# Angad Pratap Singh & Ors v. Deputy Director Consolidation/Addl. Dist. Magistrate (F/R), Lakhimpur Kheri & Ors

- **Citation:** (2023) 3 ILRA 188
- **Court:** High Court of Judicature at Allahabad
- **Decided:** 2023-02-10
- **Case number:** Writ B No. 108 of 2023
- **Bench:** Saurabh Lavania
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/allahabad-high-court/angad-pratap-singh-ors-v-deputy-director-consolidation-addl-dist-magistrate-f-r-49946
- **Pages:** 17

## Headnote

Civil Law - U.P. Consolidation of Holding
Act, 1953 - Section 48 - Revision and
reference
- scope/power of Deputy
Director of Consolidation u/s 48
-
Remand of case - Section 48 of the Act
of 1953 provides ample power to the
D.D.C. to examine the correctness/
legality/ propriety of any order which
includes the power to examine any
finding, whether of fact or law, recorded
by any subordinate authority so as the
power to re-appreciate any oral or
documentary
evidence
-
order
remanding the case to the Consolidation
Officer when the entire evidence was
before him was not proper and the DDC
should have decided the matter himself
as
he
was
exercising
very
comprehensive power under section 48
of the Act - remand of the case causes
delay and prolongs litigation as well as
harassment to the parties - In the
instant case the remand order passed by
D.D.C.
was
quashed
and
as
entire
material was available before D.D.C. ,
the matter was remanded to the D.D.C.
to
decide
the
matter
afresh
after
affording proper opportunity of hearing
to the parties (Para 26, 27)

Allowed. (E-5)

List of Cases cited:

## Text

_Characters 0–39,981 of 58,872. This is a partial read: ask again with offset=39981 for what follows._

188 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
justice of the case requires to. But we are
not so satisfied. We are of opinion that,
having regard to the merits which have
been concurrently found in favour of the
respondents
both
by
the
Deputy
Commissioner, Sibsagar, and the High
Court, we should decline to interfere."

27. In Bux Singh vs. Joint Director
of Consolidation, U.P. Lucknow and
others; AIR 1966 All 156, this Court
observed "Where orders impugned are
equitable and substantial Justice seems to
have been done to the parties, the High
Court would not be inclined to interfere in
its writ jurisdiction merely on the ground
that such orders are wrong in law."

28. In Om Prakash vs. U. P.
Secondary
Education
Service
Commission, Allenganj, Allahabad and
others, (1990) UPLBEC 983, the Court
observed as under:-

"It is well settled that a decision
of an authority, even though without
jurisdiction, may not be quashed in
proceedings under Article 226 of the
Constitution
if
by
the
decision
the
substantial justice is done between the
parties."

29. For the reasons aforesaid, this
Court is not inclined to interfere in the
order impugned dated 11.01.2023 passed
by the respondent No.1-Board of Revenue,
U.P., Lucknow Accordingly, the petition is
dismissed. No order as to costs.
----------
(2023) 3 ILRA 188
ORIGINAL JURISDICTION
CIVIL SIDE
DATED: LUCKNOW 10.02.2023

BEFORE
THE HON'BLE SAURABH LAVANIA, J.

Writ B No. 108 of 2023

Angad Pratap Singh & Ors. ...Petitioners
Versus
Deputy Director Consolidation/Addl. Dist.
Magistrate (F/R), Lakhimpur Kheri & Ors.
 ...Respondents

Counsel for the Petitioners:
Nizam Ali Siddique

Counsel for the Respondents:
C.S.C.

Civil Law - U.P. Consolidation of Holding
Act, 1953 - Section 48 - Revision and
reference
- scope/power of Deputy
Director of Consolidation u/s 48
-
Remand of case - Section 48 of the Act
of 1953 provides ample power to the
D.D.C. to examine the correctness/
legality/ propriety of any order which
includes the power to examine any
finding, whether of fact or law, recorded
by any subordinate authority so as the
power to re-appreciate any oral or
documentary
evidence
-
order
remanding the case to the Consolidation
Officer when the entire evidence was
before him was not proper and the DDC
should have decided the matter himself
as
he
was
exercising
very
comprehensive power under section 48
of the Act - remand of the case causes
delay and prolongs litigation as well as
harassment to the parties - In the
instant case the remand order passed by
D.D.C.
was
quashed
and
as
entire
material was available before D.D.C. ,
the matter was remanded to the D.D.C.
to
decide
the
matter
afresh
after
affording proper opportunity of hearing
to the parties (Para 26, 27)

Allowed. (E-5)

List of Cases cited:

1. Ram Udit Vs D.D.C. MANU/UP/1768/2014
3 All. Angad Pratap Singh & Ors. Vs. Deputy Director Consolidation/Addl. District Magistrate
 (F/R), Lakhimpur Kheri & Ors.
189
2. Prem Nath & ors. Vs D.D.C., Barabanki & ors.
W.P. No. 436 (Consolidation) of 2015

3. Gulab Chand Vs D.D.C. 2019 SCC OnLine All
4756

4. Sheo Nand Vs D.D.C., Allahabad, (2000) 3
SCC 103

5. Ram Jeet Vs D.D.C., Jaunpur & ors., Writ - B
No. 42465 of 1999, dt 31.05.2013

6. Bashir Ahmad Vs DDC 1986 RD 164

7. Ram Autar & ors. Vs D.D.C. & ors., 1991
Supp (1) SCC 552

8. Ashwin Kumar Patel Vs Upendra J. Patel, AIR
1999 SC 1125

9. Bhagwat Prasad Vs DDC 2006 RD (101) 383

10. Pheku Vs DDC 2007 RD (103) 402

11. Sitaram Vs DDC 2007 RD (102) 113

12. Babu Lal Vs DDC 2008 RD (104) 521

13. Sheikh Nathu Vs DDC (2009) 106 RD 96

14. Deena Nath & ors. Vs Deputy Director
of Consolidation and others, 2010 (110) RD
584

15. Santosh Kumar Vs D.D.C. & ors. Writ-B
No.4377 of 2014 dt 29.1.2014

16. Vijay Nath & ors. Vs Deputy Director
of Consolidation and others, 2019 (9) ADJ
85

17. Ram Sewak & ors. Vs D.D.C. & ors. Writ-B
No. 23608 of 2014 dt 06.05.2014

(Delivered by Hon'ble Saurabh Lavania, J.)

1. Heard Sri Nazim Ali Siddique,
learned counsel for the petitioners and Sri
Hemant Kumar Pandey, learned State
counsel appearing for the respondent Nos.
1 and 2.

2. In view of order proposed to be
passed, issuance of notice to respondent
Nos. 3 to 26 is hereby dispensed with.
Liberty
is
also
provided
to
these
respondents
to
file
an
appropriate
application of recall of this order, if they
are aggrieved by it.

3. By means of this petition, the
petitioners have assailed the order dated
22.12.2022, whereby, the respondent No.
1/Deputy
Director
of
Consolidation/
Additional
District
Magistrate
(F/R),
Lakhimpur Kheri remanded the matter back
to the Consolidation Officer concerned for
deciding the case afresh after providing
opportunity of hearing to the parties to the
litigation. The operative portion of the
order dated 22.12.2022 is quoted hereunder
for ready reference:-

"eSaus fuxjkuhdrkZx.kksa o foi{khx.kksa ds
fo}ku vf/koDrkx.kksa dks lquk rFkk xzke ds vfHkys[kksa o
Hkwfp= vkfn dk Hkyh&Hkkafr voyksdu fd;kA voyksdu
ls Li"V gS fd iz'uxr okn xkVk la[;k&96 fe0 ls
lacaf/kr gS] ftlesa ek0 mPp U;k;ky; ds fjV ;kfpdk
la[;k&20 1⁄4lhfyax1⁄2@1993 esa ikfjr vkns'k fnukad 0208-2004 }kjk foi{khx.kksa ds firk rjlse flag e`rd
dks
xkVk
la[;k&96@1@20-00]
94@1@1-90]
94@4@3-10 ij ladze.kh; Hkwfe/kj vafdr fd;k x;k
gSA bl vkns'k ds vuqikyu esa pdcUnh vf/kdkjh ds
ckn la[;k&82@2020&21 vUrxZr /kkjk&21 1⁄411⁄2 tksr
pdcUnh vf/kfu;e esa ikfjr vkns'k fnukad 03-02-2021
}kjk foi{khx.k vaxn izrki flag vkfn dks xkVk
la[;k&96@1@20-00 ds lkis{k ewY;kadu dk pd
izfn"V fd;k x;k] ijUrq bl vkns'k ds vuqikyu esa
rS;kj dh x;h la'kks/ku rkfydk esa fuxjkuhdrkZx.k tks
o"kZ 1976 ls iz'uxr Hkwfe ds iV~Vk/kkjd gSa] mudk
pd lekIr djds lhfyax esa ntZ fd;k x;k gS]
ftldk {ks=kf/kdkj pdcUnh izkf/kdkfj;ksa dks ugha gSA
iz'uxr xkVk la[;k&96] ftldk cUnkscLrh {ks=Qy
44-22 ,dM+ vfHkys[kksa esa vafdr gS rFkk ckn esa bldk
{ks=Qy pdcUnh esa c<+dj 48-28 ,dM+ vafdr fd;k
x;kA xkVk la[;k&96 esa gh ou Hkwfe 24-50 ,dM+
lfEefyr gSA pdcUnh vf/kdkjh }kjk ikfjr vkns'k esa
fdruk {ks=Qy lhfyax ds le; ou Hkwfe esa vkjf{kr
Fkh rFkk fdruh Hkwfe lhfyax ls voeqDr gqbZ rFkk muesa
190 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
ls fdruh Hkwfe ij fdu&fdu iV~Vsnkjksa dks fdrus
{ks=Qy dk iV~Vk fd;k x;k \ bl rF; dk dksbZ
mYys[k ugha gSA ;|fi ek0 mPp U;k;ky; }kjk ikfjr
vkns'k ds vuqikyu esa foi{khx.kksa dks xkVk
la[;k&96@1@20-00 ,dM+ ds lkis{k pd izfn"V
fd;k tkuk mfpr gS] ijUrq mlls izHkkfor gksus okys
iV~Vk/kkjdksa ds fgrksa dks Hkh /;ku j[kuk vko';d gSA
xkVk la[;k&96@1@20-00 ,dM+ dks NksM+dj 'ks"k ou
Hkwfe o iV~Vs/kkjdksa ds lEcU/k esa rF;ijd foLr`r
vkns'k fd;k tkuk vko';d gS] ftlls fd lEcfU/kr
i{kdkjksa dks viuk i{k o lk{; izLrqr djus dk volj
fey ldsA pdcUnh vf/kdkjh }kjk ikfjr vkns'k esa
izHkkfor iV~Vsnkjksa ls vkuqikfrd ewY;kadu [kkfjt djus
dk vkns'k ikfjr fd;k x;k gS] ijUrq vuqikyu djrs
le; fdlh&fdlh iV~Vsnkj dk iwjk pd gh lekIr
dj fn;k x;k gS] tks mfpr ugha gSA pdcUnh
vf/kdkjh }kjk ikfjr vkns'k dh iqf"V djds cUnkscLr
vf/kdkjh pdcUnh }kjk Hkh =qfV dh x;h gSA blfy,
U;kf;d n`f"Vdks.k ls mfpr gksxk fd iz'uxr okn
ijh{k.k U;k;ky; dks bl funsZ'k ds lkFk izR;kofrZr
fd;k tk;s fd og lHkh lEcfU/kr i{kdkjksa dks lqudj
izR;sd fcUnq ij rF;ijd foLr`r vkns'k ikfjr djrs
gq, ek0 mPp U;k;ky; }kjk ikfjr vkns'k dk
vuqikyu djuk lqfuf'pr djsaA rn~uqlkj lHkh
fuxjkfu;ka Lohdkj fd;s tkus ;ksX; gSaA mijksDr
foospukuqlkj vkns'k gqvk fd %&

vkns'k

mijksDr lElr fuxjkfu;ka Lohdkj dh
tkrh
gSA
pdcUnh
vf/kdkjh
ds
okn
la[;k&82@20&21 esa ikfjr vkns'k fnukad 03-02-2021
,oa cUnkscLr vf/kdkjh pdcUnh dh vihy la[;k&376
yxk;r 384 esa ikfjr vkns'k fnukad 26-05-2022
fujLr fd;s tkrs gSaA okn pdcUnh vf/kdkjh vfUre
vfHkys[k] izFke] y[kheiqj&[khjh dks bl funsZ'k ds
izR;kofrZr fd;k tkrk gS fd og lEcfU/kr i{kdkjksa dks
lqudj izR;sd fcUnq ij rF;ijd foLr`r vkns'k ikfjr
djuk lqfuf'pr djsaA i{kx.k pdcUnh vf/kdkjh
1⁄4mijksDr1⁄2 ds U;k;ky; esa fnukad 25-01-2023 dks is'k
gksaA
;gh
vkns'k
fuxjkuh
la[;k&
524
@202254104300002203]
525
@202254104300002204]
526
@202253104300002205]
527
@202254104300002206]
528
@202254104300002207]
529
@202254104300002208
,oa
530
@202254104300002209 ij Hkh ykxw gksxkA mijksDr
leLr fuxjkuh i=kofy;ka ckn vko';d dk;Zokgh
lafpr vfHkys[kkxkj gksA"

4. From the order impugned dated
22.12.2022 including the operative portion
of the same, quoted above, it is apparent
that the Consolidation Officer has to
provide only proper opportunity of hearing
to the parties to the litigation and thereafter
he has to pass a reasoned order on each
issue.

5. While assailing the impugned order
dated 22.12.2022, learned counsel for the
petitioner stated that the order of remand,
under challenge, dated 22.12.2022 is
unsustainable in the eye of law particularly
in view of explanation given in Section
48(3) of U.P. Consolidation of Holding Act,
1953 (hereinafter referred to as the "Act of
1953"). As such, indulgence of this Court is
required in the matter.

6. In continuation, it is further stated
that all the material was available before
the Consolidation Officer and the Act of
1953 itself provides wide power to the
Consolidation Officer, as appears from the
explanation given under Section 48(3) of
the Act of 1953 and he ought to have
decided the case of the parties on merits
after providing proper opportunity of
hearing to them. Thus, the respondent No. 1
erred in law and fact while passing the
order impugned dated 22.12.2022.

7. Sri Pandey, learned State counsel
assisted this Court on the issue involved in
the present petition. He also could not
dispute the power of respondent No. 1
under Section 48(3) of the Act of 1953.

Considered
the
submissions
advanced by the learned counsel for the
parties and perused the record.

8. In order to decide the present
petition, this Court feels it appropriate to
3 All. Angad Pratap Singh & Ors. Vs. Deputy Director Consolidation/Addl. District Magistrate
 (F/R), Lakhimpur Kheri & Ors.
191
reproduce Section 48 of the Act of 1953,
which is as under:-

"[48. Revision and reference. -
(1) The Director of Consolidation may call
for and examine the record of any case
decided or proceedings taken by any
subordinate authority for the purpose of
satisfying himself as to the regularity of the
proceedings; or as to the correctness,
legality or propriety of any order] [other
than an interlocutory order] passed by such
authority in the case or proceedings, may,
after allowing the parties concerned an
opportunity of being heard, make such
order in the case or proceedings as he
thinks fit.

(2) Powers under sub-section (1)
may be exercised by the Director of
Consolidation also on a reference under
sub-section (3).

(3) Any authority subordinate to
the Director of Consolidation may, after
allowing
the
parties
concerned
an
opportunity of being heard, refer the record
of any case or proceedings to the Director
of Consolidation for action under subsection (1).

[Explanation. -] [(1)] For the
purposes
of
this
section,
Settlement
Officers,
Consolidation,
Consolidation
Officers, Assistant Consolidation Officers,
Consolidator and Consolidation Lekhpals
shall be subordinate to the Director of
Consolidation.

Explanation
(2)
-
For
the
purposes of this section the expression
'interlocutory order' in relation to a case or
proceeding, means such order deciding any
matter arising in such case or proceeding or
collateral thereto as does not have the effect
to finally disposing of such case or
proceeding.

[Explanation (3). - The power
under
this
section
to
examine
the
correctness, legality or propriety of any
order includes the power to examine any
finding, whether of fact or law, recorded by
any subordinate authority, and also includes
the power to re-appreciate any oral or
documentary evidence.]

9. At this stage, it is also appropriate to
refer various pronouncements on the
scope/power
of
Deputy
Director
of
Consolidation under Section 48 of the Act
of 1953.

10. In the judgment dated 24.09.2014
passed by this Court in the case of Ram
Udit
v.
D.D.C.
reported
in
MANU/UP/1768/2014,
this
Court
considering the Scheme of the Act of 1953
and Section 48 observed as under:-

"10. The Scheme of the statute
contemplates a tentative plan, inviting
objection from stake-holder, i.e. tenure
holder, and, after considering the same,
finalization of plan, i.e., allotment of
Chaks. There against appellate power has
been conferred upon SOC under Section
21(2) of Act 1953. The power which is
exercised by DDC, is termed "Revision and
reference" under Section 48 of Act, 1953.

11. The original Section 48, as
enacted initially, read as under:

"48.
Revision.-Director
of
Consolidation may call for the record of any
case if the Officer (other than the Arbitrator)
by whom the case was decided appears to
have exercised a jurisdiction not vested in
him by law or to have failed to exercise
jurisdiction so vested, or to have acted in the
exercise of his jurisdiction illegally or with
substantial irregularity and may pass such
orders in the case as it thinks fit."

12.
It
was
amended
by
substitution by U.P. Act No. 24 of 1956 as
under:
192 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES

"48. Powers of Director of
Consolidation to call for records and to
revise
orders.-The
Director
of
Consolidation may call for the record of
any case or proceeding if the Officer (other
than the Arbitrator) by whom the case was
decided or proceeding taken appears to
have exercised jurisdiction not vested in
him by law or to have failed to exercise
jurisdiction so vested, or to have acted in
the exercise of his jurisdiction illegally or
with substantial irregularity and may pass
such orders in the case as it thinks fit."

(amendment in bold)

13. Within a short period, it was
again amended by U.P. Amendment Act
No. 38 of 1958 as under:

"48. Revision.-The Director of
Consolidation may call for the record of
any case decided or proceedings taken,
where he is of opinion that a Deputy
Director, Consolidation has-

(i)
exercised
jurisdiction
not
vested in him in law, or

(ii) failed to exercise jurisdiction
vested in him, or

(iii) acted in the exercise of his
jurisdiction illegally or with substantial
irregularity, and as a result of which,
substantial injustice appears to have been
caused to a tenure-holder and he may 4,
after affording reasonable opportunity of
hearing to the parties concerned, pass such
order in the case or proceeding as he thinks
fit."

(amendment in bold)

14. Section 48 underwent a minor
amendment vide Section 39 of U.P.
(Amendment) Act No. VIII of 1963. An
Explanation was added by Act No. 4 of
1969 with retrospective effect. Major
amendment came to be made by U.P. Act
No. 20 of 1982 inasmuch as, in sub
section(1) the words "other than an
interlocutory order" were inserted w.e.f.
10.11.1980. The explanation inserted in
1969 was re-numbered as Explanation- (1)
by Act No. 20 of 1982 w.e.f. 10.11.1980
and then Explanation(2) was added w.e.f.
10.11.1980.

15. Presently, Section 48 reads as
under:

"48. Revision and reference.-(1)
The Director of Consolidation may call for
and examine the record of any case decided
or proceedings taken by any subordinate
authority for the purpose of satisfying
himself as to the regularity of the
proceedings; or as to the correctness,
legality or propriety of any order [other
than interlocutory order] passed by such
authority in the case of proceedings and
may, after allowing the parties concerned
an opportunity of being heard, make such
order in the case of proceedings as he
thinks fit.

(2) Powers under Sub-section (1)
may be exercised by the Director of
Consolidation also on a reference under
Sub-section (3).

(3) Any authority subordinate to
the Director of Consolidation may, after
allowing
the
parties
concerned
an
opportunity of being heard, refer the record
of any case or proceedings to the Director
of
Consolidation
for
action
under
subsection (1).

Explanation (1)-For the purposes
of
this
section,
Settlement
Officer,
Consolidation,
Consolidation
Officers,
Assistant
Consolidation
Officers,
Consolidator and Consolidation Lekhpals
shall be subordinate to the Director of
Consolidation.

Explanation (2). For the purpose
of this section the expression 'interlocutory
order' in relation to a case or proceedings,
means such order deciding any matter
arising in such case or proceeding or
collateral thereto as does not have the effect
3 All. Angad Pratap Singh & Ors. Vs. Deputy Director Consolidation/Addl. District Magistrate
 (F/R), Lakhimpur Kheri & Ors.
193
of finally disposing of such case or
proceeding.

Explanation (3).-The power under
this section to examine the correctness,
legality or propriety of any order includes
the power to examine any finding, whether
of fact or law, recorded by any subordinate
authority, and also includes the power to reappreciate
any
oral
or
documentary
evidence."

(emphasis added)

16. Section 48 as it was initially
enacted came to be considered in Sher
Singh
(dead) Vs.
Joint
Director
of
Consolidation
and
others
MANU/SC/0514/1978 : (1978) 3 SCC 172.
The Court observed that a bare reading
show that it is pari materia with Section
115
CPC
which
confines
revisional
jurisdiction of High Court to cases of
illegal or irregular exercise or non exercise
or illegal assumption of jurisdiction by
subordinate Courts. If a subordinate court is
found to possess the jurisdiction to decide a
matter, it cannot be said to exercise it
illegally or with' material irregularity even
it decides the matter wrongly. Relying on
the cases interpreting Section 115 CPC, the
Court
held
that
whatever
revisional
jurisdiction was available to High Court
under Section 115, the same was the scope
of revisional jurisdiction of DDC under
Section 48 and it has no jurisdiction to go
into errors of facts. The Court said that an
erroneous decision on a question of fact or
of law reached by subordinate court which
has no relation to question of jurisdiction of
that court, cannot be corrected by High
Court under Section 115 CPC and same
would apply to DDC under Section 48. The
Court further observed that consolidation
authorities subordinate to Joint Director
possess
plenary
jurisdiction
and
competence to go into the question of
correctness or otherwise of entries in
revenue records. If there are concurrent
findings of fact of two Courts, which do not
leave any ground, as observed above, in
revisional jurisdiction, interference by Joint
Director of Consolidation would not be
competent. In para 16 of the judgment, the
Court said:

"Thus
the
subordinate
Consolidation authorities not having acted
illegally in exercising their jurisdiction, the
Joint Director of Consolidation was not
competent to interfere with their decisions."

17. Section 48 as amended in
1963 then came to be considered in
Ramakant Singh Vs. Deputy Director of
Consolidation,
U.P.
and
others
MANU/UP/0026/1975 : AIR 1975 All 126
but therein the Court while considering
Section 48(1), to the question, whether
Deputy Director of Consolidation, once has
called for record, is it incumbent on him to
decide the matter on merit or it can decline
and dismiss the revision on any technical
ground like lack of impleadment of proper
party etc.

18. Amended section 48 in 1963,
then came to be considered in Shanti
Prakash Gupta Vs. DDC 1981 SCC (Suppl)
73. Therein the Court observed that Section
48 as then stood, vide amendment of 1963,
was wider than Section 115 CPC. However,
it proceeded to hold that Director should
not lightly interfere with discretion of C.O.
unless the order sought to be reversed is
palpably erroneous or likely to cause
miscarriage of justice. To the same effect
and
imposing
similar
restriction,
observations were made in Ram Dular Vs.
Dy.
Director
of
Consolidation
MANU/SC/1004/1994 : (1994) Supp(2)
SCC 198 as under:

"It is clear that the Director had
power to satisfy himself as to the legality of
the proceedings or as to the correctness of
the proceedings or correctness, legality or
194 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
propriety
of
any
order
other
than
interlocutory
order
passed
by
the
authorities
under
the
Act.
But
in
considering the correctness, legality or
propriety of the order or correctness of the
proceedings or regularity thereof it cannot
assume to itself the jurisdiction of the
original authority as a fact-finding authority
by appreciating for itself of those facts de
novo. It has to consider whether the legally
admissible
evidence
had
not
been
considered by the authorities in recording a
finding of fact or law or the conclusion
reached by it is based on no evidence, any
patent illegality or impropriety had been
committed or there was any procedural
irregularity, which goes to the root of the
matter, had been committed in recording
the order or finding."

19. A slight different observation
came to be made in Preetam Singh Vs.
Assistant Director of Consolidation and
others MANU/SC/0742/1996 : (1996) 2
SCC 270 where the Court said:

"When the matter was in revision
before
the
Assistant
director
(Consolidation), he had the entire matter
before him and his jurisdiction was
unfettered. While in seisin of the matter in
his revisional jurisdiction, he was in
complete control and in position to test the
correctness of the order made by the
Settlement
Officer
(Consolidation)
effecting remand. In other words, in
exercise of revisional jurisdiction the
Assistant Director (Consolidation) could
examine the finding recorded by the
Settlement Officer as to the abandonment
of the land in dispute by those tenants who
had been recorded at the crucial time in the
Khasra of 1359 Fasli. That power as a
superior court the Assistant Director
(Consolidation) had, even if the remand
order of the Settlement Officer had not
been specifically put to challenge in
separate and independent proceedings. It is
noteworthy that the Court of the Assistant
Director (Consolidation) is a court of
revisional jurisdiction otherwise having suo
moto power to correct any order of the
subordinate officer. In this situation the
Assistant Director (Consolidation) should
not have felt fettered in doing complete
justice between the parties when the entire
matter was before him. The war of
legalistics fought in the High Court was of
no material benefit to the appellants. A
decision on merit covering the entire
controversy was due from the Assistant
Director (Consolidation). (para-6)
(emphasis added)

20. Yet in Ram Avtar Vs. Ram
Dhani, MANU/SC/0034/1997 : AIR 1997
SC 107, the Court, in para 8, observed:

"This
Court
has
repeatedly
pointed out that howsoever wide the power
under statutory revision may be in contrast
to Section 115 of the Code of Civil
Procedure, still while exercising that power
the authority concerned cannot act as a
Court of appeal so as to appreciate the
evidence on record for recording findings
on question of fact."

21. These observations again put
the things in the shape bringing the scope
of jurisdiction under Section 48 nearer to
jurisdiction as contained in Section 115
CPC.

22. Section 48(1) as it stood
before
its
amendment
in
1963
and
subsequent thereto, both came to be noticed
in Sheshmani and another vs. The Deputy
Director of Consolidation, District Basti,
U.P. and others MANU/SC/0079/2000 :
2000(2) SCC 523. Referring to earlier
decision in Sher Singh Vs. Joint Director of
Consolidation (supra) and Ram Dular Vs.
DDC
(supra)
and
the
intervening
amendment,
the
Court
followed
the
observations made in Ram Dular, as
3 All. Angad Pratap Singh & Ors. Vs. Deputy Director Consolidation/Addl. District Magistrate
 (F/R), Lakhimpur Kheri & Ors.
195
noticed above and then upheld the order
passed by DDC holding that orders of CO.
and Additional Settlement Consolidation
Officer were against settled principles of
law, therefore, DDC was justified in
exercise of revisional power, for coming to
a different conclusion.

23. It is in these circumstances,
Legislature
intervened
by
inserting
Explanation-3, by U.P. Act No. 3 of 2002,
giving effect from 10.11.1980 but in Karan
Singh Vs. DDC 2003(94) RD 382 this
Court said that even after addition of
Explanation-3, DDC cannot substitute its
own finding in place of subordinate
authorities.

24. Recent decision in Jagdamba
Prasad
Vs.
Kripa
Shankar
MANU/SC/0274/2014 : (2014) 5 SCC 707
which has also considered Section 48 as
amended in 1963, in para 15, following the
earlier decision in Sher Singh Vs. Joint
Director of Consolidation (supra) it has
said:

"15. According to the legal
principle laid down by this Court in the
case mentioned above, the power of the
Revisional Authority under Section 48 of
the Act only extends to ascertaining
whether the subordinate courts have
exceeded their jurisdiction in coming to the
conclusion. Therefore, if the Original and
Appellate Authorities are within their
jurisdiction,
the
Revisional
Authority
cannot exceed its jurisdiction to come to a
contrary conclusion by admitting new facts
either in the form of documents or
otherwise, to come to the conclusion.
Therefore, we answer point no. 1 in favour
of the appellants by holding that the
Revisional
Authority
exceeded
its
jurisdiction under Section 48 of the Act by
admitting documents at revision stage and
altering the decision of the subordinate
courts."

25. It is thus difficult to observe
that Explanation III to Section 48 has
brought the scope of revision at par with
the appellate jurisdiction so as to assess the
evidence on pure issue of fact and
recording findings de novo. Revisional
power is not a power of first or second
appellate Court which are final Courts of
fact and findings recorded therein would be
possible to be interfered under Section 48
on the ground discussed in Ram Dular
(Supra), Sheshmani (Supra) and Jagdamba
Prasad (supra).

26. Impugned orders in these
matters are all subsequent to 1980 and,
therefore, could be governed by aforesaid
provision as it is. Sub Section (1) of
Section 48 in effect deals revisional power
while sub sections (2) and (3) relate to
reference made by an authority subordinate
to Director of Consolidation. From a bare
and plain reading of Section 48(1) it is
evident that Director of Consolidation has
been given power to call for and examine
any case decided or proceedings taken by
any subordinate authority for the purpose
of satisfying himself (i) to the regularity of
the proceedings and (ii) to the correctness,
legality or propriety of any order."

11. In the judgment dated 18.06.2015
passed
in
Writ
Petition
No.
436
(Consolidation) of 2015 (Prem Nath and
others
vs.
D.D.C.,
Barabanki
and
others), this Court observed as under:-

"Appeal under Section 11 and
Revision under Section 48 of Act 1953 are
two distinct statutory remedies. The scope
of the two remedies is also different.
Powers of revision under Section 48 and
appeal under Section 11 are distinct. The
appellate powers are of wider amplitude.
Howsoever wide the power under Section
48 may be, even after amendment made in
196 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
the year 2002, it does not permit the
revisional authority to summon the records
and decide the merits of an appeal pending
before the SOC under Section 11 without
the appellate authority having passed any
order deciding the appeal or an order
deciding any matter which has the effect of
disposing of the appeal. Such action is
destructive of the statutory remedy of
appeal under the Act 1953. No doubt, the
DDC has suo moto powers under Section
48 but it does not mean that he can call for
the record of appeal pending before the
SOC and decide the same on merits without
the appellate authority having decided the
same. Reference may be had in this regard
to a decision of this Court in the case of
Ranjeet and others Vs. Dy. Director of
Consolidation Ballia and others reported in
1999(90) RD 363 wherein during pendency
of appeal against an order of subordinate
authority a revision was filed before the
DDC under Section 48 against the same
order.
Reliance
was
placed
by
the
respondents therein upon various decision
including a Full Bench decision of this
Court in the case of Ramakant Singh Vs.
Deputy Director of Consolidation, reported
in 1974 (suppl.) RD 262. This Court, after
considering the said Full Bench and other
decisions, held as under:--

"6. The facts of these three cases
relied upon by the learned counsel for the
respondent no. 2 are different, in all these
three cases the appeal before the Settlement
Officer was not pending, in the instant case,
as seen above the appeal and cross-appeals
were pending before the Settlement Officer
(Consolidation), the petitioners specifically
urged before the Deputy Director of
Consolidation that in view of the pendency
of the appeal, the revision was not
maintainable. The present case is a case
where the jurisdiction exercised by the
Deputy
Director
of
Consolidation
is
destructive of the statutory remedy of
appeal and it is a fit case which calls for
interference in petitions under Articles
226/227 of the Constitution of India."

In another case reported in [2007
(102) RD 250] Chhakku Ram and others
Vs. Deputy Director of Consolidation,
Varanasi and others a revision was filed
under Section 48 challenging the order of
SOC dismissing the appeal on the ground
of limitation. The issue was as to whether
while considering validity of the order
passed by the SOC the revisional authority
could have considered and decided the
merits of the controversy also. This Court
again after considering the Full Bench
decision in Ramakant Singh's case (supra)
held as under:--

"3. Counsel for the respondents
Sri Sankatha Rai assisted by Sri Pradip Rai
made two submissions on the point of
maintainability. First that even if the
Deputy Director of Consolidation has not
given any specific finding regarding the
condonation of delay the delay would be
deemed to have been condoned by him
when he entered into the merits of the case.
On this point he relied a decision in M. B.
Shah V. B. N. Agarwal (AIR 2002 SC 451).
This decision has no application to the
present case. It is not in dispute that the
revision, which was filed by respondent
No. 2 was within time against the order of
the Settlement Officer Consolidation. It
was the appeal before the Settlement
Officer Consolidation, which had been
dismissed on the ground of limitation. It is
also submitted that the record of the case
was before the Deputy Director of
Consolidation and he could, therefore,
decide the case on merits. In support
reliance is placed upon the Full Bench
decision of this Court in Ramakant Singh
V. Deputy Director of Consolidation (AIR
1975 Alld. 126). In that case the question
3 All. Angad Pratap Singh & Ors. Vs. Deputy Director Consolidation/Addl. District Magistrate
 (F/R), Lakhimpur Kheri & Ors.
197
referred was whether after the record is
called for under section 48 the Deputy
Director of Consolidation can dismiss the
revision
for
non-impleadment
of
a
necessary party in the memorandum of
revision or he can decide the case after
hearing the party not impleaded. It was
held that after the record has been
examined
the
Deputy
Director
of
Consolidation can exercise the revisional
jurisdiction suo moto and take appropriate
decision after hearing the affected parties.
The Full Bench further holds that if the
revision application is not defective the
exercise of the revisional jurisdiction shall
be at the instance of the parties and not suo
moto. In the present case the revision was
not defective. The exercise of jurisdiction
was therefore at the instance of the
petitioner and not suo moto. The Deputy
Director of Consolidation was therefore
required to examine the correctness of the
order
of
the
Settlement
Officer
Consolidation dismissing the appeal on the
ground of limitation, which was the order
challenged and not the merits of the chak
allotment. Counsel for the petitioners relied
upon a decision of this Court in Bashir
Ahmad Khan V. Deputy Director of
Consolidation,
Ghazipur
and
others
(2005(98) RD 378) in which this Court in
similar circumstances has taken the view
that the proper course for the Deputy
Director of Consolidation in a revision
against an order of Settlement Officer
Consolidation dismissing the appeal on the
question of limitation is to examine the
correctness of that order. It appears from
the facts and circumstances of this case too
the proper course to be adopted by the
Deputy Director of Consolidation was to
examine the correctness of the order of the
Settlement Officer Consolidation, which he
failed to do. As regards the merits also I
find that the order of the Deputy Director
of Consolidation cannot be sustained. The
contention of the learned counsel for the
petitioners is that the loss, which would be
occasioned to the petitioners by the
modification in the chaks made by the
Deputy Director of Consolidation has not
been considered. Reliance is placed upon
the averments made in paragraph 6 of the
writ petition in which it is stated that there
is a house of the petitioner No. 2 adjoining
plot No. 368. If it be true that the petitioner
No. 2 does have his house adjoining plot
No. 368 it would be a circumstance in
favour of the petitioner No. 2 for allotment
of a chak near his abadi. No opinion,
however, is being expressed by this Court
upon this point as it is proposed to remand
the case to the Deputy Director of
Consolidation for fresh decision."

In the case at hand there has been
no adjudication by the SOC either of the
appeal in entirety or of any matter/issue.
Even after amendment in the year 2002 and
addition of explanation 3 to Section 48 the
revisional authority is not empowered to
adopt the course of action as done by him
in this case. Explanation 3 only empowers
him to enter into the question of fact to
examine any finding recorded by the
subordinate authority whether on fact or
law and in this context it includes the
power to re-appreciate the evidence for the
purpose of examination of correctness,
legality or propriety of any such finding. It
does not mean that the revisional authority
can call for the records of the appellate
authority and decide the appeal himself in
exercise of his revisional powers without
any finding having been recorded by the
appellate authority or appeal itself having
been decided. Reference may be made in
this regard to the pronouncement made by
this Court in the case of Karan Singh
(Dead) Through L. Rs. Vs. Deputy Director
of Consolidation, Aligarh and others,
198 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
reported in [2003(94) RD 382 wherein after
noticing the decision of the apex court in
Gaya Deen (D) through L.Rs and others
Vs. Hanuman Prasad (D) through L. Rs and
others reported in [2001 (92) RD 79 (SC)
as also the amendment of 2002 the Court
held in para 6 as under:--

"...... The amendment of Section
48 of the Act has widened the scope of the
powers
of
the
Deputy
Director
of
Consolidation. It has given power to him to
reappraise the evidence but it nowhere
provided that the Deputy Director of
Consolidation will have jurisdiction to
reverse the findings recorded by the
authorities below and can substitute his
own findings. The Apex Court in Gaya Din
(D) through L.Rs. and others Vs. Hanuman
Prasad (D) through L.Rs. and others
[(2001(92) RD 79 (SC)] specifically laid
down
that
the
Deputy
Director
of
Consolidation has got no jurisdiction to act
as the Consolidation Officer or the
Settlement
Officer
Consolidation,
otherwise there will remain no difference in
the powers of the Consolidation Officer, the
Settlement Officer Consolidation and the
Deputy Director of Consolidation while
dealing with the cases originally, in appeal
and revision. In case the Deputy Director of
Consolidation was of the opinion that the
findings recorded were bad in law, he could
set aside the same after reappraisal of the
evidence and could remand the case for
decision afresh."

Reference may also be made to
another decision of this Court in the case of
Bashir Ahmad Khan (D) through L. Rs. V.
Deputy Director of Consolidation and
others reported in 2005(1) AWC 924 (Alld)
wherein the question which arose for
consideration was regarding jurisdiction of
the revisional authority to decide a revision
challenging the order of the appellate
authority dismissing the appeal on the
ground of limitation, on merits. A learned
single Judge of this Court referring to a
Division Bench judgment of this Court in
the case of Tirath V. Joint Director of
Consolidation reported in 1985 RD 276
held as under:--

"10. A Division Bench of this
Court vide judgment in the case of Tirath V.
Deputy Director of Consolidation (supra),
answered the question in negative. While
repealing the contention that authority
exercising the power under Section 48 of
the Act have very wide power including
suo moto power and can look into the
record and if there is any defect it can be
corrected by him, it was observed by the
Division Bench as follows:

"In this view of the matter, the
revisional authority was called upon to
examine the record of the case as it pertain to
the appeal before appellate authority. The
principal reason given by the appellate
authority for dismissing the appeal was that it
was barred by time. The revisional authority
had to see whether the order was justified in
law or not. It had to examine whether any
application has been made for condonation of
delay and whether any adequate reason has
been given for the same or not, and whether
the order dismissing the appeal as time barred
was justified in the circumstances of the case
and we would observe here that in a revision
under Section 48 (1) of the Act where there is
no defect in the revision itself to merit its
rejection in limine, the revisional authority
has to confine itself to the decision in the
appeal and the ground given for the decision
in that order. We are further of the opinion
that it was not open to the revisional authority
to go into the question of merits while
exercising the powers conferred under
Section 48 (1) in the above circumstances."

The law laid down by the
Division Bench in the case of Tirath V.
3 All. Angad Pratap Singh & Ors. Vs. Deputy Director Consolidation/Addl. District Magistrate
 (F/R), Lakhimpur Kheri & Ors.
199
Deputy Director of Consolidation (supra) is
squarely applicable to the facts of this case.

11. In the present case also the
order
passed
by
Settlement
Officer
Consolidation was not an adjudication of the
claim of the parties on merits, but an order
dismissing the appeal as barred by limitation.
The Deputy Director of Consolidation
without considering the legality or otherwise,
of the order passed by the Settlement Officer
Consolidation and without setting aside his
findings straightway proceeded to decide the
revision on merits. It was incumbent upon the
Deputy Director of Consolidation to have
considered the order of Settlement Officer
Consolidation refusing to condone the delay
in filing the appeal on its own merit and if
satisfied about the sufficiency of the ground
for delay ought to have set aside the order of
the
Settlement
Officer
Consolidation
dismissing the appeal as time barred and
remand the case back to him to be decided on
merits. It was not open to him to proceed and
decide the revision on merits."

Thus
clearly
the
scope
of
revision under Section 48 and that of
appeal under Section 11 being different
and two separate statutory remedies
having been provided, there being no
adjudication of the appeal nor of any
substantial issue involved therein by the
appellate authority, it was not open for
the Deputy Director of Consolidation to
decide the merits of the pending appeal in
exercise of his powers under Section 48.
It was clearly not the scope of revision
except to the limited extent pointed out
hereinabove. The entire dispute was not
available for adjudication before the
revisional authority.