# Amandeep Singh v. S.B.I. & Ors

- **Citation:** (2023) 12 ILRA 615
- **Court:** High Court of Judicature at Allahabad
- **Decided:** 2023-12-19
- **Case number:** Writ-C No. 2461 of 2023
- **Bench:** Pankaj Bhatia
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/allahabad-high-court/amandeep-singh-v-s-b-i-ors-49491
- **Pages:** 17

## Headnote

A. Constitution of India, 1950-Article 226 -
Indian Penal Code,1860-Section 188 r/w
Section 30 of the Arms Act-a young
advocate
carried
arms
in
the
court
premises-the
arms
license
of
the
petitioner was cancelled by the Licensing
Authority-Carrying of the arms in the
Court premises by litigants is on the
increase and is a cause for major threat to
public peace and public safety coupled
with the fact that the mandate of Rule
614-A of the General Rules (Civil) places
restrictions on carrying of arms in the
Court premises and despite directions by
this Court in PIL No. 2436 of 2019 the
same are not being followed in letter and
spirit-directions issued.(Para 1 to 47)

The writ petition is dismissed. (E-6)

List of Cases cited:

## Text

_Characters 0–39,968 of 55,249. This is a partial read: ask again with offset=39968 for what follows._

12 All. Amandeep Singh Vs. S.B.I. & Ors.
615

20. In view of above and the aforesaid
Full Bench decision of this court, the
recorded tenure holder having prima facie
title in his favour can hardly be directed to
approach the revenue court in respect of
seeking relief for cancellation of a void
document, which made him to approach the
court of law and in such case he can also
claim ancillary relief even though the same
can be granted by the revenue court, but in
the present case the petitioner was not a
recorded tenure holder and admittedly the
respondent no.4 was the recorded tenure
holder at the time of execution of sale deed.
He has also not challenged the order of
abatement passed by the civil court, which
he could have challenged in appropriate
proceedings. The petitioner before the
consolidation courts also failed to claim or
show any right or title over the land in
dispute. Nothing has also been brought on
record to show that the relief, which should
have been claimed before the revenue court
was claimed by the petitioner before the
civil court. Therefore he is not entitled for
any benefit of the said decision and also the
other case relied by learned counsel for the
petitioner. Thus this court is of the view
that the impugned orders have rightly and
in accordance with law been passed by the
Consolidation authorities, which does not
call for any interference by this court. The
petition has been filed on misconceived and
baseless ground and it lacks any merit.

21. The petition is, accordingly
dismissed. No order as to costs..
----------
(2023) 12 ILRA 615
ORIGINAL JURISDICTION
CIVIL SIDE
DATED: LUCKNOW 19.12.2023

BEFORE

THE HON'BLE PANKAJ BHATIA, J.
Writ-C No. 2461 of 2023

Amandeep Singh ...Petitioner
Versus
S.B.I. & Ors. ...Respondents

Counsel for the Petitioner:
Kuldeep Kaur, Ambrish Kumar Dwivedi,
Ravi Dwivedi

Counsel for the Respondents:
C.S.C.

A. Constitution of India, 1950-Article 226 -
Indian Penal Code,1860-Section 188 r/w
Section 30 of the Arms Act-a young
advocate
carried
arms
in
the
court
premises-the
arms
license
of
the
petitioner was cancelled by the Licensing
Authority-Carrying of the arms in the
Court premises by litigants is on the
increase and is a cause for major threat to
public peace and public safety coupled
with the fact that the mandate of Rule
614-A of the General Rules (Civil) places
restrictions on carrying of arms in the
Court premises and despite directions by
this Court in PIL No. 2436 of 2019 the
same are not being followed in letter and
spirit-directions issued.(Para 1 to 47)

The writ petition is dismissed. (E-6)

List of Cases cited:
1. Ram Vilas Vs St. of U.P & ors. (2023) AHC:
139246

2. Pradyuman Bisht Vs U.O.I. & ors. (2023)
LiveLaw SC 628

3. Kailash Nath & ors. Vs St. of U.P. & ors.
(1985) AIR All 291

4. Rana Pratap Singh Vs St. of U.P. (1995) SCC
OnLine All 979

5. Sardar Govindrao Vs St. of M.P.(1964) SCC
OnLine SC 93

6. Official Liquidator Vs Dharti Dhan (P)
Ltd.(1977) 2 SCC 166
616 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
7. N.D. Jayal Vs U.O.I. (2004) 9 SCC 362

8. D.K. Basu Vs St. of W.B. (2015) 8 SCC 744

9. Kaushal Kishor Vs St. of U.P. (2023) 4 SCC 1

10. Imtiyaz Ahmad Vs St. of U.P. (2012) 2 SCC
688

(Delivered by Hon'ble Pankaj Bhatia, J.)

1. Present petition has been filed by
the petitioner challenging the order dated
02.09.2021 whereby the arms license of the
petitioner was cancelled by the Licensing
Authority as well as the appellate order
dated 07.11.2022 whereby the appeal
preferred by the petitioner was dismissed.

2. The facts, in brief, in the present
case are very interesting inasmuch as a
young advocate - the petitioner - after
enrolling in the noble profession in the year
2018 was charged with an offence under
Section 188 IPC read with section 30 of
The Arms Act for carrying arms in the
Court premises. In pursuance to the lodging
of an FIR against the petitioner, a news
item was also published that in the District
Judgeship of Barabanki, various persons
were carrying arms without there being any
restraint whatsoever. The petitioner was
subsequently served with a show-cause
notice calling upon the petitioner as to why
the arms license of the petitioner may not
be cancelled. The petitioner appears to have
not filed a reply. Although, the show-cause
notice has not been filed alongwith the writ
petition, the same annexed alongwith the
counter affidavit filed by the State. As the
petitioner neither filed any reply nor did he
care to appear during the hearing, the
Licensing Authority on the basis of the
report submitted coupled with the fact that
the petitioner was charged with an offence
under Section 188 IPC read with Section 30
of the Arms Act, proceeded to cancel the
arms license of the petitioner. While doing
so, the Licensing Authority also noticed the
general directions given by the High Court
on 02.01.2020 in Public Interest Litigation
(PIL) No.2436 of 2019 "In Re Suo Moto
Relating to Security and Protection in All
Court Campuses in the State of U.P.". The
petitioner preferred an appeal; an affidavit
was also filed in the said appeal, which is
on record as Annexure - 3.

3. In the said appeal, it was disclosed
that the petitioner was a junior advocate
enrolled vide Enrollment No.04435/2018
and was a Member of the District Bar
Association. It was accepted that the
petitioner was carrying the arms in the
Court premises and the plea taken was that
the petitioner was not aware that he could
not carry the arms in the Court premises
and thus, there was an error on his part and
would not repeat the same in future. It was
also stated that the petitioner had taken the
arms license and only the petitioner was
singled out for initiation of proceedings for
cancellation
of
arms
license,
which
according
to
the
petitioner
was
an
important issue to be considered.

4. The appeal of the petitioner came
to be dismissed mainly on the ground of the
petitioner facing criminal trial vide Case
Crime No.644 of 2020 as well as the
general directions issued by the High Court
with regard to safety requirements in the
District Courts.

5. Challenging the said orders, the
present writ petition has been filed.

6. The main ground pleaded by the
petitioner is that right to keep arms is a
right necessary for preservation of life,
liberty and property. It is further pleaded
12 All. Amandeep Singh Vs. S.B.I. & Ors.
617
that right to carry arms is a fundamental
right enshrined under Article 21 of the
Constitution, which fact has been ignored
by the Licensing Authority. It is further
pleaded that the life of the petitioner is in
danger as he is a practicing advocate and
the task of advocacy is very challenging
due to annoyance of parties to litigation. It
is also argued that while passing the order,
the mandate of Section 17(3) of The Arms
Act (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act')
has been violated as there is no threat to
public peace or public safety.

7. In support of the contention,
learned counsel for the petitioner has relied
upon a judgment of this Court in the case of
Ram Vilas versus State of U.P. & Ors.1,
wherein this Court had the occasion to
consider the power of cancellation only on
account of pendency of the case, more so,
in the light of mandate of Section 17(3) of
the Act. The Court also had the occasion to
consider the Government Order issued on
07.02.2018

8. The State, on the other hand, has
filed the counter affidavit stating therein
that in view of the general directions given
by the High Court and the fact that the
petitioner being a lawyer was found
carrying arms in the Court campus was
charged with an offence registered as Case
Crime No.644 of 2020; and subsequently,
in view of the report of the pendency of the
case, a charge-sheet was issued for
cancellation of the license. The petitioner
did not even file a reply and the Licensing
Authority rightly rejected the arms license.

9. It is argued by learned Standing
Counsel that the petitioner who claims to
be a young lawyer has violated the law
with impunity in carrying the arms in the
Court premises and has further failed to
even reply to the charge-sheet issued to him
which demonstrates the scant respect that
the petitioner has as a lawyer in upholding
the spirit of law. It is further argued that the
petitioner himself had admitted to the
charges levelled against him in the chargesheet with regard to carrying of the arms as
is clear from the pleadings in Appeal. It is
further argued that the allegation of the
petitioner that he has been singled out,
amounts to pleading negative equality
which is not permissible.

10. It is further argued that in terms of
the mandate of the Arms Act as well as the
General Rules (Civil) and the general
directions issued, the arms license has been
rightly cancelled. It is most vehemently
argued that grant of the arms license is not
a matter of right and is a privilege and thus,
the plea that the carrying of the arms
license is guaranteed under Article 21 of
the Constitution merits rejection.

11. In the light of the arguments as
raised and noted herein above, it is
essential to note the scheme of the Arms
Act and the Rules framed thereunder as
well as the relevant provisions pertaining to
the restrictions in the Court premises.

12. The Arms Act was enacted to
regulate the possession of arms. Chapter III
of the said Act governs the provisions with
regard to grant of licenses which can be
granted subject to the police report in
respect of the person desiring the license
and on the basis of inquiry. The mandate of
granting license is further divided in two
broad categories: first being specified in
Section 13(3) of the Act which is in respect
of grant of license for a smooth bore gun
having a barrel of not less than twenty
inches and to be used for protection or
sport or in respect of a muzzle loading gun
618 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
to be used for crop protection; and in
respect of firearm to be used for target
practice by a member of a rifle club duly
recognized. With regard to grant of other
licenses, the license can be refused in the
manner as specified in Section 14(1)(b) of
the Act.

13. Section 13 and Section 14 of the
Arms Act are quoted herein below:

"13. Grant of licences.― (1) An
application for the grant of a licence under
Chapter II shall be made to the licensing
authority and shall be in such form, contain
such particulars and be accompanied by
such fee, if any, as may be prescribed.

(2) On receipt of an application,
the licensing authority shall call for the
report of the officer in charge of the
nearest police station on that application,
and such officer shall send his report
within the prescribed time.

(2A) The licensing authority,
after such inquiry, if any, as it may
consider necessary, and after considering
the report received under sub-section (2),
shall, subject to the other provisions of this
Chapter, by order in writing either grant
the licence or refuse to grant the same:

Provided that where the officer in
charge of the nearest police station does
not send his report on the application
within the prescribed time, the licensing
authority may, if it deems fit, make such
order, after the expiry of the prescribed
time, without further waiting for that
report.

(3) The licensing authority shall
grant-

(a) a licence under section 3
where the licence is required―

(i) by a citizen of India in respect
of a smooth bore gun having a barrel of not
less than twenty inches in length to be used
for protection or sport or in respect of a
muzzle loading gun to be used for bona fide
crop protection:

Provided
that
where
having
regard to the circumstances of any case,
the licensing authority is satisfied that a
muzzle loading gun will not be sufficient for
crop protection, the licensing authority
may grant a licence in respect of any other
smooth bore gun as aforesaid for such
protection; or

(ii) in respect of a firearm to be
used for target practice by a member of a
rifle club or rifle association licensed or
recognised by the Central Government;

(b) a licence under section 3 in
any other case or a licence under section 4,
section 5, section 6, section 10 or section
12, if the licensing authority is satisfied
that the person by whom the licence is
required has a good reason for obtaining
the same.

14. Refusal of licences.― (1)
Notwithstanding anything in section 13,
the licensing authority shall refuse to
grant―

(a) a licence under section 3,
section 4 or section 5 where such licence is
required in respect of any prohibited arms
or prohibited ammunition;

(b) a licence in any other case
under Chapter II,―
12 All. Amandeep Singh Vs. S.B.I. & Ors.
619

(i) where such licence is required
by a person whom the licensing authority
has (1) to be prohibited by this Act or by
any other law for the time being in force
from acquiring, having in his possession or
carrying any arms or ammunition; or

(2) to be of unsound mind; or

(3) to be for any reason unfit for
a licence under this Act; or

(ii) where the licensing authority
deems it necessary for the security of the
public peace or for public safety to refuse
to grant such licence.

(2) The licensing authority shall
not refuse to grant any licence to any
person merely on the ground that such
person does not own or possess sufficient
property.

(3) Where the licensing authority
refuses to grant a licence to any person it
shall record in writing the reasons for such
refusal and furnish to that person on
demand a brief statement of the same
unless in any case the licensing authority is
of the opinion that it will not be in the
public interest to furnish such statement."

14. It is essential to note that in terms
of the powers conferred under the Arms
Act in respect of framing rules, the rules
have been framed known as The Arms
Rules, 2016 (hereinafter referred to as 'the
Rules, 2016'). Relevant rule in the present
case is Rule 32, which is quoted herein
below:

"32. Restrictions on carrying of
firearm in public place.─ (1) No person
shall carry a firearm in a public place
unless the firearm is carried -

(a) in the case of a handgun -

(i) in a holster or similar holder
designed, manufactured or adapted for the
carrying of a handgun and attached to his
person; or

(ii) in a rucksack or similar
holder; or

(b) in the case of any other
firearm,
in
a
holder
designed,
manufactured or adapted for the carrying
of a firearm.

(2) A firearm contemplated in
sub-rule (1) must be completely covered
and the person carrying the firearm must
be able to exercise effective control over
such firearm.

(3) Brandishing or discharge of
firearms or blank-firing firearms in any
public place or a firearm free zone is
strictly prohibited.

(4) Any violation of this rule shall
be liable to revocation of the licence and
seizure of the firearm in addition to the
penalty specified under the Act."

15. On a plain reading of the mandate
of Sub-Rule 3 of Rule 32 of the Rules,
2016, it is clear that carrying of a firearm in
a firearm free zone is strictly prohibited and
can lead to an additional ground to
revocation of the license and seizure of
firearm
in
addition
to
the
penalty
prescribed under the Act.

16. It is also interesting to note that
the Civil Courts in the State of U.P. are
regulated in terms of their working on the
civil and the criminal side by the rules as
the General Rules (Civil) and the General
620 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
Rules (Criminal). The General Rules
(Civil), specifically places restriction in the
form of Rule 614-A of the said Rules,
which are as under:

"614A. Restriction on carrying
of Arms. - Save as provided in Rule 614, no
person, not belonging to the police force on
duty, shall carry or have in his possession
any arm as defined in clause (c) of subsection (1) of Section 2 of the Arms Act,
1959, within the court premises.

Explanation I. - The expression
'police force on duty' includes such
members of the police force who escort
under-trials or are posted at Hawalat
guard or are otherwise posted within the
Court premises for purposes of security
and maintenance of law and order, or come
to Court for evidence or pairvi of
Government cases or other Government
work.

Explanation II. - The expression
'Court premises' includes all lands,
building and structures therein, but does
not include residential quarters, if any, of
the officer and the staff, situate within its
limits."

17. In terms of the Explanation II to
Rule 614A, the Court premises has been
defined to include all lands, buildings and
structures except for residential quarters
within the limits of the Courts, thus, the entire
Court premises are included for restrictions in
respect of carrying of the arms within the
Court premises. It is also essential to note that
with regard to incidents that had taken place
in the District Court, suo moto cognizance
was taken by this Court in PIL No.2436 of
2019 wherein the Division Bench of this
Court after considering the various proposals
issued a slew of directions with regard to the
safety etc., in the Court premises. Specific
directions were contained in Para - 20 of the
order dated 02.01.2020 passed in PIL
No.2436 of 2019, which is quoted herein
below:

"20.
No
person
including
Advocates, their Clerks and litigants shall be
allowed to enter Court premises carrying any
weapon. If any person is found with weapon,
the matter shall immediately be reported
giving details of such person to District
Judge as also to Registrar General of this
Court so that appropriate action may be
taken against such person but in no case, any
person carrying weapon shall be allowed to
enter into the Court premises. This direction
would not apply to security personnel
deputed in Court premises as also Police
personnel on duty, accompanying accused
persons coming to Court to attend their
cases."

18. This Court also cannot ignore the
fact that in the recent past, several incidents
of the lawyers carrying and misusing the
arms inside the Court premises have attracted
the attention of the Hon'ble Supreme Court
as well as other Courts from time to time.
The Supreme Court in the case of
Pradyuman Bisht versus Union of India &
Ors.2, noticing the manner on which
incidents of misuse of arms had taken in
Court premises and being deeply concerned
with the same had issued certain directions.

19. To sum up the submissions and to
decide the issues, it is important that this
Court decides the following points of
determination that arise in the present case:

I. Whether right to carry arms is a
fundamental right guaranteed under Article
21 of the Constitution as pleaded by the
petitioner ?
12 All. Amandeep Singh Vs. S.B.I. & Ors.
621

II. Whether the carrying of arms
in the Court premises is permissible by the
lawyers who claim that law profession is
typical and is challenging due to annoyance
of parties to litigation ?

III. Whether the carrying of arms
in the Court premises can lead to
cancellation of the arms license in terms of
the provisions contained in Section 17 with
the rules framed under the Arms Act ?

20. As regards the Issue No.I framed
and quoted herein above, the same need not
detain the Court for long as the said issue
has been decided by two Full Benches; the
first being Kailash Nath and Ors. versus
State of U.P. & Ors.3 wherein considering
the nature of the licenses, the Full Bench
recorded as under:

"3. The law is well settled that
before an action is proposed to be taken
against an individual which affects his
rights and involves civil consequences, he
must be given an opportunity to show
cause. This is the essence of the rule of
'audi alteram partem' which is the
principal doctrine of natural justice. This
rule, however, must be confined to a case
in which the adjudication of right of a party
arises
and
which
involves
civil
consequences. A right is distinct from a
mere privilege. The case of a licencee to
possess or use firearm is materially
different from a case of licence to deal in
or sell firearms. Section 3 of the Arms Act,
1959 deals with acquisition and possession
of firearms or ammunition on the strength
of a licence whereas S. 5 provides for a
licence for manufacture, sale etc. of arms
and
ammunition.
The
licence
for
acquisition and possession of firearms is
materially different from a licence for
manufacture, sale etc. While the latter
confers a right to carry on a trade or
business and is a source of earning
livelihood, the former is merely a personal
privilege for doing something which
without such privilege would be unlawful.
In my opinion the obtaining of a licence
for acquisition and possession of firearms
and ammunition under the Arms Act is
nothing more than a privilege and the
grant of such privilege does not involve
the adjudication of the right of an
individual
nor
does
it
entail
civil
consequences. I may, however, hasten to
add that even an order rejecting the
application for grant of licence may
become legally vulnerable if it is passed
arbitrarily or capriciously or without
application of mind. No doubt, a citizen
may apply for grant of a licence of firearms
mostly with the object of protecting his
person or property but that is mainly the
function of the State. Even remotely this
cannot be comprehended within the ambit
of Art. 21 of the Constitution which
postulates the fundamental right of
protection of life and personal liberty. It
deals with deprivation of life and as held
in Gopalan v. State of Madras, 1950 SCC
228 : 1950 SCR 88 : (AIR 1950 SC 27).
Art. 21 is attracted only is cases of
deprivation in the sense of total loss and
that accordingly has no application to the
case of a mere restriction upon the right to
move freely or to the grant of licence for
possession and acquisition of firearms
which stands on an entirely different
footing from the licence to carry on a trade
or occupation. The rule of natural justice
cannot
be
invoked
unless
civil
consequences ensue. A civil right being
adversely affected is a condition precedent
for attracting the 'audi alteram partem
rule'.
The
cases
of Ram
Gopal
Chaturvedi v. State
of
Madhya
Pradesh, (1969) 2 SCC 240 : AIR 1970 SC
622 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
158 and Union
of
India v. J.N.
Sinha, (1970) 2 SCC 458 : AIR 1971 SC
40 were decided on the basis that the
action under challenge in those cases did
not
involve
any
civil
consequences.
Black's Law Dictionary, Fifth Edition, at
page 222 contains the following definition
of "Civil":-

"Relating to private rights and
remedies sought by civil actions as
contrasted with criminal proceedings.

The word is derived from the
Latin
civilis,
a
citizen.
Originally,
pertaining or appropriate to a member of a
civitas or free political community; natural
or proper to a citizen. Also, relating to the
community,
or
to
the
policy
and
government of the citizens and subjects of a
State."

And the same was followed in
another Full Bench in the case of Rana
Pratap Singh versus State of U.P. 4,
wherein the Full Bench recorded as under:

"37. Equally unsustainable is the
view that the right to carry non-prohibited
fire arms comes within the purview of Art.
21 of the Constitution, nor indeed one can
we subscribe to the theory as ex-pounded
by M Katju, J. In Ganesh Chandra Bhatt's
case1993 (30) ACC 204, that it is only an
armed man who can lead a life of dignity
and self respect. As rightly held in Kailash
Nath's case1985 AWC 493 : AIR 1985 All
291 (supra), obtaining of a licence for
acquisition and possession of fire arms
under the Arms Act is no more than a
privilege. M.N. Shukla, C.J. in this behalf,
further observed "No doubt, a citizen may
apply for grant of a licence of fire arms
mostly with the object of protecting his
person or property but that is mainly the
function of the State. Even remotely this
cannot be comprehended within the ambit
of Article 21 of the Constitution which
postulates
the
fundamental
right
of
protection of life and personal liberty. It
deals with deprivation of life and as held
in Gopalan v. State of Madras, 1950 SCC
228 : 1950 SCR 88 Article 21 is attracted
only in cases of deprivation in the sense of
total loss and that accordingly has no
application to the case of a mere restriction
upon the right to move freely or to the
grant of licence for possession and
acquisition of fire arms which stands on an
entirely different footing from the licence to
carry on a trade or occupation". M.K.
Katju, J. In Ganesh Chandra Bhatt's
case (1993 (30) ACC 204), brushed aside
this observation by fastening upon it the
label of "per incuriam". On the face of it,
this represents a glaring instance of a
learned single Judge, as they say "Seeking
to win the game by sweeping all the
chessmen of the table" by so blatantly
disregarding a binding judgment of a Full
Bench of five Judges, by merely saying it is
per incuriam, when it was clearly not so."

21. In view of the two Full Bench
decisions, referred above, the Issue No.I is
answered holding that arms license is
merely a privilege granted by the State and
is not a Right and right to carry arms is
certainly not a fundamental right much less
a right guaranteed under Article 21 of the
Constitution of India.

22. Coming to the Issue No.II as
framed and recorded above, whether,
carrying of the arms in the Court premises
is permissible by lawyers, the answer to the
said issue is also clearly in negative
inasmuch as it has been already held that
the grant of arms license is not flowing out
of any right but is a mere privilege which is
12 All. Amandeep Singh Vs. S.B.I. & Ors.
623
subject to various restrictions enumerated
under the Act, the Rules, 2016, and in
particular Rule 614-A of The General
Rules (Civil), which specifically bars any
person who is not belonging to the police
force to carry or have in his possession any
arms in the 'Court premises'. In fact, the
'Court
Premises'
as
explained
in
Explanation II of Rule 614-A of The
General Rules (Civil) gives an enhanced
definition to the Court Premises and is not
confined to Courtrooms, thus, carrying of
the arms in the Court premises is not only
barred for lawyers but is also barred for any
member of the public unless he belongs to
a police force, that too only if the police
official is on duty.

23. The second limb of Issue No.II
with regard to the claim of the petitioner
that
law
profession
is
typical
and
challenging requiring the carrying of the
arms needs to be repelled with all
condemnation. It is a somber moment in
the judicial chronicles when a lawyer,
having practiced for a mere two years,
harbors the misguided notion that wielding
arms within the courtroom is essential for
professional
success.
This
sentiment
reflects a concerning departure from the
principles of legal practice, undermining
the integrity and decorum of the judicial
process. Such beliefs run counter to the
foundations of a fair and just legal system,
emphasizing the need for a reevaluation of
values within the legal profession.

24. The said state of mind/impression
of a young lawyer clearly needs to be
deprecated as the same has no basis
whatsoever. The young professional needs
to be reminded that the legal profession is a
noble profession and has continued to be so
since ages; the worth of a lawyer flows
from his pen, extreme hard work and his
understanding of law and not from the
barrel of a gun as is the impression carried
by the young professional, the petitioner
herein.

25. It is a common knowledge that
ever since historical times never has a
lawyer relied upon anything other than his
sharp knowledge of law, hard work and the
power that flows from his pen to make
mark in the legal profession. The young
professionals entering the Bar like the
petitioner herein, needs serious counseling
to get over such mistaken notion that he
carries while entering the legal profession.
This
also
highlights
that
the
legal
profession is being crowded by persons
who are not undergoing any systematic
training, which was earlier provided
informally through chamber affiliations;
this aspect is within the domain of Bar
Council and the Bar Council is advised to
redress this aspect through effective ways
and means after discussion.

26. Thus, the Issue No.II is decided
by holding that no one including any
litigant or a lawyer, can carry any arms in
the Court premises and that succeeding in
law profession certainly does not require
support of the barrel of a gun.

27. Coming to Issue No.III - this is
one of the most important issues arising out
of the present case. It has already been held
that carrying of arms in the Court premises
is specifically barred by virtue of Rule 614A of The General Rules (Civil). In fact, this
Court in its order dated 02.01.2020 passed
in Public Interest Litigation (PIL) No.2436
of 2019 had specifically emphasised and
given directions for security in the Court
premises; the Hon'ble Supreme Court also
in its order in the case of Pradyuman
Bisht (Supra) has also emphasised the
624 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
security in the Court premises, which has a
direct nexus with the administration of
justice.

28. The moot question that arises is
whether carrying of arms in the Court
premises itself can be a ground for
cancelling of the arms license? The
cancellation of arms license flows from the
mandate of Section 17 of the Act. Section
17(3) of the Act, which is quoted herein
below, empowers the licensing authority to
take steps for cancellation of the arms
license in the event of any of the conditions
existing and as clarified under Section
17(3) Clause (a) to (e):

"Section
17.
Variation,
suspension and revocation of licences. -

............

(3) The licensing authority may
by order in writing suspend a licence for
such period as it thinks fit or revoke a
licence,

(a) if the licensing authority is
satisfied that the holder of the licence is
prohibited by this Act or by any other law
for the time being in force, from acquiring,
having in his possession or carrying any
arms or ammunition, or is of unsound
mind, or is for any reason unfit for a
licence under this Act; or

(b) if the licensing authority
deems it necessary for the security of the
public peace or for public safety to
suspend or revoke the licence; or

(c) if the licence was obtained by
the suppression of material information or
on the basis of wrong information provided
by the holder of the licence or any other
person on his behalf at the time of applying
for it; or

(d) if any of the conditions of the
licence has been contravened; or

(e) if the holder of the licence has
failed to comply with a notice under subsection (1) requiring him to deliver-up the
licence.

29. Clause (b) of Section 17(3) of the
Act states that the Licensing Authority may
revoke or suspend the license to preserve
the security of the public peace or public
safety In this context, it is important to
understand the scope and ambit of the
power conferred on the licensing authority
by way of Section 17(3)(b). Specifically,
this Court has to answer whether this power
conferred on the licensing authority is
merely a discretionary power, or the same
is a power coupled with the duty. In other
words, this Court has to answer whether the
licensing authority can refuse to revoke a
license under Section 17(3)(b), even though
there is a threat to the security of public
peace.

30. It has been argued before this
Court that the use of 'may' in this section
points that the power is merely enabling in
nature, and that power is the sole discretion
of the licensing authority. In other words it
has been argued that the licensing authority
can refuse to revoke a license under Section
17(3)(b), even though there maybe a threat
to the security of public peace.

31. It is well settled by the various
decisions of the Hon'ble Supreme Court
that the use of the word 'may' does not
necessarily suggest that the same is merely
directory, but may also be interpreted as a
power coupled with duty depending upon
12 All. Amandeep Singh Vs. S.B.I. & Ors.
625
the context in which the expressions have
been used, and the same has to be
interpreted in light of the scheme in the
purpose underlying the statute.

32. In Sardar Govindrao v. State of
M.P.5, a Constitution bench of the Hon'ble
Supreme Court held that the word may can
be read as shall or must, when there is
something in the nature of the thing to be
done which makes it the duty of the person
on whom the power is conferred to exercise
the power. Analysing the scheme of the
Central Provinces and Berar Revocation of
Land Revenue Exemptions Act, 1948, J.
Hidayatullah, speaking for the majority
construed the word 'may' appearing in
Section 5(3) of the Act as mandatory. The
relevant portion has been quoted as under,

"9....The word "may" in Section
5(3) must be interpreted as mandatory
when the conditions precedent, namely, the
existence of a religious, charitable or
public institutions which ought to be
continued or of the descendants of a ruling
Chief, is established. The words "may pass
such orders as it deems fit" in sub-section
(2) mean no more than that Government
must make its orders to fit the occasion, the
kind of order to make being determined by
the necessity of the occasion. As stated in
Maxwell on the Interpretation of Statutes:

"Statutes
which
authorise
persons to do acts for the benefit of others,
or, as it is sometimes said, for the public
good or the advancement of justice, have
been given rise to controversy when
conferring the authority in terms simply
enabling and not mandatory. In enacting
that they 'may' : or 'shall, if they think fit,'
or, 'shall have power,' or that "it shall be
lawful" for them to do such acts a statute
appears to use the language of mere
permission, but it has been so often decided
as to have become an axiom that in such
cases such expressions may have - to say
the least - a compulsory force, and so
would seem to be modified by judicial
exposition."

This is an instance where, on the
existence of the condition precedent, the
grant of money or pension becomes
obligatory
on
the
Government
notwithstanding that in Section 5(2) the
Government has been given the power to
pass such orders as it deems fit and in subsection (3) the word "may" is used. The
word "may" is often read as "shall" or
"must" when there is something in the
nature of the thing to be done which makes
it the duty of the person on whom the power
is conferred to exercise the power. Section
5(2) is discretionary because it takes into
account all cases which may be brought
before the Government of persons claiming
to be adversely affected by the provisions of
Section 3 of the Act. Many such persons
may have no claims at all though they may
in a general way be said to have been
adversely affected by Section 3. If the
power was to be discretionary in every case
there was no need to enact further than
sub-section (2). The reason why two subsections were enacted is not far to seek.
That Government may have to select some
for consideration under sub-section (3) and
some under Section 7 and may have to
dismiss the claims of some others requires
the contenment of a discretion and subsection (2) does no more than to give that
discrement to Government and the word
"may" in that sub-section bears its
ordinary meaning. The word "may" in subsection (3) has, however a different
purport.
Under
that
sub-section
Government must, if it is satisfied that an
institution or service must be continued or
626 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
that there a descendant of a former ruling
Chief, grant money or pension to the
institution or service or to the descendant
of the former ruling Chief, as the case may
be. Of course, it need not make a grant if
the person claiming is not a descendant of
a former ruling Chief or there is other
reasonable ground not to grant money or
pension. But, except in those cases where
there are good grounds for not granting the
pension, Government is bound to make a
grant to those who fulfil the required
condition and the word "may" in the third
sub-section
though
apparently
discretionary has to be read as "must".
The High Court was in error in thinking
that the third sub-section also like the
second conferred an absolute discretion.

33. Similarly, in Official Liquidator
v. Dharti Dhan (P) Ltd.6, it has been held
that the power conferred by the use of
'may' would carry an obligation, when it
can be show that on the fulfilment of
certainly prescribed conditions, a particular
order has to be passed. The relevant extract
is as under,

"7. In fact, it is quite accurate to
say that the word 'may' by itself, acquires
the meaning of 'must' or 'shall' sometimes.
This word, however, always signifies a
conferment of power. That power may,
having regard to the context in which it
occurs, and the requirements contemplated
for its exercise, have annexed to it an
obligation which compels its exercise in a
certain way on facts and circumstances
from which the obligation to exercise it in
that way arises. In other words, it is the
context which can attach the obligation to
the power compelling its exercise in a
certain way. The context, both legal and
factual, may impart to the power that
obligatoriness.

8. Thus, the question to be
determined in such cases always is whether
the power conferred by the use of the word
'may' has, annexed to it, an obligation that,
on
the
fulfilment
of
certain
legally
prescribed conditions, to be shown by
evidence, a particular kind of order must
be made. If the statute leaves no room for
discretion the power has to be exercised in
the manner indicated by the other legal
provisions which provide the legal context.
Even then the facts must establish that the
legal conditions are fulfilled. A power is
exercised even when the court rejects an
application to exercise it in the particular
way in which the applicant desires it to be
exercised. Where the power is wide enough
to cover both an acceptance and a refusal
of
an
application
for
its
exercise,
depending upon facts, it is directory or
discretionary. It is not the conferment of a
power which the word 'may' indicates that
annexes any obligation to its exercise but
the legal and factual context of it."

34. Again in N.D. Jayal v. Union of
India7, after analysing the scheme of the
Environment (Protection) Act, 1986, it was
held that the power conferred under the Act
was not merely a power, but the same was
power couples with a duty.

35. Similarly, in D.K. Basu v. State
of W.B.8 after analysing the scheme of the
Protection of Human Rights Act, 1993, the
Supreme Court held that the word 'may'
appearing in Section 21 of the Act has to be
construed as 'shall'.

36. Thus, in light of the above based
precedents, it is important to determine
whether the word 'may' appearing in
Section 17(3)(b) is merely a power or a
power
coupled
with
a
duty.
Such
interpretation has to be done in light of the
12 All. Amandeep Singh Vs. S.B.I. & Ors.
627
statements and objects of the Arms Act,
and the same has to be in sync with the
rights provided under Part III of the
Constitution. The Statement And Objects
of the Arms Act, 1959 are as under:

"The objects of this Bill are-

(a) to exclude knives, spears,
bows and arrows and the like from the
definition of "arms";

(b) to classify firearms and other
prohibited weapons so as to ensure-

(i) that dangerous weapons of
military patterns are not available to civilians,
particularly the anti-social elements;