# Ajay Kumar Srivastava v. State of U.P. & Ors

- **Citation:** (2026) 4 ILRA 504
- **Court:** High Court of Judicature at Allahabad
- **Decided:** 2026-04-16
- **Case number:** Writ - C No. 13663 of 2025
- **Bench:** Mahesh Chandra Tripathi, Prashant Kumar
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/allahabad-high-court/ajay-kumar-srivastava-v-state-of-u-p-ors-54919
- **Pages:** 8

## Text

504 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES

14. In aforesaid circumstances, in a case where objections filed by objectors were rejected and
respective appeals were filed, the appeal filed in later point of time cannot be declared as a cross-appeal.

15. The concept of cross-appeal would arise when rival parties are dissatisfied with an order
on different grounds, whereas in the present case objection of Dukhi can be allowed only if the
objection filed by father of petitioner was allowed that he was a Sirdar of entire land. Therefore,
both, i.e., Dukhi and father of petitioner were riding in same boat and not in different boats. The
Settlement Officer of Consolidation has committed an illegality when he has treated the substantive
appeal filed by father of petitioner as a cross-appeal, therefore, said order passed by Settlement
Officer of Consolidation is legally unsustainable and accordingly the order passed by Deputy
Director of Consolidation is also illegal and liable to be set aside.

16. Now the question arise that after 45 years when much water has flown and interim order is
modified, can the matter be remitted to Settlement Officer of Consolidation or Deputy Director of
Consolidation. In this regard Court is of the opinion that since neither Appellate Authority nor
Revisional Authority has decided matter on merit so far as objections of petitioner's father is
concerned and revision filed by Dukhi was withdrawn on consent and in case the interim order is
implemented in favour of petitioner, a case is made out to remit matter to Deputy Director of
Consolidation, who can still decide matter on merit considering powers granted under Section 48 of
Act, 1953 that revision can be considered on merit even without filing an appeal and for that Court
takes note of the judgment relied on by learned counsel for petitioner in Ranjeet (supra).

17. Accordingly the orders dated 21.02.1977 and 26.07.1979 passed by Settlement Officer of
Consolidation and Deputy Director of Consolidation, respectively, are hereby set aside. The matter
is remitted back to Revisional Authority to pass a fresh order on merit preferably within a period of
six months. The Revisional Authority will also take note, whether the interim order as modified
vide order dated 19.02.1986 has been implemented or not and accordingly revision be decided. The
revision shall not be disposed on a ground that an appeal filed by petitioner's father was not
decided on merit.

18. The writ petition is accordingly disposed of.
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(2026) 4 ILRA 504
ORIGINAL JURISDICTION
CIVIL SIDE
DATED: ALLAHABAD 16.04.2026

BEFORE

THE HON'BLE MAHESH CHANDRA TRIPATHI, J.
THE HON'BLE PRASHANT KUMAR, J.

Writ - C No. 13663 of 2025

Ajay Kumar Srivastava ...Petitioners
Versus
State of U.P. & Ors. ...Respondents
4 All. Ajay Kumar Srivastava Vs. State of U.P. & Ors.
505
ISSUE FOR CONSIDERATION
Whether the petitioner's application for reference under Section 64 of the RFCTLARR Act, 2013 could be
entertained despite being filed beyond the limitation prescribed under Section 18 of the Land Acquisition Act,
1894?

HEADNOTES
Civil Law - Constitution of India - Article 226 - Land Acquisition Act, 1894 - Section 18 -
RFCTLARR Act, 2013 - Section 64 - Limitation Act, 1963 - Section - 5: - Writ Petition under Article
226 - challenging the order passed by the Collector, rejecting petitioner's application for enhancement of
award by reference under Section 64 of the RFCTLARR Act, 2013 - acquisition proceedings initiated in 2008
under the 1894 Act - Award passed in year 2013 - petitioner moved reference only in 2024 - The Collector
rejected the application as barred by limitation under Section 18 of the 1894 Act - Petitioner pleaded that the
2013 Act applied and relied on Mohar Singh - Respondents objected, citing Vijai Pal (FB), Bhagwan Das,
Padmasundara Rao, and S.V. Global Mills, contending Collector is not a court and cannot condone delay, nor
can High Court enlarge limitation under Article 226 - Court finds that, petitioner had knowledge of
proceedings, failed to avail remedy within time, and Collector rightly rejected the application - held, limitation
under Section 18 is mandatory and Section 5 of Limitation Act is inapplicable - Act, 2013 cannot
retrospectively revive time-barred claims - consequently, writ petition devoid of merit and stands dismissed
(Para - 39, 40, 41)
WP Disposed of. (E-11)

CASE LAW CITED
Mohar Singh (Dead) through LRs v. State of U.P. (2023 (12) ADJ 527 SC) - relied by petitioner.
Vijai Pal v. State of U.P. (2010 AIR All 180) - Full Bench.
Bhagwan Das v. State of U.P. (2010) 3 SCC 545.
Padmasundara Rao v. State of T.N. (2002) 3 SCC 533.
Deputy Commissioner & SLAO v. S.V. Global Mills Ltd. (SC, 2026).

LIST OF ACTS
Constitution of India - Land Acquisition Act, 1894 - RFCTLARR Act, 2013 - Limitation Act, 1963.

LIST OF KEYWORDS
Writ Petition, Certiorari, Caste certificate, OBC verification, locus standi, repeated enquiry, fraud on
Constitution, Bhishti Abbasi, finality, harassment, substitution of complainant, service jurisprudence, Allowed.

CASE ARISING FROM
Impugned order dated 06.11.2024 passed by Collector, Siddharth Nagar in Case No.1461 of 2024 rejecting
petitioner's application for reference under Section 64 of the 2013 Act.

APPEARANCE OF PARTIES
Counsel for Appellant(s): - Shri Anirudh Singh, Shri Indrakesh Kumar Sharma,
Counsel for Respondent(s): - Shri Devesh Vikram, Additional Chief Standing Counsel, Shri Fuzail Ahmad
Ansari, Standing Counsel, Shri Gopal Verma - for Union of India.

(Delivered by Hon'ble Mahesh Chandra Tripathi, J. & Hon'ble Prashant Kumar, J.)

1. Heard Shri Anirudh Singh, Advocate holding brief of Shri Indrakesh Kumar Sharma,
learned counsel for the petitioner, Shri Devesh Vikram, learned Additional Chief Standing Counsel
as well as Shri Fuzail Ahmad Ansari, learned Standing Counsel for State-respondents and Shri
Gopal Verma, learned counsel for respondent-Union of India.
506 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES

2. The instant writ petition is preferred under Article 226 of the Constitution of India
challenging the validity of the impugned order dated 06.11.2024 passed by the Collector,
Siddharath Nagar in Case No.1461 of 2024, Computerized Case No.D202417630001461 (Ajay
Kumar Srivastava vs. State of U.P. and others) in the proceeding under Section 18 of the Land
Acquisition Act, 18941 read with Section 64 of Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in
Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 20132 whereby the application dated
24.09.2024 filed by petitioner for enhancement of award was rejected.

A. FACTS

3. Before considering the rival contentions, it is apt to have a glance over the facts of the case.
The State Government initiated acquisition proceedings in Mauja Dhanaura, Mustahakam, Tappa
Khajahani, Pargana Naugarh, Tehsil Shoharatgarh, District Siddharath Nagar, for the establishment
of the Sashastra Seema Bal Chauki. A notification under Section 4(1)/17 of the Act, 1894 was
issued on 11.09.2008 and published in the Official Gazette on the same date. It was thereafter
published in widely circulated newspapers, namely Rashtriya Sahara and Amar Ujala, on
30.11.2008 and 02.12.2008, respectively, followed by local publication (Munadi) on 27.12.2008. A
declaration under Section 6(1)/17 of the Act, 1894 was notified on 09.11.2009 and published in the
Gazette on the same date, as well as in the newspapers United India and Aaj on 10.12.2009,
with local publication effected on 27.12.2009. An award under the Act, 1894 was ultimately made
on 22.08.2013.

4. It is borne out from the record that the petitioner, for the first time, filed an application on
24.09.2024 seeking reference before the Collector under Section 64 of the Act, 2013. The
Collector, by the impugned order, rejected the said application by taking into consideration the
limitation prescribed under Section 18 of the Act, 1894. Since the application was filed under the
Act, 2013, which came into force with effect from 01.01.2014, the same was held to be barred by
limitation and accordingly rejected. The said order has been challenged under Article 226 of the
Constitution of India.

B. ARGUMENTS ON BEHALF OF THE PETITIONER

5. Learned counsel for the petitioner vehemently contended that the petitioner had rightly
invoked the provisions of the Act, 2013, which came into force on 01.01.2014. It is submitted that
upon becoming aware of the alleged discrimination, the petitioner moved an application for
reference under Section 64 of the Act, 2013.

6. In support of his submissions, learned counsel for the petitioner has placed reliance on the
judgment passed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Mohar Singh (Dead) through LRs and others
vs. State of Uttar Pradesh and Others3. It is argued that the application ought to have been
considered on merits and the matter was liable to be referred to the competent court, and that the
Collector had arbitrarily rejected the application filed under Section 64 of the Act, 2013.
Accordingly, it is prayed that the impugned order be set aside and a direction be issued to the
Collector to refer the matter to the appropriate court.
4 All. Ajay Kumar Srivastava Vs. State of U.P. & Ors.
507

C. ARGUMENTS ON BEHALF OF STATE RESPONDENTS

7. Per contra, the learned Additional Chief Standing Counsel vehemently resisted the
contention of learned counsel for the petitioner and submitted that the Act, 1894 is a complete code
in itself. Reliance was placed on Section 18 of the Act, 1894, which prescribes a specific period of
limitation. It is contended that the Collector has no discretion to extend such limitation. Further
reliance is placed on the Full Bench decision of this Court in Vijai Pal vs. State of U.P. and
others4, wherein two questions were referred by the Division Bench to the Full Bench. For ready
reference, both the questions are reproduced hereunder:-

"(1)Whether the directions contained in Savitri Devi's case in the nature of a general
mandamus are in direct conflict with the ratio of Kanchchid's case reported in 1999 (3) AWC 1978.

(2)Whether the High Court in exercise of its extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226
of the Constitution or India while interpreting Section 18 of the Land Acquisition Act can confer
the power on the Collector to refer a dispute under Section 18 even if it is barred by limitation."

8. He further submits that the second question, which has been formulated by the Full Bench,
had been answered in paras 38 and 39 of the judgment in Vijai Pal (supra). For ready reference, the
same are also reproduced hereunder:-

"38. From the discussions as made above, we arrive on following conclusion with regard
to scope and extent of jurisdiction of Collector under Section 18 of the Act:

(1) The Collector while considering an application filed under Section 18 (1) of the Act
for making reference acts as a statutory authority and the said application is to be dealt by him
subject to the statutory conditions as laid down in Section 18 (2) of the Act.

(2) The jurisdiction to make reference under Section 18 arises only when the application
satisfies the statutory conditions enumerated in Section 18 (2).

(3) The Collector is not a Court, Section 5 of the Limitation Act, is not applicable in the
proceedings of reference under Section 18 of the Act.

(4)The High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution cannot issue any general
mandamus to a statutory authority to act in a manner which is not contemplated by statutory power
given to such authority.

(5) The Collector while considering an application under Section 18 of the Act, if comes
to the conclusion that the application is barred by time which having not been made in accordance
with Section 18 (2) the Collector has no option, but to reject the said application.

39. In view of the foregoing discussion our answer to the above two questions is as
follows:

(1) The directions contained in Smt. Savitri Devi's case (supra) in the nature of general
mandamus are in direct conflict with the ratio of Division Bench judgment in Kanchchid's case
reported in 1999 (3) AWC 1978, which directions are not approved.

(2) The High Court in exercise of its extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the
Constitution while interpreting Section 18 of the Act, cannot confer jurisdiction to the Collector to
refer a dispute under 18 of the Act, to the Court even if the application is barred by limitation."
508 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES

9. Mr. Ansari, learned Standing Counsel in this backdrop vehemently contended that the
Collector, while exercising powers under Section 18 of the Act, 1894, cannot invoke Section 5 of
the Limitation Act, as the same is inapplicable to such proceedings. It was also submitted that even
the High Court, in exercise of its extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution,
cannot direct the statutory authority to act contrary to the provisions of the statute or enlarge the
prescribed limitation and accordingly, the Full Bench has answered that the High Court in exercise
of extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India while interpreting
Section 18 of the Act cannot confer jurisdiction to Collector to refer a dispute under Section 18 of
the Act to court even if the application is barred by limitation. Reliance was also placed on the
judgment passed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the matter of Bhagwan Das vs. State of U.P.5.

10. Lastly, he has placed reliance on the judgment passed by Hon'ble Apex Court in the matter
of Padmasundara Rao (Dead) & ors vs. State of T.N. & ors6, wherein the Apex Court has held
as under:-

"3. The controversy involved lies within a very narrow compass, that is, whether after
quashing of notification under Section 6 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (hereinafter referred to
as "the Act") fresh period of one year is available to the State Government to issue another
notification under Section 6. In the case at hand such a notification issued under Section 6 was
questioned before the Madras High Court which relied on the decision of a three-Judge Bench in
N. Narasimhaiah v. State of Karnataka [(1996) 3 SCC 88] and held that the same was validly
issued."

11. Shri Ansari also placed reliance upon a recent judgment passed by Honble Supreme
Court on 9th February, 2026 in Deputy Commissioner and Special Land Acquisition Officer vs.
M/s S.V. Global Mills Ltd.7. Relying upon paragraphs 31 and 74, he contended that limitation
cannot be extended and the writ petition is devoid of merit. Paragraph Nos.31 and 74 of the
judgment in S.V. Global Mill (supra) are reproduced hereunder:-

"31.At this juncture, it is apposite to note that when the power to condone delay by
invoking Section 5 of the 1963 Act is not even available to a Tribunal in the ordinary course,
certainly, the Collector, not being a Court, cannot exercise the same............

xxx

74.We have dealt with the provisions contained in both the enactments in extenso
already. We have also dealt with the principles of law. Upon such analysis, we reiterate that the
2013 Act is a unique piece of legislation. The Collector is given two different and distinct roles up
to a certain stage of the acquisition process. The first role is to facilitate the acquisition on behalf
of the Government, and the other is with respect to the determination of the compensation. For
both these roles, there is no question of application of any provisions of the 1963 Act, as the
Collector either acts as a statutory authority on the executive side or as a quasi- judicial authority
while determining the compensation or as an authority dealing with rights having civil
consequences while making a reference. In all these three acts, there is no role that is exclusively
judicial. As we have already discussed, only when the issue of compensation is decided by the
Authority, who is a legally trained person entitled to exercise the powers of a Civil Court, followed
by the declaration of an award deemed to be a decree, does an out-and-out judicial forum enter the
4 All. Ajay Kumar Srivastava Vs. State of U.P. & Ors.
509
picture. The proceedings before him are original in nature, with two parties appearing before him,
of which even the Collector is a party, since it is his award that is under challenge. There is a
reason why the Authority is expected to exercise an element of fair play by following the principles
of natural justice which would otherwise inhere in a party before it. It is only the Court that is
given the inherent power of formulating its own procedure when it is not provided under the
statute. Thus, the reference made by the Collector to the Authority, which is akin to the institution
of a suit before a Civil Court, does not attract the application of Section 5 of the 1963 Act.
However, an application filed during the pendency of the reference, being akin to an application
filed during the pendency of a suit, would attract the application of Section 5 of the 1963 Act. For
example, when a party to a reference dies, and an application for bringing the legal representatives
on record is filed belatedly, Section 5 of the 1963 Act would have to be pressed into service. Such a
situation might also arise in appellate proceedings. To that extent, there is no bar."

D. ANALYSIS BY THE COURT

12. We have heard the rival submissions, perused the record and given anxious consideration
to the judgments placed at the bar.

13. In order to appreciate the controversy involved, it is necessary to refer to the provisions of
Section 18 of the Act, 1894. For ready reference, the same is reproduced hereunder:-

"18. Reference to Court

(1)Any person interested who has not accepted the award may, by written application to
the Collector, require that the matter be referred by the Collector for the determination of the
Court, whether his objection be to the measurement of the land, the amount of the compensation,
the persons to whom it is payable, or the apportionment of the compensation among the persons
interested.

(2)The application shall state the grounds on which objection to the award is taken:

Provided that every such application shall be made,(a)if the person making it was present
or represented before the Collector at the time when he made his award, within six weeks from the
date of the Collectors award;(b)in other cases, within six weeks of the receipt of the notice from the
Collector under section 12, sub-section (2), or within six months from the date of the
Collectorsaward, whichever period shall first expire."

14. The Full Bench in Vijai Pal (supra) has considered the statutory provision under Section
18 of the Act, 1894 and arrived at a conclusion that an application filed under Section 18 of the
Act, 1894 for making reference at a statutory authority, the said application is to be dealt by him
subject to statutory conditions as laid down in Sections 18 (2) of the Act, 1894. In the present case,
the acquisition proceedings were completed under the Act, 1894. The final declaration was
published on 09.11.2009, possession of the land was taken by invoking the urgency clause, and the
land gets vested in the State free from all encumbrances. The award was thereafter made on
22.08.2013. The petitioner, however, filed the application only on 24.09.2024 under the provisions
of the Act, 2013.
510 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES

15. It transpires that in the case of Vijay Pal (supra) the Full Bench of this Court has also
considered the dictum of Apex Court in the case of Bhagwan Das (supra) in paras 21, 22, 23 & 24,
which are quoted below:-

21. The Apex Court in a very recent judgment had an occasion to again consider the
provisions of Section 18 of the Act after noticing the earlier decisions of the Apex Court in (2010) 3
SCC 545, Bhagwan Das & Ors Vs. State of U.P. & Ors. In the aforesaid case, award was made by
the Land Acquisition Officer on 14/3/2007, and notice was served on the appellants on 25/10/2007.
Appellants claim that they came to know about the award on 16/11/2007, and thereafter they made
an application for reference. The Collector rejected the application for reference vide order dated
19/12/2007, on the ground that it was made beyond the period of 6 months from the date of award.
The writ petition was dismissed by the High Court vide order dated 17/1/2008 as not maintainable.
While dismissing the writ petition the High Court observed that the appellants had a remedy by
way of filing an appeal under Section 54 of the Act.

22. The review application was filed which too was rejected vide order dated 05/5/2008,
with the observation that the appellants ought to have filed an application for condonation of delay
with the application for reference. The order of the High Court was challenged in the appeals. The
Apex Court noticed the issues which arose for consideration in paragraph 6 which is quoted
below:

"6. The following questions arise for consideration, on the contentions urged :

(a) Whether an appeal would lie under Section 54 of the Act against the order of the
Collector refusing to make a reference?

(b) Whether the Collector can condone the delay in filing an application seeking
reference, if sufficient cause is shown?

(c) Whether the period of six months under clause (b) of the proviso to section 18 of the
Act should be reckoned from the date of knowledge of the award of the Collector or from the date
of award itself?

(d) Whether the appellants were entitled to relief?"

23. While considering the question (b) the Apex Court laid down that the Collector is not
a Court and the provisions of Section 5 of the Limitation Act, have no application. Following was
laid down in paragraphs 14, 15 and 16 which are quoted below:

"14. The proviso to section 18 requires that an application by a person interested, to the
Collector, seeking reference of his claim for higher compensation for determination by the Court,
shall be made within six weeks from the date of the Collector's award, if such person was present
or represented before the Collector, at the time when the award was made. If not, the application
for reference shall have to be made within six weeks of the receipt of the notice of the Collector
under Section 12(2) or within six months from the date of the Collector's award, whichever period
shall first expire.

15.In Officer on Special Duty (Land Acquisition) & Anr. v. Shah Manilal Chandulal &
Ors. [1996 (9) SCC 414], this Court held that in view of the special limitation provided under the
proviso to section 18 of the Act, section 29(2) of the Limitation Act, cannot be applied to the
proviso to section 18 of the Act; and therefore, the benefit of sections 4 to 24 of Limitation Act
1963, will not be available in regard to applications under section 18(1) of the Act. It was also held
that as the Collector is not a court when he discharges his functions as a statutory authority under
4 All. Nafees alias Mohammad Nafees Vs. State of U.P.
511
section 18(1) of the Act, section 5 of the Limitation Act 1963 cannot be invoked for extension of the
period of limitation prescribed under the proviso to section 18(2) of the Act.

16.As the Collector is not a civil court and as the provisions of Section 5 of the Limitation
Act, 1963 have not been made applicable to proceedings before the Collector under the Act, and as
there is no provision in the Act enabling the Land Acquisition Collector to extend the time for
making an application for reference, the Collector cannot entertain any application for extension,
nor extend the time for seeking reference, even if there are genuine and bonafide grounds for
condoning delay. This view was reiterated in Steel Authority of India Ltd. vs. S.U.T.N.I. Sangam
and others [2009 (16) SCC 1]. Therefore, the observation of the High Court that an application for
condonation of delay could have been made by the person interested, is incorrect."

24. The Apex Court in the said judgement also laid down that if the person interested was
not present when the award is made and did not receive notice under Section 12 (2) of the Act, he
has to make an application within six months of the date on which he actually and constructively
came to know about the conditions of the award.

E. CONCLUSION

16. From the record, it is evident that the petitioner cannot claim lack of knowledge of the
acquisition proceedings. No explanation has been furnished as to why the statutory remedy
available under the Act, 1894 was not availed within the prescribed period. In view of the law
settled by the catena of judgments as placed before us by the respondent counsels, we have no
hesitation in holding that the Collector does not have any such power of enlargement of time.
Similar issue has also been considered by the Full Bench in Vijai Pal (supra). Accordingly, we find
no illegality or infirmity in the impugned order dated 06.11.2024 passed by the Collector.

17. The judgment of Mohan Singh (supra) relied by the petitioner is distinguishable as the
same is not applicable in the facts and circumstances of the instant matter.

18. The writ petition, being devoid of merit, does not warrant any interference and the same is
hereby dismissed.
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(2026) 4 ILRA 511
APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CRIMINAL SIDE
DATED: ALLAHABAD 03.04.2026

BEFORE

THE HON'BLE HARVIR SINGH, J.

Criminal Misc. Bail Application No. 296 of 2026

Nafees Alias Mohammad Nafees ...Applicant
Versus
State of U.P. ...Respondent

Issue for Consideration