# Angad Singh & Ors v. D.D.C. Lakhimpur Kheri & Ors

- **Citation:** (2021) 2 ILRA 333
- **Court:** High Court of Judicature at Allahabad
- **Decided:** 2021-02-09
- **Case number:** Consolidation No. 3736 of 2021
- **Bench:** Mrs. Sangeeta Chandra
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/allahabad-high-court/angad-singh-ors-v-d-d-c-lakhimpur-kheri-ors-46742
- **Pages:** 8

## Headnote

A. Civil Law - Consolidation of Holding Act,
1953 - S. 48 - Civil Procedure Code -
Sections
139
to
141
-
Consolidation
proceeding - Applicability of CPC - Nature
of Consolidation authority - Whether it is a
Court - Held, Consolidation Authorities
cannot be said to be Courts although they
may possess some of the 'trappings of a
Court' while hearing and deciding matters
related to title on land - Even if the
consolidation authorities exercised some
judicial functions also, they could not be
said to possess all the attributes of a Court
and could not therefore be considered to be
Courts - Code of Civil Procedure was also
inapplicable to the Consolidation Authorities
in deciding objections, appeals and revisions
- Ram Bharose Lal's case, Sita's case and
Bijai Narain Singh's case followed. (Para 22)
B. Civil Law - Consolidation of Holding Act,
1953 - Section 48 - Fraudulent entry -
Interest of Gao Sabha - No objection of the
authority - Duty of Consolidation officers -
Held, it is the duty of all Consolidation
Courts to look after the interest of the Gaon
Sabha and theSt. or local authority under
Section 11 (c) of the Act, even though no
objection has been filed by such authorities
-
If
the
D.D.C.
on
examination
of
documentary evidence had found that the
entry was a fraudulent entry made to the
detriment of the Gaon Sabha, he was duty
bound to direct for its deletion under the
provisions of the Act. (Para 24)
C. Practice and Procedure - Ubi Jus Ibi
Remedium - Rights of the parties - Remedy
- Role of the Court - Court must always aim
to preserve and protect the rights of the
parties and extend help to enforce them
rather than denying the relief, and thereby
render the rights themselves otiose, 'Ubi Jus
Ibi Remedium', where there is a right there
is a remedy being the basic principles of
jurisprudence. (Para 19)
Writ Petition dismissed. (E-1)
Cases referred :-
334 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES

## Text

2 All. Angad Singh & Ors. Vs. D.D.C. Lakhimpur Kheri & Ors.
333
Act of 2016 and would give rise to the
anarchy, existing earlier, in the hands of
Promoters.

24. So far as challenge to Rule 24 (a) of
U.P. Real Estate Regulatory Authority
(General) Regulation, 2019 is concerned, the
issue is kept open. It has not been debated for
the reason that an order of the nature
provided under Regulation 24 (a) has not
been passed in the case in hand. Thus, there is
no occasion for the petitioner to challenge the
vires of the said Regulation in these
proceedings However, as and when the
Authority invokes Regulation 24 (a) of
Regulation, 2019, the liberty is given to
challenge the validity. Thus, issue is kept
open for the aforesaid.

25. Thus, for all the reasons, we are
unable to accept any of the arguments raised
by the counsel for the petitioner. The writ
petition is accordingly dismissed, however,
with the liberty to avail the remedy of appeal
if other than the issue decided by us remains,
which may include the issue towards interest.
----------
(2021)02ILR A333
ORIGINAL JURISDICTION
CIVIL SIDE
DATED: LUCKNOW 09.02.2021

BEFORE

THE HON'BLE MRS. SANGEETA CHANDRA, J.

Consolidation No. 3736 of 2021

Angad Singh & Ors. ...Petitioners
Versus
D.D.C. Lakhimpur Kheri & Ors.
 ...Respondents

Counsel for the Petitioners:
Anoop Srivastava

Counsel for the Respondents:
C.S.C., Pankaj Gupta

A. Civil Law - Consolidation of Holding Act,
1953 - S. 48 - Civil Procedure Code -
Sections
139
to
141
-
Consolidation
proceeding - Applicability of CPC - Nature
of Consolidation authority - Whether it is a
Court - Held, Consolidation Authorities
cannot be said to be Courts although they
may possess some of the 'trappings of a
Court' while hearing and deciding matters
related to title on land - Even if the
consolidation authorities exercised some
judicial functions also, they could not be
said to possess all the attributes of a Court
and could not therefore be considered to be
Courts - Code of Civil Procedure was also
inapplicable to the Consolidation Authorities
in deciding objections, appeals and revisions
- Ram Bharose Lal's case, Sita's case and
Bijai Narain Singh's case followed. (Para 22)
B. Civil Law - Consolidation of Holding Act,
1953 - Section 48 - Fraudulent entry -
Interest of Gao Sabha - No objection of the
authority - Duty of Consolidation officers -
Held, it is the duty of all Consolidation
Courts to look after the interest of the Gaon
Sabha and theSt. or local authority under
Section 11 (c) of the Act, even though no
objection has been filed by such authorities
-
If
the
D.D.C.
on
examination
of
documentary evidence had found that the
entry was a fraudulent entry made to the
detriment of the Gaon Sabha, he was duty
bound to direct for its deletion under the
provisions of the Act. (Para 24)
C. Practice and Procedure - Ubi Jus Ibi
Remedium - Rights of the parties - Remedy
- Role of the Court - Court must always aim
to preserve and protect the rights of the
parties and extend help to enforce them
rather than denying the relief, and thereby
render the rights themselves otiose, 'Ubi Jus
Ibi Remedium', where there is a right there
is a remedy being the basic principles of
jurisprudence. (Para 19)
Writ Petition dismissed. (E-1)
Cases referred :-
334 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
1. Jadu Nandan Ram Vs Parsotam Ginning Co.
Ltd, AIR 1930 ALL 636
2. Ajeet Gupta Vs Mukteshwari Nigam, 1985 (3)
LCD 68
3. Puran Singh Vs St. of Punj., (1996) 2 SCC
205
4. Sardar Amarjeet Singh Kalra (Dead) by L.R.&
ors. Vs Pramod Gupta (Dead) by L.R. & ors.,
(2003) 3 SCC 272
5. Ram Bharose Lal Vs Deputy Director of
Consolidation UP Fatehpur, 1964 RD 441
6. Sita & ors. Vs St. of U.P. & ors. , 1968 ALJ
144
7. Bijai Narain Singh Vs St. of U.P., 1969 ALJ
862
8. Thakur Jugal Kishore Sinha Vs Sitamarhi
Central Cooperative bank Ltd, AIR 1967 SC 1494
(Delivered by Hon'ble Mrs. Sangeeta
Chandra, J.)

(Oral)

1. Heard Sri Anoop Srivastava,
learned counsel for the petitioners, Sri
Upendra Singh, learned standing counsel
and Sri Dilip Kumar, learned counsel
appearing on behalf of the Gaon Sabha.

2. This petition has been filed
challenging the order dated 13.01.2021
passed
by
the
Deputy
Director
of
Consolidation, Nighasan, Lakhimpur Kheri,
in Revision No.2627 under Section 48(3) of
the Consolidation of Holdings Act on an
application made by one Muneem Singh
dated 07.06.2012, wherein the DDC has
found on consideration of all documentary
evidence that a fraudulent entry had been
made in C.H. Form 45 with regard to the land
of Gata No.1054 ad-measuring 7.70 acres
which had continued to be recorded for the
past several years as Naveen Parti land and
on which the Gaon Sabha, Land Management
Committee had granted pattas to several
persons including the applicant Muneem
Singh.

3. The Land Management Committee
Village Teliyar had made proposal on
17.10.2007 to the Sub Divisional Officer
Nighasan,
which
was
approved
on
13.10.2007 for grant of patta to the applicants
Muneem Singh and others of 0.202 hectares
each. When the Revenue Officials of the
Tehsil
concerned
tried
to
hand
over
possession of the land given on patta, the
father of petitioners herein Shiv Prasad
stopped
them
from
delivering
such
possession saying that the land was recorded
in his name as Bhumidhar with transferable
rights.

4. At the time of grant of leases/ pattas,
the land had been recorded in Naveen Parti
Khata of Gaon Sabha but due to connivance
of officials of the Revenue Department, the
land was recorded in the name of the
petitioner as his Bhumidhari.

5. The petitioners' case is that the order
which has been set aside by the DDC was
passed on 10.08.1987 in Revision No.2627
under Section 48(3) in a case filed by Shiv
Prasad s/o Balkhera, the father of the
petitioners, with regard to Gata No.1054 M
area 1.70 and Gata No.1026 M area 1.00. The
application for recall was filed by the
respondent nos.2 to 5 after 25 years in 2012
and Shiv Prasad after being served notice had
also appeared and his counsel had filed his
power. The application was dismissed for
non-prosecution
on
one
occasion
and
thereafter its restoration was allowed by the
DDC without issuing any fresh notice to Shiv
Prasad, as a result whereof he could not
appear to plead his case.

6. It has also been submitted by
learned counsel for the petitioners that in
2 All. Angad Singh & Ors. Vs. D.D.C. Lakhimpur Kheri & Ors.
335
the meantime the father of the petitioners,
namely, Shiv Prasad, the erstwhile tenure
holder, died on 20.10.2020 and the order
has been passed against a dead person and
is thus a nullity in law in view of the
observations made by Hon'ble Supreme
Court in Jadu Nandan Ram Vs. Parsotam
Ginning Co. Ltd; AIR 1930 ALL 636,
which has been relied upon by the Coordinate Bench of this Court in the case of
Ajeet Gupta Vs. Mukteshwari Nigam; 1985
(3) LCD 68.

7. Learned counsel for the petitioners
has placed before this Court paragraph-15
of the judgment rendered by the Coordinate Bench in Ajeet Gupta (supra), to
say that since the order impugned has been
passed by the DDC without noticing the
fact that Shiv Prasad, the recorded tenure
holder was dead, such order cannot be said
to have been legally passed and ought to be
set aside by this Court.

8. This Court on perusal of the order
impugned finds that the applicants therein,
the respondent nos.2 to 5 on being granted
patta had approached the Revenue Officials
for delivery of possession but when
delivery of possession was attempted, the
petitioners'
predecessor-in-interest
had
stopped them from taking possession.
Thereafter, when the revenue records were
examined, it was found that since past
several years, the land in question had been
recorded as Naveen Parti land but in the
Khatauni of 1403 to 1408 Fasli, the name
of Shiv Prasad was recorded as Bhumidhar
with transferable rights. It came into the
knowledge of the applicant that it was on
the basis of a entry made in C.H. Form 45.
A restoration application was filed praying
for recall of order dated 10.08.1987 without
further delay. The predecessor-in-interest
Shiv Prasad had appeared on service of
notice through registered post and had filed
his Advocate's power also and when the
case was taken up, an objection was filed
on 25.04.2015 saying that in a Revision
made earlier bearing No.2627, the order of
the DDC had been passed and after 25
years, no application for restoration/ recall
of such order can be entertained. It was also
stated by father of the petitioners that the
objections
regarding
limitation/
delay
should
be
considered
first
before
proceeding on the merits of the case by the
DDC.

9. The DDC therefore, looked into the
delay
and
the
merits
of
the
case
simultaneously while passing the order
impugned. In the order impugned, the DDC
after examining documentary evidence has
come to the conclusion that C.H. Form 45
on which the entry of the petitioners' father
was alleged to have been made was not
deposited along with other records relating
to consolidation operations in the Revenue
Record Room. The report of the Revenue
Record Keeper dated 29.11.2014 stated
clearly that neither any case of the number
as referred to hereinabove i.e. Revision
No.2627 under Section 48(3) was ever filed
nor it was registered nor there was any
evidence of it having been ever heard, or
such order having been passed by the DDC.
Moreover, Shiv Prasad, the father of the
petitioners also not produced the certified
copy of the order allegedly made on C.H.
Form 45.

10. It was also found by the DDC on
examination of the copy of the order dated
10.08.1987 produced before him by Shiv
Prasad that going against the settled
practice of scoring out blank spaces of C.H.
Form 45 to prevent fraudulent entries; in
the case of the father of the petitioners, the
line that was diagonally drawn to score out
336 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
the empty space was somehow managed in
such a manner that the entry came to be
recorded in the empty space just before the
diagonal
line.
It
was
apparently
a
fraudulent entry.

11. This Court has perused annexure-2,
which is a copy of C.H. Form 45, and does
not find any infirmity in the observations
made by the DDC with regard to the entry
being fraudulent as it is apparent to the naked
eye that it has been managed to be
transcribed in such a manner that it fits into
the empty space of the diagonal line drawn
scoring out the page.

12. The DDC has also referred to the
judgment of this Court and of the Board of
Revenue, namely, 2010 (110) R.D. 736
Daharilal and others Vs. DDC and others,
and 2007 (102) RD 564 Hiralal Vs. Shambhu
Prasad and others, wherein it was observed
that an order obtained by playing fraud can
be set aside and as such there is no embargo
of limitation for setting aside such an order,
and also that the person playing fraud should
not be benefited in the garb of the intricacies
and technicalities of law.

13. The DDC in the order impugned
has also referred to the judgment rendered by
Hon'ble Supreme Court in Gama Vs. Board
of Revenue; 2015 (126) R.D. 334, wherein
the Supreme Court has observed that
limitation starts running from the date when
the fraud is discovered for the first time by
the aggrieved person. Admittedly, the fraud
was discovered only after the respondent
nos.2 to 5 were granted patta by the Land
Management Committee and an attempt was
made by the revenue officials to deliver
possession of land in question to the allottees.

14. The DDC has also referred to the
provisions of Consolidation of Holdings
Act wherein Section 48(3) provides for a
Reference to be made and a Revision is
entertained only under Section 48(1). There
was no Reference ever made by any
Subordinate consolidation court under
Section 48(3) of the Act. The order
impugned does not suffer from any
illegality or infirmity.

15. This Court now comes to the
objection taken by learned counsel for the
petitioners that the order impugned was
passed against a dead person as Shiv Prasad
had died on 20.10.2020 and the order was
passed on 13.01.2021.

16. It is apparent that after 2015 when
the petitioners' father had filed his
objection to the application for recall/
restoration, he had not appeared nor did his
counsel appear before the DDC during
hearing of the case.

17. The Supreme Court in Puran
Singh vs State of Punjab, (1996) 2 SCC
205, was considering the appeal against an
order passed by the High Court dismissing
the
writ
petition
arising
out
of
consolidation proceedings on the ground
that the legal heirs and representatives of
one Bir Singh who was the beneficiary of
the order impugned and had died during the
pendency of the writ petition, had not been
substituted. The Supreme Court placed
reliance upon judgement rendered in
Girijanandini Devi versus Bijendra Narain
Choudhary 1967 (1) SCR 93 and observed
in paragraph-4:- "Personal action dies with
the death of the person on the maxim action
personalis moritur cum persona. But this
operates only in a limited class of actions
Ex delicto, such as action for damages for
defamation, assault or other personal
injuries not causing the death of the parties,
and in other cases where after the death of
2 All. Angad Singh & Ors. Vs. D.D.C. Lakhimpur Kheri & Ors.
337
the party the granting of the relief would be
nugatory (Girijanandini Devi vs Bijendra
Narain Choudhary), but there are other
cases where the right to sue survives in
spite of the death of the person against
whom the proceeding had been initiated
and such right continues to exist against the
legal representatives of the deceased who
was a party to the proceedings. Order 22 of
the Code deals with this aspect of the
matter. Rule 1 of Order 22 says that the
death of a plaintiff or defendant shall not
cause the suit to abate as the right to sue
survives. That is why whenever a party to a
suit dies, the first question which is to be
decided is as to whether the right to sue
survives or not. If the right is held to be a
personal right which is extinguished with
the death of the person concerned and does
not devolve on the legal representatives or
successors, then it is an end of the suit.
Such suit therefore cannot be continued.
But if the right to sue survives against the
legal
representatives
of
the
original
defendant, then procedures have been
prescribed in order 22 to bring the legal
representative on record within the time
prescribed....". The Court went on to
observe that with regard to proceedings
under Article 226 and 227 of the
Constitution, an Explanation has been
added by way of amendment in 1976 to
Section 141 of the C.P.C. clarifying that
Section 141 shall not be applicable to
proceedings under Article 226 of the
Constitution of India.

18. Section 141 of the Civil Procedure
Code provides that the "procedure provided
in this Code in regard to suits shall be
followed, as far as it can be made
applicable, in all proceedings in any court
of
civil
jurisdiction."
However,
the
Supreme Court considered the question in
greater detail and observed that it cannot be
said that the High Court can pass an order
without hearing the legal representatives of
such deceased respondent even in cases
where the right to sue survives against the
legal representatives of such deceased
respondent. If such legal representative is
not brought on record, any order passed
against the original respondent after his
death shall not be binding on them because
they have not been heard. The order of the
High Court shall be deemed to have been
passed against a dead person. If the right of
the petitioner to pursue the remedy survives
even after the death of the original
respondent to the writ petition, then on the
same principle even the right to contest that
claim survives on the part of the legal
representative of the deceased respondent.
In such a situation, after the death of the
respondent if the right to sue survives
against the legal representatives of such a
respondent, then the petitioner has to
substitute the legal representative of such
respondent before the writ petition can
proceed and can be heard and disposed of.
The petitioner has to take steps for
substitution of legal representative within a
reasonable time.......". The Court dismissed
the appeal filed by the writ petitioners on
this ground alone that they failed to
substitute the respondent tenant by his legal
heirs.

19. The Supreme Court considered
the applicability of Section 141 again in
Sardar Amarjeet Singh Kalra (Dead) by
L.R. and others Vs Pramod Gupta (Dead)
by L.R. and others, (2003) 3 SCC 272. The
Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court
observed that even in cases where Order 22
of C.P.C. is applicable, also assuming that
the decree appealed against or challenged is
joint and inseverable, as and when it is
found necessary to interfere with the
judgement and decree challenged before it,
338 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
the Court can always declare the legal
position in general and restrict the ultimate
relief to be granted by confining it to those
before the Court only, rather than denying
the relief to one and all on account of a
procedural lapse or action or inaction of
one of the other parties before it. As far as
possible, the Court must always aim to
preserve and protect the rights of the parties
and extend help to enforce them rather than
denying the relief, and thereby render the
rights themselves otiose, ''Ubi Jus Ibi
Remedium', where there is a right there is a
remedy being the basic principles of
jurisprudence. Such a course would be
more conducive and better conform to a
fair reasonable and proper administration of
justice. "Laws of procedure are meant to
regulate effectively, assist and aid the
object of doing substantial and real justice
and not to foreclose even an adjudication
on merits of substantial rights of citizens
under personal, property and other laws.
Procedure has always been viewed as a
handmaiden of justice and meant to
hamper the cause of justice or lead to
miscarriage of justice." The Supreme Court
further observed that the "interest of justice
would have been better served had the
High Court adopted a positive and
constructive approach then merely scuttled
the whole process to foreclose adjudication
of the claims of others on merits. The
rejection by the High Court of the
application
to
set
aside
abatement,
condonation and bringing on record the
legal representatives did not appear to be a
just a reasonable exercise of the Court's
power or in conformity with the object of
the court to do real, effective and
substantial justice. With the march and
progress of law the new horizons explored
and modalities discerned and the fact that
the procedural laws must be liberally
construed to really serve as a handmaiden,
make it workable and advance the ends of
justice, technical objections which tend to
be the stumbling blocks to defeat and deny
substantial and effective justice should be
strictly viewed for being discouraged,
except where the mandate of the law
inevitably necessitates it."

20. Observations made by the
Supreme Court in the case of Puran Singh
(supra) and Sardar Amarjeet Singh Kalra
(supra)
were
made
in
respect
of
applicability of Code of Civil Procedure in
Jurisdiction exercised by the High Court
under Article 226 & 227.

21.

However
this
Court
has
specifically considered the applicability of
section 139 to 141 of the the Civil
Procedure,
to proceedings under
the
Consolidation of Holdings Act. In Ram
Bharose Lal vs Deputy Director of
Consolidation UP Fatehpur, 1964 RD
441, a Division Bench of this Court
considered
the
question
whether
proceedings
before
the
Consolidation
Officer can be termed to be "Court
Proceedings".
The
Division
Bench
observed in paragraph 5 of the report that
"it is not disputed that authorities under the
consolidation of holdings act as tribunals
for the purpose of deciding controversies
arising under the Act. All Tribunals
however, are not Courts and the question
which has fallen for our consideration is
whether these authorities are courts. For
finding this out an examination of the
provisions of the Act which may furnish
clues one way or the other appears to be
essential."

22. The Division Bench thereafter
referred to the provisions of the Act and
also to the judgements of the Supreme
Court which refer to Courts "as those
2 All. Angad Singh & Ors. Vs. D.D.C. Lakhimpur Kheri & Ors.
339
Tribunal which are set up in an organised
state for the administration of justice. "By
administration of justice is meant the
exercise of judicial power of the State to
maintain and uphold and to punish wrongs,
whenever there is an infringement of a
right or an injury, the Courts are there to
restore the Vinculum Juris which is
disturbed". After examining English Case
Law also the Division Bench came to the
conclusion that even if section 40 of the
Consolidation of Holdings Act provides
that proceedings before the Settlement
Officer
Consolidation,
Consolidation
Officer and Assistant Consolidation Officer
shall be deemed to be judicial proceedings
within the meaning of Sections 193 and
228 for the purposes of Section 196 of the
Indian Penal Code, and Section 41 provides
that the provisions of Chapter IX and X of
the U.P. Land Revenue Act 1901 shall
apply to all proceedings under the Act, the
Consolidation Authorities cannot be said to
be Courts although they may possess some
of the "trappings of a Court" while hearing
and deciding matters related to title on
land. The observations made by the
Division Bench in Ram Bharose Lal
(supra) were affirmed by a Full Bench of
this Court in Sita and others vs. State of
U.P. and others; 1968 ALJ 144, and were
reconsidered
in
another
Full
Bench
decision of this court in Bijai Narain Singh
vs. State of U.P. reported in 1969 ALJ 862.
In the decision rendered by the Full Bench
in Bijai Narain Singh (supra), the Full
Bench of this Court considered the
Consolidation of
Holdings
Act
after
amendments were carried out in the Act
and the Rules in 1963 and in the light of
subsequent observations made by the
Supreme Court in a judgement rendered in
Thakur Jugal Kishore Sinha vs. Sitamarhi
Central Cooperative bank Ltd, AIR 1967
SC 1494; it nevertheless came to the
conclusion that even if the consolidation
authorities
exercised
some
judicial
functions also, they could not be said to
possess all the attributes of a Court and
could not therefore be considered to be
Courts and the Code of Civil Procedure
was also inapplicable to the Consolidation
Authorities in deciding objections, appeals
and revisions.

23. This Court also finds from the
order impugned that it has been passed
against the record and not against a person.
The order impugned only finds the entry to
be fraudulent and has therefore directed for
its deletion from the records, and even in
the case cited by learned counsel for the
petitioners in Ajeet Gupta (supra), the
Court had observed that it appeared that the
Court had been kept in dark about the death
of
the
predecessor-in-interest
of
the
petitioners in the pending proceeding, and
that is why the mistake crept in.

24. It is the duty of all Consolidation
Courts to look after the interest of the Gaon
Sabha and the State or local authority under
Section 11 (c) of the Act, even though no
objection has been filed by such authorities.
If the DDC on examination of documentary
evidence had found that the entry made out
in favour of the father of the petitioners
was a fraudulent entry made to the
detriment of the Gaon Sabha, he was duty
bound to direct for its deletion under the
provisions of the Act.

25. Moreover, this Court is convinced
that in such a case where illegality and the
fraudulent entry is apparent to the naked
eye, the extraordinary writ jurisdiction
under Article 226 of the Constitution
cannot be exercised in favour of such a
litigant for setting aside the order dated
13.01.2021,
which
would
revive
a
340 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
fraudulent entry dated 10.08.1987 in favour
of the father of the petitioners.

26. This petition stands dismissed.

27. No order as to Costs.
----------
(2021)02ILR A340
ORIGINAL JURISDICTION
CIVIL SIDE
DATED: LUCKNOW 22.02.2021

BEFORE

THE HON'BLE MRS. SANGEETA CHANDRA, J.

Consolidation No. 4933 of 2021

Nandlal & Ors. ...Petitioners
Versus
Chakbandi Adhikari Akbarpur Ambedkar
Nagar & Ors. ...Respondents

Counsel for the Petitioners:
Vijai
Bahadur
Verma,
Pramod
Kr.
Chaudhary

Counsel for the Respondents:
C.S.C., Mohan Singh

A. Civil Law - Consolidation of Holding Act,
1953 - Ss. 9A (2), 10(1) 11C and 52 -
Consolidation of Holding Rules, 1954 -
Rule 109A - Notification u/s 52 issued -
Application
under
Rule
109A
(1)
-
Maintainability - Implementation of the
order passed by the Consolidation Officer
- Jurisdiction of Consolidation authority -
Held, the question is no longer res integra
that even after Section 52 Notification is
issued, the Consolidation Authorities, if
they are present in the District, having
jurisdiction to implement the order passed
by the Consolidation Officer or by any
other Consolidation Authority for which
the consolidation operations would be
deemed to be pending - Necessary
Direction issued. (Para 20, 21 and 22)
Writ Petition disposed of. (E-1)
Cases relied on :-
1. Ramraj Vs Deputy Director of Consolidation,
2002 (93) RD 884
2. Mukhtar Vs Deputy Director of Consolidation,
Azamgarh, 1993 RD 457
3. Raja Ram Vs Deputy Director of Consolidation
& ors., 1982 RD 387
4. Brij Bir Singh Vs Deputy Director of
Consolidation, Ambedkar Nagar & ors., 1987 RD
66
5. Writ Petition No.3438 (Consolidation) of
1981, Mohd. Naimuddin & ors. Vs Deputy
Director of Consolidation, Barabanki, decided on
08.01.2020
6. Raghunath Singh & anr. Vs St. of U.P. & anr.,
1960 RD 337
(Delivered by Hon'ble Mrs. Sangeeta
Chandra, J.)

(Oral)

1. Heard Shri Vijay Bahadur Verma,
learned counsel for the petitioners, Shri
Upendra Singh, learned counsel appearing
for the State-respondents and Shri Mohan
Singh, appearing for the Gaon Sabha and
perused the record.

2. This petition has been filed
challenging the order dated 23.01.2021
passed by the Consolidation Officer,
Akbarpur, District Ambedkar Nagar, under
Rule 109 A (1) of the Rules framed under
the
Consolidation
of
Holdings
Act
hereinafter referred to as Act.

3. It is the case of the petitioners that
the old Gata No.813 Min. admeasuring 2
bigha and 15 Biswansi and old Gata no.875
Min. admeasuring 2 bigha i.e. a total of two
plots of land measuring 4 bighas and 15
Biswansi situated in Village Sudhari,
Mauja
Afjalpur,
Pargana
and
Tehsil
Akbarpur, District Faizabad, later on,