# Abhishek Kumar Revisionist v. State Of U.P. & Anr

- **Citation:** (2016) 5 ILRA 946
- **Court:** High Court of Judicature at Allahabad
- **Decided:** 2016-05-30
- **Bench:** Suneet Kumar
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/allahabad-high-court/abhishek-kumar-revisionist-v-state-of-u-p-anr-44013
- **Pages:** 9

## Headnote

Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 Section 138 Negotiable Instrument Act, 1881 - Dishonour of cheque
- Insufficiency of funds - Penal provision - Construed strictly - Ingredients of the offence - Cheque
drawn on an account maintained by the accused - Discharge of a debt or other liability - Cheque returned
unpaid - Proviso to Section 138 - Cause of action - Cheque presented within the period of six months -
Written notice within thirty days - Failure to pay within fifteen days - Offence complete upon dishonour -
Prosecution deferred - Cognizance forbidden under Section 142 - Complaint filed before expiry of fifteen
5 All. Abhishek Kumar Vs State Of U.P. & Anr.

947
days - Does not disclose the cause of action - Court not competent to take cognizance - Section 27
General Clauses Act, 1897 - Presumption of service - Notice sent by registered post - Not necessary to
aver in the complaint - Section 142(b) - Period of one month - Excluding the date on which the cause of
action arose - Points pressed being purely factual cannot be gone into.

## Text

946 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
36. In the given facts and allegations made in the complaint would, in my opinion, not
make out an offence under Section 468. The complainant would himself allege that the
petitioners/accused are co-sharers of the disputed property and in respect thereof, some of the cosharers (petitioners 2 to 6) executed general power of attorney in favour of the first accused
(petitioner no. 1). Merely not disclosing in the deed that the complainant is also a co-sharer would
not tantamount to forgery.

37. The allegations in the complaint do not also made out the ingredients of an offence
under Section 506 IPC. Section 506 refers to intentional insult with intent to provoke breach
offence. The allegation in the complaint is that when the complainant enquried with the petitioners
about the power of attorney threatened to kill the complainant. The mother (petitioner no. 2) is aged
86 years, the sisters (petitioner nos. 3 to 6) are in their sixties, all the petitioners reside outside
Saharanpur and some outside the State, therefore, the averments in the complaint, if assumed to be
true, do not makeout an offence under Sections 468 and 506 IPC.

38. For the reasons stated above, petition is allowed. The complaint and the consequent
summoning order is, hereby quashed.

39. Cost assessed at Rs. 5,000/- to be paid by opposite party no. 2 to the petitioners.
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REVISIONAL JURISDICTION
CRIMINAL SIDE
DATED: ALLAHABAD 30.05.2016

BEFORE

THE HON'BLE SUNEET KUMAR, J.

Criminal Revision No.- 1427 Of 2016

Abhishek Kumar ...Revisionist
Versus
State Of U.P. & Anr. ...Opposite Parties

Counsel for the Revisionist:
Shiv Bahadur Singh

Counsel for the Opposite Parties:
G.A

Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 Section 138 Negotiable Instrument Act, 1881 - Dishonour of cheque
- Insufficiency of funds - Penal provision - Construed strictly - Ingredients of the offence - Cheque
drawn on an account maintained by the accused - Discharge of a debt or other liability - Cheque returned
unpaid - Proviso to Section 138 - Cause of action - Cheque presented within the period of six months -
Written notice within thirty days - Failure to pay within fifteen days - Offence complete upon dishonour -
Prosecution deferred - Cognizance forbidden under Section 142 - Complaint filed before expiry of fifteen
5 All. Abhishek Kumar Vs State Of U.P. & Anr.

947
days - Does not disclose the cause of action - Court not competent to take cognizance - Section 27
General Clauses Act, 1897 - Presumption of service - Notice sent by registered post - Not necessary to
aver in the complaint - Section 142(b) - Period of one month - Excluding the date on which the cause of
action arose - Points pressed being purely factual cannot be gone into.

1. Facts briefly stated is that the complainant opposite party no.2 filed a complaint on 14.5.2015 against the
applicant-revisionist contending that two cheques dated 29.9.2014 and 13.10.2014 respectively, were
returned by the Bank on 7.4.2015 for insufficient funds. On same date notice by registered post was sent,
the applicant did not pay the dues, thereafter, the present complaint was instituted.It is sought to be urged
that there was no cause of action for filing the complaint for the reason that the complaint was premature as
it was filed within 15 days from the date of notice dated 7.4.2015, the date of receipt of the notice was not
mentioned in the complaint, therefore, in terms of section 27 General Clauses Act, 1897, there would be a
presumption that the notice would be served within 30 days, therefore, the cause for filing the complaint
would have arisen on 22.5.2015 i.e. after a lapse of 45 days, further, the cheques were presented beyond
their statutory valid period, i.e cheques dated 29.9.2014 and 31.10.2014 were presented on 7.4.2015, the
validity period would be upto 29.12.2014 (three months) as per notification of Reserve Bank of India dated 1
April 2004.(Paras 2-3)

Held:(Paras- 21-25)

1. The basic provision of law involved in referring order before the Bench was proviso (c) to Section 138 and
142(b) of NI Act. The Court approved the ratio in Saketh India Ltd and others Vs. India Securities Ltd, (1999)
3 SCC 1, wherein it was held that while calculating the period of one month, which is prescribed under Section
142(b) of NI Act, the period has to be reckoned by excluding the date on which the cause of action arose.

2. In Saketh cheques dated 15.3.1995 and 16.3.1995 issued by the accused therein bounced when presented
for encashment. Notices were served on the accused on 29.9.1995. As per proviso (c) to Section 138 of the
NI Act, the accused were required to make the payment of the said amount within 15 days of the receipt of
the notice i.e on or before 14.10.1995. The accused failed to pay the amount. The cause of action, therefore,
arose on 15.10.1995. According to the complainant for calculating one month's period contemplated under
Section 142(b), the dated '15.10.1995', has to be excluded. The complaint filed on 15.11.1995 was, therefore,
within time. According to the accused, however, the date on which the cause of action arose i.e 15.10.1995
has to be included in the period of limitation and thus the complaint was barred by time.The Court referring to
several English decisions on the point observed that the principle of excluding the day from which the period
is to be reckoned is incorporated in Section 12(1) and (2) of the Limitation Act, 1963. This principle is also
incorporated in Section 9 of the General Clauses Act, 1897. The Court went to on to observe that ordinarily in
computing the time, the rule observed is to exclude the first day and to include the last. Following the said
rule in the facts before it, the Court excluded the date '15.10.1995' on which the cause of action had arisen
for counting the period of one month holding that the complaint was filed within the period of limitation.

3. The points pressed by the learned counsel being purely factual cannot be gone into by this court. As to
whether the plea that the cheque was presented beyond the statutory period cannot be considered at this
stage for the reason that the bank refused to honour the cheque due to insufficient funds and not for the
reason that the cheque was presented beyond the statutory period. For the law and reasons stated here in
above, the revision is dismissed.

Case Law discussed:

1. Dashrath Rupsingh Rathod v. State of Maharashtra,2014(9)SCC 129(Para 9)
948 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
2. Vinay Kumar Shailendra v. Delhi High Court Legal Services Committee,2014(10)SCC 708(Para 10)
3. Yogendra Pratap Singh v. Savitri Pandey, 2014 (10) SCC 713(Para 11)
4. C.C. Alavi Haji v. Palapetty Muhammed, (2007) 6 SCC 555(Para 17)
5. Pawan Kumar Ralli v. Maninder Singh Narula, (2014) 15 SCC 245(Para 18)
6. Jagdish Singh v. Natthu Singh, (1992) 1 SCC 647(Para 18)
7. State of M.P. v. Hiralal, (1996) 7 SCC 523(Para 18)
8. V. Raja Kumari v. P. Subbarama Naidu, (2004) 8 SCC 74(Para 18)
9. M/s Ajeet Seeds Ltd. v. K. Gopala Krishnaiah, (2014) 12 SCC 685(Para 19)
10. Shakti Travel and Tours V. State of Bihar and another (2002)9 SCC 415(Para 19)
11. M/s Econ Antri Ltd. v. M/s Rom Industries Ltd., (2014) 11 SCC 769(Para 19)
12. Saketh India Ltd. v. India Securities Ltd., (1999) 3 SCC 1(Para 21)

(Delivered by Hon'ble Suneet Kumar, J.)

1. Revision is directed against the summoning order dated 5 March 2016, in proceedings
under Section 138 Negotiable Instrument Act 1881 (in brief NI Act), P.S. Line Bazar, District
Jaunpur passed in Complaint Case No. 264 of 2015 (Vinod Kumar Tiwari Vs. Abhishek Kumar).

2. The facts briefly stated is that the complainant opposite party no.2 filed a complaint on
14.5.2015 against the applicant-revisionist contending that two cheques dated 29.9.2014 and
13.10.2014 respectively, were returned by the Bank on 7.4.2015 for insufficient funds. On same
date notice by registered post was sent, the applicant did not pay the dues, thereafter, the present
complaint was instituted.

3. It is sought to be urged that there was no cause of action for filing the complaint for the
reason that the complaint was premature as it was filed within 15 days from the date of notice dated
7.4.2015, the date of receipt of the notice was not mentioned in the complaint, therefore, in terms of
section 27 General Clauses Act, 1897, there would be a presumption that the notice would be
served within 30 days, therefore, the cause for filing the complaint would have arisen on 22.5.2015
i.e. after a lapse of 45 days, further, the cheques were presented beyond their statutory valid period,
i.e cheques dated 29.9.2014 and 31.10.2014 were presented on 7.4.2015, the validity period would
be upto 29.12.2014 (three months) as per notification of Reserve Bank of India dated 1 April 2004.

4. Section 138 N.I. Act is a penal provision, it must, therefore, be construed strictly, section
138 (2) enacting part of the provision makes it abundantly clear that what constitutes an offence
punishable with imprisonment and/or fine is the dishonour of a cheque for insufficiency of funds,
etc in the account maintained by the drawer with the bank for discharge of a debt or other liability
whether in full or part. The language used in the provision is unambiguous and the ingredients of
the offence clearly discernible namely (a) cheque is drawn by the accused on an account
maintained by him with a banker, (b) the cheque amount is in discharge of a debt or liability, and
(c) the cheque is returned unpaid for insufficiency of funds or that the amount exceeds the
arrangement made with the bank. Any dishonour falling within the four corners of the enacting
provision would be punishable without much ado.
5 All. Abhishek Kumar Vs State Of U.P. & Anr.

949
5. Section 138 is structured in two parts, the primary and the provisory. The contents of
the proviso place conditions on the operation of the main provision, while it does not form a
constituent of the crime itself, it modulates or regulates the crime in circumstances where,unless its
provisions are complied with, the already committed crime remains impervious to prosecution.
Section 142 employs the term "cause of action" as compliance with the three factors contained in
the proviso are essential for the cognizance of the offence, even though they are not part of the
action constituting the crime, therefore, so far as the offence itself, proviso has no role to play.

6. The proviso that comprises the second part of the provision, the following would
constitute "cause of action" referred to in sub-clause (b) above:

(a) The complainant has presented the chequefor payment within the
period of six months from the date of the issue thereof;

(b) The complainant has demanded thepayment of the cheque amount from
the drawer by issuing a written notice within thirty days of receipt of information by him
from the bank regarding the dishonour;

(c) The drawer has failed to pay the cheque amount within fifteen days of
the receipt of the notice.

7. A proper understanding of the scheme underlying the provision would thus make it
abundantly clear that while the offence is complete upon dishonour, prosecution for such offence is
deferred till the time the cause of action for such prosecution accrues to the complainant. The
proviso in that sense simply postpones the actual prosecution of the offender till such time he fails
to pay the amount within the statutory period prescribed for such payment.

8. The cause of action for prosecution will arise only when the period stipulated in the
proviso elapses without payment. Ingredients of the offence have got to be distinguished from the
conditions precedent for valid initiation of prosecution. The stipulations in the proviso must also be
proved certainly before the offender can be successfully prosecuted. But in the strict sense they are
not ingredients of the deemed offence under the body of Section 138 of the N.I. Act, though the
said stipulations must also be proved to ensure and claim conviction. It is in this sense that it is said
that the proviso does not make or unmake the offence under Section 138 of the NI Act. That is
already done by the body of the sections.

9. A three Judge Bench of Hon'ble Supreme Court in Dashrath Rupsingh Rathod Vs.
State of Maharashtra, 2014(9) SCC 129 in para 58 held as follows:

58.To sum up:
950 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
58. 1. An offence under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act 1881 is
committed no sooner a cheque drawn by the accused on an account being maintained by him in a
bank for discharge of debt/liability is returned unpaid for unsufficiency of funds or for the reason
that the amount exceeds the arrangement made with the bank.

58.2. Cognizance of any such offence is howeverforbidden under Section 142 of the
Act except upon a complaint in writing made by the payee or holder of the cheque in due course
within a period of one month from the date the cause of action accrues to such payee or holder
under clause (c) of proviso to section 138.

58.3. The cause of action to file a complaint accruesto a complainant/payee/holder
of a cheque in due course if:

(a) the dishonoured cheque is presented to thedrawee bank within a period of six
months from the date of its issue.

(b) if the complainant has demanded payment ofcheque amount within thirty days
of receipt of information by him from the bank regarding the dishonour of the cheque, and

(c) if the drawer has failed to pay the chequeamount within fifteen days of receipt
of such notice.

58.4. The facts constituting cause of action do notconstitute the ingredients of the
offence under Section 138 of the Act.

58.5. The proviso to section 138 simplypostpones/defers institution of criminal
proceedings and taking of cognizance by the court till such time cause of action in terms of clause
(c) of the proviso accrues to the complainant.

58.6. Once the cause of action accrues to thecomplainant, the jurisdiction of the
court to try the cause will be determined by reference to the place where the cheque is
dishonoured.

10. The ratio of Dashrath Rupsingh Rathod case was followed by a subsequent three
Judge Bench in Vinay Kumar Shailendra Vs. Delhi High Court Legal Services Committee and
another, 2014(10) SCC 708.

11. But subsequent three Judge Bench in Yogendra Pratap Singh Vs. Savitri Pandey and
another, 2014(10) SCC 713 was posed with the following question for consideration:

1.1 (I) Can cognizance of an offence punishable under Section 138 of the
Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 be taken on the basis of a complaint filed before the expiry of the
5 All. Abhishek Kumar Vs State Of U.P. & Anr.

951
period of 15 days stipulated in the notice required to be served upon the drawer of the cheque in
terms of Section 138(c) of the Act aforementioned? And,

1.2 (ii) If answer to question 1 is in the negative, can the complainant be permitted
to present the complaint again notwithstanding the fact that the period of one month stipulated
under Section 142(b) for the filing of such a complaint has expired?.

12. The Supreme court held that a complaint filed before expiry of 15 days from the date
on which the notice has been served on the drawer/accused cannot be said to disclose the cause of
action in terms of clause (c) of the proviso to Section 138 and upon such complaint which does not
disclose the cause of action the court is not competent to take cognizance.

13. Having answered the question no.1 in negative, the other question as to whether the
complainant can be permitted to present the complaint again notwithstanding the fact that the
period of one month stipulated under Section 142(b) for the filing of such a complaint has expired,
the Court held as follows:

"As we have already held that a complaint filed before the expiry of 15 days from
the date of receipt of notice issued under clause (c) of the proviso to Section 138 is not
maintainable, the complainant cannot be permitted to present the very same complaint at any later
stage. His remedy is only to file a fresh complaint; and if the same could not be filed within the time
prescribed under Section 142(b), his recourse is to seek the benefit of the proviso, satisfying the
court of sufficient cause".

14. Yogendra Pratap, however, does not notice the ratio of earlier three Judge Bench
decision in Dashrath and Vinay case, where it was held that the offence is complete the moment
the cheque is dishonoured, facts constituting cause of action do not constitute the ingredients of the
offence, whereas in Yogendra Pratap, it was held that "no offence can be said to have been
committed unless and until the period of 15 days, as prescribed under Section 138 proviso (c), has,
in fact, elapsed". Thus, the observations made in Yogendra Pratap to that effect is obitre. However
that would have no bearing on the ratio laid in Yogendra Pratap. The offence therefore, is
committed the moment the cheque issued by the drawer bounces, but the cause of action for
instituting the complaint is distinct and different from the offence. The complainant without having
a cause would not be able to maintain the complaint though the said stipulations must also be
proved to ensure and claim conviction. The commission of a crime is distinguishable from its
prosecution. In other words, the four or five concomitants of the section have to be in existence for
the initiation as well as the successful prosecution of the offence.

15. The principle of precedence should promptly and precisely be paraphrased. A
coordinate Bench is bound to follow the previously published view; it is certainly competent to add
to the precedent to make it logically and dialecticaly compelling. However, once a decision of a
larger Bench has been delivered it is that decision which mandatorily has to be applied; whereas a
coordinate Bench, in the event that it finds itself unable to agree with an existing ratio, is competent
952 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
to recommend the precedent for reconsideration by referring the case to the Chief Justice for
constitution of a larger Bench.

16. The next ground raised by the learned counsel for the applicant is that there is no proof
that either notice was served or it was returned un-served/unclaimed and that there is no averment
in the complaint about the same, therefore, there was no cause of action to prosecute the accused
under Section 138 NI Act.

17. In CC Alavi Haji V. Palapetty Muhammed and another( 2007) 6 SCC 555, a three
Judge Bench of the Supreme Court has conclusively decided this issue. It is held in this case that it
is not necessary to aver in the complaint that notice was served upon the accused.

18. Section 27 General Clauses Act 1887, gives rise to a presumption that service of notice
has been effected when it is sent to the correct address by registered post. However, NI Act does
not require that notice should only be given by post. (Refer Pawan Kumar Ralli Vs. Maninder
Singh Narula ,(2014) 15 SCC 245). Apex Court has already held that when a notice is sent by
registered post and is returned with a postal endorsement 'refused' or 'not available in the house' or
'house locked' or 'shop closed' or 'addressee not in station', due service has to be presumed. [Vide
Jagdish Singh Vs. Natthu Singh (1992) 1 SCC 647; State of M.P. Vs. Hiralal & Ors. (1996) 7
SCC 523 and V.Raja Kumari Vs. P.Subbarama Naidu & Anr. (2004) 8 SCC 74]. It is,
therefore, manifest that in view of the presumption available under Section 27 of the Act, it is not
necessary to aver in the complaint under Section 138 of the Act that service of notice was evaded
by the accused or that the accused had a role to play in the return of the notice unserved.

19. The principle laid down in C.C. Alavi Haji was reiterated and reaffirmed by the
Supreme Court in M/s Ajeet Seeds Ltd Vs. K. Gopala Krishnaiah, 2014 (12) SCC 685, wherein
the judgement rendered by two Judge Bench in Shakti Travel and Tours V. State of Bihar and
another (2002)9 SCC 415 taking a contrary view was overruled.

20. The point finally raised is regarding the computation of one month period
prescribed under Section 142(b) N.I Act. In M/s Econ Antri Ltd Vs. M/s Rom Industries
Ltd and another, ( 2014) 11 SCC 769, a three Judge Bench of the Apex Court was called
upon to consider "whether for calculating the period of one month which is prescribed under
Section 142(b), the period has to be reckoned by excluding the date on which the cause of
action arose?"

21. The basic provision of law involved in referring order before the Bench was
proviso (c) to Section 138 and 142(b) of NI Act. The Court approved the ratio in Saketh India
Ltd and others Vs. India Securities Ltd, (1999) 3 SCC 1, wherein it was held that while
calculating the period of one month, which is prescribed under Section 142(b) of NI Act, the
period has to be reckoned by excluding the date on which the cause of action arose.
5 All. Abhishek Kumar Vs State Of U.P. & Anr.

953
22. In Saketh cheques dated 15.3.1995 and 16.3.1995 issued by the accused therein
bounced when presented for encashment. Notices were served on the accused on 29.9.1995. As
per proviso (c) to Section 138 of the NI Act, the accused were required to make the payment of
the said amount within 15 days of the receipt of the notice i.e on or before 14.10.1995. The
accused failed to pay the amount. The cause of action, therefore, arose on 15.10.1995.
According to the complainant for calculating one month's period contemplated under Section
142(b), the dated '15.10.1995', has to be excluded. The complaint filed on 15.11.1995 was,
therefore, within time. According to the accused, however, the date on which the cause of
action arose i.e 15.10.1995 has to be included in the period of limitation and thus the complaint
was barred by time.

23. The Court referring to several English decisions on the point observed that the
principle of excluding the day from which the period is to be reckoned is incorporated in
Section 12(1) and (2) of the Limitation Act, 1963. This principle is also incorporated in Section
9 of the General Clauses Act, 1897. The Court went to on to observe that ordinarily in
computing the time, the rule observed is to exclude the first day and to include the last.
Following the said rule in the facts before it, the Court excluded the date '15.10.1995' on which
the cause of action had arisen for counting the period of one month holding that the complaint
was filed within the period of limitation. Para 20 and 25 of the report is as follows:

 "20. As the Limitation Act is held to be not applicable to N.I Act, drawing
parallel from Tarun Prasad Chatterjee where the Limitation Act was held not applicable, we
are of the opinion that with the aid of Section 9 of the General Clauses Act, 1897, it can be
safely concluded in the present case that while calculating the period of one month which is
prescribed under Section 142(b) of the N.I Act, the period has to be reckoned by excluding the
date on which the cause of action arose.

25. Having considered the question of law involved in this case in proper
perspective, in light of relevant judgements, we are of the opinion that Saketh lays down the
correct proposition of law. We hold that for the purpose of calculating the period of one
month, which is prescribed under Section 142(b) of the N.I Act, the period has to be reckoned
by excluding the date on which the cause of action arose. We hold that SIL Import USA does
not lay down the correct law."

24. The points pressed by the learned counsel being purely factual cannot be gone into
by this court. As to whether the plea that the cheque was presented beyond the statutory period
cannot be considered at this stage for the reason that the bank refused to honour the cheque due
to insufficient funds and not for the reason that the cheque was presented beyond the statutory
period.

25. For the law and reasons stated here in above, the revision is dismissed. However,
dismissal of the revision shall not preclude the revisionist from raising all the points herein
above before the Magistrate concerned.
954 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
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APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CRIMINAL SIDE
DATED: ALLAHABAD 31.05.2016

BEFORE

THE HON'BLE MRS. RANJANA PANDYA, J.

Jail Appeal No.- 440 Of 2016

Dileep Verma ...Appellant
Versus
State Of U.P. ...Respondent

Counsel for the Appellant:
From Jail, P.S. Pundir (Ac)

Counsel for the Respondent:
Govt. Advocate

Criminal appeal - Inordinate delay in lodging the F.I.R. - Missing report not on record - Delay of about
19 days - Fatal for the prosecution case - Age of the victim - Photocopy of mark-sheet - Not proved -
Rule 12 of Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Rules, 2007 - Medical evidence - Ossification
report - Age opined about 18 years - Above the age of consent - Testimony of prosecutrix -
Contradictions - Statement under Section 164 Cr.P.C. and statement before trial court - Not in consonance
- Medical evidence - No injuries - Recovery of victim - Doubtful - Prosecution case - Doubtful and
unreliable - Benefit of doubt - Acquittal.

1. In brief the case of the prosecution as set up in the first information report lodged by Smt. Reshami Devi
w/o Late Shiv Bachan Verma at Police Station Sahatwar, District- Ballia is that Dileep Verma s/o Ram Kishun
Verma, resident of village Chhotaki Seriya, Police Station Bansdeeh Kotwali, District Ballia, who claimed
himself to be conjurer used to come to her house for conjuring. He was aged about 35 years. On 05.06.2014,
when she had gone to Ballia in connection with her treatment and his daughter, the victim aged about 14
years was alone in the house, then Dileep Verma, the accused enticed her away. Her daughter was having
mobile number 9839341137. She along with her family members made hectic search, but whereabouts of the
victim could not be known. On the basis of aforesaid report, Ext.Ka-1, chik FIR was registered, Ext. Ka-4,
which was entered in G.D. Ext. Ka-6 and case was registered. After registration of the case, the investigation
of the case was entrusted to S.I. Ram Phool Yadav, PW-4. He copied the chik FIR and entered the same in
the case diary. Thereafter, he recorded the statement of chik scriber Vinod Kumar Pradhan and informant
Smt. Reshmi Devi and entered the same in the case diary. On the pointing out of the informant, he inspected
the spot and prepared the site plan, which was proved as Ext.Ka-3. High School marksheet of the victim was
made available to him by the informant, according to which her date of birth is 18.09.2002. After the recovery
of the victim, she was sent for medical examination on 13.09.2014. On 15.09.2014, the statement of the
victim was got recorded under Section 164 Cr.P.C., which was entered into the case diary on the order of the
court. After completing the investigation, he submitted the charge sheet against the accused-appellant under
Sections 363, 366, 376 IPC and Section 3/4 POCSO Act, which was proved as Ext. Ka-4. (Paras 2-3)

2. In the absence of the academic record, as per the rules formulated under Juvenile Justice (Care and
Protection of Children) Rules, 2007, the court has to revert back to the medical evidence. The ossification