# Amar Singh v. The State of U.P. & Ors

- **Citation:** (2022) 4 ILRA 880
- **Court:** High Court of Judicature at Allahabad
- **Decided:** 2022-03-21
- **Case number:** Writ-C No. 48730 of 2015
- **Bench:** J.J. Munir
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/allahabad-high-court/amar-singh-v-the-state-of-u-p-ors-48362
- **Pages:** 9

## Headnote

Civil Law - Constitution of India, 1950 -
Article 226, - Arms Act, 1959 - Sections
17, 17(3), 17(3)(a), 17(3)(b) & 17(3)(d )-
Indian Penal Code, 1860 - Sections 147,
148, 307, 427, 352, 406 & 506: - Firearm
License - cancelled on the ground of
misused of arm, pendency of a criminal
case & threat to public peace - Appeal
rejected - writ petition - on the ground
that allegation of misused was baseless
since alleged criminal case was registered
prior to date of issue of license - in
another criminal case petitioner was
acquitted & Authority while cancelling the
license not recorded any finding based on
cogent material relating to breach of
public peace - authorities entrusted with
power under section 17 of the Arms Act
cannot exercise on a ground which not
envisaged under the Act - its power
beyond - impugned orders quashed.
(Para - 15, 16, 18, 19, 21)

Writ Petition Allowed. (E-11)

List of Cases cited: -

## Text

880 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
The writ petition is allowed. Liberty is
granted to the State Government to proceed
afresh after examining the material on
record and the reply submitted by the
petitioner in respect of the allegations
levelled against the petitioner and pass
appropriate order afresh in accordance with
law.

37. It is clarified that this court has
not considered the merit of the allegations
against the petitioner and the same may be
considered by the authority concerned
independently.
----------
(2022)04ILR A880
ORIGINAL JURISDICTION
CIVIL SIDE
DATED: ALLAHABAD 21.03.2022

BEFORE

THE HON'BLE J.J. MUNIR, J.

Writ-C No. 48730 of 2015

Amar Singh ...Petitioner
Versus
The State of U.P. & Ors. ...Respondents

Counsel for the Petitioner:
Sri Naveen Pandey, Sri Sudhanshu Pandey

Counsel for the Respondents:
C.S.C.

Civil Law - Constitution of India, 1950 -
Article 226, - Arms Act, 1959 - Sections
17, 17(3), 17(3)(a), 17(3)(b) & 17(3)(d )-
Indian Penal Code, 1860 - Sections 147,
148, 307, 427, 352, 406 & 506: - Firearm
License - cancelled on the ground of
misused of arm, pendency of a criminal
case & threat to public peace - Appeal
rejected - writ petition - on the ground
that allegation of misused was baseless
since alleged criminal case was registered
prior to date of issue of license - in
another criminal case petitioner was
acquitted & Authority while cancelling the
license not recorded any finding based on
cogent material relating to breach of
public peace - authorities entrusted with
power under section 17 of the Arms Act
cannot exercise on a ground which not
envisaged under the Act - its power
beyond - impugned orders quashed.
(Para - 15, 16, 18, 19, 21)

Writ Petition Allowed. (E-11)

List of Cases cited: -

1. Vishwanath Singh Vs Commissioner Lucknow
& ors.(2015 (7) ADJ 393 (LB)),

(Delivered by Hon'ble J.J. Munir, J.)

1. The petitioner's firearm licence has
been cancelled by the District Magistrate of
Kaushambi vide order dated 03.12.2008 in
exercise of powers under Section 17 of the
Arms Act. That order has been upheld in
appeal by the Commissioner, Allahabad
Division, Allahabad (now Prayagraj) by his
order dated 01.07.2015. It is these orders
depriving the petitioner of his firearms
licence that he impugns through the present
writ petition.

2. The petitioner was granted a
firearm licence in the year 1997 bearing no.
9050, entitling him to hold a D.B.B.L. Gun.
The licence was granted by the Licensing
Authority under the Arms Act, 1959 in
accordance
with
law.
The
petitioner
purchased
a
D.B.B.L.
bearing
no.
94400486. It appears that acting on a report
by the Police of Police Station Saini,
District
Kaushambi,
recommending
cancellation of the petitioner's firearms
licence, Case No. 102/167 of 2007-08 was
registered before the District Magistrate,
Kaushambi. The petitioner was put to
notice. At one stage of proceedings, the
case proceeded ex parte but later on before
orders
could
be
passed,
upon
the
4 All. Amar Singh Vs. The State of U.P. & Ors.
881
petitioner's application dated 18.07.2007
the order to proceed ex parte was set aside
and the petitioner was granted opportunity
to object. The petitioner filed objections to
the show cause notice on 31.07.2008. It
was said in their report by the Police that
the petitioner had misused his firearm held
on the licence leading to registration of
Case Crime No. 61 of 1995, under Sections
147, 148, 307, 427 IPC, P.S. Saini, District
Kaushambi, and further, another Crime No.
199 of 2007 under Sections 352, 406, 506
IPC, P.S. Saini, District Kaushambi.

3. The petitioner filed his objections
as aforesaid saying that the firearms
licence, subject matter of proceedings for
cancellation, was issued in the year 1997,
and therefore, Crime No. 61 of 1995
could not at all relate to a possible misuse
of his firearm held on the subject licence.
The report of the Police on this score was
castigated as baseless. It was also said by
the petitioner that going by the principles
of settled law laid down by this Court, a
firearm licence could not be cancelled
because a case had been registered
against him by the Police or even a
charge sheet filed. It was in particular
pointed out that so far as Case Crime No.
199 of 2007 was concerned, the petitioner
had been tried in the case arising from the
said crime and acquitted by the learned
Chief Judicial Magistrate, Kaushambi
vide his judgment and order dated
31.10.2014. The other crime, that is Case
Crime No. 61 of 1995, related to a period
of time when the petitioner did not hold
the firearms licence at all, obviating any
possible misuse of the weapon in the said
crime. It is on the basis of these facts and
defences that the petitioner asked the
Licensing Authority to discharge the
notice for cancellation.

4. The licensing Authority by its order
dated 03.12.2008 proceeded to opine that
Case Crime No. 61 of 1995, under Sections
147, 148, 307, 427 IPC and Case Crime
No. 199 of 2007 under Sections 352, 406,
506 IPC are heinous offences registered
against the petitioner. Therefore, it was not
in 'public interest (जनसित)', 'interest of
justice (न्यायसित)' and ''point of view of
peace and order (शाण्डन्त व्यवस्र्था)' that the
petitioner may continue to hold the
firearms licence in question. Whatever kind
of findings these are, recording them the
District Magistrate/ Licensing Authority
proceeded
to
cancel
the
petitioner's
firearms licence. The petitioner preferred
an appeal to the Commissioner of the
Division, that came up before the Appellate
Authority/ the Commissioner, Allahabad
Division, Allahabad.

5. Before the Appellate Authority, it
was pointed out that the petitioner has been
acquitted in the case arising out of Case
Crime No. 199 of 2007 (supra), but the
Commissioner remarked that a perusal of
the judgment passed by the Criminal Court
acquitting the petitioner showed that he had
been acquitted giving him the benefit of
doubt. This remark was made in relation to
the case arising out of Crime No.61 of 1995
on account of an error apparent. In the
other case i.e. Case Crime No.199 of 2007
(supra), the case was noted to be still
subjudice though it had been decided by
time the appeal came up before the
Commissioner. It was also the Appellate
Authority's opinion that it was not in
''public interest', ''interest of justice' and
''point of view of peace and order (शाण्डन्त
व्यवस्र्था)' that the petitioner may continue to
hold the firearms licence. It was on the
basis of these findings that the Appellate
882 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
Authority
affirmed
the
Licensing
Authority's order.

6. Aggrieved, this petition has been
filed.

7. Parties have exchanged affidavits.

8. Admit.

9. Heard forthwith.

10. Heard Mr. Sudhanshu Pandey,
learned Counsel for the petitioner and Mr.
Anuj Pratap Singh, learned Standing
Counsel appearing on behalf of the
respondents.

11. This Court has no hesitation to
say that the orders impugned passed by
both the Authorities below are grossly
flawed. It is by now well settled that mere
registration of a criminal case or pendency
of a criminal case is no ground under
Section 17 of the Arms Act to cancel a
firearms licence. This Court may refer to
with immense profit the essence of judicial
opinion on this point that finds eloquent
mention in the judgment of this Court in
Vishwanath Singh vs. Commissioner
Lucknow and Others, 2015(7) ADJ 393
(LB), where it was held:

"7. Thus, the trivial question involved
in this writ petition is as to whether
licensing authority is vested with the power
under the Arms Act to revoke/cancel the
license of a public person mere on
involvement in a criminal case or pendency
of a criminal case.

8. To answer the aforesaid question, it
would be apt to refer relevant paragraphs of
Rakesh Kumar v. District Magistrate,
Raebareli and others, 2013(31) LCD 1313,
wherein it has been held that merely
because of pendency of a criminal case, the
arms- licenses of the petitioner cannot be
cancelled. Relevant paras 12, 13, 14 and 15
read as under:

"12. Further, this Court in the case of
Sahab
Singh
v.
Commissioner
Agra
Region, Agra and others, 2006 (24) LCD
374, in paragraph No. 3 held as under :

The submission of the petitioner is
That merely because of pendency of a
criminal case, the arms licence of the
petitioner cannot be cancelled in support of
the said submission, learned counsel for the
petitioner has placed reliance on two
decisions of this Court in the case of
Hausla Prasad Tiwari v. State of U.P. and
Ishwar @ Bhuri v. State of U.P. It has
further been submitted that in view of the
Full Bench decision of this Court in the
cases of Balaram Singh v. State of U.P. and
others; Kailash Nath v. State of U.P., 1985
AWC 493 as well as the Division Bench
decision of this Court in the case of Sadri
Ram v. District Magistrate, Azamgarh and
others, the arms licence of the petitioner
cannot be placed under suspension pending
enquiry."

13. In the case of Mulayam Singh v.
State of U.P., 2013 (80) ACC 786 in
paragraph Nos. 11 and 12 held as under :

"Para No. 11 - The question as to
whether mere involvement in a criminal
case or pendency of a criminal case can be
a ground for revocation of licence under the
Arms Act, has been dealt with by a
Division Bench of this Court in Sheo
Prasad Mishra v. District Magistrate, 1978
AWC 122. The division Bench relied upon
the earlier decision of another Division
Bench of this Court in the case of Masi
Uddin v. Commissioner, Allahabad, 1972
ALJ 573 wherein it has been held :

"A licence may be cancelled, inter
alia, on the ground that it is "necessary for
the security of public peace or for public
4 All. Amar Singh Vs. The State of U.P. & Ors.
883
safety, to do so. The District Magistrate has
not recorded a finding that it was necessary
for the security of the public peace or for
public safety to revoke the licence. The
mere existence of enmity between a
licencee and another person would not
establish the "necessary" connection with
security of the public peace or public
safety.

In the case before us also the District
Magistrate has not recorded any finding
that it was necessary to cancel the licence
for the security of public peace or for
public safety. All that he has done is to
have referred to some applications and
reports lodged against the petitioner. The
mere fact that some reports had been
lodged against the petitioner could not form
basis for cancelling the licence. The order
passed by the District Magistrate and that
passed by the Commissioner cannot,
therefore, be upheld on the basis of
anything contained in Section 17(3)(b) of
the Act."

Para No. 12- Similar view has been
taken by this Court in various decisions
relying upon the Division Bench judgment
passed in Sheo Prasad Mishra (supra).
There is no doubt that the District
Magistrate and the Commissioner i.e.
administrative authorities are bound to take
appropriate action in the matter of grant of
licence and also its cancellation for the
purpose of maintaining peace and harmony
in
the
society.
The
assessment
of
administrative authorities with regard to
grant or cancellation of licence should not
be interfered in usual course by the Court
in its extraordinary jurisdiction unless there
is illegality or arbitrariness."

14. In the case of Raj Kumar Verma v.
State of U.P., 2012(7) ADJ 230 (LB) this
Court in paragraph No. 4 held as under:

"The ground for issue of show-cause
notice,
suspension
and
ultimately
cancellation of the licence is that one and
precisely one criminal case was registered
against
the
petitioner.
The
District
Magistrate has also held that the petitioner
has been enlarged on bail. He has gone
further to observe that if the licence
remained intact, the petitioner, may disturb
public peace and tranquility. The same
findings
have
been
given
by
the
Commissioner, Unmindful of the fact that
this Court is repeating the law of the land,
but the deaf ears of the administrative
officers do not ready to succumb the law of
the land. The settled law is that mere
involvement in a criminal case without any
finding that involvement in such criminal
case shall be detrimental to public peace
and tranquility shall not create the ground
for the cancellation of Armed Licence. In
Ram Suchi v. Commissioner, Deuipatan
Division, 2004 (22) LCD 1643, it was held
that this law was relied upon in Balram
Singh v. State of U.P., 2006 (24) LCD
1359.
Mere
apprehension
without
substance is simply an opinion which has
no legs to stand. Personal whims are not
allowed to be reflected while acting as a
public servant. "

15. Further, in the case of C.P. Sahu v.
State, 1984 AWC 145, this Court while
interpreting the provisions of Section 17(3)
of the Act held as under :

"The object of the enquiry that a
licensing authority may, while proceeding
to consider the question as to whether or
not an arms licence should be revoked or
suspended, like to make, clearly is to
enable the licensing authority to come to a
conclusion as to whether or not the facts
stated in clauses (a) to (e) of Section 17(3)
exist and as already explained, it is not
obliged to before considering that a case for
revocation/suspension of license has been
made out, associate the licensee in such
enquiry, in this view of the matter it can
884 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
safely be taken that where a licensing
authority embarks upon such an enquiry it
is, till then not convinced about existence
of the conditions mentioned in clauses (a)
to (e) of Section 17(3), of the Act. So long
as it is not so convinced no case to make an
order either revoking or suspending an
arms licence as contemplated by the
Section will be made out."

9. The aforesaid view has been
reiterated in Hridaya Narain Tiwari v. State
of U.P. and others, 2014 (4) ADJ 744 (LB);
Rama Kushwaha v. State of U.P. and
others, 2011 (29) LCD 1045; Hiramani
Singh v. State of U.P. and others, 2011(29)
LCD
829
and
Rajendra
Singh
v.
Commissioner,
Lucknow
Division,
Lucknow and others, 2011 (29) LCD 1041,
wherein it has been propounded that
involvement in criminal case or pendency
of criminal case cannot be a ground for
cancellation/revocation of firearm license.

10. In the case of Jageshwar v. State of
U.P. and others, 2009 (67) ACC 157, it has
been held that mere involvement in
criminal case cannot in any way affect the
public Security or public interest.

11. In Thakur Prasad v. State of U.P.
and others, 2013 (31) LCD 1460, this Court
propounded that "Public Peace" or "Public
Safety" do not mean ordinary disturbance
of law and order, but the public safety
means safety of the public at large and not
safety of few persons only. Relevant paras
9,10 and 11 of the said case read as under:

"9.
Further,
while
passing
the
impugned order also the licensing authority
has not given any adequate finding that if
petitioner holds the arms license then the
same shall be against the public peace or
public safety.

"10. Public peace" or "public safety"
do not mean ordinary disturbance of law
and order public safety means safety of the
public at large and not safety of few
persons only and before passing of the
order of cancellation of arm license as per
Section 17(3) of the Act the Licensing
Authority is under an obligation to apply
his mind to the question as to whether there
was eminent danger to public peace and
safety involved in the case in view of the
judgment given by this Court in the case of
Ram
Murli
Madhukar
v.
District
Magistrate, Sitapur, 1998(16) LCD 905,
wherein it has been held that license can
not be suspended or revoked on the ground
of public interest (Jan-hit) merely on the
registration of an F.I.R. and pending of a
criminal case.

11. Further, this Court in the case of
Habib v. State of U.P., 2002 ACC 783, held
as under :

"The question as to whether mere
Involvement in a criminal case or pendency
of a criminal case can be a ground for
revocation of the licence under Arms Act,
has been dealt with by a Division Bench of
this Court in Sheo Prasad Misra v. District
Magistrate, Basti and others, 1978 AWC
122, wherein the Division Bench relying
upon the earlier decision in Masi Uddin v.
Commissioner, Allahabad, 1972 ALJ 573,
found that mere involvement in criminal
case cannot, in any way, affect the public
security or public interest and the order
cancelling or revoking the licence of fire
arm has been set aside. The present
impugned orders also suffer from the same
infirmity as was pointed out by the
Division Bench in the above-mentioned
cases. I am in full agreement with the view
taken by the Division Bench that these
orders cannot be sustained and deserve to
be quashed and are hereby quashed.

There is yet another reason that during
the pendency of the present writ petition,
the petitioner has been acquitted from the
aforesaid criminal case and at present there
is neither any case pending, nor any
4 All. Amar Singh Vs. The State of U.P. & Ors.
885
conviction has been attributed to the
petitioner, as is evident from Annexure SAI and II to the supplementary-affidavit filed
by the petitioner. In this view of the matter,
the petitioner is entitled to have the
firearms licence. It is submitted by
petitioner's counsel that the petitioner has
been acquitted of the charges."

12. The aforesaid position of the law
clearly distinguishes the mere registration
of a criminal case or pendency of one from
what is relevant under Section 17(3) for the
Licensing Authority to exercise its power
to cancel a firearms licence. Section
17(3)(b) empowers the Licensing Authority
to suspend or revoke a licence, if it is
deemed necessary for 'security of the public
peace', or for 'public safety'. These
expressions convey a widespread and broad
based threat to the public at large or a threat
to the prevalent all found equanimity and
peace in society. The connotation of the
words employed in Section 17(b) do not
refer to mere cases of violation of law and
order, but an impending threat to the
general safety of the public or to public
peace. If a licence is to be cancelled on any
of these grounds, some objective material
has to be there on record to form an opinion
that the continued possession of a firearm
held under the licence would imperil public
peace
or
public
safety.
The
mere
registration of a criminal case is certainly
not a relevant fact, on the basis of which,
an inference may be drawn about vitiation,
either of public peace or public safety.

13. If the holder of a licence has
misused his firearm in a crime targeting an
individual, the licence may be liable to be
cancelled for the breach of one of the
conditions of the licence under Section
17(3)(d), or may be on the ground that the
licensee is held for that reason unfit to hold
a licence under the Act, as envisaged under
sub-Section (3)(a) of Section 17. It is
possible that because of the petitioner's
involvement in some crime, the Licensing
Authority
after
considering
the
circumstances of the crime, the evidence
about the petitioner's involvement for the
limited purpose of exercise of powers by
him under the Act might have opined to
hold the licensee unfit, but that is not the
case here. The findings recorded by the
Licensing Authority and those by the
Appellate Authority seem to proceed on a
reasoning where the registration of a
criminal case and the petitioner's trial on
the relative charges have been regarded
facts ipso facto relevant to cancel his
firearm licence. This is certainly not what
the law envisages while empowering the
Licensing Authority to cancel a firearm
licence. There is not an iota of material that
has been taken into consideration by the
two Authorities below to opine any threat
to public safety or security of public peace.
The inference that has been drawn, if at all
it can be said to be one related to security
of public peace or to public safety, is based
solely on the fact of registration of a
criminal case and trial in that connection.
This is against so consistent a judicial
opinion that this Court may venture to say
that the Authorities below have passed
orders that suffer from mala fides in law.

14. It must also be remarked that the
Authorities below have been so callous in
their reasoning that they have not cared to
notice the relevant words used in the
Statute on the foundation of which power
may be exercised to cancel. While the
Statute refers to 'security of the public
peace' or 'public safety' as relevant
considerations on the basis of which power
may be exercised, both the Authorities
below have employed similar sounding
886 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
expressions that are foreign to the Statute,
while exercising the power to cancel. The
words employed in the order impugned are
''जनसित
(public
interest)',
''न्यायसित
(interest of justice)' and 'शाण्डन्त व्यवस्र्था
(peace and order)'. ''Public interest' and
''interest of justice' are words not even
remotely employed by Section 17(3)(b) of
the Arms Act, furnishing them to be
grounds for cancellation.

15. So far as the words ''peace and
order' are concerned, that too do not find
place in form or substance under Section
17(3)(b) aforesaid. The grounds mentioned
in Section 17(3)(b) of the Arms Act are
''security of the public peace' and ''public
safety'. Public safety is a word too remote
from the Hindi word ''शाण्डन्त व्यवस्र्था' that
the impugned order mentions. Security of
the public peace may bear a vague
resemblance, but is essentially different.
While ''शाण्डन्त व्यवस्र्था' would translate in
English to ''peace and order', which is not a
ground under Section 17(3)(b), ''security of
the public peace' translates in Hindi to
''लोक शाण्डन्त क़ी सुरक्षा' that the Hindi
translation of the Statute employs. Clearly,
''लोक शाण्डन्त क़ी सुरक्षा' is an expression that
envisages a completely different ground
from ''शाण्डन्त व्यवस्र्था क़ी दृसष्टकोण से' or
''from the point of view of peace and order',
the precise ground mentioned in both the
orders impugned. Considerations of ''peace
and order' or ''point of view of peace and
order'
are
very
different
from
the
expression ''security of the public peace'.
The expression ''security of the public
peace' is an idea that envisages a far wider
and deeper impact on the maintenance of
general public peace than what is envisaged
by the expression ''point of view of peace
and order'. The essential difference in the
two expresses or the idea behind the two
expressions is the degree of threat to public
peace by the action of the licensee
involved.

16. The authorities entrusted with
power under Section 17 of the Arms Act to
cancel a firearms licence, notwithstanding the
subjective satisfaction that the Statute
postulates while exercising the power, cannot
exercise it on a ground not envisaged under
the Act. Simply put, mere infractions of
public peace or violations of law and order do
not constitute that degree of a exacerbated
threat or violation of public peace that the
expression ''security of the public peace'
connotes. The Licensing Authority, therefore,
must have on record material on the basis of
which a reasonable conclusion can be drawn
that the act of the licensee is one that is not a
mere infraction of public peace or a violation
of law and order. There has to be material on
the basis of which the Licensing Authority
can be credited with subjective satisfaction
that the act of the licensee is a threat to
security of the public peace. Certainly, this
kind of an inference cannot be drawn on the
mere registration of a criminal case against a
licensee.

17. No doubt, the grant of a licence
under the Arms Act is a concession by the
State in favour of the licensee, but the State
or its Authority, once regulated in the
exercise of that concession by Statute,
cannot exercise that power arbitrarily,
whimsically or on grounds not envisaged
under the law. Here, by referring to
expressions, such as ''public interest',
''interest of justice' and ''the point of view
of peace and order', the Authorities have
exercised power on considerations, not at
all relevant under the Arms Act.

18. The reasoning on facts that the
Appellate Authority has somewhat made
4 All. Amar Singh Vs. The State of U.P. & Ors.
887
efforts to introduce in order to lend some
pretense of legitimacy to the exercise of
power to cancel, is also ill-founded. This
Court has perused the judgment of the 1st
Additional Sessions Judge, Kaushambi
dated 19.09.2018 in Sessions Trial No.532
of 2009 (arising out of Case Crime No. 61
of 1995), under Sections 147, 148, 307, 427
IPC, P.S. Saini, District Kaushambi. In the
clear opinion of this Court, the judgment
passed by the learned Additional Sessions
Judge does not acquit the petitioner on a
benefit of doubt. It orders an acquittal on
merits. May be the Appellate Authority
could have drawn that inference because
four witnesses for the prosecution were
declared hostile, but a reading of the
judgment shows that the learned Additional
Sessions Judge has entered a verdict of
acquittal on merits. It also seems rather
incongruous as to how the Appellate
Authority could look into the judgment
passed by the Criminal Court in relation to
the sessions trial arising out of Case Crime
No. 61 of 1995, inasmuch as the Appellate
Authority has passed the order impugned
on 01.07.2015, whereas the judgment in
Sessions Trial No.532 of 2009 (arising out
of Crime No.61 of 1995) has been passed
on 19.09.2018 by the learned Additional
Sessions Judge, Kaushambi. The findings
in this regard by the Appellate Authority,
therefore, also seem to be flawed.

19. Possibly, this error has crept in the
judgment of the Appellate Authority
because he read the judgment passed by the
Chief Judicial Magistrate, Kaushambi in
Case No. 3651 of 2007, State vs. Raju
Agrahari and others (Crime No.199 of
2007), that was passed on 21.10.2014.
About this case, the Appellate Authority
has remarked that it is still pending. This is
also the result of an error apparent,
inasmuch as on the date the Appellate
Authority decided the appeal, the case
arising out of Case Crime No.199 of 2007,
had been decided with a verdict of acquittal
in favour of the petitioner. This judgment,
no doubt, acquits the petitioner, granting
him the benefit of doubt. Therefore, most
certainly, the Commissioner had read this
judgment thinking it to be one relating to
Case Crime No.61 of 1995, that had led to
a sessions trial decided much later. All
these
incongruities
betray
lack
of
application of mind.

20. In the conspectus of facts that we
have found clearly established, the orders
impugned passed by the two Authorities
below cannot be sustained and must be
quashed with consequential relief to the
petitioner.

21. In the result, this petition succeeds
and is allowed with costs. The impugned
order dated 01.07.2015 passed by the
Commissioner,
Allahabad
Division,
Allahabad (now Prayagraj) in Appeal
No.33 of 2009, Amar Singh vs. State and
the order impugned dated 03.12.2008
passed
by
the
District
Magistrate,
Kaushambi in Case No.107/167 of 200708, State vs. Amar Singh, are hereby
quashed.
The
District
Magistrate,
Kaushambi is ordered to consider granting
of renewal of the petitioner's firearms
licence as if he had before him an
application for renewal of licence never
cancelled by the order impugned dated
03.12.2008. The non-renewal because of
the orders impugned shall be ignored. The
District
Magistrate,
Kaushambi
shall
facilitate the petitioner in making the
necessary application for renewal of the
firearms licence before passing orders
thereon, all of which shall be done within
a month of receipt of a copy of this
judgment.
888 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES

22. Let this order be communicated to
the Commissioner, Prayagraj Division,
Prayagraj and the District Magistrate,
Kaushambi by the Registrar (Compliance).
----------

(2022)04ILR A888
ORIGINAL JURISDICTION
CIVIL SIDE
DATED: LUCKNOW13.04.2022

BEFORE

THE HON'BLE MANISH MATHUR, J.

Writ-C No. 3000075 of 2002

State of U.P. ...Petitioner
Versus
Gurudee Singh & Ors. ...Respondents

Counsel for the Petitioner:
Standing Counsel, R. Srivastava

Counsel for the Respondents:
C.S.C., H.S. Jain, R. Chandra, V.K. Pandey, Vijay
Kumar Pandey, Yogita Chandra

Civil Law - U.P. Zamindari Abolition and
Land Reforms Act 1950 - Sections 209
&. 210 - Adverse Possession - Mere
Possession Vs Adverse Possession -
mere long possession over a property
without title can not be deemed to be
unauthorized or without consent of the
original tenure holder unless and until
such possession being claimed to be
unauthorized or adverse is within the
knowledge of the original tenure holder
- mere possession irrespective of its
length does not necessarily cannote
adverse possession against the true
owner
-
For
possession
over
the
property to be adverse, requires such
possession to be hostile in implied
denial of title of the true owner and
within his knowledge - The possession
must be open and hostile enough to be
capable of being known by the parties
interested in the property (Para 14, 15,
16, 24)
Land declared surplus - objections filed u/s
11(2) of 1960 Act - In the objections filed by
opposite party it was stated that he is in
cultivatory adverse possession of the disputed
property and has perfected his rights under
Section 210 of U.P. Z.A. & L.R. Act in absence of
any suit for ejectment - By means of impugned
order appeal against order rejecting objections
under section 11(2) of the Act 1960 allowed &
the entire land held to be surplus was released
in favour of opposite party - Held - objection
does not indicate the date on which he entered
into possession over the property in question -
no averment as to when the original tenure
holder came into knowledge regarding adverse
title and possession being set up by the
opposite party to its detriment - appeal allowed
primarily taking into account entries in the
khasra records from the year 1362 to 1372 fasli
indicating name of opposite party No.1 as being
in possession over the property in question -
khasra entries does not indicate as to whether
such possession was permissive or unauthorized
without consent of original tenure holder -
without satisfying twin conditions required
under Section 209 of the Zamindari Abolition
Act, possession or retention thereof cannot
automatically be deemed to be unauthorized or
without consent of the original tenure holder -
opposite party No.1 claiming to be in adverse
possession over the property in question, failed
to substantiate the story of adverse possession -
Appellate authority has failed to consider the
fact that opposite party No.1 has not been able
to make out a case of adverse possession -
Impugned order passed by appellate authority
quashed (Para 24, 25)

Allowed. (E-5)

List of Cases cited:

1. Satish Chand Mathur & ors. Vs St. of U.P. &
ors. 1996 JLR 151

2. Abdul Wahid Khan & ors. Vs Deputy Director
of Consolidation, Jaunpur & ors. 1968 ALJ 117

3. T. Anjanappa & ors. Vs. Somalingappa & anr.
reported in (2006) 7 SCC 570

(Delivered by Hon'ble Manish Mathur, J.)