# Akash v. State of U.P. & Ors

- **Citation:** (2026) 4 ILRA 663
- **Court:** High Court of Judicature at Allahabad
- **Decided:** 2026-04-01
- **Case number:** Application U/S 528 BNSS No. 1655 of 2026
- **Bench:** Vivek Kumar Singh
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/allahabad-high-court/akash-v-state-of-u-p-ors-54467
- **Pages:** 12

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4 All. Akash Vs. State of U.P. & Ors.
663

18. There is no need to refer judgments on the settled proposition of law that in custody
matters, it is only the welfare of the child that is of paramount consideration and once we have
arrived at a conclusion that writ petition could not be dismissed as not maintainable or the forum of
the writ court as not the appropriate one, the matter has to be considered by the writ court on merits
where the parties would have their full say.

19. The special appeal is, accordingly, allowed.

20. The order dated 06.11.2025 passed by the learned Single Judge is set aside.

21. Habeas Corpus Writ Petition No. 931 of 2025 is restored to its original number and
status and the same shall be listed before appropriate Bench on 16.04.2026 as a fresh case.
----------
(2026) 4 ILRA 663
ORIGINAL JURISDICTION
CRIMINAL SIDE
DATED: ALLAHABAD 01.04.2026

BEFORE

THE HON'BLE VIVEK KUMAR SINGH, J.

Application U/S 528 BNSS No. 1655 of 2026

Akash ...Applicant
Versus
State of U.P. & Ors . ...Opposite Parties

Issue for consideration
The applicant filed a petition to quash criminal proceedings u/s 363, 366, 376 IPC and section 3⁄4 of the
POCSO Act, arising out of an FIR alleging the abduction of a minor girl.

Headnotes
A. Indian Penal Code,1860-Sections 363, 366, 376 & section 3⁄4 of the POCSO Act-Criminal
Procedure Code,1973-Section 482(BNSS, 2023-Section 528)-Quashing of criminal proceedingsSubsequent developments-Amicable settlement and marriage between applicant and victimAbsence of any allegation of kidnapping, inducement or sexual assault in statements u/s 161
and 164 CrPC and deposition before Trial Court-Medical evidence assessing victim as major-Birth
of a child from the wedlock-Informant filing counter-affidavit accepting compromise and
expressing intent not to proceed-Continuation of trial would amount to abuse of process and
disruption of matrimonial harmony-Application allowed.(Para 10 to 27)
Held
The court emphasized that while settlement in heinous offenses is ordinarily discouraged, it cannot turn a
blind eye to ground realities or sacrifice substantial justice at the altar of technicalities when the parties are
leading a happy married life with a child and the informant has entered into a compromise. Continuation of
trial would serve no meaningful purpose, waste valuable judicial hours and cause undue harassment by
disrupting a stable matrimonial relationship. Hence, entire proceedings quashed. (E-6)

Case law Cited
664 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
Juhi Devi Vs. State of Bihar and Others (2005) SCC 376, Suhani and Another Vs. State of U.P. and Others
(2018) 3 AICLR 183, Reena Vs. State of U.P. (2012) 2 ACR 2349, Shaheen Parveen and Another Vs. State of
U.P. and Others (2015) 7 ADJ 713, Sunil Tiwari Vs. State of U.P. and Another (Application u/s 482 Cr.PC No.
5471 of 2016), S. Varadarajan Vs. State of Madras (1965) AIR SC 942, Sriram Urav Vs. State of Chhattisgarh
(CRLA No. 41 of 2021), Dasari Srikant Vs. State of Telangana (2024) SCC OnLine SC 936, K. Dhandhapani Vs.
The State by the Inspector of Police (2022) SCC Online SC 1056, Mafat Lal and Others Vs. The State of
Rajasthan (2022) SCC OnLine SC 433, Mahesh Mukund Patel Vs. State of U.P. and Others (2025) SCC Online
SC 614, Madhukar and Others Vs. The State of Maharashtra and Another, arising out of SLP(Cri.) No. 7212 of
2025, Prabhakar Vs. The State of Maharashtra and Another, arising out of SLP (Cri.) No. 7495 of 2025referred to.

List of Acts
Indian Penal Code, 1860, POCSO Act-Criminal Procedure Code, 1973(BNSS, 2023)

List of Keywords
POCSO Act, Kidnapping and Abduction, Rape, Abuse of process of court, Statement u/s 161 and 164,
Consenting parties, Age of discretion, Medical examination, Arya Samaj Marriage registration, Amicable
settlement/Compromise deed, Futility of trial, Substantial justice, Technicality, Welfare of Child, Matrimonial
harmony.

Case Arising from
CRIMINAL JURISDICITON: APPLICATION U/S 528 BNSS No.-1655 OF 2026
Akash Vs. State of U.P. And 3 Others
From the judgment and order dated 01.04.2026 of the High Court of judicature at Allahabad.

Appearances for Parties
Adv. for Applicant(s)
Dharmendra Kumar Patel
Advs for Opposite Party(s)
 Chandra Prakash Pandey, G.A.

(Delivered by Hon'ble Vivek Kumar Singh, J.)

1. Counter affidavit filed today is taken on record.

2. Heard Sri Dharmendra Kumar Patel, learned counsel for the applicant, Sri Brij Kishore
Singh, Advocate holding brief of Sri Chandra Prakash Pandey, learned counsel for first informant/
opposite party no.2 and Sri Prashant Kumar Singh, learned A.G.A. for the State.

3. Present application under Section 528 Bhartiya Nagrik Suraksha Sanhita (in short 'BNSS')
has been filed seeking to quash the charge sheet no.225 of 2018 dated 13.09.2018 and cognizance/
summoning order dated 25.09.2019 as well as proceeding of Special Session Trial No.195 of 2019
(State Vs. Akash), arising out of Case Crime No.207 of 2018, under Sections 363, 366 & 376 I.P.C.
and Section 3/4 of POCSO Act, Police Station Rajpura, District Bheem Nagar (Sambhal), pending
in the court of learned Special Judge POCSO Act/ Additional Session Judge, Sambhal at
Chandausi.

4. Brief facts of the case are that the opposite party no.2/ first informant lodged the first
information report against the applicant on 20.06.2018 at 12:51 hours in respect of alleged incident
4 All. Akash Vs. State of U.P. & Ors.
665
dated 17.06.2018 at 9:00 A.M. The first information report was registered as Case Crime No.0207
of 2018, under Sections 363 and 366 of I.P.C. at Police Station Rajpura, District Bheem Nagar. The
Investigating Officer, after due investigation, added Section 376 I.P.C. and Section 3/4 of POCSO
Act. The first informant stated in the first information report that his daughter, aged about 13 years
was alone in the house and on 17.06.2018 she went to the field but did not return. The first
informant later came to know that his daughter was taken by the applicant.

5. During the course of investigation, the victim was recovered by the police and her statement
under Section 161 Cr.P.C. was recorded, wherein she has categorically stated that she left her house
one month ago with the applicant and they have solemnized a court marriage in Ghaziabad. She is
living as wife of the applicant in her village for the last one month. She is a major girl and she has
solemnized her marriage on her own will. She further expressed her desire to live with the
applicant, with whom she had been in a relationship for the past two years. Similarly, in her
statement recorded under Section 164 Cr.P.C., the victim stated that no incident had taken place
with her and she is a major girl. She joined the applicant on her own will and no offence has been
committed with her.

6. The victim was medically examined, and no injury was seen on her body. As per report of
the Chief Medical Officer, Sambhal, dated 07.08.2018, the victim was 18 years of age, a copy of
which has been appended as Annexure No.5 to the present application. The Investigating Officer
concluded the investigation in this matter and submitted the charge-sheet against the applicant on
13.09.2018. Learned court concerned took cognizance of offence vide order dated 25.09.2019. A
compromise deed dated 13.12.2025 has been appended by the applicant as Annexure No.10 to the
present application, which has been duly signed by the applicant and the victim. A copy of the birth
certificate of the baby girl has also been appended along with the present application as Annexure
No.11 and as per the birth certificate, a baby girl was born to the applicant and the victim on
10.12.2018. The marriage registration certificate of the applicant and the victim has also been
appended as Annexure No.6 to the present application and as per the marriage registration
certificate, the marriage between the applicant and the victim was registered on 03.07.2018.

7. The learned counsel for the opposite party no.2/ informant has also filed his vakalatnama
along with counter affidavit, sworn by the informant/ opposite party no.2 of the present case,
wherein it is accepted by the opposite party no.2/ informant that a compromise has taken place
between the parties and he does not intend to proceed with the criminal case against the applicant.
No averment of the affidavit filed in support of the application under Section 528 BNSS has been
controverted by the informant/ opposite party no.2.

8. Per contra, the learned A.G.A. has opposed the prayer made by the applicant but could not
dispute the fact that the marriage of the victim has been solemnized with the applicant. He further
submitted that since the prosecutrix was a child within the definition of term 'child' as defined in
the POCSO Act, therefore, subsequent development, if any will not wipe out the criminality
committed by the applicant. Further, he admitted that no allegation was levelled by the victim
against the applicant in her statements recorded under sections 161 and 164 Cr.P.C. in respect of
her alleged kidnapping or rape.
666 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES

9. I have heard rival submissions of the parties and perused the records.

10. Learned counsel for the applicant submitted that the victim was a major girl at the time of
alleged incident and she was a consenting party with the applicant. She left her house on her own
will and she did not level any allegation against the applicant when her statements were recorded
under Sections 161 and 164 Cr.P.C. The marriage between the applicant and the victim was
solemnized on 03.07.2018 at Arya Samaj Mandir Shastri Nagar, Ghaziabad and was got registered
on the same day. Now the applicant and the victim have been blessed with a baby girl, who is aged
about 7 years. The statement of the victim has already been recorded in the trial court on
16.09.2025 as PW-2, wherein too she stated that she solemnized her marriage with the applicant
and since then she has been living in the house of the applicant. She claimed that at the time of
incident she was aged about 19 years. No allegation has been levelled against the applicant when
her statement was recorded in the trial court on 16.09.2025. It is further submitted by the learned
counsel for the applicant that, in view of the statements made by the victim before the police, the
Magistrate, and the learned trial court, no offence under Sections 363, 366, and 376 of the I.P.C.,
read with Section 3/4 of the POCSO Act, is made out against the applicant. Consequently, the
impugned charge-sheet, cognizance order and the entire criminal proceedings, are liable to be
quashed.

11. Reliance is placed by the learned counsel for the applicant on Juhi Devi vs. State of Bihar
and Others, 2005(13) SCC 376; Suhani and Another vs. State of U.P. and Others, 2018 (3)
AICLR 183 and this Court's decisions in Reena vs. State of U.P., 2012 (2) ACR 2349; Shaheen
Parveen and Another vs. State of U.P. and Others, 2015(7) ADJ 713 and Sunil Tiwari vs.
State of U.P. and Another, (Application under Section 482 Cr.P.C. No. 5471 of 2016), decided
on 21.10.2016.

12. The applicant is accused of committing an offence under Sections 363 and 366 of the IPC.
Section 363 of the IPC provides that whoever kidnaps any person from lawful guardianship shall be
punished in terms of sentence provided in the provision.

13. "Kidnapping from lawful guardianship" has been defined under Section 361 of the IPC.
The provision when extracted reads as under:

"Whoever takes or entices any minor under *[sixteen] years of age if a male, or under
**[eighteen] years of age if a female, or any person of unsound mind, out of the keeping of the
lawful guardian of such minor or person of unsound mind, without the consent of such guardian, is
said to kidnap such minor or person from lawful guardianship.

Explanation : The words "lawful guardian" in this section include any person lawfully
entrusted with the care or custody of such minor or other person.

Exception : This section does not extend to the act of any person who in good faith
believes himself to be the father of an illegitimate child, or who in good faith believes himself to be
entitled to the lawful custody of such child, unless such act is committed for an immoral or
unlawful purpose."
4 All. Akash Vs. State of U.P. & Ors.
667

14. Section 366 of the IPC inheres that whoever kidnaps or abducts any woman with intent
that she may be compelled, or knowing it to be likely that she will be compelled to marry any
person against her will, or in order that she may be forced or seduced to illicit intercourse, shall be
punished with a sentence, as provided in the provision. At the time of considering the allegations
made in the F.I.R., whether the offence has been committed or not, the ingredients of the offence
are required to be considered in context of the evidence collected during the course of
investigation.

15. In the peculiar facts and circumstances of this case, the Court has minutely examined the
facts that have emerged on investigation of the case. There is sufficient evidence on record to show
that the prosecutrix has solemnized marriage with the applicant.

16. Somewhat similar facts came up for consideration before the Hon'ble Supreme Court of
India in Juhi Devi Versus State of Bihar and Others, reported in (2005) 13 SCC 376, where
Hon'ble Supreme Court observed that prosecutrix who has attained the age of discretion, has a right
to enjoy her liberties by virtue of constitutional guarantee. The relevant para is quoted below :-

"2. The petitioner herein is alleged to have married another person of her age and the 5th
respondent herein, the father of the petitioner, objected to the said marriage. It seems that the
petitioner had eloped with that person and the father of the petitioner-5th respondent, has filed a
complaint and the petitioner was produced before the C.J.M., Patna. The petitioner claims that she
was major and voluntarily left with her husband. The father of petitioner alleged that the petitioner
was a minor and the question of age was referred to a Medical Board. The Medical Board opined
that as on 17.05.2003, the petitioner must have been aged between 16 and 17 years. However, the
father of the petitioner produced two certificates before the Revisional Court and contended that
her date of birth is 12.10.1985 and she has not attained majority. However, the medical report
shows that she must have been aged more than 16 years, even on 17.05.2003. Having regard to
these facts, we are of the view that she must have attained majority and her stay at the remand
home would not be in the interest of justice and we think that her continued stay at the remand
home would be detrimental and she would be in a better environment by living with the person
whom she had allegedly married. (Emphasis supplied)

17. A Division Bench of this Court in Smt. Reena Versus State of U.P. and Others (Habeas
Corpus Writ Petition No. -10180 of 2012), decided on 24.5.2012 observed that in pure and simple
case of elopement of prosecutrix it is to be seen that her right to enjoy her liberties by virtue of the
constitutional guarantees are not curtailed or encroached upon. The relevant paragraphs of the
judgment are quoted below:-

"We find from facts of the case that it was a pure and simple case of elopement of
petitioner, Smt. Reena with Rabdullah and the petitioner, thereafter went straight away to his
house from where she appears recovered. There was some dispute in respect of the age of the girl
but we find from argument appearing at page 20 of the present petition that the Chief Medical
Officer, Maharajganj had assessed her 18 years of age. Thus, the lady was undisputedly above 18
years of age, if we add three years to the medically assessed age. In our considered view in case of
being a conflict between the age recorded in any school document and that assessed by the doctor
668 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
then only for the present purposes, the court should lean towards acting upon the opinion of the
doctor furnished after carrying out scientific tests to assess the age of a victim. This is necessary as
liberty of a person has to be protected. No person could be deprived of his liberty unless
reasonable procedure has been adopted. Medical opinion on age may not be exact, but it is
generally acceptance and it is based on scientific method of assessing the age. As such, inspite of
there being some sort of margin in assessing the age and actual age, there could be chances that
the assessed age is almost exact.

We have already noted that the personal liberty of a person should be paramount
consideration in such cases and keeping that in view and for protecting the personal liberty of a
person, the court should lean towards considering the medical age than to consider the age which
is recorded in school documents. Besides, there is no dispute in the fact that the petitioner, Smt.
Reena had eloped with Rabdullah on 3-3-2011 and had wet into his house and was living there.
...... Under the present set of facts, there could not be any doubt that it is a simple and pure case of
elopement and as such no offence or offences could be said to be constituted under the admitted
facts.

...There is no age, as regards the personal liberty of a person. Anyone who is born as a
human being and who is found living in India even if he is not an Indian, has a right to enjoy his or
her liberties by virtue of the constitutional guarantees. Any order which curtails or encroaches
upon the liberties of such a person and has always to be held falling short of the constitution
requirements and safeguards and, as such, we have to struck down the same in exercise of the
powers Under Article 226 of the Constitution of India."

(Emphasis supplied)

18. In the instant case, the point for consideration is whether the applicant has committed
offence in context of the victim or not. It will be appropriate here to mention the judgement dated
23.07.2015 of this Court passed in Writ Petition No. 3519(MB) of 2015 (Shaheen Parveen and
Another Vs. State of U.P. through Principal Secretary, Home Department, and Others),
where this Court observed that a girl who has attained the age of discretion and was on the verge of
attaining majority and is capable of knowing what was good and what was bad for her, cannot be
said to be a victim of inducement, particularly when the case of the victim/girl herself is that it was
on her initiative and on account of her voluntary act that she had gone with the boy and got married
to him. In such circumstances, desire of the girl/victim is required to be seen. Ingredients of Section
361 of the I.P.C. are required to be considered accordingly, and not in mechanical or technical
interpretation. In this case the Charge sheet under Sections 363 and 366 of the IPC, was quashed
where the prosecutrix was found to have attained the age of discretion and was just below 17 years
of age. The prosecutrix gave the statement that she was neither kidnapped nor abducted who went
in the company of the accused, willingly and knowingly. She has been living with petitioner No. 2
as his wife and was an expecting mother carrying a pregnancy of 31 weeks. This Court quashed the
Charge sheet observing that substantial justice cannot be sacrificed at the altar of technicality. The
relevant paragraphs are quoted below:-

"18. Petitioner No. 1 the victim/prosecutrix would be the best witness, rather the only
witness of commission of offence under Sections 363/366 of the IPC. Surely, the victim will not
support the prosecution case, as has been made evident by her in her statement, recorded in the
4 All. Akash Vs. State of U.P. & Ors.
669
course of investigation under Section 164 Cr.P.C., and therefore the trial would result in acquittal.
During course of trial, considerable number of man hours would be wasted in prosecution/
defending and judging the case. No useful purpose would be served and the entire exercise of trial
would be in futility because the victim has declared that she was not victimised or kidnapped.

19. The facts that have emerged from the record make it evident that the impugned
criminal proceedings have been initiated because mother of the Prosecutrix/victim (respondent No.
-4) has not accepted the marriage of her daughter with petitioner No. 2.

20. In case, despite the evidence that has come on record, as noted above, proceedings
are not quashed, petitioner No. -2 would be required to face criminal charges and undergo the
agony of a trial.

21. We have also taken into account the fact that in case the petitioner No. 2 is allowed to
be prosecuted, the matrimonial life of petitioner No. 1/the alleged victim would be disrupted. Her
husband would be incarcerated and there would be no one to take care of her child, who is yet-tobe-born.

22. If a minor, of her own, abandons the guardianship of her parents and joins a boy
without any role having been played by the boy in her abandoning the guardianship of her parents
and without her having been subjected to any kind of pressure, inducement, etc and without any
offer or promise from the accused, no offence punishable under Section 363 I.P.C. will be made out
when the girl is aged more than 17 years and is mature enough to understand what she is doing.Of
course, if the accused induces or allures the girl and that influences the minor in leaving her
guardian's custody and the keeping and going with the accused, then it would be difficult for the
Court to accept that minor had voluntarily come to the accused. In case the victim/prosecutrix
willingly, of her own accord, accompanies the boy, the law does not cast a duty on the boy of
taking her back to her father's house or even of telling her not to accompany him.

27. The writ Court considering totality of fact and circumstances, cannot ignore or
disregard the welfare of the petitioners, particularly when the exercise of trial is going to be in
futility, as observed hereinabove.

28. In view of the facts and circumstances of the case noted above, the Court is convinced
that the impugned proceedings have been initiated in abuse of process of the Court and process of
the law. A personal grudge against marriage of choice of the daughter is being settled by virtue of
initiating impugned criminal proceedings, which would not be permissible in law. Such prosecution
would abrogate constitutional right vested in the petitioners to get married as per their discretion,
particularly when there is no evidence to indicate that the marriage is void.

29. The stand of the Prosecuting Agency that the victim was a few months below age of
majority when she joined the company of the accused/petitioner No. 2, and therefore offence has
been committed, cannot be accepted if ground reality is taken into account. It has come on record
that the prosecutrix is an expecting mother and is carrying a pregnancy of 31 weeks. Coupled with
this fact is the statement of the prosecutrix wherein she has said that she was neither kidnapped nor
abducted, rather has been living with petitioner No. 2 as his wife. It is the prosecutrix who went in
the company of the accused, willingly, knowingly, and rather than the accused taking the
prosecutrix out of the custody of the lawful guardian; the victim herself had eloped with petitioner
No. 2. In the considered opinion of the Court, substantial justice cannot be sacrificed at the altar of
technicality, as is being concluded by the Investigating Agency.

30. In view of above, petitioner No. 2 cannot be said to have committed offence either
under Section 363 I.P.C. read with Section 361 I.P.C. or under Section 366 I.P.C."
670 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES

(Emphasis supplied)

19. The Honble Apex Court in the case of S.Varadarajan vs. State of Madras, reported in
AIR1965 SC 942, has interpreted the meaning of Section 361 of the IPC and has held that if the
victim had voluntarily joined the accused then in such case it could not be said that the accused had
taken her away from the protection of lawful guardian within the meaning of Section 361 of the
Code. The judgment of S.Varadarajan (supra) is reproduced in its entirety:

"11. It must, however, be borne in mind that there is a distinction between "taking" and
allowing a minor to accompany a person. The two expressions are not synonymous though we
would like to guard ourselves from laying down that in no conceivable circumstance can the two be
regarded as meaning the same thing for the purposes of section 361 of the Indian Penal Code. We
would limit ourselves to a case like the present where the minor alleged to have been taken by the
accused person left her father's protection knowing and having capacity to know the full import of
what she was doing voluntarily joins the accused person. In such a case we do not think that the
accused can be said to have taken her away from the keeping of her lawful guardian. Something
more has to be shown in a case of this kind and that is some kind of inducement held out by the
accused person or an active participation by him in the formation of the intention of the minor to
leave the house of the guardian.

`
12. It would, however, be sufficient if the prosecution establishes that though immediately
prior to the minor leaving the father's protection no active part was played by the accused, he had
at some earlier stage solicited or persuaded the minor to do so. In our, opinion if evidence to
establish one of those things is lacking it would not be legitimate to infer that the accused is guilty
of taking the minor out of the keeping of the lawful guardian merely because after she has actually
left her guardian's house or a house where her guardian had kept her, joined the accused and the
accused helped her in her design not to return to her guardian's house by taking her along with
him from place to place. No doubt, the part played by the accused could be regarded as facilitating
the fulfillment of the intention of the girl. That part, in our opinion, falls short of an inducement to
the minor to slip out of the keeping of her lawful guardian and is, therefore, not tantamount to
"taking".

Whatever may be the position with respect to an offence under that ,section and even
assuming that a minor cannot in law abandon the guardianship of her lawful guardian, for the
reason which we have already stated, the accused person in whose company she is later found
cannot be held guilty of having taken her out of the keeping of her guardian unless something more
is established.

After pointing out that there is an essential distinction between the words "taking" and
"enticing" it was no doubt observed that the mental attitude of the minor is not of relevance in the
case of taking and that the word "take" means to cause to go, to escort or to get into possession.
But these observations have to be understood in the context of the facts found in that case. For, it
had been found that the minor girl whom the accused was charged with having kidnapped had been
persuaded by the accused when she had gone out of her house for answering the call of nature, to
go along with him and was taken by him to another village and kept in his uncle's house until she
was restored back to her father by the uncle later. Thus, here there was an element of persuasion
by the accused person which brought about the willingness of the girl and this makes all the
difference. In our opinion, therefore, neither of these decisions is of assistance to the State.
4 All. Akash Vs. State of U.P. & Ors.
671

We are satisfied, upon the material on record, that no offence under section 363 has been
established against the appellant and that he is, therefore, entitled to acquittal. Accordingly we
allow the appeal and set aside the conviction and sentence passed upon him."

20. The Apex Court in the case of Shriram Urav Vs. State of Chhattisgarh in Criminal
Appeal No(S). 41/2021, decided on 10.01.2025, also quashed the conviction as well as the sentence
imposed upon the appellant on the ground that the appellant/accused and the complainant/victim
had married each other.

21. Similarly, in the case of Dasari Srikant vs. State of Telangana reported in (2024) SCC
OnLine SC 936, wherein, under identical circumstances and almost identical provisions the
Supreme Court quashed the proceedings instituted against the accused therein. The relevant
paragraph 8 to 10 of the Dasari Srikant (supra) read as under:-

"8. Since, the appellant and the complainant have married each other, the affirmation of
the judgment rendered by the High Court would have the disastrous consequence on the accused
appellant being sent to jail which in turn could put his matrimonial relationship with the
complainant in danger.

9. As a consequence, we are inclined to exercise the powers under Article 142 of the
Constitution of India for quashing the conviction of the accused appellant as recorded by the
learned trial Court and modified by the High Court. 10. As a result, the impugned judgment dated
27th June, 2023 passed by the High Court and judgment dated 9th April, 2021 passed by the trial
Court are hereby quashed and set aside."

22. The facts of the present case are very similar to the above judgments. Here also I find that
the victim has not at all supported the prosecution version instead according to her she voluntarily
went with the applicant-accused on the date of alleged offence. Thereafter, she married him. The
victim also did not level any allegation against the applicant in her statement recorded under
Section 161 and 164 of Cr.P.C. Therefore, by no stretch of imagination, it can be said that no
offence under Sections 363, 366 & 376 of the I.P.C. read with Section 3/4 of the POCSO Act has
been made out. The police has submitted chargesheet in a mechanical manner without due
application of mind and unfortunately the trial court has also not considered the matter in correct
perspective. Secondly, the question arises here as to whether the proceedings of criminal case under
section 363, 366 & 376 of the IPC and 3/4 of the POCSO Act can be quashed by the High Court in
the Application under Section 482 Cr.P.C. or 528 BNSS, if the parties have settled their dispute
amicably and living as husband and wife for a long period.

23. The Apex Court in the case of K. Dhandapani Vs. The State by the Inspector of Police,
2022 SCC onLine SC 1056 and Mafat Lal and Others vs. The State of Rajasthan, 2022 SCC
OnLine SC 433, also quashed the proceedings against the accused therein on the grounds that the
accused had solemnized marriage with the prosecutrix and secondly, the court cannot turn a blind
eye to the said fact. Since the judgement rendered by Apex Court in the case of K. Dhandapani
(supra) is a short one, therefore, the same is reproduced in its entirety:

"Leave granted.
672 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES

The appellant who is the maternal uncle of the prosecutrix belongs to Valayar
community, which is a most backward community in the State of Tamilnadu. He works as a
woodcutter on daily wages in a private factory. FIR was registered against him for committing
rape under Sections 5(j)(ii)read with Section 6, 5(I) read with Section 6 and 5(n) read with Section
6 of Protection of Child from Sexual Offences (POCSO) Act, 2012. He was convicted after trial for
committing the said offences and sentenced to undergo rigorous Reason: imprisonment for a period
of 10 years by the Sessions Judge, Fast Track Mahila Court, Tiruppur on 31.10.2018. The High
Court, by an order dated 13.02.2019, upheld the conviction and sentence. Aggrieved thereby, the
appellant has filed this appeal.

Mr. M.P.Parthiban, learned counsel appearing for the appellant, submitted that
allegation against him was that he had physical relations with the prosecutrix on the promise of
marrying her. He stated that, in fact, he married the prosecutrix and they have two children.

The appellant submitted that this Court should exercise its power under Article 142 of the
Constitution and ought to do complete justice and it could not be in the interest of justice to disturb
the family life of the appellant and the prosecutrix.

After hearing the matter for some time on 08 th March, 2022, we directed the District
Judge to record the statement of the prosecutrix about her present status. The statement of the
prosecutrix has been placed on record in which she has categorically stated that she has two
children and they are being taken care of by the appellant and she is leading a happy married life.

Dr. Joseph Aristotle S., learned counsel appearing for the State, opposed the grant of any
relief to the appellant on the ground that the prosecutrix was aged 14 years on the date of the
offence and gave birth to the first child when she was 15 years and second child was born when she
was 17 years. He argued that the marriage between the appellant and the prosecutrix is not legal.
He expressed his apprehension that the said marriage might be only for the purpose of escaping
punishment and there is no guarantee that the appellant will take care of the prosecutrix and the
children after this Court grants relief to him.

In the peculiar facts and circumstances of this case, we are of the considered view that
the conviction and sentence of the appellant who is maternal uncle of the prosecutrix deserves to be
set aside in view of the subsequent events that have been brought to the notice of this Court. This
Court cannot shut its eyes to the ground reality and disturb the happy family life of the appellant
and the prosecutrix. We have been informed about the custom in Tamilnadu of the marriage of a
girl with the maternal uncle.

For the aforesaid mentioned reasons, the conviction and sentence of the appellant is set
aside in the peculiar facts of the case and shall not be treated as a precedent. The appeal is
accordingly, disposed of. Pending application(s), if any, shall stand disposed of.

In case, the appellant does not take proper care of the prosecutrix, she or the State on
behalf of the prosecutrix can move this Court for modification of this Order."

24. In another judgment of Mahesh Mukund Patel vs. State of U.P. and Others, reported in
2025 SCC OnLine SC 614, the Hon'ble Supreme Court quashed the proceedings of offence,
punishable under Sections 354A, 363, 366, 376 of the IPC and Section 3 and 4 of the POCSO Act
on the ground of marriage between the accused and the victim. It was brought on record that from
the wedlock between the accused and the victim, two children were born, whose documents were
produced alongwith the appeal. The Apex Court in this case quashed the proceedings on the ground
4 All. Akash Vs. State of U.P. & Ors.
673
that no purpose would be served by continuing the prosecution as it would cause undue harassment
to the appellant/accused and the victim and their children.

25. The Supreme Court in another judgment of Madhukar and Others vs. The State of
Maharashtra and Another, arising out of SLP (Criminal) No. 7212 of 2025, alongwith
Prabhakar vs. The State of Maharashtra and Another, arising out of SLP (Criminal) No.
7495 of 2025, quashed the proceedings of Case Crime No.302 of 2023, dated 20.11.2023, under
Sections 324, 141, 143, 147, 149, 452, 323, 504 and 506 of the IPC as well as quashed the
proceedings of Case Crime No.304 of 2023, dated 21.11.2023, under Sections 376, 354-A, 354-D,
509 and 506 IPC on the basis of compromise between the parties. Paragraph nos.6, 7 and 8 of the
said judgment are reproduced herein:-

"6. At the outset, we recognise that the offence under Section 376 IPC is undoubtedly of a
grave and heinous nature. Ordinarily, quashing of proceedings involving such offences on the
ground of settlement between the parties is discouraged and should not be permitted lightly.
However, the power of the Court under Section 482 CrPC to secure the ends of justice is not
constrained by a rigid formula and must be exercised with reference to the facts of each case.

7. In the present matter, we are confronted with an unusual situation where the FIR
invoking serious charges, including Section 376 IPC, was filed immediately following an earlier
FIR lodged by the opposing side. This sequence of events lends a certain context to the allegations
and suggests that the second FIR may have been a reactionary step. More importantly, the
complainant in the second FIR has unequivocally expressed her desire not to pursue the case. She
has submitted that she is now married, settled in her personal life, and continuing with the criminal
proceedings would only disturb her peace and stability. Her stand is neither tentative nor
ambiguous, she has consistently maintained, including through an affidavit on record, that she
does not support the prosecution and wants the matter to end. The parties have also amicably
resolved their differences and arrived at a mutual understanding. In these circumstances, the
continuation of the trial would not serve any meaningful purpose. It would only prolong distress for
all concerned, especially the complainant, and burden the Courts without the likelihood of a
productive outcome.

8. Therefore, having considered the peculiar facts and circumstances of this case, and
taking into account the categorical stand taken by the complainant and the nature of the settlement,
we are of the opinion that the continuation of the criminal proceedings would serve no useful
purpose and would only amount to abuse of process."

26. In my considered opinion, no offence is made out under Sections 363, 366 & 376 of the
I.P.C. and Section 3/4 of POCSO Act since the victim has not levelled any allegation against the
applicant in relation to the aforementioned sections inasmuch as the victim at no point of time
stated that she was sexually assaulted or abducted by the applicant. Therefore, the basic ingredient
to constitute an offence punishable under Sections 363, 366 & 376 of I.P.C. and Section 3/4 of
POCSO Act is missing. Contrary to this, the victim has solemnized marriage with the applicant and
they are living a happy married life for the last several years and the opposite party no.2/first
informant has also entered into settlement agreement with the applicant. If the proceedings of the
trial court is not quashed by this Court, the applicant and the victim may sustain legal injury and the
case of the applicant is squarely covered with the cases mentioned hereinabove.
674 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES

27. In view of the discussion made herein above, the present application succeeds and is liable
to be allowed. It is accordingly allowed.

28. The charge sheet no.225 of 2018 dated 13.09.2018 and cognizance/ summoning order
dated 25.09.2019 as well as entire proceeding of Special Session Trial No.195 of 2019 (State Vs.
Akash), arising out of Case Crime No.207 of 2018, under Sections 363, 366 & 376 I.P.C. and
Section 3/4 of POCSO Act, Police Station Rajpura, District Bheem Nagar (Sambhal), pending in
the court of learned Special Judge POCSO Act/ Additional Session Judge, Sambhal at Chandausi,
are hereby quashed, against the applicant.

29.