# Akanksha & Anr v. State Of U.P. & Ors

- **Citation:** (2025) 12 ILRA 307
- **Court:** High Court of Judicature at Allahabad
- **Decided:** 2025-12-17
- **Case number:** Writ C No. 35171 of 2025
- **Bench:** Vivek Kumar Singh
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/allahabad-high-court/akanksha-anr-v-state-of-u-p-ors-52839
- **Pages:** 19

## Text

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12 All. Akanksha & Anr. Vs. State Of U.P. & Ors.
307
in reference to a factual matrix wherein
execution of the sentence had been stayed
and not where there has been a stay of
conviction. The moment a higher court
stays a conviction, the anathema of
conviction goes out of the window and the
person against whom such conviction is
stayed, though not absolved, cannot be
stated to be a convicted person. It is only
when the appeal is decided that it could be
ascertained as to whether he would be a
convicted person or an acquitted person.

17. Our opinion is also fortified by the
judgment in Lily Thomas (Supra) wherein
the Division Bench of the Supreme Court
has
categorically
held
that
the
disqualification under Sub-section (1), (2)
or (3) of Section 8 of the Representation of
Peoples Act will not operate from the date
of order of stay of conviction passed by the
Appellate Court under Section 389 of the
Code or the High Court under Section 482
of the Code.

18. In light of the same, we are of the
view that the present writ petition is devoid
of merit. The petitioner has also sought
from us a certificate for appeal to the
Supreme Court under Article 134-A of the
Constitution of India.

19. On consideration of the said
prayer, we are of the view that no
substantial question of law arises in the
present matter, as the matter has been
categorically settled by the Supreme Court
and is no longer res integra, as discussed
above. Accordingly, the said prayer is also
rejected.

20. The writ petition is dismissed in
the aforesaid terms.
----------
(2025) 12 ILRA 307
ORIGINAL JURISDICTION
CIVIL SIDE
DATED: ALLAHABAD 17.12.2025

BEFORE

THE HON'BLE VIVEK KUMAR SINGH, J.

Writ C No. 35171 of 2025
&
Connected With Other Cases

Akanksha & Anr. ...Petitioners
Versus
State Of U.P. & Ors. ...Respondents

Issue for Consideration
The main issue was whether major consulting
adults living together in a live-in-relationship are
entitled to protection of their life and personal
liberty from interference by family members or
the state,even if such a relationship is not
socially accepted or is considered immoral by
society.

Headnotes
Constitution of India,1950-Article 226Bhartiya Shaksya Adhiniyam,2023-section
119(1)-Legality of live-in relationshipsWhile live in relationships may be viewed
as immoral or a social taboo in India, they
are not prohibited by any law-Once
individuls attain the age of majority, they
are sui juris and have the right to choose
their partner-notions of social morality are
subjective and cannot be used by criminal
law to interfere with personal autonomysection 119(1) of BSA states that if
couples live together for a significant
amount of time as husband and wife, they
will presumed to be married-writ petition
allowed.(Para 42 to 53) (E-6)

Held
The court established that a live in relationship
between two consenting adults of heterogenic
sex
does
not
amount
to
any
offenceFurthermore, the legislature has recognized
such relationship through the Protection of
women
from
domestic
violence
Act,2005,
treating them as "relationship in the nature of
marriage."
308 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
Case law cited
Badri
Prasad
Vs
Deputy
Director
of
Consolidation , AIR 1978 SC 1557;(1978 3 SCC
527, Payal Sharma @ Kamla Sharma Vs
Superintendent, Nari Niketan, Agra, AIR 2001
ALL 254, Tulsa & Ors Vs Durghatiya & Ors
(2008) 4 SCC 520,S.Khushboo Vs Kanniammal &
Anr, (2010) 5 SCC 600,Gian Devi Vs The
Superintendent, Nari Niketan Delhi & Ors (1976)
3 SCC 234, Lata Singh Vs State of UP 2006
Cr.L.J. 3309, Bhagwan Dass Vs State (NCT of
Delhi), (2011) 6 SCC 396, D. Velusamy Vs D.
Patchainmmal (2010) 10 SCC 469,Soni Gerry Vs
Grry Douglas, (2018) 2 SCC 197, Dhanu Lal Vs
Ganesh Ram, (2015) 12 SCC 301, Nandakumar
& Anr. Vs State of Kerala, (2018) 16 SCC
602,Indra Sarma Vs V.K.V Sarma (2013 15 SCC
755, Shafin Jahan Vs Asokan K.M & Ors (2018)
16 SCC 368,S.B. Criminal Writ Petition No. 1730
of 2024 (Rekha Meghwanshi & Anr. Vs State of
Rajasthan & Ors), S.B Criminal Writ Petition No.
1537 of 2025 (XXX Vs State of Rajasthan &
Ors)., CRWP No. 4725 of 2021 (Seema Kaur &
Anr. Vs State of Punjab & Ors), Anjali Kushwah
& Ors Vs The State of M.P. Writ Petition No.
41033 of 2024, Writ-C 27338 of 2023 (Razia &
Anr Vs State of U.P. & Three Ors.),Writ-C No.
11108 of 2020 Kamini Devi & Anr. Vs State of
U.P. & Ors, Kiran Rawat & Anr Vs State of U.P.,
2023 (7) ADJ 679-referred to.
List of Acts
Constitution of India,1950, Protection of Women
from Domestic Violence Act,2005, Indian Penal
Code,1860.

List of Keywords
Live-in relationship, Right to life and personal
liberty, Protection from Interference, Major
Consenting Adults, Social morality, Legality.

 Case Arising fom
 Civil Jurisdiction-WRIT-C No. - 35171 of 2025
Akanksha & Anr. Vs. State of U.P. & 3 Ors.
From the Judgment and Order dated 17.12.2025
of the High Court of Judicature at Allahabad.

Appearances for parties
Adv. for Petitioner:-
Rajeev Kumar Saxena
Adv. for Respondent:-
C.S.C

(Delivered by Hon'ble Vivek Kumar
Singh, J.)

1. Heard Sri Swetashwa Agarwal,
learned Senior Counsel, appeared as
Amicus Curiae and assisted by Sri Subir
Lal, Shri Sausthav Guha, Sri Dhanraj Singh
Yadav, Sri Ajay Kumar and Sri Abhay
Kumar Shukla, learned counsels appearing
on behalf of the petitioners and Sri Yogesh
Kumar, Sri Pramit Kumar Pal and Sri
Suresh Babu, learned Standing Counsels
for the State of U.P., in all the writ
petitions.

2. By means of the present writ
petition, the petitioners have prayed for a
writ in the nature of mandamus directing
the respondents not to interfere in their
peaceful life and also for a direction to
provide protection.

3. A large number of petitions are being
filed in this Court wherein the petitioners have
decided to stay together in a live-in relationship
and they claimed that they have an apprehension
of life threat from the private respondents and the
Police of concerned Districts have been
approached by them, but no heed was paid,
therefore, they have approached this Court by
way of filing these writ petitions. In all the writ
petitions, the petitioners have prayed that the
Police of their District be directed to provide
protection from private respondents as well as
other family members/relatives/associates of the
private respondents from causing any harm to
the petitioners.

4. Since controversy involved in all
the writ petitions are similar, hence they are
being decided by a common judgment.
12 All. Akanksha & Anr. Vs. State Of U.P. & Ors.
309

5. This Court, taking note of the
involvement of the important issue in the
matter,
requested
Mr.
Shwetashwa
Agarwal, learned Senior Advocate, to assist
this Court, as amicus curiae, which was
accepted by the learned Senior Counsel and
he argued the matter with the assistance of
learned counsels named above.

6. Learned Senior Counsel started his
argument that in India live-in relationship
is not unlawful though, it is not accepted in
many parts of the society because people
think it may increase adultery. According
to Article 21 of the Constitution of India,
every citizen's right to marry is an alienable
fundamental right. They can be married or
be in a live-in relationship. It is their choice
and no one can interfere in their peaceful
living.

7. Learned Senior Counsel further
argued that Article 21 of the Constitution of
India grants the personal choice of whether
to marry or not and be in a live-in
relationship. A major person has a right to
marry a people of his/her choice or to live
with his/her partner/they have a right to live
out of the wedlock.

8. It is further argued by the learned
Senior Counsel that live-in relationship
may be considered to be an immoral act.
Morality may differ from person to person.
It is according to each person and
perception whether a particular thing is
moral or immoral. The live-in relationship
is not prohibited by any law. The legality of
the live-in relationship arose from Article 19
and 21 of the Constitution of India, therefore,
one can live anywhere and with anyone of
their choice, with or without marriage.
According to law, a live-in relationship
cannot be said illegal, however, some people
may call it immoral. It is also submitted that
the Indian Parliament has never passed any
Legislation that declares a live-in relationship
as illegal or unlawful. The Supreme Court
and the High Courts in various judgments,
have accepted the live-in relationship.

9. The learned Senior Counsel citing
several judgments of Supreme Court as well
as High Courts, stated that it is verdict that a
live-in relationship between consenting adults
of heterogenic sex does not amount to any
offence. It is also submitted that Article 14 of
the Indian Constitution guarantees equal
protection of law in the territory of India and
Article 21 protects the citizen's right to life
and liberty. In these cases, the petitioners,
claimed to be in a live-in relationship, have
crossed the age of majority which is a legal
age to enter into any relationship with
protection, according to their prayer. The
learned Senior Counsel has relied upon
various judgments of the Supreme Court as
well as High Courts in support of his
contention, which shall be discussed by this
Court in succeeding paragraphs of this
judgment.

10. Learned Additional Chief Standing
Counsel and learned Standing Counsel for the
State of U.P. stated that the Indian society
cannot accept the live-in relationship in
replacement of marriage. Married couples
often have many societal responsibilities of
finances, taking care of each other's family
members
and
performing
the
duties
organized by the society. In a live-in
relationship there is no need to please parents
and relatives, and the couples are free from
such responsibilities which will arise out of
marriage.

11. It is also stated by learned counsel
for the State that live-in relationship cannot
be accepted at the cost of our country's
social fabric. These parties are not binding
310 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
by any law and either of the partners can
walk out of the said relationship as and
when they like to do so. It is a contract of
live-in together which is renewed every day
by the parties and can be terminated by
either of the parties without consent of the
other party and one party can walk out at
any point of time. There is no legal status
of such type of relationship and the legal
status of the children born out of such
relationship would not be determined and it
will create a lot of complications in the life
of
live-in
partners,
therefore,
before
seeking any relief from the Court, they
should marry first.

12. It is also submitted by the learned
counsel for the State of U.P. that if the
petitions are allowed, that would impose an
impermissible obligation upon the State to
supervise, affirm and protect personal
choices of the petitioners. It is further
submitted that protection may be granted to
the couples who have solemnized marriage
against the wishes of their parents and
relatives but no protection can be granted to
non-marital couples. The apprehensions of
the petitioners are vague, speculative and
unsupported
by
any
contemporaneous
complaint to local police authorities. There
is no real and immediate threat to life or
limb of the petitioners. The State's
obligation to protect arises only when a real
and
immediate
threat
exists;
the
Constitution does not compel prophylactic,
generalized or anticipatory protection for
private arrangements. The police cannot be
compelled to serve as personal security for
non-marital cohabitation. Protection by the
police is warranted only when there exists a
credible and immediate threat.

13. In last, it is submitted by learned
counsel for the State that moral values and
traditions of the Indian Society in name of
modernisation cannot be accepted and no
relief can be granted by this Court
considering
the
status
of
the
parties/petitioners. The learned counsel for
the State have also relied upon following
judgments:

"1. Director of Settlements vs.
M.R. Apparao, (2002) 4 SCC 638.

2. Shanti Fragrances v. Union of
India, (2018) 11 SCC 305.

3.
Municipal
Committee,
Amritsar vs. Hazara Singh, (1975) 1 SCC
794.

4. Common Cause vs. Union of
India, (2018) 5 SCC 1.

5. Indra Sarma vs. V.K.V.
Sarma, (2013) 15 SCC 755.

6. State of Punjab vs. Gurdial
Singh, (1980) 2 SCC 471.

7. K.K. Bhalla vs. State of M.P.,
(2006) 3 SCC 581.

8. Poonam Verma vs. Delhi
Police, (1996) 4 SCC 565.

9. Divisional Manager, Aravali
Golf Club vs. Chander Hass, (2008) 1
SCC 683."

14. I have heard rival submissions of
the parties and perused the records.

15. Marriage is a sacred relationship in
India. Marriage has its legal consequences,
entitles both the persons to cohabit,
children born out of a legal wedlock have
legitimacy as legal heirs, the wife is
entitled to maintenance during and after the
12 All. Akanksha & Anr. Vs. State Of U.P. & Ors.
311
dissolution of marriage. To avoid these
responsibilities and to enjoy the benefit of
living together, the concept of living
together has come into picture. Live-in
relationship provides for a life free from
responsibilities and commitment unlike in a
marriage. In this relationship, an unmarried
couple lives together under the same roof in
a way it resembles a marriage, but without
getting legally married.

16. Live-in relationship is not socially
accepted in our country. On the other hand,
it is considered as taboo in India. The door
for western ideas is always welcome in
India and the concept of live-in relationship
is one of such ideas. Live-in relationship is
still facing social stigma and moral debate,
especially regarding traditional values,
children,
differing
religious/cultural
perspectives. For some, it is immoral while
others see it as a valid choice for
compatibility.

17. In modern era, the concept of livein relationship means a male and a female
living together under a roof without
marriage. This Court has been approached
by live-in couples for protection from the
private respondents, therefore, without
going into the morality of the act of the
petitioners, the Court has to see as to
whether any illegal act has been committed
by the petitioners and in this context, it has
to be seen as to whether they are entitled to
any relief.

18. Badri Prasad vs. Deputy Director
of Consolidation, AIR 1978 SC 1557;
(1978) 3 SCC 527, was the first case in
which the Hon'ble Supreme Court of India
has recognized live-in relationship and
interpreted it as a valid marriage. In this case
the Hon'ble Supreme Court gave the legal
validity to the 50 years old relationship of a
couple. The Supreme Court held that the
parties were in a live-in relationship for more
than 50 years and their relationship would be
considered as husband and wife, presuming
the relationship was valid.

19. In the case of Payal Sharma @
Kamla Sharma vs. Superintendent, Nari
Niketan, Agra, AIR 2001 ALL 254, the
Division Bench of Allahabad High Court,
clearly stated that a man and women even
without getting married can live together if
they wish. This may be regarded immoral by
the society but it is not illegal. There is a
difference between the law and morality. The
petitioner was set at liberty by the Division
Bench of High Court, Allahabad, and it was
observed that she can go anywhere and can
live with anyone as she desires. The police
was also directed to ensure security of the
petitioner.

20. In the case of Tulsa And Others vs.
Durghatiya And Others, (2008) 4 SCC
520, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has
remarked that where partners live jointly for
an extended period of time, a belief would
emerge
in
a
substantial
marriage.
Subsequently, there is no rule which shows
that living together with someone is unlawful,
also
children
conceived
out
of
such
relationship will no more be considered as
illegitimate.

21. In the case of S. Khushboo vs.
Kanniammal And Another, (2010) 5 SCC
600, the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that
adults willingly engaging in sexual relations
outside the marital setting is not an offence.
Paragraph Nos. 31 and 46 of the S.
Khushboo (supra) are reproduced as under:

"31. While it is true that the
mainstream view in our society is that
sexual contact should take place only
312 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
between marital partners, there is no
statutory offence that takes place when
adults willingly engage in sexual relations
outside the marital setting, with the
exception of "adultery" as defined under
Section 497 IPC. At this juncture, we may
refer to the decision given by this Court in
Lata Singh Vs. State of U.P. & Anr., AIR
2006 SC 2522, wherein it was observed
that a live-in relationship between two
consenting adults of heterogenic sex does
not amount to any offence (with the obvious
exception of "adultery"), even though it
may be perceived as immoral. A major girl
is free to marry anyone she likes or "live
with anyone she likes". In that case, the
petitioner was a woman who had married a
man belonging to another caste and had
begun
cohabitation
with
him.
The
petitioner's brother had filed a criminal
complaint accusing her husband of offences
under Sections 366 and 368 IPC, thereby
leading to the commencement of trial
proceedings. This Court had entertained a
writ petition and granted relief by quashing
the criminal trial. Furthermore, the Court
had noted that "no offence was committed
by any of the accused and the whole
criminal case in question is an abuse of the
process of the Court".

46. Admittedly, the appellant's
remarks did provoke a controversy since
the acceptance of premarital sex and livein relationships is viewed by some as an
attack on the centrality of marriage. While
there can be no doubt that in India,
marriage is an important social institution,
we must also keep our minds open to the
fact that there are certain individuals or
groups who do not hold the same view. To
be sure, there are some indigenous groups
within our country wherein sexual relations
outside the marital setting are accepted as
a normal occurrence. Even in the societal
mainstream, there are a significant number
of people who see nothing wrong in
engaging in premarital sex. Notions of
social morality are inherently subjective
and the criminal law cannot be used as a
means to unduly interfere with the domain
of personal autonomy. Morality and
Criminality are not co-extensive"

22. Here an important issue raised in
these petitions is regarding the fundamental
rights of the petitioners guaranteed under
Article 21 of the Constitution of India. Can
this Court be a silent spectator when its
extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226
of the Constitution of India invoked
seeking its protection for personal liberty
and a young couple whose only fault is that
they have crossed the bridge which is not
socially acceptable by our society.

23. The Hon'ble Apex Court has
considered this issue and has laid down law
that partners, living in a relationship has
not committed any offence.

24. In the case of Gian Devi v. The
Superintendent, Nari Niketan, Delhi and
Others, (1976) 3 SCC 234, the three-Judge
Bench of the Hon'ble Supreme Court has
held that if a girl is major then no fetter can
be placed upon her choice of the person
with whom she is to stay nor any restriction
can be imposed regarding the place where
she should stay. The Supreme Court further
observed that relatives can also have no
right to interfere in such matter. It is
enough to extract relevant part of the
judgment which reads as under:

"7. ... Whatever may be the date
of birth of the petitioner, the fact remains
that she is at present more than 18 years of
age. As the petitioner is sui juris no fetters
can be placed upon her choice of the
12 All. Akanksha & Anr. Vs. State Of U.P. & Ors.
313
person with whom she is to stay, nor can
any restriction be imposed regarding the
place where she should stay. The court or
the relatives of the petitioner can also not
substitute their opinion or preference for
that of the petitioner in such a matter."

25. In Lata Singh vs. State of UP
2006 Cr.L.J. 3309, while dealing with a
case of harassment by the parents of the
boy and girl, who had entered into intercaste marriage, Hon'ble Supreme Court has
issued
directions
to
the
Administration/Police
authorities
throughout the country in the following
terms:-

"This is a free and democratic
country, and once a person becomes a
major he or she can marry whosoever he/she
likes. If the parents of the boy or girl do not
approve of such inter-caste or inter-religious
marriage the maximum they can do is that
they can cut off social relations with the son or
the daughter, but they cannot give threats or
commit or instigate acts of violence and
cannot harass the person who undergoes such
inter-caste or inter- religious marriage. We,
therefore, direct that the administration/police
authorities throughout the country will see to it
that if any boy or girl who is a major
undergoes
inter-caste
or
inter-religious
marriage with a woman or man who is a
major, the couple are not harassed by any one
nor subjected to threats or acts of violence,
and any one who gives such threats or
harasses or commits acts of violence either
himself or at his instigation, is taken to task by
instituting criminal proceedings by the police
against such persons and further stern action
is taken against such persons as provided by
law."

26. In Bhagwan Dass v. State (NCT
of Delhi), (2011) 6 SCC 396 Hon'ble
Supreme Court held in paragraph 28 and 29
as under:-

"28. ..... Often young couples who
fall in love have to seek shelter in the police
lines or protection homes, to avoid the
wrath of kangaroo courts. We have held in
Lata Singh case that there is nothing
"honourable" in "honour" killings, and they
are nothing but barbaric and brutal
murders by bigoted persons with feudal
minds. In our opinion honour killings, for
whatever reason, come within the category
of the rarest of rare cases deserving death
punishment. It is time to stamp out these
barbaric, feudal practices which are a slur
on our nation. This is necessary as a
deterrent for such outrageous, uncivilised
behavior. All persons who are planning to
perpetrate "honour" killings should know
that the gallows await them.

29. Let a copy of this judgment be
sent to the Registrars General/ Registrars
of all the High Courts who shall circulate
the same to all the Judges of the Courts.
The Registrars General/ Registrars of the
High Courts will also circulate copies of
the same to all the Sessions Judges/
Additional
Sessions
Judges
in
the
States/Union Territories. Copies of the
judgment shall also be sent to all the Chief
Secretaries/ Home Secretaries/ Directors
General of Police of all States/ Union
Territories in the country. The Home
Secretaries and Directors General of
Police will circulate the same to all
SSPs/SPs in the States/Union Territories
for information."

27. The anguish expressed by the
Supreme Court in the case of Bhagwan
Dass (supra) is a matter of serious concern
for our democratic polity. Organizing
Khaps on the caste basis and implementing
314 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
their decisions instantly will turn the
democracy into mobocracy. It will turn
India into a banana republic. As noticed by
the Supreme Court, honour killing has
become commonplace in several parts of
India. If the tendency to overreach the rule
of law is not nipped in the bud, it would
corrode the very foundation of our
Constitution on which its grand edifice
rests. The consequences are fraught with
danger of collapse of our institutions and
rule of law that will lead to anarchy.

28. The Supreme Court in the case of D.
Velusamy v. D. Patchaiammal, reported in
(2010) 10 SCC 469, has considered the livein relationship or a relationship in the nature
of marriage and laid down some ingredients,
which can be treated like a common law
marriage. The relevant paragraph of the
judgment reads as under:

"31.
In
our
opinion
a
"relationship in the nature of marriage" is
akin to a common law marriage. Common
law marriages require that although not
being formally married:

(a) The couple must hold themselves
out to society as being akin to spouses.

(b) They must be of legal age to
marry.

(c) They must be otherwise
qualified to enter into a legal marriage,
including being unmarried.

(d) They must have voluntarily
cohabited and held themselves out to the
world as being akin to spouses for a
significant period of time."

29. A three Judge Bench of the
Hon'ble Apex Court in Soni Gerry vs.
Gerry Douglas, (2018) 2 SCC 197, where
the daughter of appellant and respondent,
who had attained the age of majority,
expressed her desire to reside in Kuwait
with her father, where she was pursuing her
education, held:

"10. It needs no special emphasis
to state that attaining the age of majority in
an individual's life has its own significance.
She/He is entitled to make her/his choice.
The courts cannot, as long as the choice
remains, assume the role of parens patriae.
The daughter is entitled to enjoy her
freedom as the law permits and the court
should not assume the role of a super
guardian being moved by any kind of
sentiment of the mother or the egotism of
the father. We say so without any
reservation."

30. In Dhanu Lal vs. Ganesh Ram,
(2015) 12 SCC 301, the Apex Court has
held that couples in live in relationships
will be presumed legally married. It was
also held that the woman in live in
relationship would be eligible to inherit the
property after the death of a partner.

31. In Nandakumar and Another vs.
State of Kerala, (2018) 16 SCC 602, the
Apex Court emphasized that live in
relationship is now recognized by the
legislature itself and it has found its place
under the provisions of Protection of
Women from Domestic Violence Act,
2005.
The
relevant
paragraphs
of
Nandakumar (supra) are reproduced as
under:

"We need not go into this aspect
in detail. For our purposes, it is sufficient
to note that both Appellant 1 and Thushara
are major. Even if they were not competent
to enter into wedlock (which position itself
12 All. Akanksha & Anr. Vs. State Of U.P. & Ors.
315
is disputed), they have right to live together
even outside the wedlock. It would not be
out of place to mention that "live-in
relationship" is now recognized by the
legislature itself which has found its place
under the provisions of the Protection of
Women from Domestic Violence Act,
2005."

32. The matter in issue has already
been dealt with in great detail by the
Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of
Indra Sarma vs. V.K.V. Sarma, (2013)
15 SCC 755, wherein it was held that livein relationships may last for a considerable
time and can lead to standards of
dependency and vulnerability and with the
increase in number of live-in relationships
there
must
be
sufficient
protection,
specially for women and those children
who are born out of such relationships. The
law cannot promote premarital sex, and
live-in relationships are personal and
people can give their opinion in favour or
against it. The legislature must consider
this issue and enact separate legislation so
that protection for women and children
born out of live-in relationships can be
provided. The relevant paragraphs of the
aforesaid
judgment
are
reproduced
hereinunder:

"37. The distinction between the
relationship in the nature of marriage and
marital relationship has to be noted first.
The relationship of marriage continues,
notwithstanding the fact that there are
differences of opinions, marital unrest, etc.,
even if they are not sharing a shared
household, being based on law. But live-inrelationship is purely an arrangement
between the parties unlike, a legal
marriage. Once a party to a live-in-
relationship determines that he/she does
not wish to live in such a relationship, that
relationship comes to an end. Further, in a
relationship in the nature of marriage, the
party asserting the existence of the
relationship, at any stage or at any point of
time, must positively prove the existence of
the identifying characteristics of that
relationship, since the legislature has used
the expression "in the nature of".

38.
Reference
to
certain
situations,
in
which
the
relationship
between an aggrieved person referred to in
Section 2(a) and the respondent referred to
in Section 2(q) of the DV Act, would or
would not amount to a relationship in the
nature of marriage, would be apposite.
Following are some of the categories of
cases which are only illustrative:

38.1. (a) Domestic relationship
between an unmarried adult woman and
an unmarried adult male.- Relationship
between an unmarried adult woman and an
unmarried adult male who lived or, at any
point of time lived together in a shared
household, will fall under the definition of
Section 2(f) of the DV Act and in case,
there is any domestic violence, the same
will fall under Section 3 of the DV Act and
the aggrieved person can always seek
reliefs provided under Chapter IV of the
DV Act.

38.2. (b) Domestic relationship
between an unmarried woman and a
married adult male.- Situations may arise
when an unmarried adult women knowingly
enters into a relationship with a married
adult male. The question is whether such a
relationship is a relationship "in the nature
of marriage" so as to fall within the
definition of Section 2(f) of the DV Act.

38.3. (c) Domestic relationship
between a married adult woman and an
316 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
unmarried adult male.- Situations may
also arise where an adult married woman,
knowingly enters into a relationship with
an unmarried adult male, the question is
whether such a relationship would fall
within the expression relationship "in the
nature of marriage".

38.4. (d) Domestic relationship
between
an
unmarried
woman
unknowingly enters into a relationship
with a married adult male.- An unmarried
woman
unknowingly
enters
into
a
relationship with a married adult male,
may, in a given situation, fall within the
definition of Section 2(f) of the DV Act and
such a relationship may be a relationship
in the "nature of marriage", so far as the
aggrieved person is concerned.

38.5. (e) Domestic relationship
between same sex partners (gay and
lesbians).- The DV Act does not recognize
such a relationship and that relationship
cannot be termed as a relationship in the
nature
of
marriage
under
the
Act.
Legislatures in some countries, like the
Interpretation
Act,
1984
(Western
Australia), the Interpretation Act, 1999
(New Zealand), the Domestic Violence Act,
1998
(South
Africa),
the
Domestic
Violence, Crime and Victims Act, 2004
(U.K.), have recognized the relationship
between the same sex couples and have
brought
these
relationships
into
the
definition of Domestic relationship.

39. Section 2(f) of the DV Act
though uses the expression "two persons", the
expression "aggrieved person" under Section
2(a) takes in only "woman", hence, the Act
does not recognize the relationship of same
sex (gay or lesbian) and, hence, any act,
omission, commission or conduct of any of
the parties, would not lead to domestic
violence, entitling any relief under the DV
Act.

40. We should, therefore, while
determining whether any act, omission,
commission or conduct of the respondent
constitutes "domestic violence", have a
common sense/balanced approach, after
weighing up the various factors which exist in
a particular relationship and then reach a
conclusion as to whether a particular
relationship is a relationship in the "nature of
marriage". Many a times, it is the common
intention of the parties to that relationship as
to what their relationship is to be, and to
involve and as to their respective roles and
responsibilities, that primarily governs that
relationship. Intention may be expressed or
implied and what is relevant is their intention
as to matters that are characteristic of a
marriage. The expression "relationship in the
nature of marriage", of course, cannot be
construed in the abstract, we must take it in
the context in which it appears and apply the
same bearing in mind the purpose and object
of the Act as well as the meaning of the
expression "in the nature of marriage". Plight
of a vulnerable section of women in that
relationship needs attention. Many a times,
the women are taken advantage of and
essential contribution of women in a joint
household through labour and emotional
support have been lost sight of especially by
the women who fall in the categories
mentioned in para 38.1 (a) and para 38.4 (d)
supra. Women, who fall under categories (b)
and (c) (paras 38.2 and 38.3), stand on a
different footing, which we will deal with
later. In the present case, the appellant falls
under category (b), referred to in paragraph
38.2 of the Judgment.

41. We have, therefore, come
across
various
permutations
and
combinations, in such relationships, and to
12 All. Akanksha & Anr. Vs. State Of U.P. & Ors.
317
test whether a particular relationship
would
fall
within
the
expression
"relationship in the nature of marriage",
certain guiding principles have to be
evolved since the expression has not been
defined in the Act.

42. Section 2(f) of the DV Act
defines "domestic relationship" to mean,
inter alia, a relationship between two
persons who live or have lived together at
such point of time in a shared household,
through a relationship in the nature of
marriage. The expression "relationship in
the nature of marriage" is also described
as defacto relationship, marriage ? like
relationship,
cohabitation,
couple
relationship,
meretricious
relationship
(now
known
as
committed
intimate
relationship), etc.

43. The courts and legislatures of
various countries now began to think that
denying certain benefits to a certain class
of persons on the basis of their marital
status is unjust where the need of those
benefits is felt by both unmarried and
married cohabitants. Courts in various
countries have extended certain benefits to
heterosexual
unmarried
cohabitants.
Legislatures
too,
of
late,
through
legislations started giving benefits to
heterosexual cohabitants."

33. In the case of Shafin Jahan vs.
Asokan K.M. And Others, (2018) 16 SCC
368, the Hon'ble Apex Court has held that
right to marry a person of own choice is
integral part of Article 21 of the Constitution
of India. There is a complete freedom to
choose life partner of any faith, belief,
religion, caste etc. Neither State, nor law, nor
society can dictate the choice of partner. The
right cannot be taken away except through
law which is substantially and procedurally
fair, just and reasonable. The relevant
paragraphs of Shafin Jahan (supra) are
reproduced as under:

"26. In Ummu Sabeena vs. State of
Kerala and Others, (2011) 10 SCC 781, the
Court further ruled that the principle of
habeas corpus has been incorporated in our
constitutional law and in a democratic
republic like India where judges function
under a written Constitution and which has a
chapter of fundamental rights to protect
individual liberty, the judges owe a duty to
safeguard the liberty not only of the citizens
but also of all persons within the territory of
India; and the same exercise of power can be
done in the most effective manner by issuing
a writ of habeas corpus.

27 . Thus, the pivotal purpose of
the said writ is to see that no one is deprived
of his/her liberty without sanction of law. It is
the primary duty of the State to see that the
said right is not sullied in any manner
whatsoever and its sanctity is not affected by
any kind of subterfuge. The role of the Court
is to see that the detenue is produced before
it, find out about his/her independent choice
and see to it that the person is released from
illegal restraint. The issue will be a different
one when the detention is not illegal. What is
seminal is to remember that the song of
liberty is sung with sincerity and the choice of
an individual is appositely respected and
conferred
its
esteemed
status
as
the
Constitution guarantees. It is so as the
expression of choice is a fundamental right
Under Articles 19 and 21 of the Constitution,
if the said choice does not transgress any
valid legal framework. Once that aspect is
clear, the enquiry and determination have to
come to an end.

52. It is obligatory to state here
that expression of choice in accord with
318 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
law is acceptance of individual identity.
Curtailment of that expression and the
ultimate action emanating therefrom on the
conceptual structuralism of obeisance to
the societal will destroy the individualistic
entity of a person. The social values and
morals have their space but they are not
above
the
constitutionally
guaranteed
freedom. The said freedom is both a
constitutional
and
a
human
right.
Deprivation of that freedom which is
ingrained in choice on the plea of faith is
impermissible. Faith of a person is intrinsic
to his/her meaningful existence. To have
the freedom of faith is essential to his/her
autonomy; and it strengthens the core
norms of the Constitution. Choosing a faith
is the substratum of individuality and sans
it, the right of choice becomes a shadow. It
has to be remembered that the realization
of a right is more important than the
conferment of the right. Such actualization
indeed ostracises any kind of societal
notoriety and keeps at bay the patriarchal
supremacy.
It
is
so
because
the
individualistic faith and expression of
choice
are
fundamental
for
the
fructification of the right. Thus, we would
like to call it indispensable preliminary
condition.

53 . Non-acceptance of her
choice
would
simply
mean
creating
discomfort to the constitutional right by a
Constitutional Court which is meant to be
the protector of fundamental rights. Such
a situation cannot remotely be conceived.
The duty of the Court is to uphold the
right and not to abridge the sphere of the
right unless there is a valid authority of
law. Sans lawful sanction, the centripodal
value
of
liberty
should
allow
an
individual to write his/her script. The
individual signature is the insignia of the
concept.

54. In the case at hand, the father
in his own stand and perception may feel
that there has been enormous transgression
of his right to protect the interest of his
daughter but his view point or position
cannot
be
allowed
to
curtail
the
fundamental rights of his daughter who, out
of her own volition, married the Appellant.
Therefore, the High Court has completely
erred by taking upon itself the burden of
annulling
the
marriage
between
the
Appellant and the Respondent No. 9 when
both stood embedded to their vow of
matrimony."

34. The Rajasthan High Court while
deciding S.B. Criminal Writ Petition No.
1730 of 2024 (Rekha Meghwanshi And
Another vs. State of Rajasthan And
Others), dealt with the identical situation
and granted protection to the live-in
couples, vide order dated 21.8.2024.

35.
In
another
latest
judgment,
Rajasthan High Court while deciding S.B.
Criminal Writ Petition No. 1537 of 2025
(XXX vs. State of Rajasthan And
Others), granted protection to live-in
couples vide order dated 01.12.2025,
relying upon the judgments of Rekha
Meghwanshi
(supra),
Nandakumar
(supra)
and
Lata
Singh
(supra).
Paragraph nos. 10, 12 and 13 of the
judgment dated 01.12.2025 passed by the
Rajasthan High Court are reproduced as
under:

" 10. In the case of Mafi & Anr.
Vs. State of Harayana & Ors. while
deciding CRWP No.691/2021 vide order
dated 25.01.2021 has held as under:

"In the present case, this Court,
without expressing any opinion on the
validity
of
the
relationship
of
the
12 All.