Lucknow asking for
the following information:-

"1. What was the area validity at the
time of last renewal.
346 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES

2. Whether one state, more than one
states (specify the states) or All India (copy
of Area Validity extension order may also
be enclosed).

3. Date of the sanction of the licence.

4. Details of the weapon entitled
according to the arms license.

5. Quota cartridges entitlement.

6. Last renewal and its validity.

7. A copy of local police verification
conducted at the time of issues of Arms
Licence & copy of residence proof
submitted by above license, may also be
provided to this office. This may kindly be
treated as URGENT."

9. The District Magistrate Lucknow
had sent a reply on 04.08.2015 stating that
the applicant had been granted License No.
1268/P.S Mahanagar/ Lucknow in respect
of a DBBL Gun No. DTO3287W by means
of an order dated 21.09.2012. The aforesaid
license was renewed till 24.09.2015 and it
was valid in the entire state of Uttar
Pradesh.
The
license
authorized
the
applicant to purchase upto 10 cartridges at
one instance and a maximum of 100
cartridges per year. The office of the
District Magistrate conveyed that it had no
objection in case the license granted to the
applicant was registered and renewed by
the office of the Joint Commissioner of
Police.

10.

Thereafter,
the
Joint
Commissioner of Police, Licensing, New
Delhi had issued a license to the applicant
on 01.06.2017 and the applicant purchased
as many as seven arms on the strength of
the aforesaid license, which are mentioned
on the license. The license mentions the
areas of its validity to be all India being a
renowned shooter and it was valid till
24.09.2018. The cartridges purchased on
the strength of the arms license have also
been mentioned on the license, which
indicates that the applicant had made
several purchases of cartridges of a gun,
rifle and pistol of different bores at several
instances. He had often purchased 200
cartridges at once on several instances and
at one instance he had purchased 1000
cartridges of 1.22 bore. Numerous other
instances of purchase of cartridges have
been endorsed on the license issued to the
applicant.

11. The learned counsel for the
applicant has submitted that a 'Renowned
Shooter' is defined in the Explanation (c)
appended to Rule 40 of the Arms Rules
2016. A notification dated 04.08.2014
issued by the Ministry of Home Affairs,
Government of India provides that a
Renowned
shooter
may
possess
the
following categories of firearms: -

"i) Rifles in caliber .22 Long (1) The
total number of weapon Rife (also known
as .22 L.R);

(ii) Center fire Rifles with calibers up
to 8 mm including all calibers lower than
8mm;

(iii) Pistol/ Revolvers of caliber up to
and including 9 mm (2) The person must
hold a certificate but excluding o mm
parabellum (9x19mm)

(iv) Short guns of caliber up to 12
bore/gauge including all calibers lower
than 12 bore/gauge."

12. The conditions mentioned in the
Schedule appended to the aforesaid
Notification states that total number
of
weapons
exempted
shall
not
exceeds 7 in addition to the number of
weapons he is entitled to possess as a
normal citizen as per the provisions of
the Act, subject to an overall ceiling
of 10 weapons.
11 All. Abbas Ansari Vs. State of U.P.
347

13. The learned counsel for the
applicant has submitted that as the
applicant is a renowned shooter, he was
entitled to hold 10 firearms and the
applicant was having merely 7 firearms,
which was permissible in law.

14. The learned counsel for the
applicant has next submitted that the police
claimed that the applicant had acquired
firearms in excess of the number, for which
he had been licensed and the firearms had
been
recovered
from
the
applicant's
residence at New Delhi. The offence, if
any, has been committed by the applicant at
New Delhi, and, therefore, U.P. Police had
no authority to lodge a First Information
Report in police Station Mahanagar, as no
offence has been committed by the
applicant within the territorial limits of the
aforesaid Police Station or even in the
territory of the State of Uttar Pradesh.

15. In the order dated 19.10.2019
passed by a Division Bench of this court in
Writ Petition No. 28833 (M/B) of 2019,
this Court had directed that while filing a
counter affidavit, the State should address
the point that after a license had been
issued by the Delhi Police whether the
District Magistrate, Lucknow remained the
licensing authority after having given a No
Objection letter.

16. The learned counsel for the
applicant has further submitted that the
allegation that the applicant had got two
licenses issued on a single Unique
Identification Number, is false as the
license issued to the applicant by the
District Magistrate, Lucknow did not bear
any Unique Identity Number and that is the
reason why no such number is mentioned
in any of the communication issued by the
office of District Magistrate or by the
Police. He has submitted that the Unique
Identification Number was introduced in
Rule 15 of the Arms Rules, 2016 and prior
to that, there was no such prescription for
issuance of Unique Identification Number
and, therefore, the applicant has been
issued a Unique Identification Number
after he was granted a license by the Delhi
Police and prior to that he was not allotted
any Unique identification Number.

17. The applicant was languishing in
jail in connection with a case lodged by the
Directorate
of
Enforcement,
since
04.11.2022 and the applicant is in jail in
connection with the present case since
24.12.2022.

18. At the closure of his submissions,
Sri.
Priyadarshi Manish,
the
learned
counsel for the applicant supplied a
compilation
of
photocopies
of
13
judgments running into 242 pages, which
has no index attached. The judgments are
Satender Kumar Antil versus CBI,
(2022) 10 SCC 51, Siddharth versus State
of U.P. and another, (2022) 1 SCC 676,
Dr. Shivinder Mohan Singh versus
Directorate of Enforcement, 2020 SCC
OnLine Del 766, Moti Ram versus State
of M.P., (1978) 4 SCC 47, Babu Singh
versus State of U.P., (1978) 1 SCC 579,
Ash Mohammad versus Shiv Raj Singh
alias Lalla Babu and another, (2012) 9
SCC 446, Chaman Lal versus State of
U.P. and another, (2004) 7 SCC 525,
Masroor versus State of U.P. and
another,
(2009)
14
SCC
286,
P.
Chidambaram versus CBI, (2020) 13
SCC 337, P. Chidambaram versus
Directorate of Enforcement, (2020) 13
SCC 791, Prasanta Kumar Sarkar versus
Ashis Chatterjee and another, (2010) 14
SCC 496, Ram Govind Upadhyay versus
Sudarshan Singh and another, (2002) 3
348 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
SCC 598 and Sanjay Chandra versus
CBI, (2012) 1 SCC 40. However, he placed
before the Court only one judgment in the
case of Dr. Shivinder Mohan Singh
versus Directorate of Enforcement, 2020
SCC OnLine Del 766 and left the other
judgments to be read by the Court itself.

19. Replying to the aforesaid
submissions, Sri Anurag Verma, learned
A.G.A.-I has submitted that the applicant
was initially granted an Arms License by
the District Magistrate, Lucknow, which
license authorized him to purchase a single
DBBL gun and it did not authorize him to
have multiple firearms. He has submitted
that the provisions for issuance of Unique
Identification Number had been introduced
in Arms Rules, 1962 by an amendment
made in the year 2012 and this provision
was there when the applicant was granted a
licence by the District Magistrate Lucknow
and when the applicant had obtained a No
objection certificate.

20. Sri Verma has submitted that the
license issued to the applicant by the Delhi
Police has already been cancelled by means
of an order dated 26.08.2021 passed by
Joint Commissioner of Police, Licensing
Unit, Delhi, after issuing a show cause
notice to the applicant, providing him
an opportunity of personal hearing and
taking
into
consideration
his
submissions.
The
aforesaid
order
records
following
reasons
for
cancellation of his arm's license:-

"(1)
The
FIR
No.
431/19
U/s
420/467/468/471 IPC & 30 Arms Act, PS
Mahanagar, Lucknow, UP is still pending
trial in the Hon'ble Court which has not
been quashed by the Hon'ble High Court
so far. Therefore, any contention regarding
it being irrelevant or extra jurisdictional or
frivolous cannot be considered at this
stage.

2. Perusal of record revealed that the
licensee applied to this Licensing Authority
on 14.10.2015 seeking addition of an NPB
Rifle on the grounds of being "Renowned
Shot and for which recommendation of
NRAI and copy of import permit no.
NRAI/IMPP/861/1785/2015
dated
02.09.2015 was issued by the NRAI. The
then
Licensing
Authority
accordingly
allowed addition of 01 Rifle with spare
Barrel on the basis of these documents.
However, licensee preferred not to avail
import permit and rather availed the
provisions of notification no. 147/94Customs for bringing 06 spare Barrels in
personal baggage.

Further, perusal of the import permit
revealed that a clear description of Bore,
Barrel, number of Rifles as 'one' and
number of spare barrels as 'one' permitted
to be imported was mentioned in the import
permit. Had the licensee used the said
import permit he would have not been
allowed to import weapons or barrels of
other description and excess in quantity
which he actually did. He rather exploited
the conditions of the Ministry of Home
Affairs Notification No. S.O 665(E), dated
04.08.2014 which clarifies that "for
exemptees at SI No. 1 and Sl. No. 2 of the
schedule,
a
weapon
with
spare
or
conversion Barrels is to be treated as one
weapon only at the time of endorsement of
the license and full details of the said
weapon and such spare and conversion
weapon shall be endorsed on the respective
license". The act of the licensee is
suggestive of his intention to bring the
Barrels of different Bores from overseas for
some other purposes and reasons best
known to him, other than sports as Barrels
of caliber (1) .375 (9.52 mm) Bore No.
R/101633 and (2) .458 (11.63 mm) Bore
11 All. Abbas Ansari Vs. State of U.P.
349
No. R/109355 are not permissible to
shooters as per the then existing Ministry of
Home Affairs Notification No. S.O. 1988
(E), dated 04/08/2014.

Perusal of record also revealed that on
06.04.2016, the licensee had applied for
conversion of his NPB Gun to NPB
Revolver/Pistol citing reason of being a
renowned shot who wanted to participate in
'small bore' weapon events. His request
was acceded to. He imported one .357
(9.067 mm) Bore Pistol No. BBGV-728
alongwith 03 spare Barrels and out of
which .40 (10.16 mm) Bore No. BBCD-839
was not permissible to sports person as per
the then existing Ministry of Home Affairs
Notification No. S.O 1988 (E), dated
04.08.2014 which again casts aspersions
on the intention of the licensee to use said
weapon for some other purpose and
reasons best known to him."

21. The order further records that
jacketed cartridges have been recovered
from the applicant's possession regarding
which he claimed that those were used by
him for target practice. National Rifle
Association
of
India
(NRAI)
has
categorically prohibited such ammunition
to be used in range for shooting practice.
ISSF also does not allow such ammunition
to be used during events. Jacketed
cartridges are dangerous for human beings
and, therefore, not allowed in shooting
ranges. Recovery of such cartridges from
the
possession
of
licensee
further
strengthens the inference that the licensee
imported Jacketed cartridges for some other
purposes best known to him, though
certainly not for bona fide purpose.

22. In view of the aforesaid reasons,
the Joint Commissioner of Police came to a
conclusion that the applicant is not suitable
to hold an Arms License as he deliberately
imported
firearms/spare
barrels
and
ammunition
for
which
he
was
not
authorized. He has misused the status and
privileges of a renowned shooter. His
clandestine objective has been to acquire
foreign origin arms through the privileges
extended to a renowned shooter for reasons
best known to him. The applicant could not
provide satisfactory and logical reasons for
the violations during oral hearing.

23. In response to a letter issued to
National
Rifle
Association
of
India
(NRAI), its Secretary has informed through
a letter dated 21.12.2019 that the applicant
has imported the following four weapons: -

"1. 12 Bore SBBL Gun No. TA-013638
Import from Policane. Slovenija .

2. 0.357 Bore Pistol No. BBGV-728
Import form Policane. Slovenija.

3. 0.30-06 Bore Rifle No. R/105923
with 06 Barrels (1) Cal. .223 Sl. No.
R/111317 (2)Cal. .308 Sl. No. R/111048 (3)
Cal. .30-06 Sl. No. R/101847 (4) Cal. 300
Sl. No. R/105251 (5) Cal. .375 Sl. No.
R/101633 (6) Cal. .458 Sl. No. R/10355
Imported from Policane, Slovenija J

4. 12 Bore DBBL Sl. No. 03297W
Beretta Import from Cyprus."

24. Item Nos. 2 & 3, i.e. a 0.357 bore
pistol and rifle with six barrels of different
calibers, had been imported without any
import permit.

25. A copy of an affidavit dated
15.11.2019 submitted by the applicant
before the Licensing Authority at New
Delhi has been annexed with the counter
affidavit, which mentions his permanent
residential address as "111 A/9 Ganpati
Niwas Kishangarh, V Kunj, ND" whereas
the applicant was never a permanent
resident of that place. He has mentioned the
350 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
name of his nominee as Mukhtar Ansari,
who is the applicant's father whereas the
applicant's father is already undergoing
incarceration for the past more than a
decade.

26. The learned A.G.A.-I has
submitted that aforesaid address mentioned
by the applicant as his permanent resident,
is absolutely false as during investigation
statement of the owner of the premises has
been recorded, who said that the applicant
has taken a one bedroom accommodation
in her house on rent and he used to visit the
premises once in every 2 or 3 months.

27. The learned A.G.A-I has further
submitted that the applicant had filed an
application for grant of anticipatory bail,
which was rejected by means of an order
dated 26.08.2022 passed by this Court in
Criminal Misc. Anticipatory Bail No. 1396
of 2022. The applicant had challenged the
aforesaid order dated 26.08.2022 by filing
Special Leave Petition (Crl.) No. 9315 of
2022, which was dismissed by means of an
order dated 09.01.2023 passed by the
Hon'ble
Supreme
Court
with
the
observation that the observations made
while
rejecting
the
anticipatory
bail
application would not come in the way of
consideration
of
his
regular
bail
application.

28. The learned A.G.A.-I has relied
upon the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme
Court in the case of Harjeet Singh Vs.
Indrapeet Singh and others: AIR 2021
SC 4017, wherein the Hon'ble Supreme
Court has set aside a bail order passed by
the High Court for the reason that the High
Court had failed to appreciate and consider
the nature of the accusation and the
severity of the punishment in case of
conviction and the nature of supporting
evidence. The High Court had also failed to
appreciate the facts of the case; the nature
of allegations; gravity of offence and the
role attributed to the Accused.

29. Keeping in view the conduct of
the learned Counsel for the applicant in
supplying a compilation of 13 judgments
running into 242 pages, without even an
index, and placing only one judgment of
the Delhi High Court and leaving it for the
Court to go through the remaining 12
judgments, the Court is constrained to
observe that an increasing tendency of
supplying multiple case-laws, without
connecting the same to the facts and
circumstances of the case in hand is being
observed nowadays. This results in wastage
of precious time of the Court and creates an
unnecessary
obstacle
in
expeditious
dispensation of justice.

30. It would be proper and sufficient
if the learned Counsel put up a proposition
and then submit a case-law in support
thereof.
In
case
any
proposition is
supported by any land-mark judgment
which has been followed consistently and
repeatedly, it would be sufficient to cite that
land-mark judgment, or at the most one
more latest judgment in which it was
followed or reiterated. The Counsel should
not supply case laws without putting up a
proposition and they should avoid the
temptation of citing multiple case-laws on a
single point, which does not make any
beneficial difference. The learned Counsel
are expected to assist the Court in arriving
at a decision expeditiously without wasting
the precious time of the Court so that the
same time may be better utilized in the
interest of some other litigants.

31. However, since photocopies of 13
judgments have been supplied by the
11 All. Abbas Ansari Vs. State of U.P.
351
learned Counsel for the applicant, I proceed
to deal with all those judgments.

32. In Ram Govind Upadhyay v.
Sudarshan Singh, (2002) 3 SCC 598, the
first bail application of the accused had
been rejected by the High Court but his
second application was allowed for the sole
reason that the accused had spent more than
1 year in jail. While setting aside the bail
order, the Hon'ble Supreme Court held
that: -

"The High Court thought it fit not to
record any reason, far less any cogent
reason, as to why there should be a
departure when in fact such a petition was
dismissed earlier not very long ago. The
consideration of the period of one year
spent in jail cannot in our view be a
relevant consideration in the matter of
grant of bail, more so by reason of the fact
that the offence charged is that of murder
under
Section
302
IPC
having the
punishment of death or life imprisonment
- it is a heinous crime against the society
and as such the court ought to be rather
circumspect and cautious in its approach in
a matter which stands out to be a social
crime of a very serious nature."

33. In Ram Govind Upadhyay, the
Hon'ble Supreme Court reiterated the
principles regarding grant of bail in the
following words: -

"3. Grant of bail though being a
discretionary order - but, however, calls
for exercise of such a discretion in a
judicious manner and not as a matter of
course. Order for bail bereft of any cogent
reason cannot be sustained. Needless to
record, however, that the grant of bail is
dependent upon the contextual facts of the
matter being dealt with by the court and
facts, however, do always vary from case to
case. While placement of the accused in the
society, though may be considered but that
by itself cannot be a guiding factor in the
matter of grant of bail and the same should
and ought always to be coupled with other
circumstances warranting the grant of bail.
The nature of the offence is one of the basic
considerations for the grant of bail - more
heinous is the crime, the greater is the
chance of rejection of the bail, though,
however, dependent on the factual matrix of
the matter.
4. Apart from the above, certain other
which may be attributed to be relevant
considerations may also be noticed at this
juncture, though however, the same are
only illustrative and not exhaustive, neither
there can be any. The considerations being:

(a) While granting bail the court has
to keep in mind not only the nature of the
accusations, but the severity of the
punishment, if the accusation entails a
conviction and the nature of evidence in
support of the accusations.

(b) Reasonable apprehensions of the
witnesses being tampered with or the
apprehension of there being a threat for the
complainant should also weigh with the
court in the matter of grant of bail.

(c) While it is not expected to have the
entire evidence establishing the guilt of the
accused beyond reasonable doubt but there
ought always to be a prima facie
satisfaction of the court in support of
the charge.

(d) Frivolity in prosecution should
always be considered and it is only the
element of genuineness that shall have
to be considered in the matter of grant
of bail, and in the event of there being
some doubt as to the genuineness of the
prosecution, in the normal course of
events, the accused is entitled to an
order of bail."
352 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
34. In Chaman Lal v. State of U.P.,
(2004) 7 SCC 525, Masroor v. State of
U.P., (2009) 14 SCC 286, Prasanta
Kumar Sarkar v. Ashis Chatterjee,
(2010) 14 SCC 496, Ash Mohammad v.
Shiv Raj Singh, (2012) 9 SCC 446, copies
whereof have also been supplied by the
learned Counsel for the applicant, the
Hon'ble Supreme Court had set aside the
bail orders passed by the High Courts,
following the aforesaid principles laid
down in Ram Govind Upadhyay (Supra).
These cases do not at all support the
applicant's claim for being released on bail
and I cannot appreciate the aforesaid
judgments
being
included
in
the
compilation handed over by the learned
Counsel for the applicant.

35. In Moti Ram v. State of M.P.,
(1978) 4 SCC 47, the appellant, who was a
mason, had filed a Criminal Appeal, which
was pending before the Hon'ble Supreme
Court and the Hon'ble Supreme Court had
passed an order for bail in his favour "to
the satisfaction of the Chief Judicial
Magistrate". The Magistrate ordered that
a surety in a sum of Rs 10,000/- be
produced.
Further,
the
Magistrate
refused to accept the suretyship of the
petitioner's brother because he and his
assets were in another district. The
Hon'ble Supreme Court mandated the
Magistrate to release the applicant on his
furnishing a personal bond of Rs.1,000/-
and observed that: -

"2. If mason and millionaire were
treated alike, egregious inegality is an
inevitability. Likewise, geographic allergy
at the judicial level makes mockery of equal
protection of the laws within the territory of
India.
India
is
one
and
not
a
conglomeration of districts, untouchably
apart."

The
aforesaid
judgment
has
no
relevance for deciding the applicant's bail
application.

36. In Siddharth versus State of U.P.
and another, (2022) 1 SCC 676, the
Hon'ble Supreme Court held that: -

"9.... It has rightly been observed on
consideration of Section 170 CrPC that it
does not impose an obligation on the
officer-in-charge to arrest each and every
accused at the time of filing of the chargesheet. We have, in fact, come across cases
where the accused has cooperated with the
investigation throughout and yet on the
charge-sheet
being
filed
non-bailable
warrants
have
been
issued
for
his
production premised on the requirement
that there is an obligation to arrest the
accused and produce him before the court.
We are of the view that if the investigating
officer does not believe that the accused
will abscond or disobey summons he/she is
not required to be produced in custody. The
word "custody" appearing in Section 170
CrPC does not contemplate either police or
judicial custody but it merely connotes the
presentation of the accused by the
investigating officer before the court while
filing the charge-sheet.

10.We may note that personal liberty
is an important aspect of our constitutional
mandate. The occasion to arrest an accused
during investigation arises when custodial
investigation becomes necessary or it is a
heinous crime or where there is a
possibility of influencing the witnesses or
accused may abscond. Merely because an
arrest can be made because it is lawful
does not mandate that arrest must be made.
A distinction must be made between the
existence of the power to arrest and the
justification for exercise of it [Joginder
Kumarv.State of U.P., (1994) 4 SCC 260 :
11 All. Abbas Ansari Vs. State of U.P.
353
1994 SCC (Cri) 1172]. If arrest is made
routine, it can cause incalculable harm to
the reputation and self-esteem of a person.
If the investigating officer has no reason to
believe that the accused will abscond or
disobey summons and has, in fact,
throughout
cooperated
with
the
investigation we fail to appreciate why
there should be a compulsion on the officer
to arrest the accused.

11.We are, in fact, faced with a
situation
where
contrary
to
the
observations inJoginder Kumar casehow a
police officer has to deal with a scenario of
arrest, the trial courts are stated to be
insisting on the arrest of an accused as a
prerequisite formality to take the chargesheet on record in view of the provisions of
Section 170 CrPC. We consider such a
course misplaced and contrary to the very
intent of Section 170 CrPC."

37. The aforesaid principle of law has
no application to the facts of the present
case.

38. In Babu Singh v. State of U.P.,
(1978) 1 SCC 579, the Hon'ble Supreme
Court was dealing with an objection that
second bail application would not be
maintainable, and held that an order
refusing an application for bail does not
necessarily preclude another, on a later
occasion, giving more materials, further
developments and different considerations.
The Hon'ble Supreme Court reiterated the
following principles regarding grant of bail:
-

"16. Thus the legal principle and
practice validate the Court considering the
likelihood of the applicant interfering with
witnesses for the prosecution or otherwise
polluting the process of justice. It is not
only traditional but rational, in this
context, to enquire into the antecedents of a
man who is applying for bail to find
whether he has a bad record-particularly
a record which suggests that he is likely to
commit serious offences while on bail. In
regard
to
habituals,
it
is
part
of
criminological history that a thoughtless
bail order has enabled the bailee to exploit
the opportunity to inflict further crimes on
the members of society. Bail discretion, on
the basis of evidence about the criminal
record of a defendant, is therefore not an
exercise in irrelevance.

* * *

19. A few other weighty factors
deserve reference. All deprivation of liberty
is
validated
by
social
defense
and
individual
correction
along
an
anticriminal direction. Public justice is central
to the whole scheme of bail law. Fleeing
justice must be forbidden but punitive
harshness should be minimised. Restorative
devices to redeem the man, even through
community service, meditative drill, study
classes or other resources should be
innovated, and playing foul with public
peace
by
tampering
with
evidence,
intimidating
witnesses
or
committing
offences while on judicially sanctioned
"free enterprise", should be provided
against. No seeker of justice shall play
confidence
tricks
on
the
Court
or
community. Thus, conditions may be hung
around bail orders, not to cripple but to
protect. Such is the holistic jurisdiction and
humanistic orientation invoked by the
judicial discretion correlated to the values
of our Constitution.

20. Viewed from this perspective, we
gain a better insight into the rules of the
game. When a person, charged with a
grave offence, has been acquitted at a
stage, has the intermediate acquittal
pertinence to a bail plea when the appeal
before this Court pends? Yes, it has. The
354 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
panic which might prompt the accused to
jump the gauntlet of justice is less, having
enjoyed the confidence of the Court's
verdict once. Concurrent holdings of guilt
have the opposite effect. Again, the ground
for denial of provisional release becomes
weaker when the fact stares us in the face
that a fair finding - if that be so - of
innocence has been recorded by one Court.
It may be conclusive, for the judgment of
acquittal may be ex facie wrong, the
likelihood
of
desperate
reprisal,
it
enlarged, may be a deterrent and his own
safety may be more in prison than in the
vengeful village where feuds have provoked
the violent offence. It depends. Antecedents
of
the
man
and
socio-geographical
circumstances have a bearing only from
this
angle.
Police
exaggerations
of
prospective misconduct of the accused, if
enlarged, must be soberly sized up lest
danger of excesses and injustice creep
subtly
into
the
discretionary
curial
technique.
Bad
record
and
police
prediction
of
criminal
prospects
to
invalidate the bail plea are admissible in
principle but shall not stampede the Court
into a complacent refusal."

39. Dr. Shivinder Mohan Singh
versus Directorate of Enforcement, 2020
SCC OnLine Del 766 is the only judgment
that was placed before the Court by the
learned Counsel for the applicant, in which
it was held that: -

"24.Nowhere is it the law that an
accused, yet to be tried, is to be kept in
custody only on a hunch or a presumption
that he will prejudice or impede trial; or to
send any message to the society. If
anything, the only message that goes-out to
the society by keeping an accused in prison
before finding him guilty, is that our system
works only on impressions and conjectures
and can keep an accused in custody even
on presumption of guilt. While in certain
cases such message may even quench the
thirst for revenge of the lay society against
a person they believe to be guilty, such
action would certainly not leave our
criminal justice system awash in glory. An
investigating agency must come to court
with the confidence that they have arrested
an accused, based on credible material,
and have filed a complaint or a chargesheet with the certainty that they will be
able to bring home guilt, by satisfying a
court beyond reasonable doubt. But when
an investigating agency suggests that an
accused be detained in custody as an
undertrial for a prolonged period, even
after the complaint or charge-sheet has
been filed, it appears that the investigating
agency is not convinced of its case and so it
fears that the accused may 'get-off' by
discharge or acquittal; and that therefore
the only way to 'punish theaccused' is to let
him remain in custody as an undertrial.

25.After all, the Supreme Court has
said thatit would be improper for any court
to refuse bail as a mark of disapproval of
former conduct whether the accused has
been convicted for it or not or to refuse bail
to an unconvicted person for the purpose of
giving him a taste of imprisonment as a
lesson(cf.Sanjay
Chandrav.CBI,
supra).
How does one carry forward the Supreme
Court precept thatpunishment begins after
conviction, and that every man is deemed
to be innocent until duly tried and duly
found guilty, if we deny bail without cogent
reason (cf.Sanjay Chandrav.CBI, supra).

26.People's trust in the criminal
justice system must rest on surer footing
than on pre-trial punishment by keeping
accused persons in prison. Statistics
available on the Delhi Prisons website as
on 31.12.2019 show that the proportion of
undertrials to convicts in Delhi prisons is
11 All. Abbas Ansari Vs. State of U.P.
355
about 82 percent to 18 per cent. These
numbers are telling. Prison is a place for
punishment; and no punishment can be
legitimate without a trial. There must be
compelling basis, grounds and reasons to
detain an undertrial in judicial custody,
which this court does not discern in the
present case."

40. The aforesaid judgment has been
rendered by an Hon'ble Single Judge of
another High Court and it has no binding
precedential value, and there was no
occasion to place this judgment when there
are numerous judgments of the Hon'ble
Supreme Court on the points in issue.

41. In Sanjay Chandra v. CBI,
(2012) 1 SCC 40, the appellant's request
for grant of bail had been rejected by the
Session Court and the High Court on two
grounds - (1) the offence alleged against
the accused persons is very serious
involving deep-rooted planning in which,
huge financial loss is caused to the State
exchequer and (2) the possibility of the
accused
persons
tampering
with
the
witnesses. The Hon'ble Supreme Court
allowed the appeal after taking into
consideration that the charge was that of
cheating and dishonestly inducing delivery
of property and forgery for the purpose of
cheating using as genuine a forged
document. The punishment for the offence
is imprisonment for a term which may
extend to seven years.