# Abdullah v. State Of U.P. & Ors - **Citation:** (2016) 5 ILRA 1812 - **Court:** High Court of Judicature at Allahabad - **Decided:** 2016-05-04 - **Bench:** Rajan Roy - **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/allahabad-high-court/abdullah-v-state-of-u-p-ors-43832 - **Pages:** 3 ## Headnote Shri N.S. Chaudhary, Shri R.K. Porwali, Shri Anshul Chaudhari , Shri Dharam Pal Singh Counsel for the Res ## Text 1812 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES ORIGINAL JURISDICTION CIVIL SIDE DATED: LUCKNOW 04.05.2016 BEFORE THE HON'BLE RAJAN ROY, J. Service Single No.- 9572 Of 2016 Abdullah ...Petitioner Versus State Of U.P. & Ors. ...Respondents Counsel for the Petitioner: Shri Mahendra Bahadur Singh Counsel for the Respondents: C.S.C. Held - Petitioner's Claim: The petitioner was appointed to a Group 'C' post on August 11, 2014, and joined on August 13, 2014. While the Joint Director approved his selection on March 31, 2015, the District Inspector of Schools (DIOS) only authorized salary payments starting from May 12, 2015. The petitioner sought arrears from his initial joining date in 2014. Legal Provision (Section 16FF(3)): The Court analyzed Section 16FF(3) of the Act, which explicitly mandates that no person selected shall be "appointed" until the proposal for such appointment has been approved by the competent authority (the Inspector or Regional Deputy Director). Interpretation of "Prior Approval": The Court interpreted this provision to mean that "prior approval" is a mandatory condition precedent. Consequently, a valid appointment letter can only be legally issued after the approval is granted, rendering any appointment letter issued before that date (such as the petitioner's 2014 letter) legally untenable for salary purposes. Determination of Salary Date: The Court held that since approval was granted on March 31, 2015, that date must be treated as the effective date of appointment. Therefore, the petitioner is entitled to his salary from the date of approval (March 31, 2015) rather than the later date set by the DIOS or the earlier premature joining date. Distinguishing Precedents: The Court rejected the petitioner's reliance on the Shashi Kant Singh case, noting that the cited judgment did not consider the specific requirements of Section 16FF(3) and was decided based on its own unique facts without establishing a general principle of law. Final Order: The writ petition was disposed of with a direction to modify the DIOS's order. The authorities were ordered to pay the petitioner's salary starting from March 31, 2015, instead of May 12, 2015. List of Citations The following case law was cited in the Judgment: Shashi Kant Singh vs. State of U.P., [1992 E.S.C. 544 (All)]. (Delivered by Hon'ble Rajan Roy, J.) 5 All. Abdullah Vs State Of U.P. & Ors. 1813 1. Heard learned counsel for the parties. 2. The petitioner herein claims to have been appointed on Group 'C' post in the respondent institution and thereafter his papers were sent to the District inspector of Schools for approval under Section 16FF(3) of the U.P. Intermediate Education Act, 1921(hereinafter referred to as 'the Act, 1921') who in turn sent the same to the Joint Director who approved his selection vide order dated 31.03.2015 and sent back the matter to the District Inspector of Schools. 3. The contention of the petitioner is that he is being paid salary only w.e.f. 12.05.2015 consequent to a consequential order passed by the District Inspector of Schools after approval of the selection by the Joint Director. He claims salary from the date of his initial joining w.e.f. 13.08.2014 in pursuance to the appointment letter dated 11.08.2014 issued by the management. 4. Section 16FF(3) of the Act, 1921 reads as under:- "16FF(3) No person selected under this section shall be appointed, unless- (a) in the case of the Head of Institution the proposal of appointment has been approved by the Regional Deputy Director of Education; and (b) in the case of a teacher such proposal has been approved by the Inspector." 5. On a bare reading of this provision it is apparent that approval to be sought is of the selection and no person selected under this section shall be appointed unless in the case of a teacher such proposal has been approved by the Inspector meaning thereby the proposal of appointment based on such selection is approved by the Inspector, therefore, the approval contemplated therein is a prior approval. 6. In the present case the approval has been granted by the Joint Director on 31.03.2015, therefore, the appointment order could only be issued on a date subsequent to such approval instead the appointment letter of the petitioner had already been issued on 11.08.2014, therefore, considering the provision of Section 16FF (3) the claim of the petitioner for payment of salary w.e.f. 11.08.2014 is not tenable in the eyes of law. The claim at best can be sustained w.e.f. 31.03.2015 which can be treated as the date of his appointment and not from any other date. 7. Reliance placed by the learned counsel for the petitioner upon the judgment rendered in the case of Shashi Kant Singh vs. State of U.P. reported in [1992 E.S.C. 544 (All)] is misconceived for the that the said judgment does not refer to the provision as contained in Section 16FF (3) of the Act, 1921, therefore, it is not a binding precedent. Moreover the judgment is based on the facts of the said case and does not lay down any principle of law. 8. In view of the above, it is ordered that the petitioner shall be paid salary w.e.f. 31.03.2015 and the impugned order dated 12.05.2015 shall stand modified to that extent. 1814 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES 9. The writ petition is disposed of in the aforesaid terms. ---------- ORIGINAL JURISDICTION CIVIL SIDE DATED: ALLAHABAD 05.05.2016 BEFORE THE HON'BLE SUDHIR AGARWAL, J. THE HON'BLE SHAMSHER BAHADUR SINGH, J. Writ C No.- 12138 Of 1982 Balbir Singh & Ors. ...Petitioners Versus State Of U.P. & Ors. ...Respondents Counsel for the Petitioners: Shri N.S. Chaudhary, Shri R.K. Porwali, Shri Anshul Chaudhari , Shri Dharam Pal Singh Counsel for the Respondents: S.C. Held - Para 1: The Court heard the Senior Counsel for the petitioners and the Standing Counsel for the State. Para 2: Petitioners challenged the 1982 notifications under Sections 4 and 6 of the Land Acquisition Act for a Polytechnic Institute in Etawah. Para 3: The challenge was based on the illegal dispensation of the Section 5-A enquiry, claiming no real urgency existed. Para 4: Petitioners argued that the project lacked earmarked funds or layout plans, making the invocation of the "urgency clause" a result of non-application of mind. Para 5: A supplementary affidavit noted that even 14 years later (1996), compensation funds were unavailable, proving the lack of initial urgency. Para 6: The State's counter-affidavit claimed urgency existed to meet education standards but admitted that no final maps were ready and funds were only "sanctioned" vaguely. Para 7: Petitioners reiterated their stance in a rejoinder. Para 8: Evidence showed the Government later proposed fresh acquisition because the 1982 proceedings had likely lapsed under Section 11-A. Para 9: The petitioners' counsel focused the argument on the arbitrary use of Section 17 to bypass the Section 5-A enquiry. Para 10: The State counsel could not provide original records or material to justify the urgency. Para 11: The Court set out to determine if dispensing with the enquiry was legally justified. Para 12: The Court noted admitted facts: no plans, no maps, and no compensation funds were available for over a decade after the 1982 notification. Para 13: It was noted that the Institute is now functioning, but the petitioners' specific land was never possessed or paid for due to interim orders. Para 14: The Court proceeded to the legal analysis of Section 17 (Urgency).