# Akhtar Ali v. State of U.P. & Ors

- **Citation:** (2026) 2 ILRA 521
- **Court:** High Court of Judicature at Allahabad
- **Decided:** 2026-02-23
- **Case number:** Writ A No. 14138 of 2022
- **Bench:** J.J. Munir
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/allahabad-high-court/akhtar-ali-v-state-of-u-p-ors-54254
- **Pages:** 16

## Text

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2 All. Akhtar Ali Vs. State of U.P. & Ors.
521

33. So far as the reliance is placed by the petitioner upon the law rendered by the Hon'ble
Apex Court in the case of Balbir Singh Turn(Supra) is concerned, the same would not applicable in
the facts and circumstances of the present case, as in the aforesaid matter, which went upto the
Hon'ble Apex Court, the executive order was under challenge, by which, the benefit of the
recommendations of the Sixth Pay Commission to the Central Government Employees were
declined, whereas the government order dated 26-03-2010 has never been challenged and declared
nullity.

34. In view of the above, this court finds no illegality in the order of rejection dated 02-032016, to the extent of the denial of the actual benefits of the recommendations of the Sixth Pay
Commission to the petitioner, since 01-01-2006.

35. Ergo, the writ petition is partly allowed. The order impugned dated 02-03-2016 is hereby
quashed to the extent of the decision of the respondent authority for non payment of the interest, on
the delayed payment of the gratuity and the leave encashment.

36. The competent authority is directed to make payment of interest on the delayed payment of
post terminal dues (gratuity and leave encashment), with interest of 7% per annum, to the
petitioner, within period of eight weeks

37. No order as to costs.
----------
(2026) 2 ILRA 521
ORIGINAL JURISDICTION
CIVIL SIDE
DATED: ALLAHABAD 23.02.2026

BEFORE

THE HON'BLE J.J. MUNIR, J.

Writ A No. 14138 of 2022

Akhtar Ali ...Petitioner
Versus
State of U.P. & Ors. ...Respondents

Issue for Consideration
(1) Permissibility of framing the charge and holding enquiry against the filing of writ petition under Article 226
of the Constitution on the strength that it was filed without getting permission of Nagar Ayukt.
(2) Legality of dismissal order passed on the strength of enquiry held without giving sufficient notice to
answer the charge-sheet and without intimating date, time and place of inquiry and without adopting the due
process of examining and cross examining the witnesses.

Headnotes
(A) Service law - Constitution of India - Article 226 - Rule of law - Right to approach the High
Court by filing writ petition - Restriction imposed to it - In the charge-sheet, fourth charge was
522 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
framed against filing of writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution on the strength that it
was filed without getting permission of Nagar Ayukt - Permissibility : (E-1)
Held : If it were held that an employee must seek permission from his employer, before approaching us in
our jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution, it would shake the very foundations of the rule of law. In
fact, this kind of insistence, by the employer, is an act which prejudices and interferes with the due course of
judicial proceedings, competently brought by any citizen, including an employee against his employer or an
Authority of the State which constitutes criminal contempt within the meaning of Section 2(c) of the Contempt
of Courts Act, 1971 - A charge of this kind must, therefore, neither be permitted to be framed nor inquired
into in departmental proceedings. [Para 21 and 23]
(B) Service law - Dismissal - Disciplinary enquiry - Principle of natural justice - Applicability -
Charge of corruption and embezzlement -Burden to prove the charge - Duty of Establishment -
No sufficient notice to answer the charge-sheet was given - No intimation of date, time and
place for holding the inquiry was given - No due process of examination and cross examination
of witnesses was adopted during inquiry - Effect : (E-1)
Held : There is not the slightest mention of the basic imputations, in what manner, where and when the loss
was caused so as to afford the petitioner sufficient notice to answer this charge-sheet as well. We, therefore,
find and hold that the charge-sheet dated 01.11.2018 lacks essential imputations that could enable the
petitioner to answer the second charge-sheet, carrying as it does, a serious charge. We, therefore, hold that
this charge-sheet, too, is vitiated. [Para 24]
Held further : In a case where a major penalty may be imposed, the inquiry officer or Tribunal must fix a
date, time and venue for holding the inquiry and intimate the Establishment as well as the employee of the
date, time and place so fixed - At the appointed date, time and venue, the inquiry officer must not assume
the role of an officer of the Establishment, even if he is one, but don the mantle of an impartial arbiter. He
must require the Establishment, in the first instance, to prove the charge or charges against the employee
carried in the charge-sheet by leading evidence, both documentary and oral, with a right to the employee to
cross-examine the Establishment's witnesses. If the Establishment are able to discharge their burden, the
employee is to be called upon to enter defence and produce both documentary and oral evidence in support,
if he so chooses. If he produces witnesses, the Establishment's presenting officer can cross-examine the
employee's witnesses. If the employee does not produce any evidence, the Establishment's burden, to prove
the charges in the first instance, cannot be relieved. [Para 26]

Case Law Cited
Shankar Lal Sharma vs. M.S. Bisht, AIR 1956 All 160; Pratap Singh and another vs. Gurbaksh Singh, AIR 1962
SC 1172; State of Uttar Pradesh and others vs. Saroj Kumar Sinha, (2010) 2 SCC 772; Roop Singh Negi vs.
Punjab National Bank and others, (2009) 2 SCC 570; State of Uttaranchal and others vs. Kharak Singh, (2008)
8 SCC 236; State of U.P. and another vs. Kishori Lal and another, 2018 (9) ADJ 397 (DB) (LB); Smt. Karuna
Jaiswal vs. State of U.P., 2018 (9) ADJ 107 (DB) (LB); State of U.P. vs. Aditya Prasad Srivastava and another,
2017 (2) ADJ 554 (DB) (LB) - referred to.

List of Acts
Uttar Pradesh Mahapalika Service Rules, 1962 - Rule 11, 31, 32 and 35; Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 -
Section 2(c).

List of Keywords
Dismissal, Corruption, Embezzlement, First Information Report, Disciplinary proceeding, Principle of natural
justice, Preliminary enquiry, Charge-sheet, Prior approval, Permission, Departmental appeal, Rule of law,
Criminal contempt, Examination of witnesses, Cross-examination.

Case Arising From
Order of Nagar Ayukt dated 27.06.2019 dismissing the petitioner and Order of appellate authority dated
affirming the dismissal order.

Appearances for Parties
2 All. Akhtar Ali Vs. State of U.P. & Ors.
523
Advs. for the Petitioner : Anwar Hussain
Advs. for the Respondents : Sharad Chandra Upadhya, Pankaj Srivastava

(Delivered by Hon'ble J.J. Munir, J.)

1. This writ petition is directed against an order of the Nagar Ayukt, Nagar Nigam Meerut
dated 27.06.2019, dismissing the petitioner, a Clerk, from service, after holding disciplinary
proceedings. Also under challenge is the order of the Commissioner, Meerut Division, Meerut,
dismissing the petitioner's appeal against the last mentioned order of the Nagar Ayukt, and
affirming his dismissal from service.

2. The petitioner was employed as a Senior Clerk in the service of the Nagar Nigam Meerut. A
complaint was laid against him by a former Corporator, Ajay Gupta, on 16.08.2017, relating to
allegations of corruption and embezzlement, as it appears. The complaint, somehow, was taken
cognizance of by the Commissioner of the Division, who constituted a three Member Committee to
inquire into the matter. Apparently, the aforesaid inquiry, that was directed by the Commissioner,
was a preliminary inquiry. Pending this inquiry, a First Information Report (FIR) was lodged
against the petitioner, giving rise to Case Crime No.34 of 2018, under Section 409 IPC, Police
Station Dehli Gate, District Meerut. Apart from the FIR, that was lodged by the Nagar Swasthya
Adhikari on 20.02.2018, the petitioner was suspended pending inquiry vide order dated 08.03.2018,
on ground that he was not cooperating with the inquiry undertaken under orders of the Divisional
Commissioner. The inquiry apparently bears reference to the preliminary inquiry that was then
afoot under directions of the Commissioner of the Division.

3. Upon suspension from service, a regular inquiry was initiated against the petitioner and the
Chief Finance and Accounts Officer, Nagar Nigam, Meerut was appointed the Inquiry Officer. The
petitioner was issued a charge-sheet dated 11.07.2018. According to the petitioner, the charge-sheet
did not mention evidence by which the charges were proposed to be proved nor the witnesses. It is
averred that the charge-sheet has not been drawn up in accordance with Rule 31 of the Uttar
Pradesh Mahapalika Service Rules, 1962 (for short, 'the Rules of 1962'). Upon receipt of the
charge-sheet, the petitioner vide letters dated 20.07.2018, 31.07.2018, 20.08.2018 and 29.08.2018
requested the Inquiry Officer for provision of documents, so that he could submit a reply to the
charge-sheet. However, the documents in support of the charges were never supplied. Deprived of
this opportunity, the petitioner submitted a reply dated 24.09.2018, answering the charge-sheet
dated 11.07.2018. Objection in the reply as to validity of the charge-sheet was also taken in that,
that it was issued without prior approval of the Nagar Ayukt.

4. Next, the Nagar Ayukt issued a second charge-sheet dated 01.11.2018. On the basis of
whatever materials were collected by the Commissioner of the Division in the preliminary inquiry
held under his directions, this charge-sheet imputed to the petitioner, causing the Nagar Nigam a
loss to the tune of Rs.14,89,600/-. He was asked to submit his reply to the charge-sheet dated
01.11.2018 (for short, 'the second charge-sheet) within three days. This charge-sheet too, according
to the petitioner, was not drawn up in compliance with Rule 31 of the Rules of 1962. The petitioner
vide letters dated 06.11.2018 and 11.12.2018 asked for the provision of a copy of the inquiry
524 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
report, which apparently refers to the preliminary inquiry report that the Commissioner secured
through the Committee set up by him.

5. It is the petitioner's case that instead of providing a copy of the preliminary inquiry report,
he was furnished a gist of the said report vide letter dated 22.12.2018. The petitioner vide letter
dated 08.01.2019 asked for the furnishing of a complete copy of the preliminary inquiry report
dated 16.02.2018, but to no avail. Deprived of the particulars of the charge against him, which was
based on the preliminary inquiry report, the petitioner submitted, as he says, a reply to the second
charge-sheet on 04.02.2019. In his reply, it was asserted that the charge-sheet had been issued
without annexing a copy of the preliminary inquiry report or evidence in support of the charge,
sought to be relied upon by the respondents. The charge-sheet was, therefore, assailed as illegal.
Time and again, it was also asserted by the petitioner that there was no mention in the charge-sheet
that he had a right to cross-examine witnesses and produce witnesses in his defence. There are
other objections of technical detail raised to the two charge-sheets, but we need not mention them.

6. Suffice it to say that the petitioner denied the charges. It is the petitioner's case that the
inquiry that was held did not intimate to the petitioner any date, time and venue of inquiry and the
Inquiry Officer proceeded in violation of principles of natural justice. There is an assertion to this
effect in paragraph No.33 of the writ petition. It is pleaded in paragraph No.35 of the writ petition
that the Inquiry Officer did not adhere to Rule 31 of the Rules of 1962, which prescribes a detailed
procedure, in case a major penalty is in contemplation, to be followed by the Inquiry Officer when
disciplinary proceedings are taken against a servant of the Mahapalika. This procedure requires,
apart from serving the charge-sheet drawn up in the manner prescribed, opportunity to be provided
to the delinquent employee to examine and cross-examine witnesses. But, no such procedure was
followed.

7. It is also averred in paragraph No.37 of the writ petition that Rule 32 of the Rules of 1962
was observed in breach by the respondent Mahapalika in that, that a copy of the inquiry report
along with the show cause notice was not served upon the petitioner before final orders in the
disciplinary matter, dismissing him from service, were made. The petitioner was dismissed from
service, on the basis of the Inquiry Officer's report, by the Disciplinary Authority vide order dated
27.06.2019. The petitioner challenged this order through a departmental appeal dated 12.07.2019
under Rule 35 of the Rules of 1962 before the Commissioner of the Division. The appeal remained
pending and the petitioner had to move this Court by means of Writ-A No.15517 of 2021 in order
to seek a direction to the Commissioner to decide his appeal expeditiously. The directions were
issued in the aforesaid writ petition vide order dated 02.11.2021. The order of this Court was served
upon the Divisional Commissioner by registered post on 20.11.2021. Those directions to decide the
appeal were not complied with by the Commissioner. This compelled the petitioner to move an
application for contempt, being Contempt Application (Civil) No.1539 of 2022, where this Court
granted a further time of three months to the Commissioner to comply with the order dated
02.11.2021 passed in Writ-A No.15517 of 2021.

8. It is averred in paragraph No.31 of the writ petition that the Commissioner, after the order
dated 24.03.2022 made in the contempt application, proceeded to reject the petitioner's appeal in
haste vide order dated 23.05.2022.
2 All. Akhtar Ali Vs. State of U.P. & Ors.
525

9. Aggrieved by the orders of the Disciplinary Authority and the Appellate Authority, this writ
petition has been instituted under Article 226 of the Constitution.

10. The parties having exchanged affidavits, the writ petition was admitted to hearing on
12.12.2024. Later on, after hearing parties, judgment was reserved.

11. Heard Mr. Anwar Hussain, learned Counsel for the petitioner, Mr. Sharad Chandra
Upadhyay, learned Standing Counsel, appearing on behalf of respondent Nos. 1 and 2 and Mr.
Pankaj Srivastava, learned Counsel, appearing for respondent No. 3.

12. The petitioner has been punished with the imposition of a major penalty - dismissal from
service - after holding disciplinary proceedings. The foremost question to be seen is if the
procedure, in holding the inquiry as well as the entirety of disciplinary proceedings culminating in
the order of dismissal from service impugned, is one that is in accordance with the rules, and,
above all, in accordance with the rules of natural justice applicable to proceedings that are involved
here.

13. The service conditions of the petitioner, who is an employee of the Mahapalika, not
covered by Rule 11 of the Rules of 1962, are governed by the said rules. Rules 31 and 32 of the
Rules of 1962 read:

"31. Procedure for disciplinary proceedings.-(1) No order (other than an order based on
facts which have led to his conviction on a criminal charge) of dismissal, removal or reduction in
rank (which includes reduction to a lower post or time-scale or to a lower stage in a time-scale but
excludes the reversion to a lower post of a person who is officiating in a higher post), shall be
passed on any servant of the Mahapalika unless he has been informed in writing of the grounds on
which it is proposed to take action and has been afforded an adequate opportunity of defending
himself. The grounds on which it is proposed to take action shall be reduced in the form of a
definite charge or charges which shall be communicated to the person charged and which shall be
so clear and precise as to give sufficient indication to the charged servant of the facts and
circumstances against him. He shall be required, within a reasonable time, to put in a written
statement of his defence and to state whether he desires to be heard in person. If he so desires or if
the authority concerned so directs an oral enquiry shall be held in respect of such of the allegations
as are not admitted. At that inquiry such oral evidence will be heard as the inquiring officer
considers necessary. The person charged shall be entitled to cross-examine the witnesses to give
evidence in person and to have such witnesses called as he may wish provided that the officer
conducting the inquiry may for sufficient reason to be recorded in writing refuse to call a witness.
Neither the Mahapalika nor the servants of the Mahapalika shall be entitled to be represented by a
counsel. The proceedings shall contain a sufficient record of the evidence and statement of the
findings and the grounds thereof. The officer conducting the enquiry may also separately from
these proceedings make his own recommendation regarding the punishment to be imposed on the
charged servant.

(2) This rule shall not apply where the person concerned has absconded or where it is for
other reasons impracticable to communicate with him. All or any of the provisions of the rule may
for sufficient reasons to be recorded in writing be waived, where there is difficulty in observing
526 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
exactly the requirements of the rule and those requirements can in the opinion of the inquiring
officer be waived without injustice to the person charged.

(3) This rule shall also not apply where it is proposed to terminate the employment of
either a temporary servant, or of a probationer whether during or at the end of the period of
probation. In such cases a simple notice of termination, which in the case of temporary servant,
must conform to the conditions of his service, will be sufficient.

32. (1) After an inquiry against a servant has been completed and after the punishing
authority has arrived at provisional conclusions in regard to the penalty to be imposed, the servant
charged shall, if penalty proposed is dismissal, removal or reduction in rank, be supplied with a
copy of the proceedings prepared under Rule 31 excluding the recommendations, if any, in regard
to punishment made by the officer conducting the inquiry and asked to show cause by a particular
date, which affords him reasonable time, why the proposed penalty should not be imposed on him.

Provided that if for sufficient reasons the punishing authority disagrees with any part or
whole of the proceedings prepared under Rule 31 the point or points of such disagreement,
together with a brief statement of the grounds thereof, shall also be communicated to the officer or
servant charged along with the copy of the proceedings under Rule 31.

(2) Every order of dismissal, removal or reduction in rank shall be in writing and shall
specify the charge or charges brought, the defence, if any, and the reasons for the order."

14. Here, two charge-sheets were issued to the petitioner on the basis of which disciplinary
proceedings were drawn. The first charge-sheet dated 11.07.2018 must be quoted for every word of
it:

"कायाथलय मुख्य ववि एवां लेखाधधकारी,
नगर ननगम, मेरठ।
पत्राांक:- 97/लेखा वविाग/18 दिनाांक:- 11-07-2018

िी अख्तर अली
भलवपक (ननलन्म्ित)
सम्िद्ध केन्रीय कायाथलय,
नगर ननगम, मेरठ।

वविीय वषथ 2011-12 से वविीय वषथ 2015-16 तक स्वास््य वविाग में चूना सदहत ववभिन्न सामधग्रयों
के िय में िरती गई अननयभमतता एवां भ्रष्िाचार के सम्िन्ध में मण्डलायुक्त महोिय के ननिेशन में चल रही
जाांच के िौरान सम्िन्न्धत पत्रावभलयों व अन्य अभिलेखों को उपलब्ध नहीां कराया गया जिकक आप आलोच्य
अवधध में स्िोर भलवपक के पि पर कायथरत थे। अतः जाांच में सहयोग न करने तथा पत्रावभलयों व अभिलेखों
को उपलब्ध न कराये जाने के कारण नगर आयुक्त महोिय के आिेश सांख्या 1032/आ०भल०-न०आ०कैम्प/18 दिनाांक 08 माचथ, 2018 के द्वारा आपको ननलन्म्ित करते केन्रीय कायाथलय से सम्िद्ध ककया गया
2 All. Akhtar Ali Vs. State of U.P. & Ors.
527
है। उक्त ननलम्िन आिेश में अरोप-पत्र ननगथत कर जाांच करने हेतु अधोहस्ताक्षरी को जाांच अधधकारी नाभमत
ककया गया है।

अतः उक्त के िम में ननिेभशत ककया जाता है कक आप अपने ऊपर लगे आरोपों के सम्िन्ध में
ननम्नाांककत बिन्िुओां के सम्िन्ध में अपनी सुस्पष्ि एवां त्यात्मक आख्या एक सप्ताह के अन्िर
अधोहस्ताक्षरी को उपलब्ध कराना सुननन्श्चत करें :-

1. मा० आयुक्त, मेरठ मण्डल, मेरठ द्वारा करायी जा रही जाांच में सहयोग न करने।

2. जाांच से सम्िन्न्धत पत्रावभलयों/अभिलेखों को प्रस्तुत न करने।

3. अनुशासनहीनता िरतते हुए बिना अधोहस्ताक्षरी की अनुमनत के दिनाांक 19.02.2018 से
मुख्यालय छोडने व अननयभमत रूप से अवकाश पर रहने।

4. बिना अनुमनत मा० न्यायालय में वाि योन्जत करने।

उपरोक्त बिन्िुओां के सम्िन्ध में सुस्पष्ि एवां त्यात्मक आख्या उपलब्ध न कराने पर यह
समझा जायेगा कक आपको इन आरोपों के सम्िन्ध में कुछ नहीां कहना है और न्जन आरोपों में आपको
ननलन्म्ित ककया गया है वो आपको स्वीकार हैं, यह मानते हुए अधोहस्ताक्षरी द्वारा आपके आरोपों की पुन्ष्ि
करते हुए जाांच आख्या ननयुन्क्त अधधकारी/नगर आयुक्त महोिय को प्रेवषत कर िी जायेगी न्जसका
उिरिानयत्व आपका होगा।
मुख्य ववि एवां लेखाधधकारी
नगर ननगम, मेरठ।
प्रनतभलवप:- नगर आयुक्त महोिय को अवलोकनाथथ प्रेवषत।
मुख्य ववि एवां लेखाधधकारी
नगर ननगम, मेरठ।"
(emphasis by Court)

15. Likewise, the second charge-sheet dated 01.11.2018 is also required to be quoted:

"रन्जस्िडथ
कायाथलय नगर आयुक्त,
नगर ननगम, मेरठ।
पत्राांक:- 668/ आ०भल०-न०आ०/2018 दिनाांक:- 01-11-2018
आरोप पत्र - 2
िी अख्तर अली
भलवपक (ननलन्म्ित)
सम्िद्ध केन्रीय कायाथलय,
528 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
नगर ननगम, मेरठ।

आपके द्वारा नगर ननगम के स्वास््य वविाग में स्िोर भलवपक के पि पर तैनात अवधध वषथ
2011-12 से वषथ 2015-16 तक िय की गई चूना, मैलाधथयााँन तथा अन्य सामधग्रयों के िय व िण्डारण
प्रकिया में िरती गयी वविीय अननयभमतताओां की जाांच मा० मण्डलायुक्त महोिय, मेरठ मण्डल, मेरठ के
द्वारा, िी अजय गुप्ता ननवासी सागर ववला, आनन्िपुरी, मेरठ के भशकायती पत्र दिनाांक 16.08.2017 के िम
में की गई। जाांच में यह पाया गया है कक "आलोच्य अवधध में आपके द्वारा िरती गई वविीय अननयभमतताओां
के कारण नगर ननगम, मेरठ को न्यूनतम 1489600/- रू० की वविीय क्षनत हुई है।"

उक्त के िम में तीन दिवस के अन्िर साक्ष्य सदहत अपना पक्ष प्रस्तुत करें कक "आपके द्वारा की
गई वविीय अननयभमताओां के भलए अनुशासनात्मक कायथवाही करते हुए अांकन 1489600/- रु० की वसूली
आपसे, क्यों न कर ली जाये।" साक्ष्य के रूप में जाांच आख्या की छाया प्रनत इस पत्र के साथ प्रेवषत है।

नगर आयुक्त,
नगर ननगम, मेरठ।
प्रर्तमलवप :- मा० आयुक्त महोिया, मेरठ मण्डल, मेरठ को अवलोकनाथथ प्रेवषत।

ह० अपठनीय

नगर आयुक्त,

नगर ननगम, मेरठ।"

16. A look at Rule 31 of the Rules of 1962 shows that it is mandatory in the holding of
disciplinary proceedings that the grounds upon which it is proposed to take action, be reduced to
the form of a definite charge or charges, which have to be so clear and precise so as to give
sufficient indication to the employee of the facts and circumstances appearing against him. The
rule, under reference, embodies nothing more than the requirements of natural justice and
procedure salutary. A charge, after all, need not be in a particular form so far as disciplinary
proceedings or for that matter, any administrative proceedings are concerned as distinguished from
proceedings in a Court of law. But, it is essential that the charge must convey imputations on the
foot of which action is proposed to be taken in terms that are intelligible enough for the employee
to understand all the necessary particulars of the allegations sufficiently, in order to enable him to
effectively answer the charge.

17. A look at the first charge-sheet would show that the four charges, mentioned in the first
charge-sheet, are mere labels of the charges without the substance of imputations being there. It is
not mentioned as to which of the records the petitioner did not make available to the inquiry
officers holding the preliminary inquiry under orders of the Divisional Commissioner. There is a
vague allegation that the petitioner did not make available files and documents relating to the
inquiry being undertaken. Likewise, there is the first charge that the petitioner did not cooperate
with the inquiry undertaken under orders of the Divisional Commissioner; in what precise manner
and by what acts or omissions, when and where, is not specified. In the absence of these, what,
2 All. Akhtar Ali Vs. State of U.P. & Ors.
529
where and when about the charges, the charges are hollow incantations with no answerable
substance to them.

18. The third charge mentioned in the first charge-sheet dated 11.07.2018 carries somewhat of
the necessary particulars saying that from 19.02.2018 to an unspecified date the petitioner left
headquarters without permission or seeking leave of the Nagar Ayukt. Again, even if this were
regarded as a charge, which could be answered and inquired into, it is one of the four charges and
certainly not grave enough to invite the imposition of a major penalty. The major penalty would
have been imposed on the other charges based on findings of the inquiry officer.

19. The first of the two charges, we have already shown to be in terms that cannot lead us to a
conclusion that those are "answerable charges" and, therefore, valid.

20. The fourth charge is absolutely illegal; in fact, contumacious. The charge says that the
petitioner instituted an action before this Court without permission of the Nagar Ayukt. Elsewhere,
it has come that the proceedings instituted by the petitioner were before this Court and it was a writ
petition challenging an FIR that the respondents had lodged against him.

21. Now, if it were held that an employee must seek permission from his employer, before
approaching us in our jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution, it would shake the very
foundations of the rule of law. In fact, this kind of insistence, by the employer, is an act which
prejudices and interferes with the due course of judicial proceedings, competently brought by any
citizen, including an employee against his employer or an Authority of the State which constitutes
criminal contempt within the meaning of Section 2(c) of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971. A
reference, in this context, may be made to a Bench decision of this Court in Shankar Lal Sharma
v. M.S. Bisht, AIR 1956 All 160, where the facts and holding read:

"1. Sri Shankar Lal Sharma, an employee in the Public Works Department of the Uttar
Pradesh, moved in this Court an application for the grant of a writ against Sri M.S. Bisht, Chief
Engineer, P.W.D., U.P., Lucknow, praying for a direction to the opposite party to forward to the
Public Service Commission, U.P. his application for employment in some higher post, which he
had sent to the said Commission through the opposite party. While the writ petition was pending in
this Court Sri M.S. Bisht purporting to act in accordance with certain directions contained in
Government Order No. O-3237/II-B-32-52, dated December 24, 1952, asked for an explanation
from Sri Shankar Lal as to why he had submitted a writ application in the High Court of Judicature
at Allahabad (Lucknow Bench) Lucknow. It was clearly an attempt to hold out a threat of
departmental action against an employee of the Government, who had approached the High Court
for what he considered to be the protection of his rights under the Constitution. This matter was
brought to the notice of the Court by a petition filed by Sri Shankar Lal and thereupon a notice was
issued to Sri N.S. Bisht to show cause why action should not be taken against him for contempt of
court.

2. Sri M.S. Bisht has filed an application explaining the circumstances under which he
took the action complained of and disclaiming all intention of intimidating the applicant. He has
tendered an unqualified apology to this Court. With his application he has appended a copy of the
Government order.
530 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES

3. There is no doubt that if any kind of threat or any action which may amount to such
threat is held out to a person, who has approached the civil courts for a redress of such grievances
as he may consider that he has, with a view to induce him to forego the assistance of the civil
courts, the action amounts to a contempt of court. It is a clear interference with the right of every
citizen who claims redress from the civil courts for any grievance that he may have. No kind of
Government order in this respect can excuse such an action. It is true that the order of the
Government to which reference is made does contain some passages from which it may be inferred
that if any person approaches the civil courts, he may in certain circumstances, be called upon to
submit an explanation. We are not satisfied that in the present case those conditions were fulfilled,
but in any case even if they were that would be no justification for an action to be taken and we
cannot allow any impediment to be placed in the way of a citizen seeking redress from the courts of
law."

22. In Pratap Singh and another v. Gurbaksh Singh, AIR 1962 SC 1172, it was held by the
Supreme Court (Raghubar Dayal, J. dissenting):

"9. Assuming that the circular letter contained certain executive instructions, what then
is the position? It should perhaps be made clear at the very outset that the question before us is not
so much the validity of the circular letter in the abstract, but the propriety of the action taken
against the respondent on the basis of the circular letter at a time when his suit was awaiting
decision in the Court of the Senior Subordinate Judge at Amritsar. It must not, however, be
assumed that we are holding the circular letter to be valid in the sense that compliance with it will,
in no circumstances, amount to contempt of court. We do not come to any such conclusion. The
argument before us is that the circular letter did not impose an absolute ban on a government
servant seeking redress of his grievances arising out of his employment or service conditions in a
court of law; it is submitted that all that it did was to ask government servants to exhaust first the
normal official channels of redress before proceeding to a court of law. The emphasis, it is stated,
is on propriety and discipline in the conduct of a government servant; and it has been submitted
that judged from that point of view, the circular letter cannot be said to constitute an interference
with the course of justice in any court of law. Theoretically and in the abstract, this may be true;
and if the circular letter merely lays down that ordinarily a government servant should exhaust his
departmental remedies before going to a court of law, no objection can be taken to it. Speaking
generally, a government servant does not ordinarily go to court, unless and until he fails to get
what he considers to be justice from the departmental authorities. But we have to consider in this
case a somewhat different problem, namely, the action taken against the respondent during a
pending litigation, as though going to a court of law before exhausting departmental remedies must
in all cases be visited with punishment.

10. What, after all, is contempt of court? "To speak generally, contempt of court may be
said to be constituted by any conduct that tends to bring the authority and administration of the law
into disrespect or disregard, or to interfere with or prejudice parties litigant or their witnesses
during the litigation". (Oswald's Contempt of Court, 3rd Edn., p. 6). We are concerned in the
present case with the second part, namely, "to interfere with or prejudice parties litigant during the
litigation". In the case under our consideration the respondent had instituted a suit in the Court of
the Senior Subordinate Judge, Amritsar, in respect of his grievance that a certain sum of money
was being illegally deducted from his salary. On behalf of the respondent it was alleged that he had
2 All. Akhtar Ali Vs. State of U.P. & Ors.
531
no further departmental remedies to exhaust, inasmuch as the order by which a part of his salary
was being deducted was a final order made by the Punjab Government after considering the
respondent's explanation. On behalf of the appellants it has been contended that the respondent
had still a further remedy by way of an appeal to the Governor. That is a matter with which we are
not really concerned, as it relates to the question whether the respondent had or had not violated
the terms of the circular letter. We are concerned with the action that was taken against the
respondent on the footing, right or wrong, that he had violated the instructions of the circular
letter. His suit was pending in the Court of the Senior Subordinate Judge, Amritsar. When the
summons in the suit was served on the Government, the Under-Secretary to the Government, drew
the attention of one of the appellants to the circular letter and asked the latter to intimate to the
Government what action he proposed to take against the respondent. Appellant Pratap Singh then
forwarded the memorandum of the Under-Secretary to the Conservator of Forests, South Circle,
and in his forwarding endorsement Pratap Singh directed that the respondent should be proceeded
with in accordance with the instructions in the circular letter and that a copy of the proceedings
recorded and orders passed should be forwarded to him. It appears, therefore, that appellant
Pratap Singh was not merely content with forwarding the memorandum of the Under-Secretary. He
directed his subordinate officer to take action against the respondent. In accordance with that
direction a proceeding was drawn up against the respondent and the appellant Bachan Singh was
asked to enquire into it. The appellant Bachan Singh then drew up a charge-sheet and in that
charge-sheet it was stated that the respondent had gone to a court of law before exhausting all his
departmental remedies. What would be the effect of these proceedings on the suit which was
pending in the Court of the Senior Subordinate Judge, Amritsar? From the practical point of view,
the institution of the proceedings at a time when the suit in the Court of the Senior Subordinate
Judge, Amritsar, was pending could only be to put pressure on the respondent to withdraw his suit,
or face the consequences of disciplinary action. This, in our opinion, undoubtedly amounted to
contempt of court. There are many ways of obstructing the court and "any conduct by which the
course of justice is perverted, either by a party or a stranger, is a contempt; thus the use of threats,
by letter or otherwise, to a party while his suit is pending; or abusing a party in letters to persons
likely to be witnesses in the cause, have been held to be contempts". (Oswald's Contempt of Court,
3rd Edn., p. 87). The question is not whether the action in fact interfered, but whether it had a
tendency to interfere with the due course of justice. The action taken in this case against the
respondent by way of a proceeding against him can, in our opinion, have only one tendency,
namely, the tendency to coerce the respondent and force him to withdraw his suit or otherwise not
press it. If that be the clear and unmistakable tendency of the proceedings taken against the
respondent, then there can be no doubt that in law the appellants have been guilty of contempt of
court, even though they were merely carrying out the instructions contained in the circular letter.

11. We have been referred to a large number of decisions dealing with various aspects of
contempt of court. We consider it unnecessary to refer to them all, because it is clear to us that any
conduct which interferes with or prejudices parties litigant during the litigation is undoubtedly
contempt of court. There is, however, one decision which is very much in point and to which we
must refer. In Shankar Lal Sharma v. M.S. Bisht in very similar circumstances it was held by the
Allahabad High Court that if any kind of threat or any action which may amount to a threat is held
out to a person who has approached the civil courts for a redress of his grievances, with a view to
induce him to forego the assistance of the civil courts, the action amounts to a contempt of court. In
that case also an employee of the Public Works Department of Uttar Pradesh moved the High
532 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
Court for the grant of a writ. While the writ petition was pending in the High Court the Chief
Engineer, PWD., U.P., purporting to act in accordance with certain directions contained in a
circular letter asked for an explanation from the employee as to why he has submitted a writ
application to the High Court. The learned Judges expressed the view that there was no doubt that
the action taken by the Chief Engineer in accordance with the instructions contained in the circular
letter amounted to a threat with a view to induce the employee to forego the assistance of the civil
courts. An unqualified apology having been tendered in the case, no further action was taken. On
behalf of the appellants reliance was placed on the decision of this Court in S.S. Roy v. State of
Orissa. That was a case in which a First Class Magistrate misconceiving his powers and exercising
a jurisdiction not vested in him by law and without any justifying circumstances made an order
under Section 144 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, by which a civil court peon was restrained
from executing a warrant of arrest issued by an Additional Munsif in connection with the execution
of a money decree; the Magistrate was not influenced by any extraneous consideration or dishonest
motive in making the order and it was held that the Magistrate was not guilty of contempt of the
Court of the Additional Munsif, because there was nothing to suggest any wilful culpability on his
part. We are unable to agree with the learned advocate for the appellants that the principle of that
decision should apply to the present case. The appellants in the instant case were not judicial
officers who misconceived their powers. They were no doubt carrying out executive instructions
given by their employer, but they carried out those instructions at a time when a civil suit was
pending and they carried out the instructions in such a manner as to exert pressure on the
respondent to withdraw the suit. That is the finding at which the High Court arrived and on that
finding the appellants were clearly guilty of contempt of court. The decision in Webster v. Bakewell
Rural District Council on which also learned advocate for the appellants relied is not in point.
That was a case in which the yearly tenant of a cottage and land, adjoining a highway and forming
part of a settled estate, issued a writ against the local authority for an injunction to restrain an
alleged trespass on his land; the solicitor of the tenant for life wrote to the local authority with a
view to arrange the matter and at the same time wrote to the tenant that the tenant for life required
him to withdraw the writ, and that, if he did not comply, his tenancy would be determined. It was
held that the solicitor had not committed a contempt of court. The decision proceeded on the
footing that the tenant for life had the right to turn out the yearly tenant and there was nothing to
prevent the tenant for life, who was the landlord, from exercising his legal rights if he did so
honestly to protect the rights he had in the property.

12.