# Abhishek Awasthi @ Bholu Awasthi v. State of U.P. & Anr

- **Citation:** (2024) 11 ILRA 369
- **Court:** High Court of Judicature at Allahabad
- **Decided:** 2024-11-26
- **Case number:** Application U/S 482 No. 8635 of 2023
- **Bench:** Siddhartha Varma, Vinod Diwakar
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/allahabad-high-court/abhishek-awasthi-bholu-awasthi-v-state-of-u-p-anr-51015
- **Pages:** 20

## Headnote

370 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
G.A.

Criminal law- reference to larger bench-
Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 - Section
482 - Inherent jurisdiction of High Court
- Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes
(Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989 -
Section 14-A - Scope of bar - Whether
application
under
Section
482
CrPC
maintainable in presence of appeal under
Section 14-A of SC/ST Act- SC/ST Act,
1989 - Section 14-A - Nature of remedy
- Bar on recourse to inherent jurisdiction
- Distinction between "not maintainable"
and
"not
liable
to
be
entertained"-
Jurisdiction under Section 482 CrPC is not
absolutely ousted by Section 14-A of the
SC/ST Act- Inherent Powers - Exercise in
cases of private/civil dispute disguised as
criminal case under SC/ST Act - Abuse of
process - offence appears civil in nature
and unconnected to caste identity, or is
instituted with mala fide intent, the High
Court can intervene under Section 482
CrPC-reference
answered
accordingly.
(Paras 3, 33, 35 and 36)

HELD:
Confronted by these two judgments, a learned
Judge of our Court, on 20.9.2023, referred the
matter to a Larger Bench after framing the
following questions:
"1. The first Question involved in this batch of
Applications under Section 482 of the Code of
Criminal Procedure, 1973 (for short, 'the Code')
is whether a challenge laid to the entire
proceedings of a case under the Scheduled
Castes and the Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of
Atrocities) Act, 1989 (for short, 'the SC/ ST Act')
with no challenge to any interlocutory order i.e.
a summoning order, would be within the
mischief of the rule laid down in answer to
Question No. (II) by the Full Bench in Ghulam
Rasool Khan v. St. of U.P. & ors., 2022 (8) ADJ
691 (FB) (LB).

## Text

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11 All. Abhishek Awasthi @ Bholu Awasthi Vs. State of U.P. & Anr.
369
conclusion was made that the petitioner
was not a competent person to get the patta
granted in her favour.

8. He next submitted that the
courts
below
have
acted
without
jurisidiction in cancelling the patta of the
petitioner under Section 198 (4) UPZA and
LR Act, while the said patta was granted in
favour of the petitioner for fisheries rights.

9. On the other hand, learned
Additional CSC for respondent State on the
basis of counter affidavit stated that on the
basis of resolution passed by the land
management committee, gata No.22/0.23
acre and 276 min./1.25 acre total 2 kita/1.48
land was allotted in faovur of the petitioner
and both these gatas pertain to the pond,
therefore, a report for cancelling the patta was
sent to the Court of District Magistrate, Kheri
under Section 198(4) UPZA and LR Act. The
District Magistrate, after hearing all the
parties, cancelled the allotment of patta vide
order dated 13.08.1990.

10. Against the order dated
13.08.1990, the petitioner preferred a revision
before the Additional Commissioner under
Section 333 of UPZA and LR Act, which was
dismissed vide judgment and order dated
27.10.1993. Against the said order, the
petitioner filed a review application, which
was also rejected vide order dated 14.12.1993
being devoid of merits.

11. He lastly submitted that there is
no illegality and infirmity in the impugned
orders and the same are just and valid. The
writ petition being misconceived, is liable to
be dismissed by this Hon'ble Court.

12.

I
have
considered
the
submissions advanced by learned counsel
for the parties and perused the material on
record.

13. On perusal of record, it is
transpired that the petitioner is not an
agriculturist labour nor has been allotted
land in the shape of pond for fisheries
rights. In fact, the land is a pond and
allotment of lease is to be granted in favour
of persons, who comes under the category
defined under the Act. The petitioner does
not come under the ambit nor is a landless
agriculturist. In fact, 3.42 hectare land has
been allotted in the name of petitioner's
husband Sri Awadhesh Kumar, who is
posted as Sub Divisional Officer in Tube
Well Department, therefore, lease cannot be
granted in his favour, therefore, no
illegality has been committed in passing the
impugned orders.

14. In view of above, the writ
petition
lacks
merit
and
is
hereby
dismissed.
----------
(2024) 11 ILRA 369
ORIGINAL JURISDICTION
CRIMINAL SIDE
DATED: ALLAHABAD 26.11.2024

BEFORE

THE HON'BLE SIDDHARTHA VARMA, J.
THE HON'BLE VINOD DIWAKAR, J.

Application U/S 482 No. 8635 of 2023
With other connected cases

Abhishek Awasthi @ Bholu Awasthi
 ...Applicant
Versus
State of U.P. & Anr. ...Opposite Parties

Counsel for the Applicant:
Jayant Kumar

Counsel for the Opposite Parties:
370 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
G.A.

Criminal law- reference to larger bench-
Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 - Section
482 - Inherent jurisdiction of High Court
- Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes
(Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989 -
Section 14-A - Scope of bar - Whether
application
under
Section
482
CrPC
maintainable in presence of appeal under
Section 14-A of SC/ST Act- SC/ST Act,
1989 - Section 14-A - Nature of remedy
- Bar on recourse to inherent jurisdiction
- Distinction between "not maintainable"
and
"not
liable
to
be
entertained"-
Jurisdiction under Section 482 CrPC is not
absolutely ousted by Section 14-A of the
SC/ST Act- Inherent Powers - Exercise in
cases of private/civil dispute disguised as
criminal case under SC/ST Act - Abuse of
process - offence appears civil in nature
and unconnected to caste identity, or is
instituted with mala fide intent, the High
Court can intervene under Section 482
CrPC-reference
answered
accordingly.
(Paras 3, 33, 35 and 36)

HELD:
Confronted by these two judgments, a learned
Judge of our Court, on 20.9.2023, referred the
matter to a Larger Bench after framing the
following questions:
"1. The first Question involved in this batch of
Applications under Section 482 of the Code of
Criminal Procedure, 1973 (for short, 'the Code')
is whether a challenge laid to the entire
proceedings of a case under the Scheduled
Castes and the Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of
Atrocities) Act, 1989 (for short, 'the SC/ ST Act')
with no challenge to any interlocutory order i.e.
a summoning order, would be within the
mischief of the rule laid down in answer to
Question No. (II) by the Full Bench in Ghulam
Rasool Khan v. St. of U.P. & ors., 2022 (8) ADJ
691 (FB) (LB).

2. The allied and second Question involved is
whether a challenge to a proceeding under the
SC/ ST Act can be laid before this Court through
an Application under Section 482 of the Code, in
view of the principle in the Full Bench in Ghulam
Rasool
Khan
(supra),
where
along
with
proceedings, the order taking cognizance and
summoning the applicant is also challenged.

3. The third and a corollary to the aforesaid
questions is: Whether there is a conflict of
opinion between the learned Single Judge of
this Court in Sushil Kumar Singh v. St. of U.P. &
anr., (2023) 123 ACC 544 and Devendra Yadav &
ors.v. St. of U.P. & anr., 2023 (5) ADJ 452,
necessitating reference to a larger bench."

Thus, what needs to be understood is that there
has to be a distinction between a proceeding
being "not maintainable" and "not liable to be
entertained". "Not being maintainable" would
mean that the proceedings would not lie at all,
whereas "not liable to be entertained" would
mean that the application, though it would lie,
shall not be entertained in the given facts of the
case. The distinction may seems to be fine, and
at times, it gets blurred, but nevertheless, it
does exist and has to be compulsorily kept in
mind. Whether an application involving the
inherent jurisdiction of the High Court is to be
entertained or not is a question to be
considered and answered case to a case basis in
the given facts- and circumstances of the case,
and no general proposition or straight jacket
formula could be laid down. The guiding
principle is whether, in the given case, the
continuance of proceedings would amount to
abuse of the process of the Court and/ or
whether interference of the High Court is
necessary to secure ends of justice. (Para 33)

The first Question is thus answered by holding
that there can be no hard and fast rule
regarding the interference of the High Court
under its inherent jurisdiction. The High Court
can if it finds that by interfering in a particular
case, it can prevent the misuse or abuse of the
Court or law, then it may always so interfere.
(Para 35)

We also would like to observe that Question
No.III by the Full Bench in Ghulam Rasool Khan
(supra) did not answer the aforesaid question.
Therefore, we answer accordingly; when a
challenge lies to the entire proceeding of a case
registered under the SC/ST Act, the High Court
could entertain the case under its inherent
jurisdiction to secure the end of justice. High
Courts are not merely Courts of law but also
11 All. Abhishek Awasthi @ Bholu Awasthi Vs. State of U.P. & Anr.
371
Courts of Justice, and as such, they possess
inherent powers to remove injustice. (Para 36)

As far as the answers to Questions nos.2 and 3
are concerned, we would like to mention that,
as has been held by the Supreme Court in
Gulam Mustafa (supra) decided on 10.5.2023;
the High Court can also look into the
correctness and validity of the summoning order,
etc., when it takes cognizance of the entire
proceeding under Section 482 Cr.P.C. However,
when the proceedings are not under challenge
under Section 482 Cr.P.C., the only course open
to an accused/applicant is to file an appeal
under Section 14-A of the SC/ST Act. (Para 37)

Reference answered accordingly. (E-14)

List of Cases cited:

1. Ramawatar Vs St. of M.P. reported in (2022)
13 SCC 635

2. Hitesh Verma Vs St. of Uttarakhand & anr.
reported in AIR 2020 SC 5584

3. Arnit Das Vs St. of Bihar reported in 2000 (5)
SCC 488

4. In Re: Provisions of Section 14-A of the
SC/ST (Prevention of Atrocities) Amendment
Act, 2015 (CRIMINAL WRIT - PUBLIC INTEREST
LITIGATION
No.8
of
2018)
decided
on
10.10.2018

5. Ghulam Rasool Khan & ors. Vs St. of U.P. &
ors. reported in AIR Online 2022 All 68 (FB)

6. Application U/S 482 Cr.P.C. No.11043 of 2023
(Devendra Yadav & ors. Vs St. of U.P. & anr.)

7. B.Venkateswaran & ors.Vs P. Bakthavatchalm
reported in AIR 2023 SC 262

8. Ram Gopal Vs St. of M.P. reported in AIR
Online 2021 SC 807

9. Gulam Mustafa Vs St. of Karn. reported in AIR
2023 SC (Criminal) 966

10. Prabhu Chawla Vs St. of Raj. & anr. reported
in (2016) 16 SCC 30

11. Madhu Limaye Vs St. of Mah. reported in
(1977) 4 SCC 551

12.
Punjab
St.
Warehousing
Corporation,
Faridkot
v.
Shree
Durga
Ji
Traders
&
ors.reported in (2011) 14 SCC 615

13. Satya Narayan Sharma Vs St. of Raj.
reported in (2001) 8 SCC 607

14. Asian Resurfacing of Road Agency Private
Ltd. & anr. Vs CBI reported in (2018) 16 SCC
299

15. Mohd. Hafiz Vs St. & ors. reported in 1977
(14) ACC 288

16. St. of Haryana & ors. Vs Bhajan Lal &
ors.reported in 1992 Supp. (1) SCC 335

17. R.P. Kapur Vs St. of Pun. AIR 1960 SC 866

18. Anuj Kumar @ Sanjay & ors. Vs St. of U.P. &
ors. passed by this Court in Application u/s 482
No.2763 of 2022

19. U.O.I. & ors. Vs G.M. Kokil & ors., (AIR 1984
SC 1022)

20. Smt. Usha Vs St. of U.P. & anr.(Criminal
Appeal No.10230 of 2023)

(Delivered by Hon'ble Siddhartha Varma, J.
&
Hon'ble Vinod Diwakar, J.)

1. In an application under section 482
of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973
(hereinafter referred to as the "Cr.P.C.")
being
Application
U/S
482
Cr.P.C.
No.43713 of 2022 (Sushil Kumar Singh v.
State of U.P. & Anr.), a learned Single
Judge,
while
deciding
the
case
on
22.3.2023, had held that an application
under section 482 Cr.P.C. filed for the
quashing of the entire proceedings of a
particular Sessions Trial which included the
offences under the provisions of Scheduled
Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of
372 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
Atrocities) Act, 1989 (hereinafter referred
to as the "SC/ST Act") would not be
maintainable in view of the provisions of
section 14-A of the SC/ST Act. In that
case, the learned Single Judge, after
referring to the judgments of Ramawatar
v. State of Madhya Pradesh reported in
(2022) 13 SCC 635, Hitesh Verma v.
State of Uttarakhand & Anr. reported in
AIR 2020 SC 5584, Arnit Das v. State of
Bihar reported in 2000 (5) SCC 488, In
Re: Provisions of Section 14-A of the
SC/ST
(Prevention
of
Atrocities)
Amendment Act, 2015 (CRIMINAL
WRIT
-
PUBLIC
INTEREST
LITIGATION No.8 of 2018) decided on
10.10.2018 and on Ghulam Rasool Khan
& Ors. v. State of U.P. & Ors. reported in
AIR Online 2022 All 68 (FB), concluded
that when an enactment for redressal of
grievances creates a statutory remedy, the
exercise of inherent powering by way of
entertaining a petition under section 482
Cr.P.C. could not be done.

2. However, another learned Single
Judge in another case, Application U/S
482 Cr.P.C. No.11043 of 2023 (Devendra
Yadav & Ors. v. State of U.P. & Anr.),
while deciding the case on 10.4.2023, had
held, again relying upon the judgments of
Ramawatar (supra) and specifically relying
upon paragraph nos.9 and 16 of that
judgment, that even if the statutory appeal
under section 14-A of the SC/ST Act was
available, the application under section 482
Cr.P.C. could be entertained keeping in
view the judgments of the Supreme Court
in
Ramawatar
(supra)
and
B.Venkateswaran
&
Ors.
v.
P.
Bakthavatchalm reported in AIR 2023 SC
262.

3. Confronted by these two judgments,
a learned Judge of our Court, on 20.9.2023,
referred the matter to a Larger Bench after
framing the following questions :

"1. The first Question involved in
this batch of Applications under Section
482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure,
1973 (for short, 'the Code') is whether a
challenge laid to the entire proceedings of
a case under the Scheduled Castes and the
Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities)
Act, 1989 (for short, 'the SC/ ST Act') with
no challenge to any interlocutory order i.e.
a summoning order, would be within the
mischief of the rule laid down in answer to
Question No. (II) by the Full Bench in
Ghulam Rasool Khan v. State of U.P. and
others, 2022 (8) ADJ 691 (FB) (LB).

2. The allied and second Question
involved is whether a challenge to a
proceeding under the SC/ ST Act can be
laid
before
this
Court
through
an
Application under Section 482 of the Code,
in view of the principle in the Full Bench in
Ghulam Rasool Khan (supra), where
along with proceedings, the order taking
cognizance and summoning the applicant is
also challenged.

3. The third and a corollary to the
aforesaid questions is: Whether there is a
conflict of opinion between the learned
Single Judge of this Court in Sushil Kumar
Singh v. State of U.P. and another, (2023)
123 ACC 544 and Devendra Yadav and
others v. State of U.P. and another, 2023
(5) ADJ 452, necessitating reference to a
larger bench."

4. While the facts of the leading case
of Abhishek Awasthi @ Bholu Awasthi in
Application U/S 482 No.8635 of 2023 were
taken into consideration while referring the
matter, learned Single Judge had also given
the gist of the other 19 cases, which were
before him.
11 All. Abhishek Awasthi @ Bholu Awasthi Vs. State of U.P. & Anr.
373

5. Learned counsel for the applicant in
the Application U/S 482 No.8635 of 2023
(Abhishek Awasthi @ Bholu Awasthi v.
State of U.P. & Anr.), Shri Jayant Kumar
has, while extending his arguments, drawn
the attention of the Court to the Question
No. (iii) which was framed in the judgment
of Ghulam Rasool Khan (supra), and the
same is being reproduced here as under:

"(iii)
Whether
an
aggrieved
person who has not availed of the remedy
of an appeal under the provisions of
Section 14 A of Act 1989 can be allowed to
approach the High Court by preferring an
application under the provisions of Section
482 of the Cr.P.C.? "

6. Learned counsel for the applicant
has submitted that the Full Bench of this
Court has held the answer to Question No.
(iii) would be in the negative. It was held
that an aggrieved person having remedy of
appeal under Section 14-A of the 1989 Act
could not be allowed to invoke the inherent
jurisdiction of this Court under Section 482
Cr.P.C. Learned counsel for the applicant
has submitted that the judgment of the Full
Bench has not considered the case of
Ramawatar
(supra).
He
has
relied
explicitly while referring to the judgment
of Ramawatar (supra), paragraphs nos.9
and 16 of it, and the same are being
reproduced here as under:

"9.
Having
heard
learned
Counsel for the parties at some length, we
are of the opinion that two questions fall
for our consideration in the present appeal.
First, whether the jurisdiction of this Court
under Article 142 of the Constitution can
be invoked for quashing of criminal
proceedings arising out of a 'noncompoundable
offence?
If
yes,
then
whether the power to quash proceedings
can be extended to offences arising out of
special statutes such as the SC/ST Act?

16. On the other hand, where it
appears to the Court that the offence in
Question, although covered under the
SC/ST Act, is primarily private or civil in
nature or where the alleged offence has
not been committed on account of the
caste of the victim, or where the
continuation of the legal proceedings
would be an abuse of the process of law,
the Court can exercise its powers to quash
the proceedings. On similar lines, when
considering a prayer for quashing on the
basis of a compromise/settlement, if the
Court is satisfied that the underlying
objective of the Act would not be
contravened or diminished even if the
felony in Question goes unpunished, the
mere fact that the offence is covered under
a 'special statute' would not refrain this
Court or the High Court, from exercising
their respective powers under Article 142
of the Constitution or Section 482
Cr.P.C."

7. Shri Kumar, Learned counsel for
the applicant, has also referred to the
judgment of Ram Gopal v. State of
Madhya Pradesh reported in AIR Online
2021 SC 807. This decision is dated
29.9.2021.
Learned
counsel
for
the
applicant has submitted, while referring to
paragraph 20 of that judgment, that
compounding
of
offences
where
the
occurrence involved could be categorized
as purely personal or was having overtones
of criminal proceedings of private nature
and also by looking into the nature of
injuries incurred therein, the powers under
section 482 Cr.P.C. could be invoked, and
the entire case could be quashed. He has
also relied upon the judgment of B.
Venkateswaran (supra) decided by the
Supreme Court on 5.1.2023. He has
374 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
submitted while referring to paragraph 3.0
that a purely civil dispute between the
parties
is
converted
into
criminal
proceedings, and the case is tried for
offences under sections 3(i)(v) and (v)(a) of
the SC/ST Act then definitely the Court can
interfere and stop the abuse of the process
of law and the Court. This judgment,
learned counsel stressed, has gone to the
extent of saying that the High Court should
quash
the
criminal
proceedings
in
exercising powers under section 482
Cr.P.C.
The
relevant
paragraphs
i.e.
paragraph nos.3.0 and 4.0 of the judgment
as has been relied on by the learned counsel
in
B.
Venkateswaran
(supra)
are
extracted here as under:

"3.0.
We
have
heard
Shri
Nagamuthu, learned senior counsel for the
appellants - original accused and the
respondent appearing in person. We have
also gone through the complaint and
considered the allegations in the complaint
made
against
the
accused.
Having
considered the allegations in the complaint
and the material on record, it appears that
initiation of the criminal proceedings by
the respondent against the appellants -
original accused for the offence under the
provisions of the Scheduled Castes and the
Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities)
Act, 1989 is nothing but an abuse of
process of law and the Court and also
provision of the Scheduled Castes and the
Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities)
Act, 1989. It appears that a private dispute
was going on between the parties with
respect to the illegal construction. As per
the allegations in the complaint, the
original complainant had purchased the
vacant land and constructed the building. It
is alleged that adjacent to his house and on
the common pathway, the accused have
unlawfully encroached upon the pathway
and started constructing the temple and
thereby have put up illegal construction on
his water pipeline, sewage pipeline and EB
Cable. In the entire complaint, there are no
allegations
that
the
complainant
is
obstructed and / or interfered with
enjoyment of his right on his property
deliberately and willfully knowing that
complainant belongs to SC/ST. From the
material on record, it appears that a civil
dispute is converted into criminal dispute
and that too for the offence under the
provisions of the Scheduled Castes and the
Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities)
Act, 1989. Prior to filing of the complaint,
it appears that the temple was already in
existence
since
many
years.
The
complainant, who resides adjacent to the
temple, filed WP No. 1272 of 2007 before
the Madras High Court. Pursuant to the
order passed by the High Court, the
Commissioner of Corporation, Chennai
conducted the inspection and found that
there was absolutely no encroachment by
the temple. It appears that thereafter the
complainant filed another Writ Petition No.
30326 of 2013 before the Madras High
Court. The High Court directed the official
respondent to proceed with the inquiry
against both the parties. At this stage, it is
required to be noted that it was the case on
behalf of the original accused that in fact
complainant had violated all building
norms and had constructed a building in
blatant violation of the set-back rules and
had also put up unauthorized construction
on the ground floor and first floor. That
thereafter, the Temple filed writ petition
being No.3322 of 2017 before the High
Court. The Division Bench of the High
Court vide order dated 10.2.2017 stayed
the proceedings against temple. It appears
that thereafter the complainant filed a
private complaint for the aforesaid offences
under the provisions of the Scheduled
11 All. Abhishek Awasthi @ Bholu Awasthi Vs. State of U.P. & Anr.
375
Castes
and
the
Scheduled
Tribes
(Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989. From
the aforesaid, it seems that the private civil
dispute between the parties is converted
into criminal proceedings. Initiation of the
criminal proceedings for the offences under
Sections 3(1)(v) and (va) of the Scheduled
Castes
and
the
Scheduled
Tribes
(Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989,
therefore, is nothing but an abuse of
process of law and Court. From the
material on record, we are satisfied that no
case for the offences under Sections 3(1)(v)
and (va) of the Scheduled Castes and the
Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities)
Act, 1989 is made out, even prima facie.
None of the ingredients of Sections 3(1)(v)
and (va) of the Scheduled Castes and the
Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities)
Act, 1989 are made out and/ or satisfied.
Therefore, we are of the firm opinion and
view that in the facts and circumstances of
the case, the High Court ought to have
quashed the criminal proceedings in
exercise of powers under Section 482 of the
Code
of
Criminal
Procedure.
The
impugned judgment and order passed by
the High Court, therefore, is unsustainable
and the same deserves to be quashed and
set aside and the criminal proceedings
initiated against the appellants deserves to
be quashed and set aside.

4.0. In view of the above and for
the reasons stated above, present appeal
succeeds. The impugned judgment and
order passed by the High Court dismissing
the writ petition is hereby quashed and set
aside. The criminal proceedings initiated
against the appellants, initiated by the
respondent herein - original complainant
for the offence under Sections 3(1)(v) and
(va) of the Scheduled Castes and the
Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities)
Act, 1989 including summons issued by the
learned Special Court in a private
complaint filed by the respondent herein
are hereby quashed and set aside. The
present appeal is allowed accordingly."

8. Learned counsel for the applicant
next referred to another judgment of the
Supreme Court passed in Hitesh Verma
(supra) and submitted that though the
object of the SC/ST Act was to improve the
socio-economic
conditions
of
the
Scheduled Caste and Scheduled Tribes, as
they were denied a number of civil rights,
and if the Court finds that due to a civil
dispute, proceedings under the SC/ST Act
has
been
initiated
then
the
entire
proceedings could be quashed. He further
submits that the Supreme Court had taken
cognizance of the matter and has held that
the application under section 482 Cr.P.C.
could
also
be
entertained
after
the
submission of even the charge sheet. Shri
Jayant Kumar, learned counsel for the
applicant, after that, referred to the Full
Bench judgment of this Court passed in In
Re: Provisions of Section 14(a) of SC/ST
(Prevention of Atrocities) Amendment
Act, 2015 reported in 2018 Cr.L.J. 5010
and invited the attention of the Court to the
questions as were reformulated for the
consideration of the Full Bench and the
same are being reproduced here as under
for easy understanding:

"The questions formulated for the
consideration of this Full Bench on the suo-
moto petition read thus:

"A. Whether by virtue of the
provisions of the Scheduled Castes and the
Scheduled Tribes (Amendment ) Act, 2015
the powers of the High Court under
Articles 226/227 or its revisional powers or
the powers under Section 482 Cr.P.C. shall
stand ousted?

B.
Whether
the
amended
provisions of Section 14 A would apply to
376 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
offenses
or
proceedings
initiated
or
pending prior to 26 January 2016?

C. Whether upon the expiry of the
period of limitation for filing of an appeal
as specified in the second proviso to
Section 14 (A) (3), Section 439 Cr.P.C. and
the powers conferred on the High Court in
terms thereof would stand revived.

D. Whether the power to directly
take cognizance of offenses shall be
exercisable by the existing Special Courts
other than the Exclusive Special Courts or
Special Courts to be specified under the
amended Section 14?"

9. Learned counsel without referring
to the facts of the case to save the Court's
time, straight referred to the answers
responded by the Full Bench of this Court,
which are extracted herein below:

"In light of the above discussion,
our answer to the Questions formulated are
as follows:

A. Whether provisions of subsection (2) of Section 14-A and the second
proviso to sub-section (3) of Section 14-A
of the Amending Act, are violative of
Articles 14 and 21 of the Constitution,
being unjust, unreasonable and arbitrary?

While we reject the challenge to
section 14A (2), we declare that the second
proviso to Section 14A (3) is clearly
violative of both Articles 14 and 21 of the
Constitution. It is not just manifestly
arbitrary, it has the direct and unhindered
effect of taking away the salutary right of a
first appeal which has been recognised to
be an integral facet of fair procedure
enshrined in Article 21 of the Constitution.
The absence of discretion in the Court to
consider condonation of delay even where
sufficient cause may exist renders the
measure wholly capricious, irrational and
excessive. It is consequently struck down.

B. Whether in view of the
provisions contained in Section 14-A of the
Amending Act, a petition under the
provisions of Article 226/227 of the
Constitution of India or a revision under
Section 397 of the Code of Criminal
Procedure or a petition under Section 482
Cr.P.C., is maintainable. OR in other
words, whether by virtue of Section 14-A of
the Amending Act, the powers of the High
Court under Articles 226/227 of the
Constitution or its revisional powers or the
powers under Section 482 Cr.P.C. stand
ousted ?

We therefore answer Question
(B)
by
holding
that
while
the
constitutional and inherent powers of this
Court are not "ousted" by Section 14A,
they cannot be invoked in cases and
situations where an appeal would lie
under Section 14A. Insofar as the powers
of the Court with respect to the revisional
jurisdiction is concerned, we find that the
provisions of Section 397 Cr.P.C. stand
impliedly excluded by virtue of the special
provisions made in Section 14A. This, we
hold also in light of our finding that the
word "order" as occurring in subsection(1) of Section 14A would also
include intermediate orders.

C.
Whether
the
amended
provisions of Section 14-A would apply to
offences
or
proceedings
initiated
or
pending prior to 26 January 2016?

We hold that the provisions of
Section 14A would be applicable to all
judgments, sentences or orders as well as
orders granting or refusing bail passed or
pronounced after 26 January, 2016. We
further clarify that the introduction of this
provision would not effect proceedings
instituted or pending before this Court
provided they relate to a judgment,
sentence or order passed prior to 26
January 2016. The applicability of Section
11 All. Abhishek Awasthi @ Bholu Awasthi Vs. State of U.P. & Anr.
377
14A does not depend upon the date of
commission
of
the
offence.
The
determinative factor would be the date of
the order of the Special Court or Exclusive
Court.

D. Whether upon the expiry of the
period of limitation for filing of an appeal
as specified in the second proviso to
Section 14-A (3), Section 439 Cr.P.C. and
the powers conferred on the High Court in
terms thereof would stand revived ?

We
hold
that
the
powers
conferred on the High Court under Section
439 Cr.P.C. do not stand revived. We find
ourselves unable to sustain the line of
reasoning adopted by the learned Judge in
Rohit that the provisions of Section 439
Cr.P.C. would remain in suspension during
the period of 180 days and thereafter revive
on its expiry. The conclusion so arrived at
cannot be sustained on any known
principle of statutory interpretation. We
are therefore, constrained to hold that both
Janardan Pandey as well as Rohit do not
lay down the correct law and must, as we
do, stand overruled.

E. Whether the power to directly
take cognizance of offences shall be
exercisable by the existing Special Courts
other than the Exclusive Special Courts or
Special Courts to be specified under the
amended Section 14?"

The existing Special Courts do
not have the jurisdiction to directly take
cognisance of offences under the 1989 Act.
This power stands conferred only upon the
Exclusive Special Courts to be established
or the Special Courts to be specified in
terms of the substituted section 14.
However it is clarified that the substitution
of Section 14 by the Amending Act does not
have the effect of denuding the existing
Special Courts of the authority to exercise
jurisdiction in respect of proceedings under
the 1989 Act. They would merely not have
the power to directly take cognizance of
offences and would be bound by the rigours
of Section 193 Cr.P.C. Even if cognizance
has been taken by the existing Special
Courts directly in light of the uncertainty
which prevailed, this would not ipso facto
render the proceedings void ab initio.
Ultimately it would be for the objector to
establish
serious
prejudice
or
a
miscarriage of justice as held in Rati Ram."

10. Referring to the answer to
Question "B", he specifically states that the
constitutional and inherent powers of this
Court can not be ousted by section 14-A of
the SC/ST Act. Further, he submits that
they can not be invoked in cases and
situations where the statutory appeal would
definitely lie under section 14-A of the
SC/ST Act.

11. Learned counsel for the applicant
thereafter referred to Ghulam Rasool
Khan's (supra) judgment and read out the
questions placed before that Full Bench.
The answers given by the Full Bench in
Ghulam Rasool Khan (supra) were also
read out and, therefore, after reproducing
the questions, we are also reproducing the
answers given by the Full Bench, and the
same are as follows:

QUESTIONS

"(i) Whether a Single Judge of
this Court while deciding Criminal Appeal
(Defective) No. 523/2017 In re : Rohit Vs.
State of U.P. and another vide judgment
dated 29.08.2017 correctly permitted the
conversion of appeal under Section 14 A of
the Act, 1989 into a bail application by
exercising the inherent powers under
Section 482 of the Cr.P.C.?

(ii) Whether keeping in view the
judgment of Rohit (supra), an aggrieved
378 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
person will have two remedies available of
preferring an appeal under the provisions
of Section 14 A of the Act, 1989 as well as
a bail application under the provisions of
Section 439 of the Cr.P.C.?

(iii) Whether an aggrieved person
who has not availed of the remedy of an
appeal under the provisions of Section 14 A
of Act, 1989 can be allowed to approach
the
High
Court
by
preferring
an
application under the provisions of Section
482 of the Cr.P.C.?

(iv) What would be the remedy
available to an aggrieved person who has
failed to avail the remedy of appeal under
the provision of Act, 1989 and the time
period for availing the said remedy has
also lapsed? "

ANSWERS

"(i) Question No.(I) is answered
in negative as Rohit Vs State of U.P. and
another, (2017) 6 ALJ 754 has been
overruled by Full Bench of this Court in In
Re : Provision of section 14 (a) of SC/ST
(Prevention of Atrocities) Amendment Act,
2015, (2018) 6 ALJ 631.

(ii) Question No.(II) is answered
in negative holding that an aggrieved
person will not have two remedies namely,
i.e. filing an appeal under Section 14-A of
the 1989 Act as well as filing a bail
application in terms of Section 439 Cr.P.C.

(iii)
Question
No.(III)
is
answered in negative holding that the
aggrieved person having remedy of appeal
under Section 14A of the 1989 Act, cannot
be allowed to invoke inherent jurisdiction
of this Court under Section 482 Cr.P.C.

(iv) Question No.(IV) - There will
be no limitation to file an appeal against an
order under the provisions of 1989 Act.
Hence, the remedies can be availed of as
provided."

12.
Shri
Jayant
Kumar,
learned
counsel for the applicant after that,
submitted that the judgment of Ghulam
Rasool Khan (supra) was passed on
28.7.2022 and that it had not taken into
consideration
the
judgments
of
the
Supreme Court in Hitesh Verma (supra)
dated 5.9.2020; Ram Gopal (supra) dated
21.9.2021 and Ramawatar (supra) dated
25.10.2021. He further submits that the
judgment of the Supreme Court in B.
Venkateswaran (supra) dated 5.1.2023
has categorically held that the complaints
for the offences under section 3(i)(v) and
(v)(a) of the SC/ST Act including the
summons issued by the learned Special
Court could be quashed under the inherent
powers of the High Court.

13. Learned counsel for the applicant
has also referred to a judgment of the
Supreme Court in Gulam Mustafa v. State
of Karnataka reported in AIR 2023 SC
(Criminal) 966 decided on 10.5.2023 and
has submitted that if there was a
miscarriage of justice by the filing of a case
under the provisions of the SC/ST Act then
the High Court could use its inherent
powers under section 482 Cr.P.C. or even
under the Constitution of India to quash the
FIR and this would also mean that the High
Court has powers to quash the charge sheet
and the order of cognizance in the case
therein.

14. Learned counsel for the applicant,
therefore, submitted that the answer to the
first Question referred by the learned
Single Judge in Application U/S 482
No.8635 of 2023 (Abhishek Awasthi @
Bholu Awasti v. State of U.P.) should be
that where the entire proceedings under the
SC/ST Act are to be quashed, the same can
be so done under the inherent powers of the
High Court i.e. under Articles 226 and 227
11 All. Abhishek Awasthi @ Bholu Awasthi Vs. State of U.P. & Anr.
379
of the Constitution of India and also under
section 482 Cr.P.C. He also submits,
relying upon the judgment of the Supreme
Court in B. Venkateswara (supra), that all
interlocutory orders, including summoning
orders, etc., etc., could be looked into by
the
High
Court
under
its
inherent
jurisdiction. He submits that Question No.3
in the case of Ghulam Rasool Khan
(supra), which was to the effect that
whether a person aggrieved by orders under
the SC/ST Act has not availed the remedy
of appeal, could be allowed to approach the
High Court by preferring an application
under the provisions of section 482 Cr.P.c.,
has been answered by saying that a person
who could, under section 14-A of the
SC/ST Act, file an appeal and if he has not
so done then he should not avail the
remedy of filing any application for
invoking the inherent jurisdiction of the
High Court. He, however, submits that
definitely, the provisions contained in
section 14-A of the SC/ST Act did not oust
the inherent jurisdiction of the High Court
if the remedy as per the judgments of the
Supreme Court in Hitesh Verma (supra);
Ram Gopal (supra); Ramawatar (supra),
B. Venakateswaran (supra) and Gulam
Mustafa (supra) under 482 Cr.P.C. are
available to the applicant.

15. While this case was being argued,
certain other members of the Bar have also
assisted the Court.

16. Shri Sushil Shukla, Advocate,
submitted that the Supreme Court in
Prabhu Chawla v. State of Rajasthan &
Anr. reported in (2016) 16 SCC 30 has
held that all inherent powers of the High
Court when there has been an abuse of the
process of Court could be used by the High
Court. He nest submitted that the only
limitation is self-restraint and nothing
more. He next submits that the judgment of
the Supreme Court in Prabhu Chawla
(supra) has relied upon the judgment of the
Supreme Court in Madhu Limaye v. State
of Maharashtra reported in (1977) 4 SCC
551. He further relied upon the judgment of
the Supreme Court in Punjab State
Warehousing Corporation, Faridkot v.
Shree Durga Ji Traders & Ors. reported
in (2011) 14 SCC 615 and has submitted
that the remedy of appeal against any order
provided under the Cr.P.C. or in any other
Act itself did not operate as an absolute bar
in entertaining an application under section
482 Cr.P.C. He again reiterated the law as
pointed out by the earlier counsel passed by
the Supreme Court in Ramawatar (supra)
and Ram Gopal (supra). He referred to the
judgment of the Supreme Court passed in
Satya Narayan Sharma v. State of
Rajasthan reported in (2001) 8 SCC 607,
which propounded that the inherent power
of the High Court under section 482
Cr.P.C. could not be exercised against the
express provisions of law enacted in any
special Act. He has submitted that the
judgment of the Supreme Court in Asian
Resurfacing of Road Agency Private
Ltd. & Anr. v. CBI reported in (2018) 16
SCC 299 has held that the inherent power
of a Court set up by the Constitution is a
power that inherits in such Court because it
is a superior Court of record and not
because it is conferred by the Cr.P.C. or
any other provision of law and states that
the law in Satya Narayan Sharma (supra)
has been overruled. The relevant paragraph
i.e. paragraph 54 of the judgment of the
Supreme Court in Asian Resurfacing of
Road Agency Pvt. Ltd. (supra), is being
reproduced here as under:

"It is thus clear that the inherent
power of a Court set up by the Constitution
is a power that inheres in such Court
380 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
because it is a superior court of record,
and not because it is conferred by the Code
of Criminal Procedure. This is a power
vested by the Constitution itself, inter alia,
under Article 215 as aforestated. Also, as
such High Courts have the power, nay, the
duty to protect the fundamental rights of
citizens
under
Article
226
of
the
Constitution, the inherent power to do
justice in cases involving the liberty of the
citizen would also sound in Article 21 of
the
Constitution.
This
being
the
constitutional position, it is clear that
Section 19(3)(c) cannot be read as a ban
on the maintainability of a petition filed
before the High Court under Section 482 of
the Code of Criminal Procedure, the nonobstante clause in Section 19(3) applying
only to the Code of Criminal Procedure.
The judgment of this Court in Satya
Narayan Sharma v. State of Rajasthan,
(2001) 8 SCC 607 at paragraphs 14 and 15
does not, therefore, lay down the correct
position in law. Equally, in paragraph 17
of
the
said
judgment,
despite
the
clarification that proceedings can be
"adapted" in appropriate cases, the Court
went on to hold that there is a blanket ban
on stay of trials and that, therefore, Section
482, even as adapted, cannot be used for
the aforesaid purpose. This, again, is
contrary to the position in law as laid down
hereinabove. This case, therefore, stands
overruled."

17. He, submits that inherent powers
being all pervasive, their exercise cannot be
barred against either the express or
alternative provisions engrafted within the
Cr.P.C. or in any other special enactment.
He, therefore, submits that the provisions
of section 14-A cannot operate as a
complete
bar
in
entertaining
any
application under section 482 Cr.P.C. for
quashing the criminal proceedings.

18. Shri V.P. Srivastava, a learned
Senior Advocate, also appeared in this case
and argued that in the celebrated case of
Mohd. Hafiz v. State & Ors.