# Ajeet Shukla & Ors v. State of U.P. & Ors

- **Citation:** (2022) 8 ILRA 1043
- **Court:** High Court of Judicature at Allahabad
- **Decided:** 2022-08-10
- **Case number:** Application U/s 482 No. 5776 of 2017
- **Bench:** Dinesh Kumar Singh
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/allahabad-high-court/ajeet-shukla-ors-v-state-of-u-p-ors-48702
- **Pages:** 9

## Headnote

Law
-
Code
of
Criminal
Procedure,1973 -Section 197 - Impugned
revisional order-summoning order-mandatory
1044 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
provision of sanction u/s 197 Cr.P.C. not
complied-Applicant
Police
personnel-criminal
proceedings would be non-est and void in the
absence of sanction u/s 197 Cr.P.C.-impugned
order quashed.

Application allowed. (E-9)

List of Cases cited:

## Text

8 All. Ajeet Shukla & Ors. Vs. State of U.P. & Ors.
1043
not revealed as to why the appellant had
poured the kerosene oil on the deceased
and set her ablazed. Moreover, it is stated
by the deceased in dying declaration that
fire was also put out by the appellant
himself, hence, there is no dispute to the
fact that fire was put out by the appellant
and as per the dying declaration, it is also
not in dispute that appellant and his family
members had taken the deceased to the
Medical College, Gorakhpur for treatment
and she was admitted by them.

34. Keeping in view of the aforesaid
fact that fire was put out by the appellant
himself and deceased was admitted to the
hospital in injured condition by the
appellant and his family members, it is
transpired that appellant's had no intention
to do away with the deceased. Deceased
died after four days of the occurrence and
during this period, she constantly remained
admitted in Medical College and was under
treatment. Doctor conducted the postmortem, has also mentioned the cause of
death as "Shock".

35. On overall scrutiny of the facts
and circumstances of the case coupled
with the opinion of the medical officer
and considering the principle laid down
by the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of
Tuka Ram and others vs. State of
Maharashtra [(2011) 4 SCC 250] and in
the case of BN Kavadakar and another
vs. State of Karnataka [1994 Supp (1)
304], we are of the considered opinion
that the offence would be punishable
under Section 304 (Part-I) IPC because
the burn injuries were caused to the
deceased by appellant with the intention
to cause such bodily injuries as were
likely to cause death and, therefore, the
instant case falls under the Exceptions 4
of Section 300 IPC.

36. In view of the aforesaid
discussion, we are of the view that appeal
has to be partly allowed. The conviction of
the appellant under Section 302 IPC is
converted into conviction under Section
304 (Part-I) IPC and the appellant is
sentenced
to
undergo
ten
years
of
incarceration with remissions and fine of
Rs. 10,000/-. In case of default of payment
of fine, the appellant shall further undergo
simple imprisonment for one year. This
default sentence would commence on
completion of ten years of incarceration for
the main sentence of ten years with
remission.

37. Accordingly, the appeal is partly
allowed, as modified above.

38. Record be sent to trial court
immediately.
----------
(2022) 8 ILRA 1043
ORIGINAL JURISDICTION
CRIMINAL SIDE
DATED: LUCKNOW 10.08.2022

BEFORE

THE HON'BLE DINESH KUMAR SINGH, J.

Application U/s 482 No. 5776 of 2017

Ajeet Shukla & Ors. ...Applicants
Versus
State of U.P. & Ors. ...Opposite Parties

Counsel for the Applicants:
Nadeem Murtaza

Counsel for the Opposite Parties:
Govt. Advocate, Ajit Shukla, Amrendra Nath
Tripathi

Criminal
Law
-
Code
of
Criminal
Procedure,1973 -Section 197 - Impugned
revisional order-summoning order-mandatory
1044 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
provision of sanction u/s 197 Cr.P.C. not
complied-Applicant
Police
personnel-criminal
proceedings would be non-est and void in the
absence of sanction u/s 197 Cr.P.C.-impugned
order quashed.

Application allowed. (E-9)

List of Cases cited:
1. Matajog Dobey Vs H.C. Bhari, AIR 1956 SC 44
2. Pukhraj Vs St. of Raj. & anr., 1973 (2) SCC
701
3. D. Devraja Vs Owais Sabeer Hussain, (2020)
7 SCC 695

4. Bakhshish Singh Brar Vs Gurmej Kaur & anr.,
(1987) 4 SCC 663
(Delivered by Hon'ble Dinesh Kumar
Singh, J.)

1. By way of this application under
Section 482 CrPC, the applicants have
prayed for quashing of the order dated
19.08.2017 passed by the learned Sessions
Judge, Court No. 5, Pratapgarh in Criminal
Revision No.192 of 2016 (Visharjan Singh
Yadav and others Vs. State of U.P. and
others).

By means of the impugned order
the learned Sessions Judge has dismissed
the revision filed by the applicants against
the order dated 12.01.2015 passed by the
learned
Chief
Judicial
Magistrate,
Pratapgarh in Case No.732 of 2014
(Vidhyabhan Singh Vs. Visharjan Singh
Yadav and others) and Case No.761 of
2014 (Indirakar Misra Vs. Visharjan Singh
Yadav and others) whereby the applicants
were summoned to face trial under Sections
323, 325, 379, 427, 452 and 506 IPC.

Further prayer has been made for
quashing of the entire proceedings of Case
No.732 of 2014 (Vidhyabhan Singh Vs.
Visharjan Singh Yadav and others) and
Case No.761 of 2014 (Indirakar Misra Vs.
Visharjan Singh Yadav and others), pending
in the Court of Additional Chief Judicial
Magistrate, Pratapgarh.

2. On the date of incident i.e.
21.05.2014 all the applicants were posted
in the District Police Pratapgarh. Applicant
no. 1 was posted as Sub-Inspector at Police
Station Kotwali Nagar, District Pratapgarh,
applicant no. 2 was posted as Chowki Incharge at Police Station Kotwali City,
applicant no. 3 was posted as Additional
Superintendent
of
Police,
District
Pratapgarh, while applicant no. 4 was
posted as Circle Officer, City, District
Pratapgarh.

3. District Court, Pratapgarh comes
within the jurisdiction of Police Station
Kotwali Nagar, District Pratapgarh.

4. On 21.05.2014, the police received
an information through Dial-100 of Police
Service that a conflict between advocates
of the District Court, Pratapgarh and
Pradeshik Armed Constabulary (for short
'PAC') personnel, deployed in the premises
of Civil Courts, Pratapgarh, was taking
place. Information was also given that a
PAC personnel had fired upon one lawyer,
who had sustained firearm injuries. Soon
after receiving the information, to maintain
peace and to prevent any further untoward
incident, the applicants and many other
police personnel rushed towards the Civil
Courts compound Pratapgarh to control the
situation
and
maintain
peace.
The
advocates, present in the Courts compound,
were highly agitated and, it appears that in
the
skirmishes,
between
the
police
personnel and the advocates, the applicants
suffered injuries. The police also used mild
force to control the situation and, it took
almost
entire
day
for
the
District
Administration to control the situation and
8 All. Ajeet Shukla & Ors. Vs. State of U.P. & Ors.
1045
bring normalcy in the District Courts
compound and city of Pratapgarh.

5. The respondent nos. 2 and 3 filed
two complaints before the Chief Judicial
Magistrate,
Pratapgarh
on
24.05.2014
against the applicants and 8-10 other police
personnel,
alleging
therein
that
on
21.05.2014 the police personnel, named in
the complaints, assaulted and abused the
advocates. The advocates suffered injuries.
The
police
personnel
also
damaged
property of the advocates and snatched
their mobile-phones etc.

6. After recording statement of the
complainants under Section 200 CrPC and
witness under Section 202 CrPC, the
learned
Chief
Judicial
Magistrate,
Pratapgarh vide order dated 15.07.2014
directed merging of both the complaints.

7. After merging of the two
complaints, statement of Mr. Ramchandra
Yadav was recorded under Section 202
CrPC on 04.08.2015 and statement of Mr.
Anil Yadav was recorded under Section 202
CrPC on 30.08.2014. Learned Magistrate
thereafter passed order, summoning the
applicants vide order dated 12.01.2015
under Sections 323, 325, 379, 427, 452,
504 and 506 IPC.

8. Heard Nadeem Murtaza, learned
counsel for the applicants, Mr. Amrendra
Nath
Tripathi,
learned
counsel
for
respondent nos. 2 and 3, as well as learned
Additional
Government
Advocate,
representing respondent no. 1-State.

9. On behalf of the applicants, it has
been submitted that the applicants were
discharging official/public duty when the
alleged incident took place for which two
complaints came to be filed and the
applicants had been summoned as accused;
mandatory provision of sanction by the
competent authority under Section 197
Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 (for short
'CrPC') could not have been ignored by the
learned Chief Judicial Magistrate before
taking cognizance and summoning the
applicants as accused; the information
received on Dial-100 through Mr. Anvar
Khan, Advocate was recorded in the G.D.
dated 21.05.2014. In the G.D. dated
22.05.2014 the extract of incident was also
recorded. The police personnel, after
receiving information, which got recorded
in the G.D., reached to the District Court to
control the situation in discharge of their
official/public duty.

10. On behalf of the applicants, it has
also been submitted that if the police
personnel, including the applicants, would
not have reached at the Court's compound
to control the situation, there would have
been much more damage to lives and
properties, which might have included
public property as well; the impugned
proceedings, in absence of sanction by the
competent authority for prosecution of the
applicants, are non-est and, are liable to be
quashed
as
the
same
are
without
jurisdiction.

11. On behalf of the applicants, it has
also been submitted that the learned
Magistrate has exceeded its jurisdiction to
take cognizance and summon the applicants
as there was no proper sanction by the
competent authority.

12. On behalf of the respondents, it
has been submitted that assaulting the
lawyers, destroying their properties and
taking away their cell-phones etc. cannot be
said to be a part of official duty of the
applicants. The offence committed by the
1046 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
applicants cannot be said to be a part of the
official duty and, therefore, no sanction was
required for prosecuting them for the
offences committed by them and the same
did not come within the performance of the
public/official duty; the police personnel,
including the applicants, reached to the
Court's compound without prior permission
from the District Judge and, therefore, their
action was wholly illegal and not in
performance of public/official duty. Their
acts/crimes are not protected by the
provision of Section 197 CrPC. It has been
further
submitted
that
the
present
application has no merit and is liable to be
dismissed.

13. I have considered the submissions
advanced by the learned counsel for the
parties and gone through the record.

14. Section 197 in The Code of
Criminal Procedure, 1973 is extracted
herein below for convenience:-

"197. Prosecution of Judges
and public servants.-(1) When any
person who is or was a Judge or
Magistrate or a public servant not
removable from his office save by or with
the sanction of the Government is
accused of any offence alleged to have
been committed by him while acting or
purporting to act in the discharge of his
official
duty,
no
Court
shall
take
cognizance of such offence except with
the previous sanction-

(a) in the case of a person who
is employed or, as the case may be, was
at the time of commission of the alleged
offence employed, in connection with the
affairs of the Union, of the Central
Government;

(b) in the case of a person who
is employed or, as the case may be, was
at the time of commission of the alleged
offence employed, in connection with the
affairs
of
a
State,
of
the
State
Government."

Notification No. 1841 (3)/VI538-71 dated 30th January, 1975 reads as
under:

"Grih
Vibhag
(Police),
Anubhag-9, Notification No. 1841 (3)/VI538-71, dated January 30, 1975:-

In
exercise
of
the
powers
conferred by sub-section (3) of Section
197 of the Code of Criminal Procedure,
1973 (Act No. 2 of 1974), the Governor is
pleased to direct that the provisions of
sub-section (2) of the aforesaid section
shall apply to all members of the
following forces of the State, charged
with the maintenance of public order
wherever they may be serving, namely :

(i) U.P. Police Force

(ii)
U.P.
Pradeshik
Armed
Constabulary"

15. The object of sanction for
prosecution under Section 197 CrPC is to
protect the public servants discharging
official/public functions from harassment
by
initiation
of
malafide/frivolous/retaliatory
criminal
proceedings. A Constitution Bench of the
Supreme Court in the case of Matajog
Dobey Vs. H.C. Bhari, AIR 1956 SC 44,
delineating importance of sanction for
prosecution of public servants held as
under:-

"15.The minor contentions may
be disposed of at the outset. Even if there
was anything sound and substantial in the
constitutional point about the vires of
Section 5(1) of the Act, we declined to go
into it as it was not raised before the High
Court or in the grounds of the petition for
special leave to appeal. Article 14 does not
8 All. Ajeet Shukla & Ors. Vs. State of U.P. & Ors.
1047
render Section 197 of the Criminal
Procedure
Code
ultra
vires
as
the
discrimination is based upon a rational
classification. Public servants have to be
protected from harassment in the discharge
of official duties while ordinary citizens not
so engaged do not require this safeguard. It
was argued that Section 197 of the
Criminal
Procedure
Code
vested
an
absolutely
arbitrary
power
in
the
Government to grant or withhold sanction
at their sweet-will and pleasure, and the
legislature did not lay down or even
indicate any guiding principles to control
the exercise of the discretion. There is no
question of any discrimination between one
person and another in the matter of taking
proceedings against a public servant for an
act done or purporting to be done by the
public servant in the discharge of his
official duties. No one can take such
proceedings without such sanction. If the
Government gives sanction against one
public servant but declines to do so against
another, then the government servant
against whom sanction is given may
possibly complain of discrimination. But
the petitioners who are complainants
cannot be heard to say so, for there is no
discrimination as against any complainant.
It has to be borne in mind that a
discretionary power is not necessarily a
discriminatory power and that abuse of
power is not to be easily assumed where the
discretion is vested in the government and
not in a minor official. Further, we are not
now concerned with any such question. We
have merely to see whether the court could
take cognisance of the case without
previous sanction and for this purpose the
court has to find out if the act complained
against was committed by the accused
while acting or purporting to act in the
discharge of official duty. Once this is
settled, the case proceeds or is thrown out.
Whether sanction is to be accorded or not
is a matter for the government to consider.
The absolute power to accord or withhold
sanction conferred on the government is
irrelevant and foreign to the duty cast on
the court, which is the ascertainment of the
true nature of the act."

16. The intention behind protection
under Section 197 CrPC is to protect the
public servant from being unnecessarily
harassed
by
launching
a
criminal
proceeding against him for an offence
allegedly committed while performing
official/public duty. If the offence is in
respect of an act done or purported to be
done in discharge of official/public duty,
the public servant has protection under
Section 197 CrPC. This protection under
Section 197 CrPC has salutary object to
prevent harassment of public servants and
protect them for mala fide and motivated
criminal prosecution. However, if the
competent authority finds that the act of
commission/omission
done
by
public
servant was not in performance of his
public duty, he would sanction prosecution
of the public servant.

17. In 1973 (2) SCC 701 (Pukhraj
Vs. State of Rajasthan and another) the
Supreme
Court
has
held
that
the
requirement of sanction cannot be confined
to only such an act done or purporting to be
done directly in discharge of his public
office. This protection would be available
in cases where the act complained of is in
excess of the duty or under a mistaken
belief as to the existence of such duty.
Paragraph-2 of Pukhraj Vs. State of
Rajasthan and another case (supra) is
extracted hereinunder:-

"2.
The
law
regarding
the
circumstances under which sanction under
1048 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
Section 197 of the Code of Criminal
Procedure is necessary is by now well
settled as a result of the decisions from
Hori Ram Singh's case [AIR 1939 FC 43 :
1939 FCR 159 : 40 Cri LJ 468] to the
latest decision of this Court in Bhagwan
Prasad Srivastava v. N.P. Misra [(1970) 2
SCC 56 : (1971) 1 SCR 317] . While the
law is well settled the difficulty really arises
in applying the law to the facts of any
particular case. The intention behind the
section is to prevent public servants from
being unnecessarily harassed. The section
is not restricted only to cases of anything
purported to be done in good faith, for a
person who ostensibly acts in execution of
his duty still purports so to act, although he
may have a dishonest intention. Nor is it
confined to cases where the act, which
constitutes the offence, is the official duty
of
the
official
concerned.
Such
an
interpretation
would
involve
a
contradiction in terms, because an offence
can never be an official duty. The offence
should have been committed when an act is
done in the execution of duty or when an
act purports to be done in execution of
duty. The test appears to be not that the
offence is capable of being committed only
by a public servant and not by anyone else,
but that it is committed by a public servant
in an act done or purporting to be done in
the execution of duty. The section cannot be
confined to only such acts as are done by a
public servant directly in pursuance of his
public office, though in excess of the duty
or under a mistaken belief as to the
existence of such duty. Nor need the act
constituting the offence be so inseparably
connected with the official duty as to form
part and parcel of the same transaction.
What is necessary is that the offence must
be in respect of an act done or purported to
be done in the discharge of an official duty.
It does not apply to acts done purely in a
private capacity by a public servant.
Expressions such as the "capacity in which
the act is performed", "cloak of office" and
"professed exercise of the office" may not
always be appropriate to describe or
delimit the scope of section. An act merely
because it was done negligently does not
cease to be one done or purporting to be
done in execution of a duty. In Hori Ram
Singh case Sulaiman, J. observed:

"The section cannot be confined
to only such acts as are done by a public
servant directly in pursuance of his public
office, though in excess of the duty or under
a mistaken belief as to the existence of such
duty. Nor is it necessary to go to the length
of saying that the act constituting the
offence should be so inseparably connected
with the official duty as to form part and
parcel of the same transaction."

In the same case Varadachariar,
J. observed: "there must be something in
the nature of the act complained of that
attaches it to the official character of the
person doing it". In affirming this view, the
Judicial Committee ofthe Privy Council
observed in Gill [AIR 1948 PC 128 : 1948
LR 75 IA 41 : 49 Cri LJ 503] case:

"A public servant can only be
said to act or purport to act in the
discharge of his official duty, if his act is
such as to lie within the scope of his official
duty.... The test may well be whether the
public
servant,
if
challenged,
can
reasonably claim that, what he does in
virtue of his office."

In Matajog Dobey v. H.C. Bhari
[AIR 1955 SC 44 : (1955) 2 SCR 925 :
1956 Cri LJ 140] the Court was of the view
that the test laid down that it must be
established that the act complained of was
an official act unduly narrowed down the
scope of the protection afforded by Section
197. After referring to the earlier cases the
Court summed up the results as follows:
8 All. Ajeet Shukla & Ors. Vs. State of U.P. & Ors.
1049

"There must be a reasonable
connection between the act and the
discharge of official duty; the act must bear
such relation to the duty that the accused
could lay a reasonable, but not a pretended
or fanciful claim, that he did it in the
course of the performance of his duty."

Applying this test it is difficult to
say that the acts complained of i.e. of
kicking the complainant and of abusing
him, could be said to have been done in the
course
of
performance
of
the
2nd
respondent's duty. At this stage all that we
are concerned with is whether on the facts
alleged in the complaint it could be said
that what the 2nd respondent is alleged to
have done could be said to be in purported
exercise of his duty. Very clearly it is not.
We must make it clear, however, that we
express no opinion as to the truth or falsity
of the allegations."

18. In (2020) 7 SCC 695 (D. Devraja
Vs. Owais Sabeer Hussain) the Supreme
Court, after making survey of the case law
on the question of sanction in paragraphs66, 67, 68, 69, 70 and 71 has held as
under:-

66. Sanction of the Government,
to prosecute a police officer, for any act
related to the discharge of an official
duty, is imperative to protect the police
officer from facing harassive, retaliatory,
revengeful and frivolous proceedings. The
requirement
of
sanction
from
the
Government, to prosecute would give an
upright police officer the confidence to
discharge his official duties efficiently,
without fear of vindictive retaliation by
initiation of criminal action, from which
he would be protected under Section 197
of the Code of Criminal Procedure, read
with Section 170 of the Karnataka Police
Act. At the same time, if the policeman
has committed a wrong, which constitutes
a criminal offence and renders him liable
for prosecution, he can be prosecuted
with sanction from the appropriate
Government.

67. Every offence committed by
a police officer does not attract Section
197 of the Code of Criminal Procedure
read with Section 170 of the Karnataka
Police Act. The protection given under
Section 197 of the Criminal Procedure
Code read with Section 170 of the
Karnataka Police Act has its limitations.
The protection is available only when the
alleged act done by the public servant is
reasonably connected with the discharge
of his official duty and official duty is not
merely a cloak for the objectionable act.
An offence committed entirely outside the
scope of the duty of the police officer,
would certainly not require sanction. To
cite an example, a policeman assaulting a
domestic help or indulging in domestic
violence would certainly not be entitled
to protection. However, if an act is
connected to the discharge of official duty
of investigation of a recorded criminal
case, the act is certainly under colour of
duty, no matter how illegal the act may
be.

68. If in doing an official duty a
policeman has acted in excess of duty, but
there is a reasonable connection between
the act and the performance of the
official duty, the fact that the act alleged
is in excess of duty will not be ground
enough to deprive the policeman of the
protection of the government sanction for
initiation of criminal action against him.

69. The language and tenor of
Section 197 of the Code of Criminal
Procedure
and
Section
170
of
the
Karnataka Police Act makes it absolutely
clear that sanction is required not only for
acts done in discharge of official duty, it is
1050 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
also required for an act purported to be
done in discharge of official duty and/or act
done under colour of or in excess of such
duty or authority.

70. To decide whether sanction is
necessary, the test is whether the act is
totally unconnected with official duty or
whether there is a reasonable connection
with the official duty. In the case of an act
of a policeman or any other public servant
unconnected with the official duty there can
be no question of sanction. However, if the
act alleged against a policeman is
reasonably connected with discharge of his
official duty, it does not matter if the
policeman has exceeded the scope of his
powers and/or acted beyond the four
corners of law.

71. If the act alleged in a
complaint purported to be filed against the
policeman is reasonably connected to
discharge of some official duty, cognizance
thereof cannot be taken unless requisite
sanction of the appropriate Government is
obtained under Section 197 of the Code of
Criminal Procedure and/or Section 170 of
the Karnataka Police Act."

19. It is also well settled that an
application under Section 482 CrPC is
maintainable to quash the proceedings for
want of sanction or if same are frivolous or
in abuse of process of the Court. If there is
no
reasonable
relationship
with
the
official/public duty the protection under
Section 197 CrPC will not be available to
such a public servant. However, for the
alleged offence committed by the police
personnel, which may be in excess of his
official/public duty, without sanction the
Court is barred to take cognizance of the
offence. The judgment reported in (1987) 4
SCC 663 (Bakhshish Singh Brar Vs.
Gurmej Kaur and another) relied on by
Mr. Amrendra Nath Tripathi, learned
counsel for the respondent nos. 2 and 3 is
not applicable in the facts of the present
case inasmuch as in the said case the police
officer was accused of causing grievous
injuries and death in conducting raid and
search and, therefore, the Court held that
where the police officer, while acting in
purported
discharge
of
official
duty
exceeded limits (underline supplied) of
his official capacity, would be a question
which
can
be
decided
after
taking
cognizance of offence and, therefore, held
that the trial need not be stayed for want of
sanction in the said case.

20. In the present case, it is not in
dispute that there was unrest and the
atmosphere was highly changed. The
applicants,
along
with
other
police
personnel, went to control the situation and
maintain peace and order. The police
officials also had suffered injuries to
control the situation. To control the
situation, if they had used force, and as a
result thereof, some lawyers had suffered
injuries, it cannot be said that the police
officers were not acting in discharge of
their official duty. The question that the
police
personnel
went
there
without
permission of the District Court has no
relevance inasmuch as the duty of the
police is to maintain peace, law & order. It
appears that there was an emergent
situation to deal with by the police and,
they could not have waited for the order to
be passed by the District Judge to enter the
Court premises. On this ground that there
was no order passed by the District Judge
for the police to enter the Court compound,
the action taken by the police officials
cannot be said to be not one towards
discharge of the official/public duty. Even
if the police official had exceeded to some
extent their authority in discharge of their
official/public duty, then also sanction
8 All. Arvind Mishra Vs. C.B.I., Lucknow
1051
would be required for their prosecution. In
absence
of
sanction,
the
criminal
proceedings against the applicants would
be non-est and void and the same are liable
to be quashed.

21. In view thereof, the application is
hereby
allowed.
Consequently,
the
impugned proceedings are quashed.
----------
(2022) 8 ILRA 1051
ORIGINAL JURISDICTION
CRIMINAL SIDE
DATED: LUCKNOW 25.08.2022

BEFORE

THE HON'BLE DINESH KUMAR SINGH, J.

Application U/s 482 No. 6257 of 2019

Arvind Mishra ...Applicant
Versus
C.B.I., Lucknow ...Opposite Party

Counsel for the Applicant:
Pranshu Agrawal, Raghvendra Pandey

Counsel for the Opposite Party:
A.S.G., Anurag Kumar Singh

Civil Law - Indian Evidence Act,1872 -
Section
33-impugned
order
allowed
for
reading the evidence recorded in a previous
proceedings of criminal case-treating it to be
relevant-in previous proceeding-evidences got
recorded and statement of accused recordedfinal order was-prosecution sanction was invalid-
Earlier court had jurisdiction-only sanction was
invalid-section
33
fully
applicable-AccusedApplicant is not prejudiced by impugned orderevidence recorded earlier cannot become nonest merely on the ground that the proceedings
were dropped because of improper/invalid
sanction under section 19 of the PC Act.

Application dismissed. (E-9)

List of Cases cited:
1. Baij Nath Prasad Tripathi Vs St. of Bhopal &
anr., AIR 1957 SC 494

2. Nanjappa Vs St.of Karn., (2015) 14 SCC 186

3. Sudhindra Nath Vs The State, AIR 1953 Cal.
339

4. Lallan Prasad Vs St. of U.P. & Noorul Haq),
(2008) 3 ADJ 413

5. Subramanian Swamy Vs Director, Central
Bureau of Investigation & anr., (2014) 8 SCC
682
(Delivered by Hon'ble Dinesh Kumar
Singh, J.)

1. Heard Mr. Pranshu Agrawal,
learned counsel for the accused-applicant,
as well as Mr. Anurag Kumar Singh,
learned counsel for respondent-Central
Bureau of Investigation, and gone through
the record.

2. By way of this application under
482 CrPC, the applicant has prayed for
quashing of the order dated 15.07.2019
passed by the learned Special Judge, AntiCorruption, CBI (West), Lucknow by
means of which application filed by the
CBI under Section 33 of The Indian
Evidence Act,1872 (hereinafter referred to
as 'Evidence Act') in Criminal Case No.502
of 2016 (State through CBI V. Arvind
Mishra) for reading the evidence, recorded
in the proceedings of Criminal Case No.04
of 2001, RC No 30(A) of 1999 and,
treating it to be relevant for Criminal Case
No.502 of 2016, has been allowed.

3. Facts of the case are that the
applicant is an accused in Criminal Case
No.502 of 2016, under Sections 120-B,
409, 420, 468 and 471 IPC read with
Section 7 and Sections 13(2) read with
Sections 13(1)(d) of the Prevention of