# Abhishek Singh & Anr v. State of U.P. & Anr

- **Citation:** (2023) 6 ILRA 78
- **Court:** High Court of Judicature at Allahabad
- **Decided:** 2023-05-01
- **Case number:** Criminal Appeal No. 1513 of 2021
- **Bench:** Ajai Kumar Srivastava-I
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/allahabad-high-court/abhishek-singh-anr-v-state-of-u-p-anr-50449
- **Pages:** 8

## Headnote

Criminal Law - Indian Penal Code, 1860 -
Sections 304, 326, 323 & 506 - Scheduled
Caste and Scheduled Tribe (Prevention of
Atrocities) Act, 1989 - Sections 3(2)(V) -
Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled
Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Rules,
1995 - Rules 7(2) - Appeal against
rejection of default bail - FIR was lodged
against four accused persons including
appellants - Appellants were arrested on
26.06.2021, produced before Court on
same day, remanded to judicial custody,
sent to jail - According to appellants,
period of 60 days as provided in Rule 7(2)
of Rules, 1995 was completed on
25.08.2021 and by that date, no police
report was submitted - Therefore, on
26.08.2021,
appellants
moved
application, seeking default bail on
ground
that
investigation
was
not
concluded within said period - Rejected
- Impugned order - Held, an inference
that provision contained in Rule 7(2),
whereby
Investigating
Officer
is
expected
to
conclude
investigation
within 60 days irrespective of nature of
offence
and
punishment,
has
an
overriding
effect
over
provision
contained in Section 167(2), and in
absence of any provision contained in
Act, 1989 or Rules, 1995 which excludes
application of provision contained in
Section 167, especially Section 167(2)
can't be drawn because such inference
would be against Act, 1989 & Rules,
1995 - Therefore, period for concluding
investigation
would
be
90
days
according to Section 167(2) - Appeal
lacks merit, dismissed. (Para 4, 18, 20)

Criminal Appeal dismissed. (E-13)

List of Cases cited:

## Text

78 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
regarded as jejune. Such cases do create a
thunder and lightening having the effect
potentiality of torrential rain in an
analytical mind. The law expects the
judiciary to be alert while admitting these
kind of accused persons to be at large and,
therefore, the emphasis is on exercise of
discretion judiciously and not in a
whimsical manner."

41. It is argued on behalf of State that
the co-accused Sushil Kumar Tiwari
against whom the present applicant is
claiming the parity had criminal history of
four cases while the applicant has a
criminal history of 14 cases to his credit.
Therefore, the applicant cannot claim parity
on this score also.

42. In view of the above, the criminal
history of the applicant, which includes the
offenses of heinous nature, is also taken
into consideration.

43. Learned A.A.G. Sri Manish Goyal
submitted that the Vikroo massacre took
place within the limits of notified area
under the U.P. Dacoity Affected Area Act
and the provision under Section 10 of the
Act be also taken into consideration.

44. The relevant portion of the Act is
quoted below:-

"10.Special provisions regarding
bail- Notwithstanding anything contend in
the code of criminal procedure, 1973, no
person accused or convicted of a scheduled
offence shall, if in custody be released on
bail or on his own bonds unless

(a) The prosecution has given an
opportunity to oppose the application for
bail, and
(b) Where the prosecution
opposes the application for bail, the court
is satisfied that there are reasonable
grounds for believing that he is not guilty of
such offence......"

45. Therefore, it is concluded that on
the basis of above discussion, it is clear that
the nature of the offence and amount of
culpability is serious and heinous. The
applicant has criminal history of cases of
heinous nature to his credit. The applicant
is actively involved in the incident in which
eight police personnel including the Circle
Officer, Bilhore, were done to death
mercilessly
and
seven
others
police
personnel received grievous injury. The
applicant actually assisted the main accused
Vikas Dubey by providing him Rs. 2 lakh
and 25 cartridges to be used in the incident.
Further, the applicant also promised and
provided vehicles to slain accused Vikas
Dubey for his safe journey to his next
destination after committing one of the
most heinous crimes. Therefore, I do not
find any sufficient reason to allow the bail
application of the present applicant. The
bail application of the present applicant Jay
Kant Bajpai @ Jay is rejected.

46. Any observation made above shall
not be treated as any finding on the merit
and shall not prejudice the trial.
----------
(2023) 6 ILRA 78
APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CRIMINAL SIDE
DATED: LUCKNOW 01.05.2023

BEFORE

THE HON'BLE AJAI KUMAR SRIVASTAVA-I, J.

Criminal Appeal No. 1513 of 2021

Abhishek Singh & Anr. ...Appellants
Versus
State of U.P. & Anr. ...Respondents

Counsel for the Appellants:
6 All. Abhishek Singh & Anr. Vs. State of U.P. & Anr.
79
Rahul Srivastava, Amit Kumar Awasthi,
Ipsha Mishra, Sushil Kumar Singh, Vivek
Tiwari

Counsel for the Respondents:
G.A., Dileep Kumar Yadav, Suresh Kumar
Yadav

Criminal Law - Indian Penal Code, 1860 -
Sections 304, 326, 323 & 506 - Scheduled
Caste and Scheduled Tribe (Prevention of
Atrocities) Act, 1989 - Sections 3(2)(V) -
Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled
Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Rules,
1995 - Rules 7(2) - Appeal against
rejection of default bail - FIR was lodged
against four accused persons including
appellants - Appellants were arrested on
26.06.2021, produced before Court on
same day, remanded to judicial custody,
sent to jail - According to appellants,
period of 60 days as provided in Rule 7(2)
of Rules, 1995 was completed on
25.08.2021 and by that date, no police
report was submitted - Therefore, on
26.08.2021,
appellants
moved
application, seeking default bail on
ground
that
investigation
was
not
concluded within said period - Rejected
- Impugned order - Held, an inference
that provision contained in Rule 7(2),
whereby
Investigating
Officer
is
expected
to
conclude
investigation
within 60 days irrespective of nature of
offence
and
punishment,
has
an
overriding
effect
over
provision
contained in Section 167(2), and in
absence of any provision contained in
Act, 1989 or Rules, 1995 which excludes
application of provision contained in
Section 167, especially Section 167(2)
can't be drawn because such inference
would be against Act, 1989 & Rules,
1995 - Therefore, period for concluding
investigation
would
be
90
days
according to Section 167(2) - Appeal
lacks merit, dismissed. (Para 4, 18, 20)

Criminal Appeal dismissed. (E-13)

List of Cases cited:
1.
M.
Ravindran
Vs
Intelligence
Officer,
Directorate of Revenue Intelligence, AIR 2020
SC 5245

2. Gyanendra Maurya Vs U.O.I. & ors., 2023 SCC
Online All 46, (Para 22 to 27)

3. Bhavnagar University Vs Palitana Sugar Mill
Pvt. Ltd. & ors., AIR 2003 SC 511

(Delivered by Hon'ble Ajai Kumar
Srivastava-I, J.)

1. Heard Sri Amit Kumar Awasthi,
learned counsel for the appellants, Sri
Dileep Kumar Yadav, learned counsel for
the opposite party no.2, Sri Alok Saran,
learned A.G.A. for the State and Sri S.S.
Rajawat Advocate
and
Sri
Saksham
Agarwal, Advocates,
who
have
also
addressed this Court on the question of law
involved in this case.

2. The instant Criminal Appeal is filed
under Section 14 A(2) of The Scheduled
Castes and the Scheduled and Tribes
(Prevention
of Atrocities) Act,
1989
(hereinafter referred to as 'Act, 1989') to
assail the order dated 10.09.2021 passed by
learned Special / A.D.J., S.C./S.T. Act,
Lakhimpur Kheri in Bail Application under
Section 167 of Code for default bail read
with Rule 7(2) of The Scheduled Castes
and the Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of
Atrocities)
Rules,
1995
(hereinafter
referred
to
as
'Rules,
1995')
dated
26.08.2021 in Crime No.566/2021, under
Sections 304, 326, 323, 506 I.P.C. and
Section 3(2)(V) of Act, 1989, Police
Station Kotwali Sadar, District Lakhimpur
Kheri.

3. The only short question, which fell
for consideration, is whether the period
provided for completion of investigation
relating to offence(s) under Act, 1989 shall
80 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
be governed by the Rule 7(2) of Rules,
1995 and in the event of non-submission of
police report under Section 173(2) of Code
within 60 days as provided in Rule 7(2) of
Rules, 1995, irrespective of nature of
offence(s)
and
punishment
provided
therefor, an accused/appellant shall be
entitled to be released on default bail as
provided in Section 167(2) of Code of
Criminal Procedure (hereinafter referred to
as 'Code') ?

4. Brief facts leading to this criminal
appeal are that a first information report
bearing Case Crime No.0566 of 2021 came
to be lodged against four accused persons
including the present appellants. The
appellants were arrested on 26.06.2021 and
were produced before the learned Court
concerned on the same day. Thereafter, they
were remanded to judicial custody and
were sent to jail. According to the present
appellants, the period of 60 days as
provided in Rule 7(2) of Rules 1995 came
to be completed on 25.08.2021 and by that
date, no police report under Section 173(2)
of Code was submitted before the learned
Special Court concerned. Therefore, on
26.08.2021, the present appellants moved
an application, seeking default bail as
provided in Section 167(2) of Code before
the learned Special Court concerned on the
ground that the investigation was not
concluded within the period of 60 days as
provided in Rule 7(2) Rules, 1995 and no
charge sheet came to be submitted within
the period of 60 days, therefore, the
appellants were entitled to default bail as
provided in Section 167(2) of Code. It also
appears from the perusal of memo of
instant appeal that according to the present
appellants, the charge sheet came to be
submitted against the present appellants on
26.08.2021.
However,
ultimately
the
application seeking default bail under
Section 167(2) of Code came to be rejected
by means of impugned order dated
10.09.2021.

5. It is submitted by learned counsel
for the appellants that the impugned order
is patently illegal insofar as the same has
been passed without due application of
judicial mind and in utter violation of
provision contained in Rule 7(2) of Rules,
1995.

6. His further submission is that the
impugned order dated 10.09.2021 itself
reveals the fact that in this matter charge
sheet came to be filed in the learned trial
court on the 61st day. Learned trial court
took
cognizance
of
the
matter
and
proceeded accordingly, however, by means
of impugned order dated 10.09.2021,
learned trial court rejected the application
moved by the appellants seeking default
bail which, according to learned counsel for
the appellants, the appellants were entitled
to, in view of provision contained in
Section 7(2) of Rules, 1995. He has also
submitted that learned trial court fell in
error in holding that since it is a case of
default bail, it shall necessarily be governed
by the provision contained in Section
167(2) of Code and the period prescribed
for concluding the investigation would be
90 days having regard to the punishment
provided for the offence under Section 304
& 326 I.P.C.

7. He further submits that having
regard to the fact that the investigation in
this matter relates to offences under Act,
1989 also and this being special Act,
provisions contained thereunder in form of
Rule 7(2) of Rules, 1995 shall have
overriding effect over the provisions
contained in Section 167(2) of Code,
therefore, their application seeking default
6 All. Abhishek Singh & Anr. Vs. State of U.P. & Anr.
81
bail ought to have been allowed by the
learned trial Court.

8. In order to substantiate the aforesaid
submissions, reliance has been placed on
judgment rendered by Hon'ble the Supreme
Court in the case of M. Ravindran Vs.
Intelligence
Officer,
Directorate
of
Revenue Intelligence1 wherein it has been
held that in case, an accused has already
applied for default bail, the prosecution
cannot
defeat
enforcement
of
its
indefeasible right by subsequently filing
final report/additional complaint or report
seeking extension of time.

9. Per contra Sri Dileep Kumar Yadav,
learned counsel for the opposite party nos.2
and Sri Alok Saran, learned A.G.A. for the
State have vehemently opposed the prayer
by submitting that the object behind
incorporating Rule 7(2) Rules 1995 is
nothing but to ensure the speedy and time
bound conclusion of investigation of
offence(s) pertaining to Act, 1989. Their
submission is that there is no specific
provision for default bail in Act, 1989 or
the Rules, 1995, therefore, as default bail
was being sought under 167(2) of Code, it
necessarily had to be dealt with in
accordance with the provision contained in
Section 167(2) of Code and the period
prescribed for conclusion of investigation
regarding various offence(s) in Section
167(2) of Code would necessarily apply in
this case also. They, therefore, submit that
in this view of the matter, the impugned
order is a reasoned and well discussed
order wherein no interference by this Court
is warranted.

10. Sri S.S. Rajawat and Sri Saksham
Agarwal, Advocates have also submitted
that there is no provision either in Act,
1989 or in Rules, 1995 which expressly
excludes the provision contained in Section
167 of Code. Their further submission is
that a Division Bench of this Court in the
case of Gyanendra Maurya vs. Union of
India and others2 has held that unless
expressly barred, the provisions of Code
shall be applicable while trying the cases
under the Act, 1989. Therefore, their
submission is that the learned trial Court
has rightly rejected the application seeking
default bail on account of applicability of
Section 167 of Code.

11. They have also submitted that in
absence of any explicit provision like
Section 36-A (4) of Narcotic Drugs and
Psychotropic
Substances
Act,
1985
(hereinafter referred to as 'N.D.P.S. Act')
which has provided for extended period for
concluding investigation in certain cases
under N.D.P.S. Act, the provision contained
in Section 167 of Code shall have
application in respect of investigation
concerning offence(s) under Act, 1989.

12. So far as the issue of applicability
of Code of Criminal Procedure before the
Exclusive/Special Court created under Act,
1989 is concerned, a Division Bench of this
Court in the case of Gyanendra Maurya
(supra) in paragraph nos.22 to 27 has held
as under :-

"22. In the Act 1989 or the Rules
of 1995, the procedure to be followed by
these Courts under the Act 1989 has not
been prescribed. Such procedure has been
prescribed in the Code 1973 which
contains the general law relating to
criminal procedure.

23. In this context it is relevant to
refer to Section 4 of the Code 1973 which
reads as under:

"4. Trial of offences under the
Penal Code, 1860 and other laws. (1) All
82 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
offences under the Penal Code, 1860 (45 of
1860) shall be investigated, inquired into,
tried, and otherwise dealt with according to
the provisions hereinafter contained.

(2) All offences under any other
law shall be investigated, inquired into,
tried, and otherwise dealt with according to
the same provisions, but subject to any
enactment for the time being in force
regulating
the
manner
or
place
of
investigating, inquiring into, trying or
otherwise dealing with such offences."

24. Section 5 of the Code 1973
reads as under:

"5. Saving. Nothing contained in
this Code shall, in the absence of a
specific provision to the contrary, affect
any special or local law for the time being
in force, or any special jurisdiction or
power conferred, or any special form of
procedure prescribed, by any other law for
the time being in force."

25. As per Sections 4 and 5 of
Code 1973 all offences under any other law
(which shall include the Act, 1989) shall be
investigated, inquired, tried and otherwise
dealt with according to the Code of
Criminal Procedure subject to there being
any enactment on the subject containing a
specific provision to the contrary. We find
that certain provisions of the Code 1973
have specifically been excluded from their
application to the proceedings under the
Act, 1989. Section 18 of the Act 1989
excludes the application of Section 438 of
Code 1973 regarding anticipatory bail.
Sections 18 and 18A of the Act 1989
exclude any preliminary inquiry before
registration of a First Information Report
contrary to the provisions contained in
Sections 154 and 156 of Code 1973 Section
19 excludes applicability of Section 360 of
the Code 1973. The applicability of other
provisions of the Code 1973 have not been
excluded
specifically
or
generally,
therefore, it leads us to reasonably infer
that other provisions of the Code 1973 will
apply to the Courts established and
specified under the Act, 1989, subject to
Section 20 thereof.

26. Section 20 of the Act 1989
provides as under:

"20. Act to override other laws.-
Save as otherwise provided in this Act, the
provisions of this Act shall have effect
notwithstanding
anything
inconsistent
therewith contained in any other law for the
time being in force or any custom or usage
or any instrument having effect by virtue of
any such law."

27. As per Section 20 of the Act
1989 save as otherwise provided in the Act,
1989, the provisions of the said Act shall
have
effect
notwithstanding
anything
inconsistent therewith contained in any
other law for the time being in force or any
custom or usage or any instrument having
effect by virtue of any such law. Thus,
subject to any inconsistency between the
Act 1989 and the Code 1973, the said Code
1973 would apply unless it has been
otherwise provided in the Act 1989 itself.
This would obviously refer to the exclusion
from applicability of Section 438 of Code
1973, etc. as referred in Sections 18, 18A
and 19 of the Act, 1989. Apart from these
three provisions, there is no other
provision in the Act 1989 excluding the
applicability of the Code 1973 to the
proceedings under the Act 1989 which is
also indicative of applicability of other
provisions of the Code 1973 including
Section
156(3)
of
Code
1973,
to
proceedings under the Act, 1989. Sections
4(2) and 5 of the Code 1973 support this
reasoning."
(emphasis supplied)

13. Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case
of Bhavnagar University vs. Palitana
6 All. Abhishek Singh & Anr. Vs. State of U.P. & Anr.
83
Sugar Mill Pvt. Ltd. and others3 has held
that it is the basic principle of construction
of statute that the same should be read as a
whole, then chapter by chapter, section by
section and words by words. Recourse to
construction or interpretation of statute is
necessary
when
there
is
ambiguity,
obscurity or inconsistency therein and not
otherwise. An effort must be made to give
effect to all parts of statute and unless
absolutely necessary, no part thereof shall
be rendered surplusage or redundant. True
meaning of a provision of law has to be
determined on the basis of what is provided
by its clear language, with due regard to the
scheme of law. Scope of the legislation on
the intention of the legislature cannot be
enlarged when the language of the
provision is plain and unambiguous. In
other words, statutory enactments must
ordinarily be construed according to its
plain meaning and no words shall be added,
altered or modified unless it is plainly
necessary to do so to prevent a provision
from
being
unintelligible,
absurd,
unreasonable,
unworkable
or
totally
irreconcilable with the rest of the statute.

14. In order to appreciate the scope of
provision contained in Rule 7(2) of Rules,
1995, it is useful to refer to Rule 7(2) & 7
(2A) of Rules, 1995, which are quoted
hereinbelow :-

"(2) The investigating officer so
appointed
under
sub-rule
(1)
shall
complete the investigation on top priority
basis within thirty days and submit the
report to the Superintendent of Police who
in turn will immediately forward the report
to the Director General of Police or
Commissioner of Police of the State
Government, and the officer-in-charge of
the concerned police station shall file the
charge-sheet in the Special Court of the
Exclusive Court within a period of sixty
days
(the
period
is
inclusive
of
investigation and filing of charge-sheet)

(2A) The delay, if any, in
investigation of filing of charge-sheet in
accordance with sub-rule (2) shall be
explained in writing by the investigating
officer."
(emphasis supplied)

15. If read conjointly, the above
provisions would indicate that they were
incorporated in the Rules, 1995 to facilitate
a prompt and efficient investigation of the
matter related to the Act, 1989. In the event
of any delay, instead of having a provision
akin to Section 167(2) of Code, there is a
provision in the form of Rule 7 (2A) in the
Rules, 1995 that requires the Investigating
Officer to explain cause for such delay in
writing.

16. Section 167(2) of Code provides as
under :-

"(2) The Magistrate to whom an
accused person is forwarded under this
section may, whether he has or has not
jurisdiction to try the case, from time to
time, authorise the detention of the accused
in such custody as such Magistrate thinks
fit, for a term not exceeding fifteen days in
the whole; and if he has no jurisdiction to
try the case or commit it for trial, and
considers further detention unnecessary, he
may order the accused to be forwarded to a
Magistrate
having
such
jurisdiction:
Provided that-

(a) the Magistrate may authorise
the detention of the accused person,
otherwise than in the custody of the police,
beyond the period of fifteen days; if he is
satisfied that adequate grounds exist for
doing so, but no Magistrate shall authorise
the detention of the accused person in
84 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
custody under this paragraph for a total
period exceeding,-

(i)
ninety
days,
where
the
investigation
relates
to
an
offence
punishable with death, imprisonment for
life or imprisonment for a term of not less
than ten years;

(ii)
sixty
days,
where
the
investigation relates to any other offence,
and, on the expiry of the said period of
ninety days, or sixty days, as the case may
be, the accused person shall be released on
bail if he is prepared to and does furnish
bail, and every person released on bail
under this sub- section shall be deemed to
be so released under the provisions of
Chapter XXXIII for the purposes of that
Chapter;"
(emphasis supplied)

17. A survey of entire scheme of Act,
1989 and Rules, 1995 reveals that there is
no provision akin to provision contained in
Section 36-A (4) of N.D.P.S. Act which
provides that in respect of persons accused
of an offence punishable under Section 19
or Section 24 or Section 27-A or for
offence(s) involving commercial quantity
the references in sub-section (2) of Section
167 of Code thereof to "ninety days",
where they occur, shall be construed as
reference to "one hundred and eighty
days". It also provides that if it is not
possible to complete the investigation
within the said period of one hundred and
eighty days, the Special Court may extend
the said period up to one year on the report
of the Public Prosecutor indicating the
progress of the investigation and the
specific reasons for the detention of the
accused beyond the said period of one
hundred and eighty days.

18. Thus, an inference that the
provision contained in Rule 7(2) of Rules
1995, whereby the Investigating Officer is
expected to conclude the investigation
within 60 days irrespective of nature of
offence
and
punishment
prescribed
therefor, has an overriding effect over
provision contained in Section 167(2) of
Code, and that too in absence of any
provision contained in the Act, 1989 or in
the Rules, 1995 which excludes application
of provision contained in Section 167 of
Code, especially Section 167(2) of Code
cannot be drawn because such inference
would be against the scheme of Act, 1989
& Rules, 1995.

19. Had it been the legislative intent,
the legislature should have explicitly
provided for default bail in Act, 1989 or in
Rules, 1995 or in alternative there should
have been some provision in Act, 1989 or
in Rules, 1995 which excludes the
provision contained in Section 167(2) of
Code. In absence of any provision akin to
provision contained in Section 36-A(4) of
N.D.P.S. Act, in the considered opinion of
this Court, provision contained in Section
167
of
Code
would
apply
to
the
investigation of offence(s) under Act, 1989
also.

20. Adverting to the case at hand,
admittedly the appellants were arrested on
26.06.2021 and charge sheet came to be
submitted against the present appellants on
26.08.2021, which is annexed as annexure
No.15 to the instant criminal appeal, under
Sections 326, 304, 323, 506 I.P.C. and
3(2)5 SC/ST Act. The offence under
Sections 304 & 326 I.P.C. are punishable
with life imprisonment or imprisonment of
10
years,
therefore,
the
period
for
concluding the investigation in this case
would be 90 days according to Section
167(2) of Code. Therefore, having regard to
the law laid down by Division Bench of
6 All. Guddu Verma Vs. State of U.P.
85
this Court in Gyanendra Maurya (Supra)
as the applicability of Section 167 of Code
has not been specifically excluded or
barred by any provision contained in the
Act, 1989 or in the Rules, 1995, therefore,
Section 167 of Code would apply in this
case. Reckoned accordingly, the charge
sheet came to be submitted on 61th day,
well within the stipulated period of 90
days, as stated above.

21. In view of the above, no
indefeasible right to seek default bail
accrued in favour of the present appellants.
Therefore, law laid down by Hon'ble
Supreme Court in M. Ravindran (supra),
in the humble opinion of this Court, is not
applicable in the facts of the case at hand.

22. The upshot of the aforesaid overall
discussion is that the learned trial Court has
rightly rejected the application moved by
the present appellants seeking default bail
under Section 167(2) of Code, which was
moved on the ground that charge sheet was
not submitted within 60 days as stipulated
under Rule 7(2) of Rules 1995 and since no
indefeasible right accrued in favour of the
present appellants, therefore, rejection of
application moved by the present appellants
seeking default bail under Section 167(2)
Code by learned Special Court cannot be
faulted with.

23. Before parting, this Court places
on record its appreciation for valuable and
erudite assistance rendered by Sri S.S.
Rajawat
and
Sri
Saksham
Agarwal,
Advocates.

24. In view of the aforesaid discussion
and for the reasons aforestated, this Court
does not find any illegality or irregularity
with the impugned order dated 10.09.2021,
which may warrant interference by this
Court. Therefore, the instant criminal
appeal lacks merit, which deserves to be
dismissed and the same is dismissed,
accordingly.
----------
(2023) 6 ILRA 85
APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CRIMINAL SIDE
DATED: ALLAHABAD 29.05.2022

BEFORE

THE HON'BLE DR. KAUSHAL JAYENDRA
THAKER, J.
THE HON'BLE SHIV SHANKER PRASAD, J.

Criminal Appeal No. 2207 of 2016

Guddu Verma ...Appellant
Versus
State of U.P. ...Respondent

Counsel for the Appellant:
Sri Ramesh Chandra Mishra, Sri Dinesh
Kumar Pandey, Sri Manu Sharma, Sri Prem
Sagar Gupta

Counsel for the Respondent:
G.A.

Criminal Law - Indian Penal Code, 1860 -
Sections 302/34 & 201 - Punishment for
murder - Appeal against conviction -
Rigorous Life imprisonment - Code of
Criminal Procedure, 1973 - Sections 161,
313 - Indian Evidence Act, 1872 - Section
106 - Circumstantial Evidence - P.W.1 filed
written report alleging that his daughter
committed suicide by hanging herself and
no fault of her in-laws, requested to give
him dead body for last rites - After
investigation, charge-sheet submitted -
Charges framed - During trial co-accused
died - Held, from testimony of P.W.-1,
P.W.-6
and
P.W.-8
(reside
in
other
village), it was clear that P.W.-6 and P.W.-
8 was informed by deceased and P.W.-1
was informed by his wife P.W.6 that
appellant and his mother used to make
allegation against deceased of having