# Abdul Sattar Beg v. The Judge Small Causes Court Lko. and another

- **Citation:** (2012) 3 ILRA 1371
- **Court:** High Court of Judicature at Allahabad
- **Decided:** 2012-11-30
- **Bench:** Saeed-Uz-Zaman Siddiqi
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/allahabad-high-court/abdul-sattar-beg-v-the-judge-small-causes-court-lko-and-another-42418
- **Pages:** 3

## Headnote

Control) Act 1972-Section 34 (1) (a)-
Right to cross examination-proceeding
under Section 21 (1) (a) summery in
nature-to be decide on basis of affidavit
of
parties-one
who
seeks
crossexamination has to be determined by
affidavits
the
extraordinary
circumstances and reasons for crossexamination-can not be used as tool for
delaying the proceeding.

Held: Para-5

While praying for cross-examination, the
party seeking cross-examination must
show something extraordinary, which
cannot be rebutted by the counter
affidavit. In cases, under the Act, where
the legislature has specifically provided
that the evidence is to be led through
affidavits,
the
shifting
from
normal
course must be based upon cogent
reasons.
Case Law discussed:
[ARC 1997 (2) 674]; [AIR 1967 Sc 122]; [1989
(1) ARC 407]; [1998 (1) ARC 334]; [2005 (2)
ARC 764]

## Text

3 All] Abdul Sattar Beg V. The Judge Small Causes Court Lko. and another

1371
ORIGINAL JURISDICTION
CIVIL SIDE
DATED: LUCKNOW 30.11.2012

BEFORE
THE HON'BLE SAEED-UZ-ZAMAN SIDDIQI, J.

Rent Control No. - 1 of 2012

Abdul Sattar Beg

...Petitioner
Versus
The Judge Small Causes Court Lko. and
another

 ...Respondents

Counsel for the Petitioner:
Sri Mohammad Naseerullah

Counsel for the Respondents:
Sri Manish Kumar
Sri Mohd. Aslam Khan

U.P. Urban Building (Letting or Rent
Control) Act 1972-Section 34 (1) (a)-
Right to cross examination-proceeding
under Section 21 (1) (a) summery in
nature-to be decide on basis of affidavit
of
parties-one
who
seeks
crossexamination has to be determined by
affidavits
the
extraordinary
circumstances and reasons for crossexamination-can not be used as tool for
delaying the proceeding.

Held: Para-5

While praying for cross-examination, the
party seeking cross-examination must
show something extraordinary, which
cannot be rebutted by the counter
affidavit. In cases, under the Act, where
the legislature has specifically provided
that the evidence is to be led through
affidavits,
the
shifting
from
normal
course must be based upon cogent
reasons.
Case Law discussed:
[ARC 1997 (2) 674]; [AIR 1967 Sc 122]; [1989
(1) ARC 407]; [1998 (1) ARC 334]; [2005 (2)
ARC 764]

(Delivered by Hon'ble Saeed-Uz-Zaman
Siddiqi, J.)

1. By means of this writ petition, the
petitioner / tenant has sought for writ in
the nature of certiorari, quashing the order
dated 16.11.2011 passed by learned
Judge, Small Causes Courts (Prescribed
Authority) in P.A. case No. 5 of 2010 and
for issuance of writ in the nature of
mandamus commanding the landlady
(O.P. No. 2) to produce all the five
witnesses for cross-examination.

2. Heard learned counsel for both
the parties and have gone through the
records.

3. Brief facts, relevant for the
purposes of deciding this writ petition are
that O.P. No. 2 is admittedly the landlady
of the disputed premises, of which the
petitioner is the tenant. The landlady
moved application under Section 21 (1)
(a) of U.P. Act. XIII of 1972 (hereinafter
referred to as "the Act"). The petitioner
(tenant) filed written statement and both
the parties filed affidavits, in evidence
and the case was fixed for hearing of
arguments. The landlady (O.P. No. 2)
filed evidence of five witnesses. After a
lapse of about a year, the tenant moved
application under Section 34 (1) (a) of the
Act for cross-examination of all the five
witnesses, which has been mentioned that
the landlady has filed her affidavit on
11.08.2010.
Counter
affidavit
and
Rejoinder Affidavits were exchanged
between the parties. In the application
paper No. 37 C, the tenant, who is the
petitioner before this Court has submitted
that the landlady is not in the need of the
shop, in question and she has concealed
very important facts about ownership of
her properties as she is the richest person
1372 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES [2012

in respect of the landed and built
properties in Lucknow, especially in
Hazratganj area. All the allegations
contained in application paper No. 37 C
are vague and just to delay the disposal of
the case.

4. Though, there is a provision to
permit cross-examination of the deponent,
but this power has to be exercised only
when
such
cross-examination
is
absolutely necessary. The party, seeking
such permission has to show reasons for
cross-examination.

5. While praying for crossexamination, the party seeking crossexamination
must
show
something
extraordinary, which cannot be rebutted
by the counter affidavit. In cases, under
the Act, where the legislature has
specifically provided that the evidence is
to be led through affidavits, the shifting
from normal course must be based upon
cogent reasons.

6. A Division Bench of this Court in
Khushi Ram Dedwal v. Additional
Judge, Small Causes Court/Prescribed
Authority, Meerut and Ors. [ARC 1997
(2), 674], has held as under:-

"The principle that a party is to be
permitted to cross-examine on the
principle of natural justice cannot be
accepted in every case. Oral examination
in all cases is not contemplated. Even in
disciplinary inquiries in exceptional
cases oral evidence may not be insisted
upon as held in Hira Nath Mishra v.
Principal, Rajendra Medical College,
AIR 1973, SC 1260, and State of
Haryana v. Rattar Singh, AIR 1977 SC
1512. If a party wants to cross-examine,
he has to give the necessary facts in the
application
as
to
why
the
crossexamination is necessary. The Prescribed
Authority will give the reasons either for
allowing
or
refusing
the
crossexamination. The reasons disclosed in the
order of the Prescribed Authority will
show whether he acted fairly or not.
Considering every aspect of the matter the
authority under the provisions of U.P. Act
No. 13 of 1972 can permit the crossexamination of a deponent of an affidavit
only when it is necessary in the case."

7. In the State of Jammu and
Kashmir and ors. v. Bakshi Gulam
Mohammad and another [AIR 1967 Sc
122], the Hon'ble Apex Court has
observed that the primary objective of the
Act is expeditious disposal of cases. It
may be surrendered if the parties are
permitted to lead oral evidence.

8. In the case of Smt. Gulaicha Devi
v. Prescribed Authority (Munsif) Basti
and another [1989 (1) ARC 407], the
following observation was made:-

"If oral evidence was contemplated
to be filed and if the deponent of every
affidavit was permitted to be crossexamined then it would not be possible to
decide the release application under
Section 21 (1) of the Act within a period
of one months."

9. In Kripal Singh v. Prescribed
Authority, Haldwani, District- Nainital
[1998 (1) ARC 334, the same view has
been reiterated. In Fahmida Shoeb
(Smt.) v. Kanhaiya Lal and another
[2005 (2) ARC 764], this court has
relied upon the authority has laid down
in Gulaicha Devi's case (supra), and
has reiterated the same view, which is as
under;-
3 All] Virendra Singh Yadav V. Collector, Ghazipur and others

1373

"The consistent view of this Court,
consequently, is that the normal mode of
proceeding in a case under the Act is to
receive evidence on affidavits from both
the parties and to decide the case on the
basis of the said affidavits. It is only in a
very rare case where the Court thinks fit
necessary in the interest of justice crossexamine a particular deponent of an
affidavit, but it has to be very sparingly
exercised
in
very
exceptional
circumstances, if such a power is
exercised, specific reasons for exercise of
the powers have to be given by the
authority
concerned.
The
crossexamination cannot be ordered as a
matter of course."

10. In view of the law as discussed
above, it is clear that the proceedings
under Section 21 (1) of the Act are of
summary nature, by which the prescribed
authority holds an enquiry which have to
be dealt with.

11. The impugned order is perfectly
in accordance with law on the point. The
learned Prescribed Authority has rightly
observed that vague application has been
given, by which all the five witnesses
have been sought to be examined and the
application has been moved at the stage of
arguments, after a lapse of a considerable
period just to delay the disposal of the
case which deserves to be decided within
two months as provided by Rule 15 (3) of
the rules framed under the Act.

12. The present application has been
given by the petitioner with an intent to
delay the proceedings and the tenant has
dragged the landlady into the controversy
up to this Court.

13. In view of the above, the writ
petition is dismissed.
---------
ORIGINAL JURISDICTION
CIVIL SIDE
DATED: ALLAHABAD 12.10.2012

BEFORE
THE HON'BLE RAJES KUMAR, J.

Civil Misc. Writ Petition No. 109 of 1998

Virendra Singh Yadav

 ...Petitioner
Versus
Collector, Ghazipur and others

 ...Respondents

Counsel for the Petitioner:
Sri Prakash Padia

Counsel for the Respondents:
C.S.C.

Constitution
of
India,
Article
226termination order-appointment on class
4th post-without advertisement, without
constituting
selection
committee-dehorse
the
rules-plea
regarding
opportunity of hearing-not available-as
before this court material do not disclose
how termination order is faulty-working
on
strengthen
of
interim
order-not
helpful-after dismissal of Writ Petitioninterim order nonest-petition dismissed.

Held: Para-11 and 12

Thus, it is apparent that the appointment
of the petitioner was without following
the Rules. The appointment of the
petitioner was motivated by extraneous
consideration
and
as
a
result
of
favouritism. The petitioner is not able to
justify his appointment under the Rules.
In the appointment letter itself it was
made clear that the appointment of the
petitioner was wholly temporary and
could be terminated without any prior
notice. Therefore, even if the termination
order has been passed without giving
any opportunity to the petitioner, the