# Amar Pal Singh v. State of U.P.& Ors

- **Citation:** (2025) 2 ILRA 493
- **Court:** High Court of Judicature at Allahabad
- **Decided:** 2025-02-07
- **Case number:** Writ-A No. 17707 of 2023
- **Bench:** J.J. Munir
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/allahabad-high-court/amar-pal-singh-v-state-of-u-p-ors-53005
- **Pages:** 17

## Headnote

Ms.
Monika
Arya
(Addl.
C.S.C.),
Sri
Roopesh Tiwari

A.
Service
Law
-
Disciplinary
Proceedings
-
Uttar
Pradesh
Government Servants (Discipline and
Appeal) Rules, 1999 - Rule 7 - Uttar
Pradesh Revenue Code, 2006 Section
98 - Uttar Pradesh Government Servant
Conduct Rules, 1956 - Rule 3 - Uttar
Pradesh Revenue Code Rules, 2016 -
Rule 99.

The principle is that for errors of judgment
on
law
or
facts,
or
even
perverse
conclusions or negligence of a quasijudicial officer or a judicial officer, is not
to be proceeded with in the disciplinary
jurisdiction. If his errors or even perversities
were to be regarded as misconduct, punishable
in the disciplinary jurisdiction, the wheels of
dispensation of justice or disposal of quasijudicial business would come to a standstill. It
would, most certainly, slow down to a snail's
pace, never to achieve the purpose for which it
is there. (Para 15, 18)

In the present case, the charge cannot be
said to be one that is just about an error
of judgment, mistake or mere negligence
in the passing of his quasi- judicial orders
by the petitioner. The charge is about the
petitioner's involvement, apparently for
extraneous reasons or on account of
improper motive. It is true that the way the
charge is worded at the tail-end and in its
formal close, it does appear to be nothing more
that an allegation of negligence in the discharge
of his quasi-judicial functions by the petitioner.
But, the charge is way beyond it, with ample
St.ment of imputations in the body thereof,
that are suggestive of both an improper
motive and extraneous consideration in
the exercise of quasi-judicial powers by
the petitioner in the grant permission to
transfer. The petitioner may not have been
around in the year 1985, when bogus patta
were granted in favour of the land holders,
through whom it is claimed that the land
belonging to the Gaon Sabha was transferred to
vendees not belonging to the SC and then sold
to the UPEIDA, but he was certainly around, as
it appears, when rights of many of the patta
holders were enlarged by conniving revenue
officials. On facts such as these, he passed
order granting transfer of land held by
bhumidhar of the SC to vendees not of that
class, without looking into the report of the
Tehsildar or the SDM or without considering the
fact that some files had the relevant certificates,
494 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
but not placed through the SDM's report. (Para
27)

This is a charge which is required to be
determined at the inquiry, which will have
to take its own course. Thus, it is perhaps for
this reason that the petitioner has come up with
the alternative prayer to the effect that a
mandamus
be
issued
to
conclude
the
disciplinary
proceedings
against
him
expeditiously. While we are of opinion that the
charge-sheet in this case cannot be quashed at
the threshold, considering the fact that the
petitioner's promotion is due, it is imperative
that the disciplinary proceedings (not just the
inquiry) be expedited. (Para 28)

Writ petition disposed of. (E-4)

Precedent followed:

Jamuna & ors. Vs St.of U.P. through Additional
Chief Secretary, Principal Secretary, Revenue
Civil Secretariat, Lucknow & ors., 2023 AHC-LKO
81272 DB (Para 12)

Precedent distinguished:

## Text

_Characters 0–39,843 of 59,515. This is a partial read: ask again with offset=39843 for what follows._

2 All. Amar Pal Singh Vs. State of U.P. & Ors.
493
Director himself has rejected the claim of
respondent no. 6 for his transfer from
Bajrang P.G. College, Dadar Ashram,
Ballia to Meerut College, Meerut by orders
dated
17.8.2023
&
13.12.2023,
the
subsequent order dated 15.1.2024, directing
the management to appoint respondent no.
6 as Principal is wholly without jurisdiction
and cannot be sustained and hereby
quashed.

27. Since the appointment of the
petitioner by the respondent no. 3, vide
order dated 3.10.2024 was subject to
outcome of present writ petition, the said
appointment order based on illegal order
dated 15.1.2024 is also quashed.

28. The writ petition is allowed. No
order as to costs.
----------
(2025) 2 ILRA 493
ORIGINAL JURISDICTION
CIVIL SIDE
DATED: ALLAHABAD 07.02.2025

BEFORE

THE HON'BLE J.J. MUNIR, J.

Writ-A No. 17707 of 2023

Amar Pal Singh ...Petitioner
Versus
State of U.P.& Ors. ...Respondents

Counsel for the Petitioners:
Sri Ramesh Upadhyay (Sr. Advocate), Sri
Rajan Upadhyay, Ms. Atipriya Gautam

Counsel for the Respondents:
Ms.
Monika
Arya
(Addl.
C.S.C.),
Sri
Roopesh Tiwari

A.
Service
Law
-
Disciplinary
Proceedings
-
Uttar
Pradesh
Government Servants (Discipline and
Appeal) Rules, 1999 - Rule 7 - Uttar
Pradesh Revenue Code, 2006 Section
98 - Uttar Pradesh Government Servant
Conduct Rules, 1956 - Rule 3 - Uttar
Pradesh Revenue Code Rules, 2016 -
Rule 99.

The principle is that for errors of judgment
on
law
or
facts,
or
even
perverse
conclusions or negligence of a quasijudicial officer or a judicial officer, is not
to be proceeded with in the disciplinary
jurisdiction. If his errors or even perversities
were to be regarded as misconduct, punishable
in the disciplinary jurisdiction, the wheels of
dispensation of justice or disposal of quasijudicial business would come to a standstill. It
would, most certainly, slow down to a snail's
pace, never to achieve the purpose for which it
is there. (Para 15, 18)

In the present case, the charge cannot be
said to be one that is just about an error
of judgment, mistake or mere negligence
in the passing of his quasi- judicial orders
by the petitioner. The charge is about the
petitioner's involvement, apparently for
extraneous reasons or on account of
improper motive. It is true that the way the
charge is worded at the tail-end and in its
formal close, it does appear to be nothing more
that an allegation of negligence in the discharge
of his quasi-judicial functions by the petitioner.
But, the charge is way beyond it, with ample
St.ment of imputations in the body thereof,
that are suggestive of both an improper
motive and extraneous consideration in
the exercise of quasi-judicial powers by
the petitioner in the grant permission to
transfer. The petitioner may not have been
around in the year 1985, when bogus patta
were granted in favour of the land holders,
through whom it is claimed that the land
belonging to the Gaon Sabha was transferred to
vendees not belonging to the SC and then sold
to the UPEIDA, but he was certainly around, as
it appears, when rights of many of the patta
holders were enlarged by conniving revenue
officials. On facts such as these, he passed
order granting transfer of land held by
bhumidhar of the SC to vendees not of that
class, without looking into the report of the
Tehsildar or the SDM or without considering the
fact that some files had the relevant certificates,
494 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
but not placed through the SDM's report. (Para
27)

This is a charge which is required to be
determined at the inquiry, which will have
to take its own course. Thus, it is perhaps for
this reason that the petitioner has come up with
the alternative prayer to the effect that a
mandamus
be
issued
to
conclude
the
disciplinary
proceedings
against
him
expeditiously. While we are of opinion that the
charge-sheet in this case cannot be quashed at
the threshold, considering the fact that the
petitioner's promotion is due, it is imperative
that the disciplinary proceedings (not just the
inquiry) be expedited. (Para 28)

Writ petition disposed of. (E-4)

Precedent followed:

Jamuna & ors. Vs St.of U.P. through Additional
Chief Secretary, Principal Secretary, Revenue
Civil Secretariat, Lucknow & ors., 2023 AHC-LKO
81272 DB (Para 12)

Precedent distinguished:

1. Raj Kumar Dwivedi Vs St. of U.P. through
Additional
Chief
Secretary,
Appointment,
Lucknow & anr.2024 AHC-LKO 60811 (Para
11)

2. Shri Prakash Gupta Vs St. of U.P. through
Additional
Chief
Secretary,
Appointment,
Lucknow & ors. Writ-A No. 29828 of 2021,
decided on 13.07.2022 (Para 11)

3. St. of U.P. through Additional Chief Secretary,
Department of Appointment, Government of
U.P., Civil Secretariat, Lucknow & anr.Vs Shri
Prakash Gupta & ors., 2022 AHC-LKO 59147 DB
(Para 11)

4. Shivani Singh Vs St. of U.P. through Chief
Secretary, Government of U.P., Lucknow & ors.,
2024 AHC-LKO 54832 (Para 11)

Present petition assails the charge-sheet
dated 18.08.2023, issued to him by the St.
Government,
initiating
proceedings
u/Rule 7 of the Uttar Pradesh Government
Servants (Discipline and Appeal) Rules,
1999. And alternatively prays for an order
to conclude the disciplinary proceedings
initiated
against
the
petitioner
expeditiously.

(Delivered by Hon'ble J.J. Munir, J.)

The petitioner is a member of the
Provincial Civil Service1 of the State. He is
aggrieved by initiation of disciplinary
proceedings against him and prays that the
charge-sheet dated 18.08.2023 issued to
him by the State Government, initiating
proceedings under Rule 7 of the Uttar
Pradesh Government Servants (Discipline
and Appeal) Rules, 19992 be quashed.
There is another prayer, which says that a
mandamus be issued to the respondents,
ordering them to conclude the disciplinary
proceedings initiated against the petitioner
expeditiously. Though the second prayer is
not expressed to be one made in the
alternative,
but,
the
two
are
so
diametrically opposed to each other that
they have to be regarded as prayers made in
the alternative.

2. The petitioner was selected to the
PCS of the State by the Uttar Pradesh
Public Service Commission3 and appointed
a
Sub-Divisional
Magistrate4
on
04.06.2005. He is an officer of the 2004
batch of the UPPSC. He was next promoted
to the post of a City Magistrate in the year
2015, and then, an Additional District
Magistrate in the year 2016. He was posted
as an Additional Commissioner in the year
2022 and since then, is working as the
Additional Commissioner (Administration),
Chitrakoot Dham Division, Banda in the
Divisional Commissionerate there.

3. A charge-sheet was issued to the
petitioner on 18th August, 2023 under Rule
7 of the Rules of 1999. The substance of
the charge carried in the charge-sheet
2 All. Amar Pal Singh Vs. State of U.P. & Ors.
495
against the petitioner is that while posted as
the
Additional
District
Magistrate
(Administration), Lucknow, he granted
permission under Section 98 of the Uttar
Pradesh
Revenue
Code,
20065
to
bhumidhar belonging to the Scheduled
Caste6 to transfer land to persons other
than members of the SC, ignoring the
report of the SDM that there was no
description of the land held by the vendor,
the medical necessity certificate and the
non-encumbrance certificate. In one of the
files relating to transfer, there was no report
by the SDM. The imputation further goes
that though these certificates are enclosed
with the relevant files moved to seek
permission for transfer, there is neither
mention of these certificates nor the report
of the SDM, saying that the certificates are
not there in the order passed by the
petitioner,
permitting
transfers.
The
transferees from the members of the SC
later on sold off their land to the Uttar
Pradesh
Expressways
Industrial
Development
Authority7
for
valuable
consideration, causing loss on one hand to
the Gaon Sabha by transferring land
belonging
to
the
Gaon
Sabha,
unauthorizedly and deceitfully, and on the
other, loss to the exchequer. The charge
ultimately is that if the petitioner had been
vigilant in granting permission for transfer,
carefully examining the record of Gaon
Sabha, the land in question would not have
been sold and loss of money to the
exchequer eschewed. The act, according to
the
charge-sheet,
constituted
gross
negligence
and
serious
irregularity,
showing the petitioner to be prima facie
guilty of misconduct under Rule 3 of the
Uttar
Pradesh
Government
Servant
Conduct Rules, 19568.

4. The petitioner says that this is a case
where no charge worth inquiry is disclosed
against him, and therefore, the charge-sheet
ought be quashed. It is the petitioner's case
that he has not committed any misconduct
and performed his duties with utmost
sincerity and honesty. He passed orders
permitting transfer, after considering the
entire
material
available
on
record,
following the rules and regulations in a
quasi-judicial capacity. It is emphasized
that the powers under Section 98 of Code
read with Rule 99 of the Uttar Pradesh
Revenue Code Rules, 20169 that have been
exercised in this matter are quasi-judicial in
nature, and therefore, by settled principle,
the petitioner cannot be punished merely
for an error of judgment, if any.

5. It is the petitioner's case that the
issue of charge-sheet was preceded by a
preliminary
inquiry
by
a
committee
presided over by the Commissioner,
Lucknow
Division,
Lucknow.
This
preliminary inquiry was held on the
complaint of Mr. Vinay Kumar Singh and
Mr. Shobhit Shukla, Advocates. The
complaint
is
one
dated
24.09.2021,
addressed to the Chairman, Board of
Revenue, U.P. Lucknow. It appears that a
preliminary inquiry report was submitted
by the Commissioner, Lucknow Division,
Lucknow
to
the
Commissioner
and
Secretary,
Board
of
Revenue,
U.P.,
Lucknow
through
a
memo
dated
16.01.2023. In the preliminary inquiry, the
petitioner was indicted. The Commissioner
and Secretary, Board of Revenue submitted
a memo dated 21.04.2023 to the Additional
Chief
Secretary,
Department
of
Appointment and Personnel, Government
of U.P., Lucknow, requesting that for the
purpose
of
initiation
of
disciplinary
proceedings against the SDMs Surya Kant
Tripathi, Dr. Santosh Kumar and Shambhu
Sharan, besides Manish Kumar Nahar,
Dharmendra Singh and Sandeep Kumar,
496 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
former
Additional
District
Magistrate
(Administration), permission in accordance
with rules may be granted.

6. Some directions were issued by the
Government on 10.05.2023 to the Board of
Revenue,
pursuant
whereto,
the
Commissioner,
Lucknow
Division,
Lucknow submitted an amended inquiry
report
along
with
his
letter
dated
12.06.2023 to the Board. It is on the basis
of the said inquiry report that disciplinary
proceedings were instituted against the
petitioner vide order dated 03.08.2023
issued by the Government, nominating the
Commissioner, Kanpur Division, Kanpur
as the ex-officio Inquiry Officer. It was
directed by the same order that a chargesheet would be issued in accordance with
Rules. It is thus that the impugned chargesheet dated 18.08.2023 came to be issued
jointly signed by the Commissioner,
Kanpur
Division,
Kanpur
and
the
Additional Chief Secretary, Department of
Appointment and Personnel, Government
of U.P., Lucknow. The said charge-sheet
was
served
upon
the
petitioner
on
14.09.2023
through
a
letter
of
the
Commissioner, Kanpur Division, Kanpur
on the last mentioned date. It is also the
petitioner's
case
that
a
Selection
Committee was convened on 21.08.2023 to
draw up a select list of candidates for
promotion from the State PCS to the Indian
Administrative Service in the year 2022.
By the said date, no charge-sheet was
issued to the petitioner, but in the select
list, juniors to the petitioner have been
promoted to the central service.

7. Aggrieved by the impugned chargesheet and the initiation of disciplinary
proceedings against the petitioner, this
petition has been instituted under Article
226 of the Constitution.

8. A counter affidavit on behalf of
respondent No. 1 dated 17.01.2024 was
filed, to which, the petitioner filed a
rejoinder dated 07.05.2024. The petitioner
filed a supplementary affidavit dated
06.07.2024 and another dated 21.07.2024.
A counter affidavit has also been filed by
the Special Secretary, Department of
Appointment and Personnel, Government
of U.P., in compliance with this Court's
order
on
19.08.2024,
to
which
the
petitioner
has
filed
a
rejoinder
on
21.08.2024. This petition was admitted to
hearing on 31.08.2024, which proceeded
forthwith. The matter was heard further on
24.09.2024, and finally, on 27.09.2024,
when judgment was reserved.

9. Heard Mr. Ramesh Upadhyay,
learned Senior Advocate assisted by Mr.
Rajan Upadhyay, learned Counsel for the
petitioner and Ms. Monika Arya, learned
Additional Chief Standing Counsel along
with Mr. Roopesh Tiwari, learned Standing
Counsel appearing on behalf of the State.

10. It is submitted by Mr. Ramesh
Upadhyay, learned Senior Advocate that
the inquiry report submitted by the
Commissioner,
Lucknow
Division,
Lucknow
employs
the
words
"ववधध
ववरुद्ध" (against the law) for condemning
the petitioner's act in granting permission
under Section 98 of the Code as a
misconduct. Which provision of the law
has been violated by the petitioner while
granting permission under reference has not
been mentioned anywhere in his findings. It
is urged that the orders made by the
petitioner, granting permission, was an
exercise of quasi-judicial powers under
Section 98 of the Code. The permission
was granted as all conditions enumerated in
Section 98 were fulfilled by the applicant.
2 All. Amar Pal Singh Vs. State of U.P. & Ors.
497
Section 98, according to the learned Senior
Advocate, provides for grant of permission,
and Rule 99 of the Rules of 2016 provides
the conditions subject to which permission
is to be granted. Mr. Upadhyay has drawn
the Court's attention to the rejoinder
affidavit dated 21.08.2024 and pointed out
that copies of applications, which have
been moved before the petitioner to seek
the requisite permission for transfer of land,
would go to show that all ingredients
necessary for grant of permission were
satisfied. There was no occasion for the
petitioner to have refused permission. It is
emphasized that there is an allegation in the
Commission's preliminary inquiry report
that the petitioner retained the file for
sufficiently long period of time, during
which, he got it completed, that is to say,
caused all deficiencies to be made good,
and then granted the requisite permission
for sale. It is submitted that this imputation
is ex-facie fit to be rejected, because the
petitioner has brought on record a copy of
the order-sheet, which shows that all the
cases assigned to him were decided by the
petitioner on the day following that he
received these by transfer from the District
Magistrate. It is pointed out by the learned
Senior Advocate that in compliance with
the order dated 11.12.2023 passed by the
Lucknow Bench of this Court for the
conduct of a fresh preliminary inquiry, a
fresh
preliminary
inquiry
under
the
chairmanship of the Chairman, Board of
Revenue was held. An inquiry report dated
13.08.2024 was made, wherein, with regard
to the petitioner, it was remarked that the
permission granted by him was against the
law (ववधध ववरुद्ध). There is also a remark
in the said report made by the Chairman,
Board of Revenue that the petitioner should
have taken more care before granting
permission. In the aforesaid inquiry report,
it has been said of Dharmendra Singh, who
was the Additional District Magistrate,
Land Acquisition, at the relevant time
posted
at
Lucknow,
alongside
the
petitioner, that he had colluded with others
like revenue officials in the tehsil to
distribute compensation, causing financial
loss to the Government. Dharmendra Singh
too was charge-sheeted on 13.09.2023.
These proceedings were withdrawn on
18.09.2023
and
Dharmendra
Singh
promoted to the Indian Administrative
Service.

11. Mr. Upadhyay has emphasized that
by preponderant authority, it has been held
by this Court that departmental proceedings
cannot be instituted against an officer
exercising quasi-judicial powers only on
the
ground
of
error
of
judgment,
carelessness,
or
negligence
in
the
performance of his duties. It can be
instituted
only
if
it
involves moral
turpitude, unlawful behaviour, forbidden
act etc. He has relied on the authority of
Raj Kumar Dwivedi v. State of U.P.
through Additional Chief Secretary,
Appointment, Lucknow and another10,
besides Shri Prakash Gupta v. State of
U.P. through Additional Chief Secretary,
Appointment, Lucknow and others11. It
is also pointed that Shri Prakash Gupta
(supra) has been affirmed by the Division
Bench upon an appeal in State of U.P.
through
Additonal
Chief
Secretary,
Department
of
Appointment,
Government of U.P., Civil Secretariat,
Lucknow and another v. Shri Prakash
Gupta and others12. Further reliance has
been placed upon Shivani Singh v. State
of
U.P.
through
Chief
Secretary,
Government of U.P., Lucknow and
others13. The thrust of these decisions,
which rely on the authority of the Supreme
Court as well, is that unless there are some
extraneous considerations in the rendering
498 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
of a quasi-judicial order, mere error of
judgment, mistake or even negligence
would not give rise to a charge against an
officer, exercising quasi-judicial powers.
The
submission,
therefore,
is
that
disciplinary proceedings of this kind, and
on the charge that these have been initiated
against the petitioner, ought be quashed at
the threshold.

12. Ms. Monika Arya, learned
Additional Chief Standing Counsel and Mr.
Roopesh Tiwari, learned Standing Counsel,
on the other hand, submit that a preliminary
inquiry was held under the orders of this
Court passed in Jamuna and others v.
State of U.P. through Additional Chief
Secretary, Principal Secretary, Revenue
Civil Secretariat, Lucknow and others14.
A copy of the report, a voluminous
document, has been annexed as Annexure
No. CA-3 to the counter affidavit dated
20.08.2024 filed on behalf of the State. It is
submitted by the learned Counsel for the
State that the SDM made a report that nonencumbrance certificates, proof of land
being held by the sellers and medical
certificates were not there. The petitioner,
knowing all these relevant facts, granted
permission to transfer in favour of persons
who were got up to act as vendors by
causing them to be regarded as bhumidhar
with transferable rights within the period of
2-3 months. In the records of the
Additional District Magistrate, that is to
say, the petitioner, who granted the
permission on some files, requisite medical
certificates, non-encumbrance certificates
and proof of land held by the sellers are
attached. It is submitted by the learned
Counsel for the State that the petitioner did
not see that while these certificates were
there on record in some of the files, they
did not come attached with the report of the
SDM. He did not care to examine as to how
these certificates appeared on the files,
when they were not forwarded by the
SDM. It is also emphasized by the learned
State Counsel that some allottees of patta of
Gaon Sabha land, who were declared
bhumidhar with transferable rights a few
days prior to the making of the application
for permission too were granted permission
to transfer. In some cases, the application
for permission to sell was made even
before
the
vendor
was
declared
a
bhumidhar with transferable rights. Some
of the alleged allottees holding land on
patta gave false statement that they had not
entered into any contract, that is to say,
before the authority who was to declare
them bhumidhar, whereas, the records
show that contract and agreements to sell
were entered into between them before
enlargement of their rights into bhumidhari
with transferable rights.

13. It is also argued that Rule 99(4)
of the Rules of 2016 mandate that an
inquiry be done by an officer not below the
rank of a Naib Tehsildar, regarding the
circumstances,
entitling
a
bhumidhar
belonging to the SC to transfer land to a
person not of that category, but no such
inquiry
was
done,
despite
the
circumstances being very suspicious. It is
particularly argued that Rule 99(8)(b) of
the Rules of 2016 provide that if a
bhumidhar or any member of his family is
suffering from a fatal disease and a
certificate in this regard has been issued by
a physician or a surgeon, the Collector may
take into consideration the fact while
granting permission for transfer. Here, the
petitioner
neither
conducted
any
investigation into these relevant facts
himself nor caused it to be inquired if the
sellers or members of their family were
suffering from any fatal disease, as
contemplated under the Rules. It is argued
2 All. Amar Pal Singh Vs. State of U.P. & Ors.
499
further that the permission to transfer/sell
was granted on papers, where the medical
certificate appeared on the file in a
suspicious manner, which, imperatively,
required investigation, as mandated under
the Rules, by the Naib Tehsildar or an
officer above that rank. It is argued that the
permission was granted without inquiry or
verification and either in the absence of the
requisite certificates and documents or in
the presence of documents, whose presence
on the record was unexplained. It was all a
conspiracy to usurp compensation for land
that was the Gaon Sabha's. If the essentials
of the statutory requirements were adhered
to, the entire conspiracy could be exposed
and the exchequer spared the loss that it
suffered. It is also emphasized that the act
of the petitioner in granting permission
without complying with the provisions of
the Statute, both the Act and the Rules, in a
cursory manner, followed by distributing
government funds received from the
UPEIDA, reveals ill-will and collusion on
his part, together with other officers, for
extraneous considerations.

14. We have carefully considered
the rival submissions advanced by learned
Counsel for the parties. The point that
arises for consideration in this case is if the
petitioner, prima facie, exercised his
powers to grant permission under Section
98 of the Code, committing a mere error of
judgment on facts or law, or may be, a
gross error, or went perverse with his
reasoning or did he act out of improper
motive or for extraneous considerations.

15. It is true that a quasi-judicial
authority like a judicial officer is to be
protected about the orders that he makes,
that are flawed indeed in law or facts. Such
orders, even if perverse, like orders that are
wrong, are to be corrected by the appellate
and the revisional fora. But, a quasi-judicial
officer or a judicial officer, who reasons
wrongly on facts and law, or even
perversely, is not to be penalized by
charging him for misconduct. If his errors
or even perversities were to be regarded as
misconduct, punishable in the disciplinary
jurisdiction, the wheels of dispensation of
justice
or
disposal
of
quasi-judicial
business would come to a standstill. It
would, most certainly, slow down to a
snail's pace, never to achieve the purpose
for which it is there. This, however, does
not mean that where, apparently, a quasijudicial officer has acted out of improper
motive or due to extraneous consideration,
his conduct is not to be inquired into. It is
quite another matter that appearances may
be false, and on the holding of a
departmental inquiry, what appears to be an
action borne out of improper motive or
based on extraneous consideration may be
no more than negligence. Even negligence
in the performance of his quasi-judicial
functions by an administrative authority or
a judicial officer may not lead to the
initiation of any disciplinary proceedings.

16. Section 98 of the Code reads :

 98. Restrictions on transfer by
bhumidhars belonging to a scheduled
caste- (1) Without prejudice to the
provisions of this Chapter, no bhumidhar
belonging to a scheduled caste shall have
the right to transfer, by way of sale, gift,
mortgage or lease any land to a person not
belonging to a scheduled caster, except
with the previous permission of the
Collector in writing:

Provided that the permission by
the Collector may be granted only when-

(a) the bhumidhar belonging to a
scheduled caste has no surviving heir
specified in clause (a) of sub-section (2) of
500 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
Section 108 or clause (a) of Section 110, as
the case may be; or

(b) the bhumidhar belonging to a
scheduled caste has settled or is ordinarily
residing in the district other than that in
which the land proposed to be transferred is
situate or in any other State for the purpose
of any service or any trade, occupation,
profession or business; or

(c) the Collector is, for the
reasons prescribed, satisfied that it is
necessary to grant the permission for
transfer of land.

(2) For the purposes of granting
permission under this section, the Collector
may make such inquiry as may be
prescribed.

17. Rule 99 of the Rules of 2016,
which guide the exercise of power under
Section 98 of the Code, reads :

99. Collector's permission for
transfer of Scheduled Caste bhumidhar's
land. (Section 98)- (1) An application
under Section 98 (1) or under section 98 (1)
read with section 107, for permission to
transfer land by way of sale or gift or for
permission to bequeath land by Will, as the
case may be, shall be made by a Bhumidhar
with transferable rights belonging to
Scheduled Caste to the Collector in R.C.
Form-27.

(2) An application under Section
98 (1), for permission to mortgage his
interest in the land shall be made by a
bhumidhar, belonging to a Scheduled Caste
to the Collector in R.C. Form-28.

(3) An application under Section
98 (1), for permission to let out land shall
be made by a bhumidhar belonging to a
Scheduled Caste to the Collector in R.C.
Form-29.

(4) On receipt of an application
under section 98 (1), the Collector shall
make such inquiry as he may, in the
circumstances of the case, deem necessary.
He may also depute an officer not below
the rank of Naib Tahsildar for:

(a) verification of the facts stated
in the application; and

(b) reporting the circumstances in
which permission for transfer is sought.

(5) The inquiry officer referred to
in sub-rule (4) of this rule shall submit the
report in duplicate within the period of
fifteen days, from the date of receiving the
order of such inquiry.

(6) A copy of the report shall be
supplied to the applicant free of charge,
from the office of the Collector where such
report has been submitted.

(7)
The
applicant
may
file
objection against the report submitted by
the inquiry officer within the period of
seven days from the date of receipt of the
copy of the report.

(8) After receiving the report
submitted under sub-rule (3) and the
objection, if any, if the Collector is satisfied
that-

(a) the conditions of clause (a) or
clause (b) of sub-section (1) of Section

98 are fulfilled; or

(b) the tenure holder or any
member of his family is suffering from any
fatal disease regarding which the certificate
has been issued by any physician or
surgeon specialist in the disease concerned
and the permission for transfer is necessary
to meet out the expenses for the treatment
of such disease; or

(c) the applicant is seeking
permission under Section 98(1) of the Code
for the proposed transfer to purchase any
other land from the consideration of such
proposed transfer and the facts in this
regard in the application are supported with
certified copy of a registered agreement to
sell in favour of the applicant; or
2 All. Amar Pal Singh Vs. State of U.P. & Ors.
501

(d) the area of land held by the
applicant on the date of application does
not, after such transfer, reduce to less than
1.26 hectares, and

(e) if the permission is being
sought for transfer by sale the consideration
for the transfer of the land is not below the
amount calculated as per the circle rate
fixed by the Collector;he may grant the
permission by recording the reasons.
Explanation-- For the removal of doubt it
is a hereby clarified that if the condition
enumerated in clause (d) of this sub-rule is
not fulfilled but any condition enumerated
in clauses (a) to (c) of this rule is fulfilled
the permission under Section 98(1) of the
Code may be granted by Collector.

(9) An application referred to in
sub-rule (2) or sub-rule (3) of Rule 99 for
permission to mortgage or to let out land,
as the case may be, may be granted by the
Collector on his being satisfied that the
mortgage or letting out, as the case may be,
is not possible in favour of a person
belonging to a Scheduled Caste or
Scheduled Tribe.

(10) An application referred to in
sub-rule (1) of Rule 99 for permission to
bequeath land by Will, may be granted by
the Collector on his being satisfied that the
bequeath of the land was not possible in
favour of the person belonging to a
Scheduled Caste or a Scheduled Tribe.

(11) The Collector shall make an
endeavour to dispose of the application
under Section 98(1) within the period of
fifteen days from the date of receiving the
report submitted by the inquiry officer and
if the application is not disposed of within
such period the reason for the same shall be
recorded.

18. As noticed at the outset, much
authority has been relied upon by the learned
Senior Advocate appearing for the petitioner,
mostly Bench decisions and Judges of this
Court sitting singly to hold that quasi-judicial
authorities, for the errors they commit in
judgment, may be gross or negligent, are not
to be visited with penal consequences, after
holding disciplinary proceedings against
them, dubbing those errors as misconduct. It
is true, as we would presently see, that in
most of those decisions, the principle is that
for errors of judgment on law or facts, or
even perverse conclusions or negligence of a
quasi-judicial officer or a judicial officer, is
not to be proceeded with in the disciplinary
jurisdiction. It is to be remarked that in the
decisions relied upon, the facts show that
officers were already proceeded with in the
disciplinary jurisdiction and inflicted with
penalties, when they came to Court, laying
challenge. With the full course of the
disciplinary proceedings wide open and all
evidence there, the Court, no doubt,
concluded
in
those
authorities
that
disciplinary proceedings should never have
been initiated. It is also true that if
disciplinary proceedings ought not be
initiated, there is no point in permitting them
to run their full course and then arrive at a
conclusion, as if in repentance, that the
proceedings should never have commenced.
It is, perhaps, on account of the said reason
that the petitioner, being convinced that he
has committed no more than error of
judgment, gross or trivial, that he has moved
this Court, seeking to quash the charge-sheet.
Essentially,
he
seeks
quashing
of
proceedings. May be, he could have applied
for a Prohibition, instead of a Certiorari. But,
insistence on forms in contemporary times is
not much favoured by the law in the writ
jurisdiction, so long as there is a remedy to
seek on a good cause of action, and the writ
petition maintainable.

19. It would be of immense profit to
briefly survey the authority relied upon on
502 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
behalf of the petitioner in Raj Kumar
Dwivedi. The facts are not very copiously
set out, but, what appears from a reading of
the judgment, is that the petitioner in that
case, was an officer empowered to decide
applications under Section 33/39 of the
Uttar Pradesh Land Revenue Act, 190115.
He made some orders, which were said to
be erroneous. The orders were challenged
before
the
Deputy
Director
of
Consolidation under Section 48(3) of the
Uttar Pradesh Consolidation of Holdings
Act, 1953 and the false entries expunged.
The order made by the petitioner in Raj
Kumar Dwivedi on 22.01.2016 was set
aside for reason that the documents relied
upon by him, while passing the aforesaid
order, were forged. After his order was set
aside, the petitioner was placed under
suspension on 25.01.2018 and suspension
from service pending inquiry was later on
revoked on 07.09.2021. He was, later on,
punished by inflicting some penalty, that is
not mentioned in the judgment. It is in the
context of these facts that it was observed :

7. The Apex Court in re:
ZunjarraoBhikajiNagarkar (supra) in
para no. 29 has held that if the revenue
officer in quasi-judicial adjudication has
wrongly exercised his jurisdiction that
wrong can be corrected in Appeal. That
cannot always form a basis for initiating
disciplinary proceedings against an officer
while he is acting as a quasi-judicial
authority. It must be kept in mind that
being a quasi-judicial authority, he is
always subject to judicial supervision in
appeal.

8. Learned Senior Advocate has
further submitted that if any quasi judicial
authority passes any order which is
appellable or revisable, that order may not
be treated as misconduct and if the conduct
of
an
employee
is
not
treated
as
misconduct, he may not be subjected to the
departmental proceedings.

9. The Hon'ble Apex Court in re:
Abhay Jain vs. High Court of Judicature of
Rajasthan and Another, 2022 SCC Online
Supreme Court 319 has held as under:

"71. We concur with the view of
this Court in the aforesaid case that merely
because a wrong order has been passed by
the appellant or the action taken by him
could have been different, this does not
warrant
initiation
of
disciplinary
proceedings against the judicial officer.

.....

74. In light of the above judicial
pronouncements, we hold that the appellant
may have been guilty of negligence in the
sense that he did not carefully go through
the case file and did not take notice of the
order of the High Court which was on his
file. This negligence cannot be treated to be
misconduct....."
10. In the present case, the petitioner has
passed the orders under Sections 33/39 of
U.P. Land Revenue Act, 1901 and against
those orders, the statutory remedies are
available. In paragraph no. 34 of the writ
petition, the specific recital has been given
to the effect that those orders have been
challenged before the Deputy Director of
Consolidation/District
Collector
under
Section 48(3) of the U.P. Consolidation of
Holdings Act and false entries were
expunged and the order being passed by the
petitioner on 22.01.2016 was set aside vide
order dated 17.11.2017 for the reason that
the documents relied upon by the petitioner
while passing the aforesaid order were
forged.

11. Therefore, in the light of what
has been considered above, it is clear that
the order passed by the petitioner on
22.01.2016 was set aside by the superior
quasi judicial authority on 17.11.2017 and
later on, the petitioner was placed under
2 All. Amar Pal Singh Vs. State of U.P. & Ors.
503
suspension on 25.01.2018. However, the
aforesaid
suspension
order
has
been
revoked on 07.09.2020.

12. Hence, in the light of the
settled proposition of law laid down by the
Apex Court in catena of cases, some of
them
has
been
referred
above,
the
impugned order dated 14.08.2024 passed
by the opposite party no.2 is patently
illegal, arbitrary and uncalled for, therefore,
the same is hereby set aside/quashed.

20. It does not truly appear if the
misconduct attributed to the petitioner was
a mere error of law in deciding the
application under Section 33/39 of the Act
of 1901 or even gross error or a perverse
order, or the charge went beyond, that is to
say, that it was an order made with
improper motive or due to extraneous
considerations. Thus, in our opinion, Raj
Kumar
Dwivedi
would
not
be
of
assistance in a case where, as here it is
urged that the order was made out of
improper motive or due to extraneous
considerations, of course, to be inferred
from circumstances too difficult to ignore.

21. The next is the authority in Shri
Prakash Gupta, where, from a reading of
the report, it appears that the petitioner was
a Deputy Collector posted at Tehsil Sadar,
District Mau in the year 1999. An
application was made before him under
Section 33/39 of the Act of 1901, seeking
conversion of land from non-Zamindari
Abolition to Zamindari Abolition. The
petitioner, after inviting objections and
report from the Tehsildar, and considering
the entire material available on record,
allowed the application by means of his
order dated 07.11.2009. The facts in Shri
Prakash Gupta can further on be best
recapitulated in the words of his Lordship,
as these appear in the report :

6. It has been submitted by
learned counsel for the petitioner that while
deciding the said application, it was
mentioned that certain fraudulent entires
have been made and corrected. The said
land which was infact ZA land was
recorded non ZA land and only to rectify
and correct the revenue records, the
petitioner was called upon to exercise
power under Section 33/39 of Land
Revenue Act.

7. Order dated 17.11.2009, passed
by the petitioner was subjected to revision
before the Commissioner, who allowed the
said revision and set aside the order passed
by the petitioner. While allowing the said
revision the Commissioner held that
petitioner did not had any jurisdiction to
exercise power under Section 33/39 of the
Land Revenue Act for converting non ZA
land to ZA land. While setting aside the
order
passed
by
the
petitioner,
the
Commissioner also recorded that copy of
his judgment be placed before the Chief
Secretary, Appointments for conducting an
inquiry in the said matter. It is on the basis
of direction issued by the Additional
Commissioner
that
disciplinary
proceedings were initiated against the
petitioner and charge sheet was issued to
him on 05.02.2018. The charge sheet was
issued by the Commissioner, Azamgarh
Division,

Azamgarh
who
was appointed inquiry officer.

8.
The
inquiry
proceedings
concluded and inquiry report was submitted
on 19.06.2018, exonerating the petitioner
of all the charges. Finding was returned in
the inquiry report that there was no
malafide intention neither it can be alleged
nor can be proved for which the petitioner
in exercise of his judicial functions could
be charged.

9. On the inquiry report dated
19.06.2018, opinion was sought from
504 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
Board of Revenue, in pursuance to which
Board of Revenue also gave its opinion on
22.03.2019, for dropping the proceedings
against the petitioner.

10. In the aforesaid backdrop of
the facts, where the inquiry officer has also
recorded finding in favour of the petitioner
and even Board of Revenue had gave
finding that there is no infirmity with the
order passed by the petitioner, the matter
was considered by the State Government
and surprisingly by means of order dated
31.07.2019, the inquiry officer was asked
to give his report specifically stating that on
what facts guilt of the petitioner could not
be proved during the said inquiry.

11. Learned counsel for the
petitioner has submitted that said order on
the face of it speaks of malafide on the part
of respondents as the said order on the face
of it is without jurisdiction and once
inquiry officer has passed an order he
becomes functus officio and only in case of
direction for re-inquiry, he cannot have any
jurisdiction in his capacity as inquiry
officer, to submit a fresh inquiry report.
Such a exercise of jurisdiction is alien to
the service jurisprudence.

12.