# Akash Yadav Revisionist v. State of U.P. & Anr

- **Citation:** (2026) 1 ILRA 871
- **Court:** High Court of Judicature at Allahabad
- **Decided:** 2026-01-20
- **Case number:** Criminal Revision No. 7290 of 2025
- **Bench:** Abdul Shahid
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/allahabad-high-court/akash-yadav-revisionist-v-state-of-u-p-anr-54023
- **Pages:** 8

## Text

1 All. Akash Yadav Vs. State of U.P. & Anr.
871

35. A perusal of the impugned order shows that opposite party no.2 was ordered maintenance
of Rs.3000/- per months from the date of application up to the date of order and Rs.5000/- per
month from the date of order.

36. Looking into the status of both the parties, the above maintenance amount awarded by
Trail Court is not excessive. Thus, in view of the above discussion, the impugned order does not
suffer from any perversity or illegality or infirmity. Hence, no interference is warranted by this
Court. As a result, this revision, being devoid of merits, is dismissed and the impugned order dated
06.09.2022 is hereby affirmed. Accordingly, the interim order passed by this Court on 04.04.2023
is vacated.
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(2026) 1 ILRA 871
REVISIONAL JURISDICTION
CRIMINAL SIDE
DATED: ALLAHABAD 20.01.2026

BEFORE

THE HON'BLE ABDUL SHAHID, J.

Criminal Revision No. 7290 of 2025

Akash Yadav ...Revisionist
Versus
State of U.P. & Anr. ...Opposite Parties

Issue for Consideration
Issue pertains to whether the learned trial court committed any illegality or material irregularity in rejecting
the discharge application of accused in a prosecution u/s 376 IPC and ss. 5/6 of POCSO Act, particularly in
light of alleged contradictions regarding the age of the prosecutrix, the medical opinion suggesting an age
approximating majority, the reliance upon educational records to determine minority, the plea of consensual
relationship, and the absence of injuries at a stage where the matter was confined to consideration of framing
of charge and not appreciation of evidence on merits.

Headnotes
Indian Penal Code, 1860 - s. 376 - The Protection of Children From Sexual Offences Act, 2012 -
ss. 5/6 - Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 - ss. 161, 164 - Discharge application - Rejection of -
Framing of charge - Scope of - According to the prosecution case, as emerging from first
information report lodged by informant - father of prosecutrix, was that the accused had enticed
away and committed sexual assault upon the minor victim - During investigation, statements of
prosecutrix u/ss. 161 and 164 Cr.P.C. were recorded, and medical examination was conducted -
The age of prosecutrix was determined primarily on the basis of her educational records, which
indicated that she was below eighteen years of age at the time of alleged occurrence, though the
medical opinion assessed her age to be near about majority - The accused, asserting that the
relationship was consensual and disputing the minority of prosecutrix, moved an application
seeking discharge on the ground that no prima facie case was made out, however, the trial
court, upon consideration of material collected during investigation, rejected the said
application, leading to filing of criminal revision before the High Court.(E-11)
872 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
Held: After perusing the impugned order, it appears that the learned trial court had mentioned the name of
the victim - It is not appreciable - It is absolutely clear that the disclosure of the identity can be permitted by
the special court only when the same is in the interest of the child and in no other circumstances - The Court
was of the view that the disclosure of the name of the child to make the child a sample of protest cannot
normally be treated to be in the interest of the child - There are sufficient ingredients of the evidence
available before the learned court below and he has rightly rejected the application of discharge of accusedrevisionist - There is neither any illegality nor irregularity in impugned order dated 20.9.2025 - Accordingly,
the criminal revision is dismissed. [Paras 8, 12, 13]

Case Law Cited
Rohini and another v. State of U.P. and others, 2025 LawSuit (All) 1263; P. Yuvaprakash v. State Rep. By
Inspector of Police in Criminal Appeal No. 1898 of 2023 decided on 18.7.2023; Zakir Shaikh v. State of
U.P., 2015 (90) A.C.C. 901; Irfan Vs. State of U.P., Criminal Appeal No. 1594 of 2017; Vijay alias Chinee
v. State of M.P., (2010) 8 SCC 191; Raju alis Umakant v. State of M.P., 2025 SCC OnLine SC 997; Nipun
Saxena and another v. Union of India and others, reported in (2019) 2 Supreme Court Cases 703;
Kinnori Ghosh and another v. Union of India and others, Writ Petition (Civil) Diary No.(s) 37158 of
2024; referred to

List of Acts
Indian Penal Code, 1860; The Protection of Children From Sexual Offences Act, 2012; Code of Criminal
Procedure, 1973

List of Keywords
Criminal Revision; Application for discharge; Rejected; Special Judge (POCSO Act); s. 376 IPC;
ss. 5/6 of POCSO Act; First Information Report; Investigation; Framing of charge; Statements
u/ss. 161 and 164 Cr.P.C.; Age of prosecutrix; Medical examination report; Age determination test;
Date of Birth; High School certificate; School Transfer certificate; College record; Status of Minor
victim/prosecutrix; Consensual relationship plea; Absence of injuries; Appreciation of evidence;
Illegality nor irregularity; Dismissed; Trial to proceed in accordance with law.

Case Arising From
REVISIONAL JURISDICTION: Criminal Revision No. - 7290 of 2025

From the Judgment and Order dated 20.9.2025 passed by Addl. District & Sessions Judge, POCSO Act,
(Exclusive) Jaunpur in S.S.T. No. 124 of 2024 arising out of Case Crime No. 78 of 2024, P.S. Mugrbadshahpur,
District Jaunpur.

Appearances for Parties
Advs. for the Revisionist:
Prem Prakash Yadav, Satya Prakash Yadav

Adv. for the Opposite Party:
G.A.

(Delivered by Hon'ble Abdul Shahid, J.)

1. Heard Sri Prem Prakash Yadav, learned counsel for the revisionist and learned A.G.A. for
the State. None is present for the Opposite Party No. 2 despite service of notice.

2. The instant Criminal Revision has been preferred against the impugned judgment and order
dated 20.9.2025 passed by the Addl. District & Sessions Judge, POCSO Act, (Exclusive) Jaunpur
1 All. Akash Yadav Vs. State of U.P. & Anr.
873
in S.S.T. No. 124 of 2024 ( State Vs. Akash Yadav, arising out of Case Crime No. 78 of 2024,
under Section 376 IPC and Section 5/6 POCSO Act, P.S. Mugrbadshahpur, District Jaunpur.

3. Learned counsel for the revisionist has submitted that the learned trial court has ignored the
statement of the prosecutrix recorded under Section 161 Cr.P.C. and 164 Cr.P.C. which shows
material contradictions regarding the alleged age of the prosecutrix. The medical report of the
prosecutrix as stated, the age of the prosecutrix as approximately 18 years on the date of medical
examination, although her age was 18 plus (1-2) is equal to 19-20 years. This contradicts the school
certificate which suggest her date of birth dated 20.11.2007, mentioning her age nearly 18 years at
the time of the alleged incident i.e. on 6.3.2024. It creates a doubt as to her minor status under the
POCSO Act.

4. Learned trial court while rejecting the discharge application of the revisionist has ignored
the documents suggested prior to consensual relationship between them. The statement of the
prosecutrix itself shows that she had met with him 3-4 times before the incident. The rejection of
the discharge application had not adequately been considered that voluntarily relationship between
the parties, close to the age of majority neither comes under the POCSO Act nor under Section 376
IPC is made out where the victim is major and the parties had entered into consensual relationship.

5. Learned counsel for the revisionist relied on the law laid down by the Division Bench of
this Court in the case of Rohini and another Vs. State of U.P. and others, 2025 LawSuit (All)
1263. It is passed in the Habeas Corpus writ petition. In para-25 of the aforesaid case, the School
Transfer Certificate was produced to prove the age of the child. The Hon'ble Supreme Court has
held that the School Transfer Certificate cannot be relied upon to determine the age of the child
under the Act of 2015. In this context, the observation of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Para Nos.
14,18 and 19 of the aforesaid judgment are reproduced below:-

[25] In the aforesaid case, the school transfer certificate was produced to prove the age
of the child. The Supreme Court held that a school transfer certificate cannot be relied upon to
determine the age of child under the Act, 2015. In this context, the observation of the Supreme
Court in paragraph nos. 14, 18 and 19 of the aforesaid judgment are reproduced below:-

"14. Section 94 (2)(iii) of the JJ Act clearly indicates that the date of birth certificate
from the school or matriculation or equivalent certificate by the concerned examination board has
to be firstly preferred in the absence of which the birth certificate issued by the Corporation or
Municipal Authority or Panchayat and it is only thereafter in the absence of these such documents
the age is to be determined through "an ossification test" or "any other latest medical age
determination test" conducted on the orders of the concerned authority, i.e. Committee or Board or
Court. In the present case, concededly, only a transfer certificate and not the date of birth
certificate or matriculation or equivalent certificate was considered. Ex. C1, i.e., the school
transfer certificate showed the date of birth of the victim as 11.07.1997.

....

....
874 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES

....

Since it did not answer to the description of any class of documents mentioned in Section 94(2)(i)
as it was a mere transfer certificate, Ex C-1 could not have been relied upon to hold that M was
below 18 years at the time of commission of the offence.

18. Reverting to the facts of this case, the headmaster of M's School, CW-1, was
summoned by the court and produced a Transfer Certificate (Ex.C-1). This witness produced a
Transfer Certificate Register containing M's name. He deposed that she had studied in the school
for one year, i.e., 2009-10 and that the date of birth was based on the basis of the record sheet
given by the school where she studied in the 7th standard. DW-2 TMT Poongothoi, Headmaster of
Chinnasoalipalayam Panchayat School, answered the summons served by the court and deposed
that 'M' had joined her school with effect from 03.04.2002 and that her date of birth was recorded
as 11.07.1997. She admitted that though the date of birth was based on the birth certificate, it
would normally be recorded on the basis of horoscope. She conceded to no knowledge about the
basis on which the document pertaining to the date of birth was recorded. It is stated earlier on the
same issue, i.e., the date of birth, Thiru Prakasam, DW-3 stated that the birth register pertaining to
the year 1997 was not available in the record room of his office.

19. It is clear from the above narrative that none of the documents produced during the
trial answered the description of "the date of birth certificate from the school" or "the
matriculation or equivalent certificate" from the concerned examination board or certificate by a
corporation, municipal authority or a Panchayat. In these circumstances, it was incumbent for the
prosecution to prove through acceptable medical tests/examination that the victim's age was below
18 years as per Section 94(2)(iii) of the JJ Act. PW-9, Dr. Thenmozhi, Chief Civil Doctor and
Radiologist at the General Hospital at Vellore, produced the X-ray reports and deposed that in
terms of the examination of M, a certificate was issued stating "that the age of the said girl would
be more than 18 years and less 2015 than 20 years". In the cross-examination, she admitted that
M's age could be taken as 19 years. However, the High Court rejected this evidence, saying that
"when the precise date of birth is available from out of the school records, the approximate age
estimated by the medical expert cannot be the determining factor". This finding is, in this court's
considered view, incorrect and erroneous. As held earlier, the documents produced, i.e., a transfer
certificate and extracts of the admission register, are not what Section 94 (2) (i) mandates; nor are
they in accord with Section 94 (2) (ii) because DW-1 clearly deposed that there were no records
relating to the birth of the victim, M. In these circumstances, the only piece of evidence, accorded
with Section 94 of the JJ Act was the medical ossification test, based on several X-Rays of the
victim, and on the basis of which PW-9 made her statement. She explained the details regarding
examination of the victim's bones, stage of their development and opined that she was between 1820 years; in cross-examination she said that the age might be 19 years. Given all these
circumstances, this court is of the opinion that the result of the ossification or bone test was the
most authentic evidence, corroborated by the examining doctor, PW-9.""

6. Learned counsel for the revisionist has also relied upon the law laid down by the Hon'ble
Supreme Court in t he case of P. Yuvaprakash Vs. State Rep. By Inspector of Police in
1 All. Akash Yadav Vs. State of U.P. & Anr.
875
Criminal Appeal No. 1898 of 2023 decided on 18.7.2023. The important aspect has been held as
follows:-

"(1) It is only when there is penetrative sexual assault which implies sexual contact with
or without consent of minor victim, that offences under POCSO Act are committed.

(2) Only in absence of birth certificate, age shall be determined by Ossification Test or
any other latest medical age determination test conducted on orders of Committee or Board."

Whereas, in the present case, the trial is yet to begin. The application for the discharge
has been rejected by the trial court. The final adjudication on the merit of the case would be held at
the stage of trial. Opposite Party No. 2/ complainant had filed the objection against the application
for discharge that he is the complainant. He is the father of the victim. Victim has passed Class10th in the 2023-2024 from Sarvajanik Inter College, Mungra Badshahpur, District Jaunpur. The
transfer certificate is available in the file. The date of birth, as per record, of the victim is
20.11.2007. The incident is dated 6.3.2024 hence, at the time of the incident, the age of the victim
was 16 years, 3 months and 16 days. The victim had recorded her statement under Section 161
Cr.P.C. and she has stated herself that she studies in Sarvajanik Inter College, Mungra Badshahpur,
District Jaunpur. She told her date of birth as 20.11.2007. She had also told that the revisionist had
called her on phone several times and he made physical relationship with her. In her statement
under Section 164 Cr.P.C. she supported the prosecution story. The complainant further objected
that in the availability of the High School Certificate where the age of victim is 16 years at the time
of incident, hence there is no reason for the admissibility of the local report, if any, at the stage of
framing of charge. The victim is High School pass. The incident is dated 6.3.2024, whereas the
medical examination of the victim took place on 15.3.2024. In the absence of any injuries on the
private part of the victim, it could not be a reason that no offence of rape has been committed.

7. During the investigation, statement of Principal of Sarvajanik Inter College, Mungra
Badshahpur, District Jaunpur had also been recorded and he verified that the date of birth of the
victim, as per the college record, is 20.11.2007.

8. The trial court had passed a detailed, reasoned and speaking order and refused to discharge
the revisionist-accused. The learned trial court had relied upon the educational documents of the
victim wherein her date of birth is 20.11.2007 and the incident is dated 6.3.2024. The victim had
herself stated her age as 16 years in her statement under Sections 161 and 164 Cr.P.C.. She had
recorded her statement that the revisionist had called her on phone and makes the physical
relationship with her after removing her cloths.

9. The learned trial court had specifically held that it is settled law that at the stage of framing
of the charge, meticulous appreciation of the evidence is not permissible. He has further relied upon
the law laid down by this Court in the case of Zakir Shaikh Vs. State of U.P., 2015 (90) A.C.C.
901 has held that if there is reasonable suspicion on the basis of the material available and collected
during the investigation, it is sufficient for framing of the charge. It is held by the Division Bench
of this Court in Criminal Appeal No. 1594 of 2017 ( Irfan Vs. State of U.P.). In para-75 of the said
judgment it has been held that the injury to the private part of the victim is not always necessary as
876 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
evidence, to establish the offence of rape. Learned Co-ordinate Bench of this Court had also
referred on this issue the law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Vijay alias Chinee v.
State of M.P., (2010) 8 SCC 191, and Raju alis Umakant Vs. State of M.P., 2025 SCC OnLine SC
997 also a case of gang-rape, it was observed by the Supreme Court:

"Injury on the person of the prosecutrix

25. In Gurcharan Singh v. State of Haryana [(1972) 2 SCC 749 : 1972 SCC (Cri) 793 :
AIR 1972 SC 2661] this Court has held that : (SCC p. 753, para 8) the absence of injury or mark of
violence on the private part on the person of the prosecutrix is of no consequence when the
prosecutrix is minor and would merely suggest want of violent resistance on the part of the
prosecutrix. Further absence of violence or stiff resistance in the present case may as well suggest
helpless surrender to the inevitable due to sheer timidity. In any event, her consent would not take
the case out of the definition of rape.

26. In Devinder Singh v. State of H.P. [(2003) 11 SCC 488 : 2004 SCC (Cri) 185] a
similar issue was considered by this Court and the Court took into consideration the relevant
evidence wherein rape was alleged to have been committed by five persons. No injury was found on
the body of the prosecutrix. There was no matting on the pubic hair with discharge and no injury
was found on the genital areas. However, it was found that the prosecutrix was used to sexual
intercourse. This Court held that the fact that no injury was found on her body only goes to show
that she did not put up resistance."

Hence, the submission made by the learned counsel for the revisionist that there was no
injury to the victim does not possess any significance, more particularly at the stage of framing of
the charge.

10. After perusing the impugned order, it appears that the learned trial court had mentioned the
name of the victim. It is not appreciable. It is held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Special Leave
Petition (Criminal) Diary No. 7772 of 2021 dated 30.6.2021, wherein the Hon'ble three Judges
Bench passed the order, " However, we take excepting to the judgment of the Sessions Judge where
the name of victim is mentioned. It is well established that in cases like the present one, the name
of the victim is not to be mentioned in any proceeding. We are of the view that all the subordinate
courts shall be careful in future while dealing with such cases." Hence, the law laid down by the
Hon'ble Supreme Court is binding and it is complied with in toto without any exception. It has been
held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case Nipun Saxena and another Vs. Union of India
and others, reported in (2019) 2 Supreme Court Cases 703, wherein it has been held by the
Hon'ble Supreme Court that the law makers was that the victim of such offences should not be
identifiable so that they do not face any hostile discrimination or harassment in the future.
Moreover, discriminating the purpose of POCSO Act, the Court observed, " a bare reading of
Section 24 (5) and Section 33 (7) makes it amply clear that the name and identity of the child is not
to be disclose at any time during the course of investigation or trial and the identity of the victim is
protected from the public or media. Furthermore, Section 37 provides that the trial is to be
conducted in camera which means that the media cannot be present. The entire purpose of the
POCSO is to ensure that the identity of the child is not disclosed unless the Special Court for
1 All. Akash Yadav Vs. State of U.P. & Anr.
877
reasons to be recorded in writing permits such disclosure. This disclosure can only be made if it is
in the interest of the child and not otherwise. It is absolutely clear that the closure of the identity
can be permitted by the Special Court only when the same is in the interest of child and in no other
circumstances. We are of the view that the disclosure of the name of the child to make the child a
sample of protest cannot normally be treated to be in the interest of child. There are sufficient
ingredients and the evidences are available before the learned court below and he has rightly
rejected the application of discharge of the accused-revisionist.

11. The Hon'ble Supreme Court has passed an order that the directives issued by this Court in
the case of Nipun Saxena and another (supra) as well as the directive was also issued by the
Union of India, Ministry of Home Affairs on 16.1.2019 regarding the identity of victims of rape
should be protected by the media including the press electronic and social media shall not reveal
their identity in Writ Petition (Civil) Diary No.(s) 37158 of 2024 (Kinnori Ghosh and another Vs.
Union of India and others). The order is as follows:-

"2 Plainly, this is in violation of the directives of this Court in Nipun Saxena & Anr Vs
Union of India & Ors'. This Court directed that the identity of victims of rape should be protected
and the media including the press, electronic and social media shall not reveal their identity. A
directive was also issued by the Union Union Ministry of Home Affairs on 16 January 2019.

3 Reliance has also been placed on the provisions of Section 72(1) of the Bhartiya Nyay
Sanhita 2023.

4 This Court is constrained to issue an injunctive order since the social and electronic
media have proceeded to publish the identity of the deceased and photographs of the dead body
after the recovery of the body.

5 We accordingly direct that all references to the name of the deceased in the above
incident, photographs and video clips shall forthwith be removed from all social media platforms
and electronic media in compliance of this order.

6 The Writ Petition is accordingly disposed of.

7 Pending applications, if any, stand disposed of."

12. It is absolutely clear that the disclosure of the identity can be permitted by the special court
only when the same is in the interest of the child and in no other circumstances. We are of the view
that the disclosure of the name of the child to make the child a sample of protest cannot normally
be treated to be in the interest of the child. There are sufficient ingredients of the evidence available
before the learned court below and he has rightly rejected the application of discharge of the
accused-revisionist.

13. There is neither any illegality nor irregularity in the impugned order dated 20.9.2025
passed by the Addl. District & Sessions Judge, POCSO Act, (Exclusive) Jaunpur. The present
criminal revision is liable to be dismissed and it is dismissed accordingly.
878 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
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(2026) 1 ILRA 878
REVISIONAL JURISDICTION
CRIMINAL SIDE
DATED: ALLAHABAD 08.01.2026

BEFORE

THE HON'BLE ABDUL SHAHID, J.

Criminal Revision No. 8411 of 2025

Sanjay Yadav ...Revisionist
Versus
State of U.P. & Anr. ...Opposite Parties

Issue for Consideration
Matter pertains to whether a criminal appeal, duly instituted within the prescribed period of limitation, can be
dismissed in default solely on account of non-appearance of counsel, and whether such dismissal, being
contrary to the statutory mandate governing appellate procedure, renders subsequent proceedings including
rejection of an application for condonation of delay in filing a fresh appeal legally unsustainable.

Headnotes
Negotiable Instrument Act, 1881 - s. 138 - Limitation Act, 1963 - s. 5 - Bharatiya Nyaya Suraksha
Sanhita, 2023 - s. 425 - Dismissal of appeal - Summary - Revisional - Powers - The instant
criminal revision was instituted by revisionist, challenging the judgment dated 20.05.2022
passed by learned Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate, Ist, Gorakhpur, in Complaint Case No.
1400 of 2020, whereby he was convicted and sentenced u/s 138 of Negotiable Instruments Act,
as well as the subsequent appellate order dated 26.10.2023 passed by learned Sessions Court in
Criminal Appeal No. 96 of 2022 dismissing his appeal in default, and the order dated 17.09.2025
passed by Special Judge (S.C./S.T. Act), Gorakhpur, rejecting his application u/s 5 of Limitation
Act seeking condonation of delay in filing a fresh appeal - The revisionist had preferred the
original criminal appeal within the prescribed period of limitation while remaining in custody,
however, the same was dismissed for non-appearance of counsel - Thereafter, he filed another
appeal along with an application for condonation of delay to set aside the dismissal order, which
too was rejected, leading to filing of instant criminal revision before the High Court. (E-11)

Held: The order dated 26.10.2023 dismissing Criminal Appeal No. 96 of 2022 in default is absolutely void ab
initio - Hence, the order dated 26.10.2023 passed in Criminal Appeal No. 96 of 2022 is set aside -
Consequently, the impugned order dated 17.09.2025 passed by the Special Judge (S.C./S.T. Act), Gorakhpur,
in Criminal Misc. Case No. 587 of 2024 u/s 5 of Limitation Act has no legal significance and is also set aside -
There is no requirement or legal necessity for filing a second criminal appeal - The Criminal Appeal No. 96 of
2022, which was filed by the revisionist/accused within the prescribed period of limitation, is valid and in
consonance with the provisions of law - The same can be decided only on merits and not dismissed in default
- The learned appellate court is directed to decide the criminal appeal as expeditiously as possible -
Accordingly, criminal revision allowed. [Paras 8 to 11]

Case Law Cited
K. Muruganandam & ORS. v. State Rep. by the Superintendent of Police and Anr., (2021) 20 SCC 642 -
referred to

List of Acts