# Amol Bhagwan Nehul v. State of Maharashtra (2025 SC)

- **Citation:** (2026) 2 ILRA 867
- **Court:** High Court of Judicature at Allahabad
- **Decided:** 2026-02-23
- **Case number:** Application U/S 528 BNSS. No. 45399 of 2025
- **Bench:** Avnish Saxena
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/allahabad-high-court/amol-bhagwan-nehul-v-state-of-maharashtra-2025-sc-54214
- **Pages:** 9

## Text

2 All. Vipin Kumar & Ors. Vs. State of U.P. & Anr.
867
mentioned in the gang-chart. Therefore, in the opinion of this Court, no false information is
mentioned in the gang chart.

27. Rule 22 of the Rules, 2021 also makes it clear that criminal history is not mandatory and sections of
the Gangster Act can be imposed in the course of investigation of any base case, falls under category of
certain offences mentioned in Rule 22 of the Rules, 2021. The controversy has already been decided by the
Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Shraddha Gupta (supra) that the provisions of the Gangster Act can be
imposed on the basis of a solitary case.

28. In para 37 of Shraddha Gupta (supra) it has been held by the Hon'ble Apex Court that even on the
basis of a single case Gangster Act can be imposed, which is quoted as under:-

"Now so far as the main submission on behalf of the accused that for a single offence/FIR/charge
sheet with respect to any of the anti- social activities, such an accused cannot be prosecuted under the
Gangsters Act, 1986 is concerned, on a fair reading of the definitions of 'Gang' and 'Gangster' under the
Gangsters Act, 1986, it can be seen that a 'Gang' is a group of one or more persons who commit/s the crimes
mentioned in the definition clause for the motive of earning undue advantage, whether pecuniary, material or
otherwise. Even a single crime committed by a 'Gang' is sufficient to implant Gangsters Act on such
members of the 'Gang'. The definition clause does not engulf plurality of offence before the Gangsters Act is
invoked."

29. Needless to say that Gangster Rules, 2021 have been considered in great detail in Ambuj
Parag Dubey (supra) and the manner in which satisfaction is to be recorded has been laid down, therefore,
in view of the judgment of Ambuj Parag Dubey (supra), I find that in the present case satisfaction has been
recorded as per Rules, 2021 and Form-I of the Gangster Act, which provides the format of the gang chart. I,
therefore, find that the satisfaction was recorded by the authorities in the manner as per the provisions of the
Rules, 2021 and it cannot be said that satisfaction was not recorded in accordance with the Rules, 2021.

30. From the discussion made hereinabove. I, therefore, find that the present application
is devoid of merit and is accordingly dismissed.

31. No order as to costs.
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(2026) 2 ILRA 867
ORIGINAL JURISDICTION
CRIMINAL SIDE
DATED: ALLAHABAD 23.02.2026

BEFORE

THE HON'BLE AVNISH SAXENA, J.

Application U/S 528 BNSS. No. 45399 of 2025

Vipin Kumar & Ors. ...Applicants
Versus
State of U.P. & Anr. ...Opposite Parties
868 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
ISSUE FOR CONSIDERATION
Whether the allegations of sexual intercourse on false promise of marriage by a married man, along with
intimidation by co-accused, are sufficient to proceed with trial, or whether continuance of trial would amount
to abuse of process of law?

HEADNOTES
Criminal Law - Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 - Sections 528, 180, 183 - Bharatiya
Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 - Sections 69, 115(2), 351(3), 352 - Indian Evidence Act, 1872 - Section
114A - Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 - Section 482: - Application under Section 528 BNSS -
against charge sheet and summoning order as well as the entire criminal proceedings - FIR - allegation of
sexual intercourse on false promise of marriage, blackmail, intimidation, repeated pregnancies and abortions -
victim's statements under Sections 180 & 183 BNSS consistent - medical certificate records accused as father
of child - chargesheet - summoning order - applicants pleaded consensual relationship, prior knowledge of
marriage, delay in FIR, reliance on precedents - Court finds, victim unaware of marital status initially, promise
deceitful from inception, prima facie case made out - further, observed that, Section 69 BNSS specifically
criminalizes sexual intercourse by deceitful means including false promise of marriage - scope of quashing of
proceedings limited to rarest of rare cases - held, Scope of High Court's powers under Section 482 CrPC /
Section 528 BNSS are very wide, but should be exercised with circumspection and in rarest of rare and
appropriate case - relying on the law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court and considering the facts i.e.
Victim's consistent statements, medical evidence, and admitted paternity establish prima facie case -
application is devoid of its merit and is dismissed. (Para - 11, 17, 18)
Application Dismissed. (E-11)

CASE LAW CITED
Amol Bhagwan Nehul v. State of Maharashtra (2025 SC)
Mahesh Damu Khare v. State of Maharashtra (2024 SC)
Uday v. State of Karnataka (2003 SC)
Yedla Srinivasa Rao v. State of Andhra Pradesh (2006 SC)
Pramod Suryabhan Pawar v. State of Maharashtra (2019 SC)
Kuldeep Verma v. State of U.P. (2026 AHC)
Kurukshetra University v. State of Haryana (1977 SC)
State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal (1992 SC)
Som Mittal v. Government of Karnataka (2008 SC)
Naresh Potteries v. Aarti Industries (2025 SC)
Punit Beriwala v. State (NCT of Delhi) (2025 SC)

LIST OF ACTS
Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 - Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 - Indian Evidence Act, 1872 - Code
of Criminal Procedure, 1973.
LIST OF KEYWORDS
Application under section 528 - chargesheet - summoning order - aggravated criminal intimidation -
voluntary causing hurt - intentional insult - consensual in nature - False promise of marriage - Deceitful
means - Consent under misconception - Quashing of proceedings - Prima facie case - blackmail - social media
- victim - recorded videos and photos - prima facie - compromise - - Abuse of process - Rarest of rare case
- Section 69 BNSS - application dismissed.

CASE ARISING FROM
Case Crime No. 312 of 2025, P.S. Deoband, Saharanpur - Case No. 554 of 2025 (State vs. Vipin Kumar &
Others) - FIR dated 22.05.2025 - Charge sheet dated 22.07.2025 - Summoning order dated 26.08.2025.

APPEARANCE OF PARTIES
Counsel for Appellant(s): Shri Syed Safdar Ali Kazmi.
Counsel for Respondent(s): Shri Sheshadri Trivedi and Ms. Seema Shukla, A.G.A.
2 All. Vipin Kumar & Ors. Vs. State of U.P. & Anr.
869
(Delivered by Hon'ble Avnish Saxena, J.)

1. Heard, Shri Syed Safdar Ali Kazmi, learned counsel for the accused-applicant; Shri
Sheshadri Trivedi, learned counsel for the opposite party no. 2; and Ms. Seema Shukla, learned
A.G.A. for State.

2. The present application under Section 528 BNSS has been moved by four accusedapplicants with a prayer to quash the charge sheet dated 22.07.2025, the summoning order dated
26.08.2025 and the proceeding of Case No. 554 of 2025 (State Vs. Vipin Kumar and others) before
the court of Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate, Deoband, Saharanpur arose out of Case Crime
No. 312 of 2025, under Sections 69, 115(2), 352, 351(3) of BNS. The main allegations of sexual
intercourse on false promise of marriage is leveled against the accused applicant no. 1, the other
accused who are wife, sister and brother-in-law of applicant no. 1 have been charge sheeted for the
offence of voluntary causing hurt, intentional insult and aggravated criminal intimidation along
with applicant no. 1

3. The FIR is lodged by opposite party no. 2 on 22.05.2025 against the above four accused
applicants with the allegation that the victim (opposite party no. 2) came in contact with accused
applicant no. 1 through facebook and since May 2018 was continuously entering into sexual
intercourse on false promise of marriage. Four times the victim became pregnant and all the time
she was aborted, she was again pregnant for the fifth time. Whenever she asked for marriage, the
applicant no. 1 managed to escape the reply. Hearing the pregnancy of the victim, the accused
applicant no. 1 has started putting pressure on her to abort the child but she refused. The accused
applicant has refused to marry her and threatens her to kill, voluntary hurt and hurl abuses. The first
applicant's wife, sister and brother-in-law, then started threatening to kill her, offered her money
and pressurised her family for compromise on a heavy amount. It is further revealed from the FIR
that applicant no. 1 is also having her indecent photographs and videos and he used to blackmail
her. On 24.12.2024, the applicant no. 1 has called the victim in a hotel and entered into sexual
intercourse, on which she became pregnant fifth time. It is also disclosed that the accused applicant
no. 1 did the same act with other girls. On 11.05.2025 the applicant no. 1 has taken the victim to a
Doctor for abortion.

4. The victim in her statement under Section 180 BNSS has reiterated the same incident as
narrated in the FIR. She further stated that she is 26 years of age, did her graduation (Bachelor of
Arts), the course of GNM (General Nursing and Midwifery) and was six months pregnant at the
time of recording her statement.

5. The victim thereafter gave her statement under Section 183 BNSS wherein she has again
reiterated the averments made in the FIR and further stated that the applicant no. 1 and she were
friends through facebook, she was called by applicant no. 1, after 56 months of their friendship in a
hotel at Saharanpur, where the accused applicant no. 1 has entered into sexual intercourse against
her consent by alluring that they belong to the same caste, knew each other for quite sometime and
assured her that he will not do any wrong to her. The victim was not having any idea when the
accused applicant no. 1 had shot her video and photos while entering into sexual intercourse and
therefore started blackmailing her for subsequent sex and abortion. He has also sent video to her
870 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
mobile phone. Only sometime back she came to know that the applicant no. 1 is married having
two children. When his wife had called her for entering into compromise, then she came to know
that applicant no. 2 belong to her village.

6. Victim's father has stated in his statement under Section 180 BNSS that the victim was not
knowing that the accused applicant is the husband of applicant no. 2 Priti, who belong to the same
village. He further stated that the accused are pressurizing the victim and family to enter into
compromise.

7. On these allegations the accused applicants have come up with the application to quash the
entire proceedings on the ground that the relation between the two was consensual in nature. It is
the contention of learned counsel for applicants that there is no deceitful means applied by the
accused applicant no. 1 to enter into sexual intercourse with the opposite party no. 2. He further
submits that there is no false promise of marriage given by the accused applicant no. 1 to the
victim, who has attended the marriage of accused applicant no. 1 and applicant no. 2 in the year
2016 along with her family and knew that the accused applicant is married, despite that she has
entered into sexual intercourse with applicant no. 1 just to fetch the financial support from the
accused applicant no. 1. The FIR was registered, when this financial support was refused by the
applicant no. 1. He submits that during her medical examination, the victim has specifically stated
before the Doctor that she knew three years back that the accused applicant no. 1 is a married man.
He further admits that the child born out of the illegitimate relation between the accused applicant
no. 1 and victim shall be taken care of and the right of child will be safeguarded. Further submits
that the FIR is highly delayed the victim is educated lady, she knew the pros and cons of her
conduct of entering into sexual relations with the applicant no. 1. In support of his contention,
learned counsel has relied on the judgment passed in Amol Bhagwan Nehul Vs. State of
Maharashtra and another1; Mahesh Damu Khare Vs. State of Maharashtra2; and Uday Vs.
State of Karnataka3.

8. Learned A.G.A. for State and learned counsel for opposite party no. 2 submit that there is
ample material on record to show that the accused applicant no. 1, who is already married, but has
given a promise to the victim to enter into marriage, who has been in contact with the victim since
long through facebook. The accused applicant no. 1 is married and he knew that his promise to
marry is deceitful from the beginning. The accused applicant has called the victim to a hotel where
he has assured her of marriage, procured her consent and entered into sexual intercourse with her.
The accused applicant himself is in hotel business and therefore, he has shot the video and photos
of the victim while in intimate acts and blackmailed her, because he knew that he is a married man
and he cannot fulfill the promise of marriage. Therefore, in order to blackmail the victim, he has
recorded the videos and photos surreptitiously fixing the camera in the hotel room. Further submits
that it is an excuse projected by the accused applicant that the victim knew prior to entering into
relation with applicant no. 1 that he is married. Further submits that the allegations levelled by the
applicants that they have given financial assistance to the victim and when that financial assistance
was demanded back, the FIR is lodged. This allegation is not a part of case diary. Further submits
that the accused applicant no. 1 is absconding and did not appear to the court with clean hands, as
he is not appearing before the trial court. Further submits that Section 114A of the Indian Evidence
Act 1872, a presumption as to absence of consent in certain prosecution for rape, as the accused
2 All. Vipin Kumar & Ors. Vs. State of U.P. & Anr.
871
applicant no. 1 has repeatedly raped the victim. Hence submits that the application is devoid of
merit and is liable to be dismissed. In substantiation of his arguments learned counsel for opposite
party no. 2 has relied on the judgment in Yedla Srinivasa Rao Vs. State of Andhra Pradesh4
(Paragraph No. 15 to 17).

'[15] In this connection reference may be made to the amendment made in the Indian
Evidence Act. Section 114 A was introduced and the presumption has been raised as to the absence
of consent in certain prosecutions for rape. Section 114-A reads as under:

Section 114 A- Presumption as to the absence of consent in certain prosecutions for
rape.- In a prosecution for rape under Cl. (a) or Cl.(b) or Cl.(c) or Cl. (d) or Cl. (e) or Cl. (g) of
sub-section (2) of Section 376 of the Indian Penal Code (45 of 1860), where sexual intercourse by
the accused is proved and the question is whether it was without the consent of the woman alleged
to have been raped and she states in her evidence before the court that she did not consent, the
Court shall presume that she did not consent."

[16] If sexual intercourse has been committed by the accused and if it is proved that it
was without the consent of the prosecutrix and she states in her evidence before the court that she
did not consent, the court shall presume that she did not consent. Presumption has been introduced
by the legislature in the Evidence Act looking to atrocities committed against women and in the
instant case as per the statement of PW, she resisted and she did not give consent to the accused at
the first instance and he committed the rape on her. The accused gave her assurance that he would
marry her and continued to satisfy his lust till she became pregnant and it became clear that the
accused did not wish to marry her.

[17] In the present case in view of the facts as mentioned above we are satisfied that the
consent which had been obtained by the accused was not a voluntary one which was given by her
under misconception of fact that the accused would marry her but this is not a consent in law. This
is more evident from the testimony of PW1 as well as PW6 who was functioning as Panchayat
where the accused admitted that he had committed sexual intercourse and promised to marry her
but he absconded despite the promise made before the Panchayat. That shows that the accused had
no intention to marry her right from the beginning and committed sexual intercourse totally under
the misconception of fact by prosecutrix that he would marry her. Therefore, we are satisfied that
the conviction and sentence awarded to the appellant is correct and no case is made out for our
interference. The appeals are dismissed.'

9. This Court has taken into consideration the rival submissions made by the parties and
perused the record.

10. Point of concern in the present application is whether prima facie the allegations
levelled by the victim on the applicant accused is sufficient to proceed with the trial or
continuance of the trial would amount to gross abuse of process of law?

11. Following facts culled out from the bare reading of FIR, statement of victim recorded
under Sections 180 and 183 BNSS and the record of the case;
872 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES

11.1 The victim came in contact with the accused through a social media app;

11.2 The accused applicant is already married;

11.3 The victim was called in a hotel in the year 2018 and entered into sexual intercourse
with her on false promise of marriage.

11.4 The victim was pregnant at the time of lodging of the FIR and gave birth to a baby
girl on 01.10.2025, in the medical certificate, the name of father is record as the name of applicant
no. 1.

11.5 It is admitted by the accused applicant that the child is born of the victim from
accused applicant no. 1;

11.6 The victim was repeatedly subjected to sexual intercourse on false promise of
marriage;

11.7 There is continuous pressure on victim and her family for entering into compromise.

12. The charge sheet is submitted against the accused applicant no. 1 for the offence of sexual
intercourse on false promise of marriage and for criminal intimidation, voluntary causing hurt on
other applicants.

13. This Court while deciding the case of Kuldeep Verma Vs. State of U.P. and another5
(authored by Avnish Saxena, J.) has dealt with the new Section 69 of Bhartiya Nyaya Sanhita,
2023. The relevant paragraph nos. 15, 16 and 21 are reiterated underneath:

'15. Section 69 of Bhartiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 provides that 'Whoever, by deceitful
means or by making promise to marry a woman without any intention of fulfilling the same, has
sexual intercourse with her, such sexual intercourse not amounting to the offence of rape, shall be
punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to ten years and
shall also be liable to fine.'

16. The provision contained in Section 69 of B.N.S. is a new induction in penal law,
wherein sexual intercourse with a woman, by deceitful means including false promise of marriage
is not 'Rape', but is made punishable. Prior to the enactment the courts interpret the conduct of
parties in view of the provisions of Section 375 I.P.C. (Rape) coupled with the provision of Section
90 I.P.C (Consent known to be given under fear or misconception). The explanation provided
under Section 69 B.N.S. of 'Deceitful means' 'shall include the false promise of employment or
promotion, inducement, or marrying after suppressing identity.

xxxxxxxx

21. Even otherwise Section 69 B.N.S. provides for sexual intercourse by employing
deceitful means and false promise of marriage as one of the deceitful means. In the case of Pramod
2 All. Vipin Kumar & Ors. Vs. State of U.P. & Anr.
873
Suryabhan Pawar Vs. State of Maharashtra, (2019) 9 SCC 608, Hon'ble the Supreme Court has
drawn a clear distinction between 'false promise of marriage, which is given on understanding by
the maker that it will be broken' and 'a breach of promise which is made in good faith but
subsequently not fulfilled'. It is former which out rightly attracts penal provision.'

14. Learned counsel for applicants has relied on three judgments of Hon'ble the Supreme
Court. The case of Amol Bhagwan Nehul (supra) is not applicable in the present case because the
fact of the case is that the allegation of rape on false promise of marriage continued for more than
one year leveled by a woman having a child, obtained Khulanama, not a formal divorce, from her
erstwhile husband and the allegation is levelled on a student, who was residing next door with three
other men. It is in this backdrop that Hon'ble the Supreme Court in paragraph 11 has quashed the
proceedings of the criminal case. The relevant paragraph no. 11 is reiterated underneath:-

11. Taking into consideration that the Appellant is just 25 years of age, and has a lifetime
ahead of him, it would be in the interest of justice that he does not suffer an impending trial and,
therefore, the proceedings emanating from C.R. No. 490/2023 dt. 31.07.2023 are quashed at this
stage itself.

15. The case of Mahesh Damu Khare (supra) is also not applicable in the present set of facts
because in that case the victim knew that accused was having two wives, while she was working in
his house. Hence, Hon'ble the Supreme Court has observed that the sexual intercourse on false
promise of marriage cannot be considered as rape on deceitful means. Paragraph No. 26 and 27 of
the judgment relied by learned counsel for applicant is reiterated underneath:-

'26. In the present case, the nature of relationship between the appellant and the
complainant can be characterised by the following attributes:

(i) The appellant and the complainant were acquainted with each other since 2008. The
complainant herself admits that the appellant has been in physical relationship since then till 2017
without protest in spite of alleging that the appellant had done so without her consent.

(ii) The physical relationship was going on routinely. But the complainant in her
complaint states that after she got a rented room in Shirvane, Nerul Sector 1, Navi Mumbai, in
December, 2010, the appellant used to come every day and had sexual intercourse everyday,
though without her consent and by giving false promise of marriage.

(iii) The complainant does not appear to be a naive and gullible woman who was
susceptible to deceit while maintaining physical relationship with the appellant and the allegation
of false promise surfaced only when the appellant refused to provide further financial and other
assistance.

(iv) The conduct of the complainant clearly shows that she is a mature person clearly
capable of understanding the consequences of her acts and she was fully aware of the kind of illicit
relationship she was maintaining with a married person.
874 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES

(v) The complainant was fully aware that the appellant was already married and had two
wives, though one of them was not keeping well.

27. Thus, from the above it appears that it is more of an extra-marital affair during the
aforesaid period without any insistence by the complainant for getting married to the appellant. The
fact that the complainant continued to have a physical relationship for a long time without any
insistence on marriage would indicate the unlikelihood of any such promise made by the appellant
for marrying her and it rather indicates that the relationship was a consensual one.'

16. In the same way the case of Uday (surpa) is also not applicable in the present case, as in
that case the accused and victim were neighbours and used to meet each other regularly. Once the
accused has proposed her for marriage, on which the victim has refused, as she belongs to different
caste. It is thereafter that the allegation of rape on false promise of marriage has been levelled by
the victim. The relevant paragraph 21 relied by learned counsel for applicant is reiterated
underneath:-

'21. It, therefore appears that the consensus of judicial opinion is in favour of the view
that the consent given by the prosecutrix to sexual intercourse with a person with whom she is
deeply in love on a promise that he would marry her on a later date, cannot be said to be given
under a misconception of fact. A false promise is not a fact within the meaning of the Code. We are
inclined to agree with this view, but we must add that there is no strait jacket formula for
determining whether consent given by the prosecutrix to sexual intercourse is voluntary, or
whether it is given under a misconception of fact. In the ultimate analysis, the tests laid down by
the Courts provide at best guidance to the judicial mind while considering a question of consent,
but the Court must, in each case, consider the evidence before it and the surrounding
circumstances, before reaching a conclusion, because each case has its own peculiar facts which
may have a bearing on the question whether the consent was voluntary, or was given under a
misconception of fact. It must also weigh the evidence keeping in view the fact that the burden is on
the prosecution to prove each and every ingredient of the offence, absence of consent being one of
them.'

17. In the present case the accused applicant is a married man and came in contact with the
victim through social media app. Called the victim to a hotel where the accused applicant no. 1 had
entered in sexual intercourse with the victim. It is the case of victim that she was not knowing that
the accused applicant no. 1 was married. She also did not know whether the accused applicant no. 1
is the husband of a girl of her village. The prior knowledge of victim that applicant no. 1 was
married at the time when she entered into sexual intercourse with him is the matter of trial, because
the record is clear and explicit on the point that the victim was not knowing about the marital status
of applicant no. 1. Moreover, the accused applicant no. 1 while entering into sexual intercourse
with the victim knew that he is a married man and his false promise of marriage to the victim will
be broken, therefore, the allegation of deceit is from the very beginning of entering into sexual
intercourse. The point of consent of sexual intercourse, knowing the marriage of applicant no. 1, is
the matter of trial and the allegation of criminal intimidation levelled on other co-accused, applicant
nos. 2 to 4 is also apparent and explicit on record and subject matter of trial.
2 All. Sanjay Gandhi Post Graduate Institute of Medical Science, Lucknow Vs. M/S Trishul Enterprises 875

18. The scope of ambit of the powers of the High Court invoking under Section 482 CrPC or
528 BNSS are very wide, but should be exercised with circumspection and in rarest of rare and
appropriate cases. This power do not confer arbitrary jurisdiction to act according to whims and
caprice and is used to prevent the abuse of process of law and for procuring the ends of justice.
This preposition of law is enunciated in the cases of Kurukshetra University Vs. State of
Haryana6 and the State of Haryana Vs. Bhajan Lal7. In the case of Som Mittal Vs. Government
of Karnataka8, Hon'ble the Supreme Court has given an expression of 'rarest of rare case', while
describing the scope of Section 482 CrPC. This view is consistently maintained by Hon'ble the
Supreme Court till the present day, which is settled by 'en' number of judgments, latest are Naresh
Potteries Vs. Aarti Industries9 and Punit Beriwala Vs. State (NCT) of Delhi10.

19. Therefore, the application under Section 528 BNSS is devoid of merit and is dismissed.
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(2026) 2 ILRA 875
APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL SIDE
DATED: LUCKNOW 18.02.2026

BEFORE

THE HON'BLE ARUN BHANSALI, C.J.
THE HON'BLE JASPREET SINGH, J.

Appeal U/S 37 Of Arbitration & Conciliation Act 1996 No.- 5 of 2024

Sanjay Gandhi Post Graduate Institute of Medical Science, Lucknow ...Applicant
Versus
M/S Trishul Enterprises ...Respondent

Issue for Consideration
Issue pertains to whether the arbitral award dated 20.08.2020, as affirmed by the Commercial Court u/s 34 of
Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, suffers from patent illegality or jurisdictional error warranting
interference u/s 37 of the Act, particularly on the ground that the Sole Arbitrator exceeded the scope of
reference by adjudicating claims beyond the terms of contract and the arbitration agreement.

Headnotes
Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 - ss. 11, 34, 37 - Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 - O. 2 R. 2 -
Arbitral Award - Modification - Severability - Jurisdiction of Arbitrator - Appeal - Scope of -
Arbitration clause - Interpretation of - The instant dispute emanates from an agreement dated
16.04.2008 executed between the appellant, and respondent contractor for carrying out
landscaping and maintenance works for a stipulated period, which agreement incorporated an
arbitration clause - Upon the expiry of contract and emergence of disputes, particularly
concerning alleged non-payment of dues including security deposit and other claims, the
respondent initially approached the High Court by way of writ petition seeking, inter alia,
appointment of an arbitrator, pursuant to which a Sole Arbitrator came to be appointed - Owing
to certain procedural delays and change of arbitrator, fresh arbitral proceedings were
commenced, culminating in an award dated 20.08.2020 whereby the Arbitrator partly allowed
the respondent's claims, including refund of security deposit, reimbursement towards provident
fund contributions, and other monetary reliefs - The appellant, assailing the said award as being
contrary to the terms of contract and beyond the scope of reference, instituted proceedings u/s