# Ajai Kumar Singh Khandelial v. Principal Comm. of Income Tax, Gorakhpur & Anr

- **Citation:** (2020) 1 ILRA 1319
- **Court:** High Court of Judicature at Allahabad
- **Decided:** 2020-01-18
- **Case number:** Writ Tax No. 318 of 2016
- **Bench:** Alok Mathur
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/allahabad-high-court/ajai-kumar-singh-khandelial-v-principal-comm-of-income-tax-gorakhpur-anr-45537
- **Pages:** 8

## Headnote

A. Tax - Reassessment - Income Tax Act,
1961: Sections 40A(3), 143(3), 147, 148,
264; Income Tax Rules, 1962: Rule 6DD -
The question for consideration before the
Court is as to whether the deposit of
amount in cash in bank account of
beneficiary/supplier can be held to be
covered
under
provisions
of
Rule
6DD(c)(v) of the Rules, 1962 and for
which purpose can it be said to be a
payment by use of "electronic clearing
system" through bank account.

Transaction by depositing cash directly in the
bank account of the beneficiary is not routed
through any clearing house nor is the money
sent through electronic mode and therefore
such a transaction cannot be covered by Rule
6DD(c)(v) and benefit of the provision cannot
be given to the petitioner. (Para 20, 26 & 29)

B. Onus is on the assessee to show that
he is covered by any of the exception
provided in S. 40A(3) or in Rule 6DD of
the Rules, 1962 - In the present case the
amount was directly deposited in the account
of the seller i.e. M/s Jalan Synthetics. The
petitioner also could not lead any evidence to
show that he had deposited the amount on the
instructions of M/s Jalan Synthetics or due to
any business exigency. In absence of such
evidence, the assessing authority was held to
have rightly denied the benefit of exemption to
the petitioner. (Para 24, 26, 30 & 31)

C. The application was preferred by
petitioner u/s 264, the scope of which is
different from that of an appeal u/s 246 -
Petitioner challenged the re-assessment order
passed u/s 148/148(3) and not the notice u/s

## Text

1320 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
decision was based on the reasoning that
the authority had no developed land to
allot to these landowners.

28. It is admitted to the petitioners
that the entire compensation amount as
payable in terms of the provisions
contained under the Land Acquisition Act,
1894 has been paid to them and over and
above that they have also been paid
additional compensation at the rate of
64.70%. The additional benefit by way of
allotment of 10% developed abadi plot
which is sought by the petitioners not
being founded on any legally enforceable
right no mandamus can be claimed for
grant of such benefit.

29. For the aforestated reasons the
petitioners are not entitled for the reliefs
prayed for.

30. The writ petition lacks merit and
is, accordingly, dismissed.
----------
(2020)1ILR 1319

ORIGINAL JURISDICTION
CIVIL SIDE
DATED: ALLAHABAD 18.01.2020

BEFORE
THE HON'BLE ALOK MATHUR, J.
Writ Tax No. 318 of 2016

Ajai Kumar Singh Khandelial ...Petitioner
Versus
Principal
Comm.
of
Income
Tax,
Gorakhpur & Anr. ...Respondents

Counsel for the Petitioner:
Sri Suyash Agarwal

Counsel for the Respondents:
C.S.C., Sri Praveen Kumar, S.C.

A. Tax - Reassessment - Income Tax Act,
1961: Sections 40A(3), 143(3), 147, 148,
264; Income Tax Rules, 1962: Rule 6DD -
The question for consideration before the
Court is as to whether the deposit of
amount in cash in bank account of
beneficiary/supplier can be held to be
covered
under
provisions
of
Rule
6DD(c)(v) of the Rules, 1962 and for
which purpose can it be said to be a
payment by use of "electronic clearing
system" through bank account.

Transaction by depositing cash directly in the
bank account of the beneficiary is not routed
through any clearing house nor is the money
sent through electronic mode and therefore
such a transaction cannot be covered by Rule
6DD(c)(v) and benefit of the provision cannot
be given to the petitioner. (Para 20, 26 & 29)

B. Onus is on the assessee to show that
he is covered by any of the exception
provided in S. 40A(3) or in Rule 6DD of
the Rules, 1962 - In the present case the
amount was directly deposited in the account
of the seller i.e. M/s Jalan Synthetics. The
petitioner also could not lead any evidence to
show that he had deposited the amount on the
instructions of M/s Jalan Synthetics or due to
any business exigency. In absence of such
evidence, the assessing authority was held to
have rightly denied the benefit of exemption to
the petitioner. (Para 24, 26, 30 & 31)

C. The application was preferred by
petitioner u/s 264, the scope of which is
different from that of an appeal u/s 246 -
Petitioner challenged the re-assessment order
passed u/s 148/148(3) and not the notice u/s
147. The assessing authority duly considered
the application and has recorded a finding
against the petitioner. It is settled that
jurisdiction under Art. 226 is limited to
examining the decision -making process and
not the decision itself. Therefore, the Court did
not interfere as no infirmity was found in the
impugned order. (Para 18, 19, 28 & 30)

Writ Petition dismissed. (E-4)

Precedent followed: -

1. Attar Singh Gurmush Singh Vs. Income Tax
Officer, 1991 SCR (3) 405 (Para 24)
1 All. Ajay Kumar Singh Khandelial Vs. Principal Comm. Of Income Tax, Gorakhpur & Anr. 1321
2. Municipal Council, Neemuch Vs. Mahadeo
Real Estate, (2019) 10 SCC 738 (Para 28)

Petition
challenges
order
dated
19.01.2016,
passed
by
Principal
Commissioner, Income Tax, Gorakhpur.

(Delivered by Hon'ble Alok Mathur,J.)

1. Heard Sri Suyash Agarwal,
learned counsel for the petitioner as well
as Sri Praveen Kumar, learned counsel for
the respondents.

2. The petitioner by means of this
writ petition has challenged the order
passed by the Principal Commissioner,
Income Tax, Gorakhpur thereby he has
rejected the application preferred by the
petitioner under Section 264 of the Income
Tax Act, 1961 (hereinafter referred to as
"the Act, 1961").

3. Learned counsel for the petitioner
submits that petitioner is proprietor of M/s
Purushottam Das Ajai Kumar, Asif Ganj,
Azamgarh and is engaged in the business
of retail trading of ready made and other
clothes in the name of the proprietary
concern. For the assessment year 2008-09,
the petitioner's firm filed income tax return
which included income of Rs.34,912/-
earned from the house property besides
business income of Rs.1,70,304/-. The
petitioner got his firm's accounts audited
with net profit of Rs.1,61,012/- showing
@ 2.00% and gross profit of Rs.8,67,837/-
being 44.33% of the gross receipt.

4. It has been further submitted on
behalf of petitioner that he disclosed about
the advance given to supplier's account as
well as copy of the account of M/s Jalan
Synthetics, Varanasi before the assessing
authority which clearly demonstrated that
on various dates the amount of payment
has been deposited by the petitioner in
UBI, Varanasi bank on their instructions.
It has further been contended that the
assessing authority while passing the
assessment order for the assessment year
2008-09, did not raise any objection
relating to the aggregate amount of
Rs.3,40,000/- deposited on various dates in
the bank account of M/s Jalan Synthetics.

5. The assessment proceedings were
completed in exercise of power under
Section 143(3) of the Act, 1961 on the
income of Rs.2,80,004/- by order dated
10.11.2010 and giving appeal effect it was
revised at Rs.1,99,804/-.

6. The petitioner received a notice
dated 30.03.2013, issued under Section
148 of the Act, 1961, stating therein that
the authorities had reason to believe that
cash payment of Rs.3,40,000/- had been
made by the petitioner to M/s Jalan
Synthetics for the assessment year 200809, in violation to the provisions of
Section 40A(3) of the Act, 1961, which is
other than by making payment through
crossed account payee cheque or crossed
bank draft, as such the same is liable to be
disallowed and added back to the income
of the petitioner.

7. The petitioner objected to the
notice issued under Section 148 of the Act,
1961 and submitted that he had truly and
faithfully disclosed all the facts necessary.
He
further
stated
that
payment
of
Rs.3,40,000/- was genuine and that there is
no violation of Section 40(3) of the Act,
1961 read with Rule 6DD of the Income
Tax Rules, 1962 (hereinafter referred to
as "the Rules, 1962") and further that
payment of Rs.3,40,000/- in cash to M/s
Jalan Synthetics is also reflected in their
ledger accounts and therefore, there was
1322 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
no basis for reopening of the assessment
proceedings.

8. The assessing authority not being
satisfied by the reply submitted by the
petitioner proceeded to make addition of
Rs.3,40,000/- in the income of the
petitioner
and
disallowed
the
benefit/exemption under Section 40A(3) of
the Act, 1961 for the reason that payment
exceeding Rs.20,000/- was made other
than crossed cheque or bank draft.

9. The petitioner being aggrieved by
the order dated 14.03.2014, preferred an
application under Section 264 of the Act,
1961 before the Principal Commissioner,
Income Tax, Gorakhpur on 07.04.2014.

10. By means of impugned order
dated
19.01.2016,
the
Principal
Commissioner, Income Tax, Gorakhpur
has considered the application of the
petitioner and has rejected the same
holding that the petitioner had clearly
misrepresented in his return as well as
audit report with respect to application of
Section 40A(3) of the Act, 1961 read with
Rule 6DD of the Rules, 1962 and
concluded that the payment made to M/s
Jalan Synthetics Ltd. is not covered by any
exemption. The assessing authority had
carried out only limited examination in
good faith with respect to the genuineness
of the party and believed the assessee and
auditor. He has further stated that there is
difference between a document and
information and despite documents being
on record it was on the basis of the fresh
information
that
the
petitioner
has
concealed his income in violation of
Section 40A(3) of the Act, 1961. It was
within the competence and jurisdiction of
the authority to reopen the assessment
under Section 148 of the Act, 1961 and
therefore up held the order passed by the
assessing authority.

11. Assailing the order of the
Principal Commissioner, Income Tax,
Gorakhpur, the petitioner has urged that
the
revenue
has
misinterpreted
the
provisions of Section 40A(3) of the Act
and Rule 6DD of the Rules, 1962 and that
the amount of Rs.3,40,000/-, deposited on
various dates in the bank account of M/s
Jalan Synthetics, would be covered under
Rule 6DD(c)(v) of the Rules, 1962 as the
same has been done by use of "electronic
clearing system" through the Bank. It is
further submitted that there was no new
information in possession of respondent
no. 2 for invoking reassessment under
Section 147 of the Act, 1961, as the
documents on the basis of which reassessment has taken place, were already
on record at the time of original
assessment and same can not be converted
as fresh information in the course of
examination by the audit party.

12. Sri Praveen Kumar, learned
counsel for the respondents on the other
hand has submitted that scope of Section
264 of the Act, 1961 is very limited and in
exercise
of
powers
the
Principal
Commissioner, Income Tax, Gorakhpur is
empowered to hold limited enquiry into
the grounds raised by the assessee and
thereupon
examining
and
passing
appropriate orders. Power under Section
264 of the Act, 1961 cannot be equated
with the power of appeal which lies to the
appeal under Section 246 of the Act and in
this regard he has submitted that the
Principal Commissioner, Income Tax has
duly enquired into the allegations made by
the
assessee
and
has
rejected
the
application after due consideration of the
same and therefore there was no infirmity
1 All. Ajay Kumar Singh Khandelial Vs. Principal Comm. Of Income Tax, Gorakhpur & Anr. 1323
in order rejecting the application preferred
by the assessee and concluded that the writ
petition be dismissed.

13. On merits Sri Praveen Kumar,
learned counsel for the respondents
submits that the assessee had made
misrepresentation in his returns, declaring
that no amount was admissible or it is
liable under Section 40A(3) of the Act and
Rule 6DD of the Rules, 1962 and same
was also mentioned in the audit report
under Section 44AB of the Act, 1961. he
also submitted that only account number
of M/s Jalan Synthetics was submitted by
the assessee and no proof that the amount
of payment had been deposited on their
instructions. He further vehemently urged
that the assessee had failed to prove that
payment to M/s Jalan Synthetics was not
made by cheque or bank draft on account
of some business exigency, as the cash
payment made by the petitioner was in
contravention to the provisions of Section
40A(3) of the Act, 1961.

14. With regard to the issue
regarding reopening of the assessment
under Section 147 of the Act, 1961, he has
submitted that the assessing authority had
recorded sufficient reasons with regard to
the fact that certain items of income
though taxable had escaped notice of the
assessing authority and therefore the same
did not amount to change of opinion and
therefore there was no infirmity in the
same.

15. Heard learned counsel for the
parties and perused the record.

16. The petitioner who carries on the
business of retail trade in ready made and
other clothes had given advance to the
suppliers bank account i.e. M/s Jalan
Synthetics while depositing total amount
of Rs.3,40,000/- on various dates between
12.06.2007 to 01.12.2007, in the UBI
Bank,
Varanasi
in
account
no.
303505040010515.

17. In the return filed by the assessee
he had declared that inadmissible expenses
under Section 40A(3) of the Act read with
Rule 6DD of the Rules, 1962 were nil and
the same was also mentioned in the audit
report. The assessing authority having no
reason to disbelieve the aforesaid declaration
made
by
the
assessee,
which
was
subsequently reopened in exercise of powers
contained in Section 148 of the Act, 1947.
The
assessing
authority,
after
giving
opportunity of hearing to the assessee has
made re-assessment by means of order dated
14.03.2014 and added Rs.3,40,000/- in the
income of the assessee.

18. The application was preferred by
the petitioner under Section 264 of the
Act,
1961,
against
re-assessment
proceedings and the impugned order
passed by the Principal Commissioner,
Income Tax also mentions that the
assessee has filed application only against
the order of assessment.

19. It seems that the issue pertaining
to the validity of the order under Section
147 of the Act, 1961 was not raised by the
assesseee in his application and his only
grievance was with regard to the reassessment order. In para 22 of the writ
petition the petitioner has stated that he is
aggrieved by the re-assessment order
passed under Section 148/143(3) of the
Act, 1961 and the notice under Section
147 of the Act was not challenged.

20. The main question which falls for
consideration of this Court is as to
1324 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
Whether the deposit of amount in cash in
the bank account of M/s Jalan Synthetics
can be held to be covered under the
provisions of Rule 6DD(c)(v) of the Rules,
1962? and for which purpose it can be said
to be a payment by use of "electronic
clearing system" through bank account.

21. It is relevant to reproduce the
provisions of Section 40A(3) of the Act,
1961 and Rule 6DD of the Rules, 1962,
which are reproduced herein below :

"Section 40A(3) - Where the
assessee incurs any expenditure in respect
of which a payment or aggregate of
payment made to a person in a day,
otherwise than by an account payee
cheque drawn on a bank or account payee
bank draft, or use of electronic clearing
system through a bank account, exceeds
ten thousand rupees, no deduction shall be
allowed in respect of such expenditure."

"Rule 6DD - No disallowance
under sub-section (3) of section 40A shall
be made and no payment shall be deemed
to be the profits and gains of business or
profession under sub-section (3A) of
section 40A where a payment or aggregate
of payments made to a person in a day,
otherwise than by an account payee
cheque drawn on a bank or account payee
bank draft, exceeds twenty thousand
rupees in the cases and circumstances
specified hereunder, namely :-

(a) where the payment is made
to-

(i) the Reserve Bank of India or
any banking company as defined in clause
(c) of section 5 of the banking Regulation
Act, 1949 (10 of 1949);

(ii) the State bank of India or
any subsidiary bank as defined in section 2
of the State Bank of India (Subsidiary
Banks) Act, 1959 (38 of 1959);

(iii) any co-operative bank or
land mortgage bank;

(iv) any primary agricultural
credit society or any primary credit society
as defined under section 56 of the Banking
Regulation Act, 1949 (10 of 1949);

(v)
the
Life
Insurance
Corporation of India established under
Section
3
of
the
Life
Insurance
Corporation Act, 1956 (31 of 1956);

(b) where the payment is made to
the Government and, under the rules
framed by it, such payment is required to
be made in legal tender;

(c) where the payment is made
by -

(i)
any
letter
of
credit
arrangements through a bank;

(ii)
a
mail
or
telegraphic
transfer through a bank;

(iii) a book adjustment from any
account in a bank to any other account in
that or any other bank;

(iv) a bill of exchange made
payable only to a bank;

(v) the use of electronic clearing
system through a bank account;

(vi) a credit card;

(vii) a debit card.

.................."

22. Initially Section 40A(3) of the
Act, 1961 which requires payment in
respect
of
expenses
which
exceed
Rs.2500/- to be made by means of crossed
cheque or crossed bank draft, on failure to
do so, payment made were disallowed in
computation of income. In order to remove
hardship to smaller assessees the ceiling
limit was increased to Rs.10,000/- and
later on it was increased to Rs.20,000/- by
means of Finance Act, 2017 which was
made effective on 01.04.2018. Section
40A(3) of the Act, 1961, has a non
obstantive clause which has over riding
1 All. Ajay Kumar Singh Khandelial Vs. Principal Comm. Of Income Tax, Gorakhpur & Anr. 1325
provision. It operates inspite of any thing
to the contrary contained in any other
provision of the Act, 1961 relating to
computation of income under the head
"profits
and
gains
of
business
or
profession", the Legislature as thus made it
clear that provisions of Section 40A of the
Act, 1961 will apply in place of other
contrary provisions of this Act relating to
computation of income. Sub Section 3
empowers the assessing authority to
disallow deducting any expenditure in
respect of which payment is made of any
sum exceeding Rs.20,000/- otherwise than
by crossed cheque or crossed bank draft.

23. Rule 6DD of the Rules, 1962
refers to cases and circumstances in which
payment of sum exceeding Rs.20,000/-
made by a mode otherwise than by crossed
cheque or by crossed bank draft.

24. A combined reading of Section
40A(3) of the Act alongwith Rule 6DD of
the Rules, 1962 would indicate that the
provisions
have
been
inserted
by
Legislature to prevent transactions of
above Rs.20,000/-. It is also necessary to
mention here that validity of Section 40A
of the Act, 1961 has been up held by the
Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Attar
Singh Gurmush Singh Vs. Income Tax
Officer, 1991 SCR (3) 405, holding that
onus is on the assessee to show that he is
covered by any of the exception provided
or in Rule 6DD of the Rules, 1962 and in
the present case the amount was directly
deposited in the account of the seller i.e.
M/s Jalan Synthetics.

25. The term "use of electronic
clearing system through bank account"
would necessarily include the transaction
of funds by electronic mode through
clearing system. Any transfer of funds
through use of electronic clearing system
through a bank account would mean a
transfer of funds through electronic mode
of transfer i.e. RTGS, IMPS, NEFT etc.,
where the funds are transferred through the
bank account of one individual into the
bank account of beneficiary through
electronic means. When the funds are
transferred through electronic clearing
system then at least two banks or two
branches of the same bank have to be
involved
then
only
the
money
is
transferred through electronic clearing
system between them.

26. In the present case, the question
which arises for consideration is that in
case, cash is deposited directly in the bank
account of the beneficiary, can the benefit
of Rule 6DD(c)(v) of the Rules, 1962, can
be given to the assessee. Such transaction
by depositing cash directly in the bank
account of the beneficiary is not routed
through any clearing house nor is the
money send through electronic mode and
therefore such a transaction in my
considered opinion cannot be covered by
Rue 6DD(c)(v) of the Rules, 1962, and
therefore benefit of the provision cannot
be given to the petitioner. The petitioner
also could not lead any evidence to show
that he had deposited the amount on the
instructions of M/s Jalan Synthetics or due
to any business exigency. In absence of
such evidence, the assessing authority
rightly denied the benefit of exemption to
the petitioner.

27. The impugned order dated
19.01.2016, passed by the Principal
Commissioner,
Income
Tax
has
considered
the
reply given by
the
petitioner and has concluded that in
respect to the transfer of funds made by
the petitioner, benefit of Rule 6DD of the
1326 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
Rules, 1962 is not attracted and therefore
computation
made by
the
assessing
authority has been up held.

28. The jurisdiction of writ Court in
exercise of jurisdiction under Article 226
of the Constitution of India is limited to
examining the decision making process
and not the decision itself. This position of
law has been constantly reiterated by the
Hon'ble Apex Court in its various
pronouncements. The Apex Court in its
recent judgment in the case of Municipal
Council, Neemuch v. Mahadeo Real
Estate, (2019) 10 SCC 738, has observed
as under :

"13.In the present case, the
learned Judges of the Division Bench have
arrived at a finding that such a sanction
was, in fact, granted. We will examine the
correctness of the said finding of fact at a
subsequent stage. However, before doing
that, we propose to examine the scope of
the powers of the High Court of judicial
review
of
an
administrative
action.
Though, there are a catena of judgments of
this Court on the said issue, the law laid
down
by
this
Court
inTata
Cellularv.Union
of
India[Tata
Cellularv.Union of India, (1994) 6 SCC
651] lays down the basic principles which
still hold the field. Para 77 of the said
judgment reads thus:

"77. The duty of the court is to
confine itself to the question of legality.

Its concern should be:

1. Whether a decision-making
authority exceeded its powers?

2. Committed an error of law,

3. committed a breach of the
rules of natural justice,

4. reached a decision which no
reasonable tribunal would have reached
or,

5. abused its powers.

Therefore, it is not for the court
to determine whether a particular policy
or particular decision taken in the
fulfilment of that policy is fair. It is only
concerned with the manner in which those
decisions have been taken. The extent of
the duty to act fairly will vary from case to
case. Shortly put, the grounds upon which
an administrative action is subject to
control by judicial review can be classified
as under:

(i) Illegality : This means the
decision-maker must understand correctly
the law that regulates his decision-making
power and must give effect to it.

(ii)
Irrationality,
namely,
Wednesbury unreasonableness.

(iii) Procedural impropriety.

The above are only the broad
grounds but it does not rule out addition of
further grounds in course of time. As a
matter of fact, inR.v.Secy. of State for
Home Department, ex p Brind[R.v.Secy. of
State for Home Department, ex p Brind,
(1991) 1 AC 696 : (1991) 2 WLR 588
(HL)] , Lord Diplock refers specifically to
one development, namely, the possible
recognition
of
the
principle
of
proportionality. In all these cases, the test
to be adopted is that the court should,
''consider whether something has gone
wrong of a nature and degree which
requires its intervention'."

14.It could thus be seen that the
scope
of
judicial
review
of
an
administrative action is very limited.
Unless the Court comes to a conclusion
that
the
decision-maker
has
not
understood
the
law
correctly
that
regulates his decision-making power or
when it is found that the decision of the
decision-maker is vitiated by irrationality
and
that
too
on
the
principle
of
"Wednesbury unreasonableness" or unless
1 All. Ajay Kumar Singh Khandelial Vs. Principal Comm. Of Income Tax, Gorakhpur & Anr. 1327
it is found that there has been a procedural
impropriety in the decision-making process, it
would not be permissible for the High Court to
interfere in the decision-making process. It is
also equally well settled that it is not
permissible for the Court to examine the
validity of the decision but this Court can
examine only the correctness of the decisionmaking process."

29. Applying the above principles to the
facts of the present case, it is seen that the
reassessment proceedings were initiated on
account of the fact that it was discovered that
the assessee had misrepresented in his return
with regard to the payments made to M/s Jalan
Synthetics of Rs.3,40,000/- in cash which were
deposited in their bank account and such a
transfer was not admissible in the light of
provisions of Section 40A(3) of the Act and
Rule 6DD of the Rules, 1962, and therefore, in
the reassessment proceedings the said amount
was added to the income of the assessee.

30. The reassessment order was
assailed by moving an application under
Section 264 of the Act, 1961. The
assessing authority has duly considered the
application of the assessee and after
considering the same has recorded a
finding that the assessee has clearly
misrepresented in his return as well as
audit report with respect to Section 40A(3)
of the Act and Rule 6DD of the Rules,
1962 and therefore the case of the
petitioner is not covered by any of the
exceptions. No evidence was led by the
assessee to demonstrate that the cash was
deposited at the instance of M/s Jalan
Synthetics, so as to give benefit of Rule
6DD of the Rules, 1962, to the petitioner.

31.

Learned
counsel
for
the
petitioner-assessee
also
could
not
demonstrate that the impugned order is
bereft of reasons or that it is perverse or
that it has failed to consider the relevant
material or document and therefore in
absence of any of such infirmity the
contention of learned counsel for the
petitioner cannot be accepted and the writ
petition is liable to be dismissed.

32. In the light of discussion made
above, this Court does not find any merit
in the contentions raised by the petitioner.
The writ petition is accordingly dismissed.
----------
(2020)1ILR 1326

ORIGINAL JURISDICTION
CIVIL SIDE
DATED: ALLAHABAD 17.01.2020

BEFORE
THE HON'BLE BISWANATH SOMADDER, J.
THE HON'BLE AJAY BHANOT, J.

Writ Tax No. 1308 of 2019

M/s Dabur India Ltd. ...Petitioner
Versus
Commissioner Of CGST, Ghaziabad & Ors.
 ...Respondents

Counsel for the Petitioner:
Sri Atul Gupta, Sri Abhishek Kumar Tripathi

Counsel for the Respondents:
A.S.G.I., Sri Ashok Singh

A. Tax - Classification - Central Goods
and Services Tax Act, 2017: Section 101;
Uttar Pradesh Goods and Services Tax
Act, 2017; Customs Tariff Act, 1975:
Chapter
38
-
Appellate
Authority
for
Advanced Ruling for Goods and Services Tax,
has classified the product in question, 'odomos'
as mosquito repellant, whereas the petitioner
contends it to be a medicament. Holding in
favour of Revenue, Court held as follows:

The "Common Parlance test" or the
"Market Identity Test" for classification