# Abhishek Kumar Yadav Revisionist(In Jail) v. State of U.P. & Anr

- **Citation:** (2020) 10 ILRA 115
- **Court:** High Court of Judicature at Allahabad
- **Decided:** 2019-09-21
- **Case number:** Criminal Revision No. 1221 of 2019
- **Bench:** J.J. Munir
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/allahabad-high-court/abhishek-kumar-yadav-revisionist-in-jail-v-state-of-u-p-anr-44977
- **Pages:** 9

## Headnote

Children) Act, 2015- Section 12(1)- Bail of
juvenile- Clause that disentitles a child to
bail, where his release would defeat the
ends of justice - The clause " defeat the
ends of justice"- Is to be associated with
the ground realities of dispensing justice
where the offender is a child in conflict
with law, bearing in mind the object of the
Act - The legislature has been conscious
of the fact that the society too has to be
protected against the depredations of
juvenile offenders. A juvenile offender,
particularly, above the age of 16 years
about whom the Act now makes a
distinction, is sometimes to be tried as an
adult , if he has the ability to understand
the consequences of the offence and is
capable of committing the offence- Where
the statute disentitles a child in conflict
with law to bail on the ground that his
release would lead to ends of justice being
defeated, it requires the Court to take into
consideration different factors. One of
them is certainly the gravity of the
offence. The other is its impact on the
society or locale where it is committed.
The gravity of the offence committed
works and serves as a guide to grant or
refuse bail in conjunction with other
relevant factors to refuse bail on the
ground that release would "defeat the
ends of justice".

The disentitling Clause to Section 12(1) of the
Act has been consciously used by the legislature
to disentitle a juvenile to bail where his offence
is grave and his release would have an adverse
impact on the society.

Parity-
Not
applicable
in
cases
of
juveniles in conflict with law- It must be
remarked that the rule of parity , which
normally applies in cases of bail under
Sections 437 or 439 Cr.P.C, may not be
attracted to the case of a child in
conflict with law, where another child in
conflict in the same crime is granted the
concession of bail, under the Act. This is
for the reason that in the case of bail to
a
juvenile,
in
matters
where
the
entitlement to bail is not on merits but
by virtue of the provisions of Section 12
(1) of the Act, the right is always
personal to the accused.
116 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
The rule of parity cannot be made applicable in
cases
of
bail
of

juveniles
since
the
circumstances of every juvenile differ and
conclusions may be different in respect of the
same offence for a similar role. ( Para 11, 12,
16)

Criminal Revision Rejected. (E-3)

Case Law/ Judgements relied upon:-

## Text

10 All. Abhishek Kumar Yadav Vs. State of U.P. & Anr.
115
as expressions of opinion on merits of the
charge. It is for the Juvenile Justice Board,
holding trial, to determine independently
irrespective of anything said here, what is
proved by evidence led on behalf of the
prosecution. It would always be the
prosecution's burden to establish the
charges beyond reasonable doubt. What has
been said here is in the context of the bail
plea, and nothing more.

13. In the result, this revision fails and
is dismissed. The Juvenile Justice Board,
Etawah,
considering
the
period
of
detention, shall conclude the trial by the
31st of December, 2020.

14. Let a copy of this order be
communicated to the Juvenile Justice
Board,
Etawah
through
the
learned
Sessions Judge, Etawah by the Joint
Registrar (Compliance).
----------
(2020)10ILR A115
REVISIONAL JURISDICTION
CRIMINAL SIDE
DATED: ALLAHABAD 21.09.2019

BEFORE

THE HON'BLE J.J. MUNIR, J.

Criminal Revision No. 1221 of 2019

Abhishek Kumar Yadav
 ...Revisionist(In Jail)
Versus
State of U.P. & Anr. ...Opposite Parties

Counsel for the Revisionist:
Sri Anand Prakash Srivastava, Sri Matiur
Rehman Khan, Sri Sugendra Kumar Yadav

Counsel for the Opposite Parties:
A.G.A.

Juvenile Justice ( Care and Protection of
Children) Act, 2015- Section 12(1)- Bail of
juvenile- Clause that disentitles a child to
bail, where his release would defeat the
ends of justice - The clause " defeat the
ends of justice"- Is to be associated with
the ground realities of dispensing justice
where the offender is a child in conflict
with law, bearing in mind the object of the
Act - The legislature has been conscious
of the fact that the society too has to be
protected against the depredations of
juvenile offenders. A juvenile offender,
particularly, above the age of 16 years
about whom the Act now makes a
distinction, is sometimes to be tried as an
adult , if he has the ability to understand
the consequences of the offence and is
capable of committing the offence- Where
the statute disentitles a child in conflict
with law to bail on the ground that his
release would lead to ends of justice being
defeated, it requires the Court to take into
consideration different factors. One of
them is certainly the gravity of the
offence. The other is its impact on the
society or locale where it is committed.
The gravity of the offence committed
works and serves as a guide to grant or
refuse bail in conjunction with other
relevant factors to refuse bail on the
ground that release would "defeat the
ends of justice".

The disentitling Clause to Section 12(1) of the
Act has been consciously used by the legislature
to disentitle a juvenile to bail where his offence
is grave and his release would have an adverse
impact on the society.

Parity-
Not
applicable
in
cases
of
juveniles in conflict with law- It must be
remarked that the rule of parity , which
normally applies in cases of bail under
Sections 437 or 439 Cr.P.C, may not be
attracted to the case of a child in
conflict with law, where another child in
conflict in the same crime is granted the
concession of bail, under the Act. This is
for the reason that in the case of bail to
a
juvenile,
in
matters
where
the
entitlement to bail is not on merits but
by virtue of the provisions of Section 12
(1) of the Act, the right is always
personal to the accused.
116 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
The rule of parity cannot be made applicable in
cases
of
bail
of

juveniles
since
the
circumstances of every juvenile differ and
conclusions may be different in respect of the
same offence for a similar role. ( Para 11, 12,
16)

Criminal Revision Rejected. (E-3)

Case Law/ Judgements relied upon:-

1. Mangesh Rajbhar Vs St. Of U.P & anr., 2018
(2) ACR 1941.

2. Monu @ Moni @ Rahul @ Rohit Vs St. Of U.P,
2011 (74) ACC 353

3. Om Prakash Vs St. Of Raj & anr. (2012) 5
SCC 201 : 2012 (2) ACR 1825 (SC)

(Delivered by Hon'ble J.J. Munir, J.)

1. This revision is directed against the
order of Mr. Gajendra Kumar, First
Additional Sessions Judge, Deoria dated
17.01.2019 dismissing Criminal Appeal
No. 55 of 2018 and affirming an order of
the Juvenile Justice Board, Deoria dated
06.12.2018, declining bail to the revisionist
in Case Crime No. 37 of 2018 under
Sections 147, 149, 302, 323, 353, 307/34
I.P.C., P.S. Bhatpar Rani, District Deoria.

2. This revision was admitted to
hearing on 28.03.2019 and notice to the
complainant-opposite party was directed to
issue
vide
order
dated
28.03.2019.
According
to
office
report
dated
18.07.2019, service has been effected
personally, evidenced by the report placed
at flag ''X'. The report marked by flag ''X' is
a report dated 03.05.2019, submitted by the
Chief Judicial Magistrate, Deoria which
indicates that the second opposite party,
Jitendra Yadav has been personally served.
A copy of the notice issued bearing
acknowledgment
of
service
is
also
enclosed. Service upon the second opposite
party is, therefore, held sufficient. No one
appears on behalf of the second opposite
party.

3. The prosecution originates in the
FIR dated 20.04.2018, giving rise to Case
Crime No. 37 of 2018, last mentioned. This
FIR was lodged by the second opposite
party at half past nine on 20.04.2018
reporting an incident of the said date, that
occurred at 3:00 o'clock in the evening
hours. The first informant/opposite party
no. 2, Jitendra Yadav, who is the brother of
the two deceased, described the occurrence
in the FIR thus: The informant, Jitendra
Yadav was a native of village Jiraso, P.S.
Bhatpar
Rani,
district
Deoria.
On
20.04.2018 in the day hours, his younger
brothers Rakesh Kumar Yadav, Rajkumar
Yadav, sons of Jiut Yadav, Dileep Yadav s/o
Jiut Yadav, Durgesh s/o Shree Kant Yadav,
all residents of village Jiraso were all ready
to depart for a nearby place called Vahoran
ka Tola, where at a certain Shambhu's place
they were invited to a feast in connection
with a Tilak. They had proceeded to
destination and on way reached a place
Bandhe, at about 3:00 p.m. There, the
accused Sunil Yadav s/o Nanhoo @
Vreejanand, Vimlesh Yadav s/o Dhurendra
Yadav, Kamlesh Yadav s/o Surendra Yadav,
Rajesh Yadav s/o Jamuna Yadav, Nand Ji
Yadav s/o Jamuna Yadav, Chandrabhan
Yadav s/o Mahaveer Yadav, Vikash Yadav
s/o Nanhoo @ Vreejanand Yadav, Vijay
Yadav s/o Rampravesh Yadav, Abhishek
Yadav s/o Amresh Yadav, Jayprakash
Yadav s/o Jamuna Yadav, Parbhas Yadav
s/o Indrashan Yadav, all natives of village
Jiraso, armed with iron rods and pipes, with
a common intention to do the informant's
brothers to death, surrounded the victim's
on all sides and assaulted them. It is alleged
that
the
informant's
brother,
Rakesh
attempted to escape in order to save his life
10 All. Abhishek Kumar Yadav Vs. State of U.P. & Anr.
117
but was surrounded on all sides. He was
cornered in front of one Subhash Yadav's
house and battered to death by the accused,
employing the iron rods and pipes. The
informant's other brother Rajkumar was
surrounded by the assailant's at the door of
one Mundeerika Gaud and was battered to
death on the spot, assaulted by the rods and
pipes. The two others Dileep and Durgesh
were battered by the assailants, injuring
them grievously. Dileep collapsed on the
spot and fainted. It is also reported that the
other victim, Durgesh had disappeared.

4. The revisionist applied to the
Juvenile Justice Board that he be declared a
juvenile. The Board, by their order dated
15.11.2018, declared the revisionist a juvenile
aged 17 years 9 months and 19 days on the
date of occurrence. The revisionist then
moved the Juvenile Justice Board for bail but
his bail plea was rejected. An appeal was
carried to the Sessions Judge, under Section
101 of the Juvenile Justice (Care and
Protection of Children) Act, 2015 (for short,
''the Act') which has been dismissed by means
of the order impugned, passed by the learned
First Additional Sessions Judge, Deoria.

5. Aggrieved, this revision has been
preferred.

6. Heard Mr. M.R. Khan, learned
counsel for the revisionist and the learned
A.G.A. appearing on behalf of the State.

7. It is submitted by Mr. Khan, learned
counsel for the revisionist that there is no
cavil about the matter that the revisionist is a
juvenile, duly adjudicated to be so by the
Juvenile Justice Board. He submits that the
courts below have committed a manifest error
of law in proceeding to refuse bail to the
revisionist, looking to the gravity of the
offence that is quite irrelevant in the case of a
juvenile. So far as a juvenile is concerned,
according to Mr. Khan, the rule is that he is
entitled to bail. It is only when his case falls
under one or the other dis-entitling category
under Section 12(1) of the Act that his bail
plea may legitimately be refused.

8. Learned A.G.A. on the other hand
has resisted the revision and said that it is not
a case where the orders impugned ought to be
interfered with.

9. This Court has keenly considered the
rival submissions and perused the record.

10. It is true that so far as a juvenile is
concerned, his plea for bail is to be judged on
parameters quite different from that of an
adult. Section 12 of the Juvenile Justice Act
certainly envisages bail as a rule to every
juvenile/child in conflict with law. It is also
true that unless the bail plea of a juvenile fails
to pass muster under the three dis-entitling
conditions postulated under the proviso to
Section 12 (1) of the Act, bail ought not to be
refused to a child in conflict with the law.
Section 12 of the Act is quoted in extenso:

"12. Bail to a person who is
apparently a child alleged to be in
conflict with law.--(1) When any person,
who is apparently a child and is alleged to
have committed a bailable or non-bailable
offence, is apprehended or detained by the
police or appears or brought before a
Board, such person shall, notwithstanding
anything contained in the Code of Criminal
Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974) or in any other
law for the time being in force, be released
on bail with or without surety or placed
under the supervision of a probation officer
or under the care of any fit person:

Provided that such person shall
not be so released if there appears
reasonable grounds for believing that the
118 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
release is likely to bring that person into
association with any known criminal or
expose the said person to moral, physical or
psychological danger or the person's release
would defeat the ends of justice, and the
Board shall record the reasons for denying
the bail and circumstances that led to such
a decision.

(2) When such person having
been apprehended is not released on bail
under sub-section (1) by the officer incharge of the police station, such officer
shall cause the person to be kept only in an
observation home in such manner as may
be prescribed until the person can be
brought before a Board.

(3) When such person is not
released on bail under sub-section (1) by
the Board, it shall make an order sending
him to an observation home or a place of
safety, as the case may be, for such period
during the pendency of the inquiry
regarding the person, as may be specified
in the order.

(4) When a child in conflict with
law is unable to fulfil the conditions of bail
order within seven days of the bail order,
such child shall be produced before the
Board for modification of the conditions of
bail."

11. Here, the juvenile is aged 17 years
9 months and 19 days. He is clearly above
the age of 16 years. Before turning to a
consideration of the two dis-entitling
categories that speak about the child in
conflict,
upon
release,
coming
into
association with any known criminal or
being exposed to moral, physical or
psychological danger, this Court thinks that
this case is one that requires to be tested
first on the anvil of the clause, that disentitles a child to bail, where his release
would defeat the ends of justice. Now,
"defeat the ends of justice" employed in the
proviso to section 12(1) of the Act, is not a
word of art. It is to be associated with the
ground realities of dispensing justice in
cases where the offender is a child in
conflict with the law, bearing in mind the
object of the Act. The statute is no doubt
enacted to safeguard the interests of young
offenders, who are yet not adults. Still, the
legislature has been conscious of the fact
that the society too has to be protected
against
the
depredations
of
juvenile
offenders
whose
misdirected
and
abounding enthusiasm, replete with energy,
enters a wrong channel or pursuit and
threatens society.

12. A juvenile offender, particularly,
above the age of 16 years about whom the
Act now makes distinction, is sometimes to
be tried as an adult, if he has the ability to
understand the consequences of the offence
and is capable of committing the offence.
That apart, where the statute disentitles a
child in conflict with law to bail on the
ground that his release would lead to ends
of justice being defeated, it requires the
Court to take into consideration different
factors. One of them is certainly the gravity
of the offence. The other is its impact on
society or the locale where it is committed.
To illustrate, if the juvenile perpetrator of a
gruesome rape or murder is allowed to
walk free the day following he commits the
offence, the shock it would administer to
the society's conscience and the feeling of
unrequited justice, it would leave behind,
lingering in the minds of the aggrieved or
the bereaved family, would certainly lead to
ends of justice being defeated. Here, this
Court finds, though limited to the purpose
of adjudicating the revisionist's bail plea,
that it is a case of a double murder
committed brazenly without any fear of the
authority of law and in association with a
number of other accused, whose figure is
10 All. Abhishek Kumar Yadav Vs. State of U.P. & Anr.
119
indicted to be eleven, nominated. The
manner of perpetration of the offence is
gruesome. The determination of each of the
offenders is so abiding that it has led to two
lives being extinguished, one after the
other, in the same transaction of crime.
Prima facie the two murders were not the
end of it, as the two surviving victims were
also battered and inflicted with grievous
injuries. In a crime like this, if the
revisionist were allowed to walk free
because he is short by two months and an
odd number of days of his eighteenth
birthday, the ends of justice, in the opinion
of this Court, would most certainly be
defeated.

13. I had occasion to consider this
issue in Mangesh Rajbhar vs. State of
U.P. and another, 2018(2) ACR 1941,
where it was held:

"24. This court from what appears
on a furter (sic further) reading of the
judgment in Raja (minor) (supra) did not
construe the last of the three grounds for
the refusal of bail to a juvenile in the
proviso to Section 12(1) of the Act ejusdem
generis; rather, this court in that case
referred to the merits of the case and
related the ground for denying bail to the
juvenile being released on bail "would
defeat the ends of justice" with the merits
of the prosecution case. In other words, this
Court found in the expression "defeat the
ends of justice" a repose for the society to
defend itself from the onslaught of a minor
in conflict with law by certainly making
relevant though not decisive, the inherent
character of the offence committed by the
minor. In this connection paragraph nos. 11,
12 and 13 of the judgment in Raja (minor)
(supra) may be gainfully quoted.

"11. The report of the medical
examination of the victim clearly shows
that the revisionist had forced himself upon
the victim, who was seven years old child
and in the statements under sections 161
Cr.P.C. and 164 Cr.P.C., the child had
clearly deposed about how she was taken
away by the revisionist and later on caught
on the spot by the public and he pretended
to be taking a bath. In the orders impugned,
there is specific mention about the fact that
the revisionist was accused by name by the
victim, who was studying in class II and the
release on bail of the revisionist would
defeat the ends of justice.

12. Having gone through the
record of the case including statement
under section 161 Cr.P.C. and the statement
under section 164 Cr.P.C. given by the
victim and also the report of the medical
examination of the victim, which shows
penetration by force and resultant injury, I
am of the opinion that there is no legal
infirmity in the orders impugned as the
release on bail of the revisionist would
indeed defeat the ends of justice.

13. No doubt, the Juvenile Justice
Act is a beneficial legislation intended for
reform of the juvenile/child in conflict with
the law, but the law also demands that
justice should be done not only to the
accused, but also to the accuser."

25. It is not that this aspect of the
gravity of the offence has been considered
irrelevant to the issue of grant or refusal of
bail to a minor in the past and before the
present Act of 2015 came into force. In a
decision of this Court under the Juvenile
Justice Act, 2000 where the interest of the
society were placed seemingly not on a
level of playing field with the juvenile, this
Court in construing the provisions of
Section 12 in that Act that were pari
materia to Section 12 of the Act in the
matter of grant of bail to a minor held in
the case of Monu @ Moni @ Rahul @
Rohit v. State of U.P., 2011 (74) ACC 353
120 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
in paragraph Nos. 14 and 15 of the report
as under:

"14. Aforesaid section no where
ordains that bail to a juvenile is a must in
all cases as it can be denied for the
reasons"......if there appears reasonable
grounds for believing that the release is
likely to bring him into association with
any known criminal or expose him to
moral, physical or psychological danger or
that his release would defeat the ends of
justice."

15. In the light of above statutory
provision bail prayer of the juvenile
revisionist has to be considered on the
surrounding
facts
and
circumstances.
Merely by declaration of being a juvenile
does not entitle a juvenile in conflict with
law to be released on bail as a matter of
right. The Act has a solemn purpose to
achieve betterment of juvenile offenders but
it is not a shelter home for those juvenile
offenders
who
have
got
criminal
proclivities and a criminal psychology. It
has a reformative approach but does not
completely
shun
retributive
theory.
Legislature has preserved larger interest of
society even in cases of bail to a juvenile.
The Act seeks to achieve moral physical
and psychological betterment of juvenile
offender and therefore if, it is found that the
ends of justice will be defeated or that goal
desired by the legislature can be achieved
by detaining a juvenile offender in a
juvenile home, bail can be denied to him.
This is perceptible from phraseology of
section 12 itself. Legislature in its wisdom
has therefore carved out exceptions to the
rule of bail to a juvenile."

26. The Hon'ble Supreme Court
in the case of Om Prakash vs. State of
Rajasthan and another, (2012) 5 SCC
201: 2012 (2) ACR 1825 (SC) has brought
in due concern in matters relating to
juveniles where the offences are heinous
like rape, murder, gang-rape and the like
etc., and, has indicated that in such matters,
the nature and gravity of the offence would
be relevant; the minor cannot get away by
shielding himself behind veil of minority. It
has been held in Om Prakash (supra) by
their Lordships thus:

"3. Juvenile Justice Act was
enacted with a laudable object of providing
a separate forum or a special court for
holding trial of children/juvenile by the
juvenile court as it was felt that children
become delinquent by force of circumstance
and not by choice and hence they need to
be treated with care and sensitivity while
dealing and trying cases involving criminal
offence. But when an accused is alleged to
have committed a heinous offence like rape
and murder or any other grave offence
when he ceased to be a child on attaining
the age of 18 years, but seeks protection of
the
Juvenile
Justice
Act
under
the
ostensible plea of being a minor, should
such an accused be allowed to be tried by a
juvenile court or should he be referred to a
competent court of criminal jurisdiction
where the trial of other adult persons are
held.

23. ...... Similarly, if the conduct
of an accused or the method and manner of
commission of the offence indicates an evil
and a well planned design of the accused
committing the offence which indicates
more towards the matured skill of an
accused than that of an innocent child, then
in the absence of reliable documentary
evidence in support of the age of the
accused, medical evidence indicating that
the accused was a major cannot be allowed
to be ignored taking shelter of the principle
of benevolent legislation like the Juvenile
Justice Act, subverting the course of justice
as statutory protection of the Juvenile
Justice Act is meant for minors who are
innocent law breakers and not accused of
10 All. Abhishek Kumar Yadav Vs. State of U.P. & Anr.
121
matured mind who uses the plea of minority
as a ploy or shield to protect himself from
the sentence of the offence committed by
him."

27. It seems thus that the
suggestion of the learned counsel for the
revisionist that bail to a juvenile or more
properly called a child in conflict with law
can be denied under the last ground of the
proviso to Section 12 ejusdem generis with
the first two and not with reference to the
gravity of the offence, does not appear to
be tenable. The gravity of the offence is
certainly relevant though not decisive. It is
this relevance amongst other factors where
gravity of the offence committed works and
serves as a guide to grant or refuse bail in
conjunction with other relevant factors to
refuse bail on the last ground mentioned in
the proviso to Section 12 (1) of the Act,
that is to say, on ground that release would
"defeat the ends of justice".

28. Under the Act, as it now
stands there is further guidance much more
than what was available under the Act,
2000 carried in the provisions of Section 15
and 18 above extracted and the definition
of certain terms used in those sections. A
reading of Section 18 of the Act shows that
the case of a child below the age of 16
years, who has committed a heinous crime
as defined in the Act is made a class apart
from cases of petty offence or the serious
offence committed by a child in conflict
with the law/juvenile of any age, and, it is
further provided that various orders that
may be made by the Board as spelt out
under clause (g) of Section 15 depending
on nature of the offences, specifically the
need for supervision or intervention based
on circumstances as brought out in the
social investigation report and past conduct
of the child. Though orders under Section
18 are concerned with final orders to be
made while dealing with the case of a
juvenile, the same certainly can serve as a
guide to the exercise of power to grant bail
to a juvenile under Section 12(1) of the Act
which is to be exercised by the Board in the
first instance.

29. Read in the context of the fine
classification of juveniles based on age visa-vis the nature of the offence committed
by them and reference to a specifically
needed supervision or intervention, the
circumstances brought out in the social
investigation report and past conduct of the
child which the Board may take into
consideration, while passing final orders
under Section 18 of the Act it is, in the
opinion of this court, a good guide for the
Board while exercising powers to grant bail
to go by the same principles though
embodied in Section 18 of the Act, when
dealing with a case under the last part of
the proviso to Section 12 (1) that authorizes
the Board to deny bail on ground that
release of the juvenile would "defeat the
ends of justice."

30. Thus, it is no ultimate rule
that a juvenile below the age of 16 years
has to be granted bail and can be denied the
privilege only on the first two of the
grounds mentioned in the proviso, that is to
say, likelihood of the juvenile on release
being likely to be brought in association
with any known criminal or in consequence
of being released exposure of the juvenile
to moral, physical or psychological danger.
It can be equally refused on the ground that
releasing a juvenile, that includes a juvenile
below 16 years would "defeat the ends of
justice." In the opinion of this Court the
words
"defeat
the
ends
of
justice"
employed in the proviso to Section 12 of
the Act postulate as one of the relevant
consideration, the nature and gravity of the
offence though not the only consideration
in applying the aforesaid part of the
disentitling legislative edict. Other factors
122 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
such as the specific need for supervision or
intervention, circumstances as brought out
in the social investigation report and past
conduct of the child would also be relevant
that are spoken of under Section 18 of the
Act.

31. In this context Section 12 and
18 and also Section15 (Section 15 not
relevant in the case of a child below 16
years) and other relevant provisions all of
which find place in Chapter IV of the Act
are part of an integrated scheme. The power
to grant bail to a juvenile under Section
12(1) cannot be exercised divorced from
the other provisions or as the learned
counsel for the revisionist argues on the
other specific disentitling provisions in the
grounds mentioned in the proviso to
Section 12(1) of the Act. The submission
made based on the rule of ejusdem generis
urged by the learned counsel for the
revisionist is misplaced, in the opinion of
this Court."

14. A reading of the Social Investigation
Report also leaves an impression on the
Court's mind that the revisionist may be disentitled on the two other grounds, as well.
The learned Additional Sessions Judge has
examined that report and concluded against
the revisionist. This Court is inclined to agree
with the learned Additional Sessions Judge.

15. Mr. Khan invited the attention of the
Court to the fact that another co-accused,
Vikash Yadav, also a child in conflict with
law, with an identical role, had the favour of
this Court in Criminal Revision No. 3265 of
2019 decided on 27.07.2020, where orders
refusing him bail by the Courts below, were
overturned and he was allowed to go free on
bail.

16. This Court has carefully perused the
judgment and order of His Lordship, Gautam
Chowdhary, J. in the Criminal Revision, last
mentioned. It must be remarked that the rule
of parity, which normally applies in cases of
bail under Sections 437 or 439 Cr.P.C., may
not be attracted to the case of a child in
conflict with law, where another child in
conflict in the same crime is granted the
concession of bail, under the Act. This is for
the reason that in the case of bail to a
juvenile, in matters where the entitlement to
bail is not on merits but by virtue of the
provisions of Section 12(1) of the Act, the
right is always personal to the accused. It is
not that for an identical role, two children in
conflict with law, would both pass muster
under the proviso to the Section 12(1) of the
Act. In the case of one, the Court may infer
based on the Social Investigation Report, the
police record and other circumstances that
release on bail would not bring the young
offender into association with a known
criminal or expose him to moral, physical or
psychological danger, but in the case of the
other, the conclusion may be diametrically
the opposite, considering the circumstances
of the child. The circumstances that could
differ could be the criminal history of a
family, the presence of family members in
one case, who could be expected to exercise
good care and control over the child in future
and the absence of such family members in
the other case. The varying company of the
two
children
shown
in
the
Social
Investigation Report could also lead to
different results in case of two children,
accused of the same offence, with the same
role.

17. Likewise, on the third disentitling factor about ends of justice
being defeated on account of release,
conclusions may be different in respect of
the same offence for a similar role. This
would
again
be
the
personal
circumstances
of
the
child.
10 All. Akash @ Nirmal Mishra Vs. State of U.P. & Anr.
123

18. This Court is of opinion that in
relation to the last of the three dis-entitling
features, the present case is an apt
illustration of a very valid distinction
between the case of co-accused, Vikash
Yadav (minor) and the revisionist here. In
the case of Vikash Yadav (minor), the child
in conflict with the law was aged 13 years 9
months and 16 days on the date of
occurrence, whereas in the present case, he
is hardly two and a half month short of
majority. More than that, the child in
conflict in Vikash Yadav (minor) (supra)
was found to be a disabled child with 57%
physical disability. These factors, in the
opinion of this Court, would work to
illustrate the point that in cases of juvenile
justice, the rule of parity in bail matters
would not operate the way it does, in cases
under Section 437 or 439 Cr.P.C.

19. In the result, this Court does not
find any good ground to interfere with the
impugned orders. This revision fail and is
dismissed.

20. It is, however, clarified that
anything said in this matter will not affect
the rights of parties on merits and the
Juvenile Justice Board or the Children's
Court trying the offence, would be free to
reach its conclusions at the trial, based on
the evidence led, unaffected by anything
said here.

21. However, looking to the period of
detention of the revisionist, it is directed
that trial pending before the concerned
court be concluded expeditiously and
preferably within three months from the
date of receipt of a copy of this order, in
accordance with Section 309 Cr.P.C. and in
view of principle laid down in the judgment
of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of
Vinod Kumar v. State of Punjab reported
in 2015 (3) SCC 220, if there is no legal
impediment.

22. It is made clear that in case the
witnesses are not appearing, the concerned
court shall initiate necessary coercive
measures for ensuring their presence.

23. Let a copy of the order be
certified to the court concerned for strict
compliance to the Board or the Court
concerned, through the learned Sessions
Judge, Deoria by the Joint Registrar
(Compliance).
----------
(2020)10ILR A123
REVISIONAL JURISDICTION
CRIMINAL SIDE
DATED: ALLAHABAD 05.10.2020

BEFORE

THE HON'BLE J.J. MUNIR, J.

Criminal Revision No. 1944 of 2019

Akash @ Nirmal Mishra
 ...Revisionist(In Observation Home)
Versus
State of U.P. & Anr. ...Opposite Parties

Counsel for the Revisionist:
Sri Babu Lal Ram, Sri Phool Singh Yadav

Counsel for the Opposite Parties:
A.G.A.

Juvenile Justice ( Care and Protection of
Children ) Act, 2015- Section 12- Bail of
Juvenile- Relevant considerations for-
Last disentitling clause- " defeat the ends
of justice"- About the factum of the
incident, there is reasonable assurance at
this stage, short of the charge being
tested at the trial- It is true that the
merits of the case or prima facie tenability
of the charge, like an adult, is not entirely
decisive to the fate of the bail plea- It is
not altogether irrelevant-The gravity of