# Angad Tiwari & Anr v. National Insurance Co. Ltd. & Anr

- **Citation:** (2022) 7 ILRA 565
- **Court:** High Court of Judicature at Allahabad
- **Decided:** 2022-05-31
- **Case number:** First Appeal From Order No. 747 of 2013
- **Bench:** J.J. Munir
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/allahabad-high-court/angad-tiwari-anr-v-national-insurance-co-ltd-anr-48803
- **Pages:** 13

## Headnote

(A) Civil Law - Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 -
Sections 168, 173 - UP Motor Vehicles
Rules, 1998 - Rule-220-A(2)(i), 220-A(3),
220-A(3)(iii), 220-A(4) - Indian Penal
Code,1860 - Section-275, 304-A, 337, 338
& 427: - Claimant's Appeal - non-joinder
of party - appreciation of evidence &
factum of accident - denial of liabilities by
insurers - accident cause by offending
vehicle being driven negligently & hit the
tempo at high speed - deceased was died
on spot - owner of truck & driver filed
their DL, Insurance papers, etc - No any
oral
or
documentary
evidence
from
insurance company filed only raise issue
of non-joinder of parties - Tribunal framed
issues
-
after
considering
all
the
documentary & oral evidences, decided all
the issues positively - held, non-joinder of
566 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
the owner & driver of tempo not fatal to
the claim. (Para - 7)

(B) Civil Law - Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 -
Sections 168 & 173 - UP Motor Vehicles
Rules, 1998 - Rule-220-A(2)(i), 220-A(3),
220-A(3)(iii), 220-A(4) - Indian Penal
Code,1860 - Sections 275 & 304-A, 337,
338 & 427 - claimant's Appeal - quantum
of compensation - determination - income
& future prospectus - deceased between
age of 15-20 years - in absence of any
evidence
about
skilled
profession
-
tribunal rightly holds Rs. 100/- per day as
earned by an unskilled labour - income
would be Rs. 3000/- pm - tribunal has
erred in not adding anything towards
entitlement of future prospectus - future
prospects is no longer res interga in view
of law laid down in case of Pranay Shethi'
case - held, future prospects are to be
determined in accordance with the UP
Rules, 1998 which provides a statutory
guide & scale for assessment of such
prospects. (Para - 12, 13)

(C) Civil Law - Motor Vehicles Act, 1988,
Section -168, 173, UP Motor Vehicles
Rules, 1998, Rule-220-A(2)(i), 220-A(3),
220-A(3)(iii),
220-A(4),
Indian
Penal
Code, Section-275, 304-A, 337, 338, 427: -
Claimant's
Appeal
-
quantum
of
compensation - determination - Multiplier
& Deduction - as deceased was in age
bracket of 15-20 years - instead of the
multiplier of '13' should be applied instead
of '18' as per the law laid down in case of
Sarla Verma's as well as being deceased
was bachelor, 50 % is appropriate to be
deducted as personal & living expenses.
(Para - 16, 19)

(D) Civil Law - Motor Vehicles Act, 1988,
Section - 163-A, 168, 173, UP Motor
Vehicles Rules, 1998, Rule 220-A(3), 220A(3)(ii), 220-A(6): - claimant's Appeal -
quantum of compensation - determination
of compensation towards conventional
heads - bearing in mind the price index,
falling bank interest, escalation of rates in
different cases - Rules, 1998 do not serve
as realistic index to award compensation -
as such law laid down in case of Pranay
Sethi would be applicable - hence, appeal
succeeds
&
allowed
with
costs
-
compensation
enhanced
as
from
Rs.
2,54,000 to a sum of Rs. 5,96,000/- with
7% rate of interest - impugned award
modified accordingly. (Para - 22, 24, 34)

Appeal Dismissed. (E-11)

List of Cases cited: -

## Text

_Characters 0–39,694 of 42,871. This is a partial read: ask again with offset=39694 for what follows._

7 All. Angad Tiwari & Anr. Vs. National Insurance Co. Ltd. & Anr.
565
man's identity could be produced by the
insurers by calling him as a witness, or
requesting the Court to ascertain it. Far
from it, no suggestion was given to P.W.1
that the man whom she was identifying was
Satish Kumar.

25. So far as P.W.1 Nanhakai is
concerned, like her son, the first informant
Rupesh Kumar, she was not an eyewitness of the accident and her evidence
that it was Satish Kumar who was
operating the offending vehicle is a remote
hearsay based upon her son's information,
who had himself heard about the fact and
not seen it.

26. On going through a xerox copy of
the record, on the basis of which this appeal
has been heard, this Court did not find any
medical examination report on record
regarding the injuries sustained by Satish
Kumar, on the foot of which, the Tribunal
has remarked that Satish Kumar has
sustained injuries, whereas Rajesh Kumar
has not. There is no other evidence
discernible from the record that led the
Tribunal to say this. The circumstantial
evidence, on the foot of which the Tribunal
has supported its conclusions to hold that it
was Satish Kumar who was operating the
offending vehicle, therefore, also appears to
be unreliable.

27. The conclusion, therefore, would
be that the offending vehicle was ridden by
the owner at the relevant time and not
Satish Kumar. The conclusion, to the
contrary, recorded by the Tribunal is not
sustainable. The owner had a valid driving
license and insurance policy, and there is
no other facet of the quarrel between
parties about a breach of the terms of the
policy, entitling the insurers to be relieved
of their obligation to satisfy the award.

28. In the result, this appeal succeeds
and stands allowed. The impugned award
passed by the Tribunal is modified to the
extent that the compensation awarded and
directed to be paid by the owner shall be
payable by the insurers.

29. Costs easy.
----------
(2022)07ILR A565
APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL SIDE
DATED: LUCKNOW 31.05.2022

BEFORE

THE HON'BLE J.J. MUNIR, J.

First Appeal From Order No. 747 of 2013

Angad Tiwari & Anr. ...Appellants
Versus
National Insurance Co. Ltd. & Anr.
 ...Respondents

Counsel for the Appellants:
Sri Mukesh Singh

Counsel for the Respondents:
Sri Deepak Mehrotra, Sri Vikas Pandey

(A) Civil Law - Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 -
Sections 168, 173 - UP Motor Vehicles
Rules, 1998 - Rule-220-A(2)(i), 220-A(3),
220-A(3)(iii), 220-A(4) - Indian Penal
Code,1860 - Section-275, 304-A, 337, 338
& 427: - Claimant's Appeal - non-joinder
of party - appreciation of evidence &
factum of accident - denial of liabilities by
insurers - accident cause by offending
vehicle being driven negligently & hit the
tempo at high speed - deceased was died
on spot - owner of truck & driver filed
their DL, Insurance papers, etc - No any
oral
or
documentary
evidence
from
insurance company filed only raise issue
of non-joinder of parties - Tribunal framed
issues
-
after
considering
all
the
documentary & oral evidences, decided all
the issues positively - held, non-joinder of
566 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
the owner & driver of tempo not fatal to
the claim. (Para - 7)

(B) Civil Law - Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 -
Sections 168 & 173 - UP Motor Vehicles
Rules, 1998 - Rule-220-A(2)(i), 220-A(3),
220-A(3)(iii), 220-A(4) - Indian Penal
Code,1860 - Sections 275 & 304-A, 337,
338 & 427 - claimant's Appeal - quantum
of compensation - determination - income
& future prospectus - deceased between
age of 15-20 years - in absence of any
evidence
about
skilled
profession
-
tribunal rightly holds Rs. 100/- per day as
earned by an unskilled labour - income
would be Rs. 3000/- pm - tribunal has
erred in not adding anything towards
entitlement of future prospectus - future
prospects is no longer res interga in view
of law laid down in case of Pranay Shethi'
case - held, future prospects are to be
determined in accordance with the UP
Rules, 1998 which provides a statutory
guide & scale for assessment of such
prospects. (Para - 12, 13)

(C) Civil Law - Motor Vehicles Act, 1988,
Section -168, 173, UP Motor Vehicles
Rules, 1998, Rule-220-A(2)(i), 220-A(3),
220-A(3)(iii),
220-A(4),
Indian
Penal
Code, Section-275, 304-A, 337, 338, 427: -
Claimant's
Appeal
-
quantum
of
compensation - determination - Multiplier
& Deduction - as deceased was in age
bracket of 15-20 years - instead of the
multiplier of '13' should be applied instead
of '18' as per the law laid down in case of
Sarla Verma's as well as being deceased
was bachelor, 50 % is appropriate to be
deducted as personal & living expenses.
(Para - 16, 19)

(D) Civil Law - Motor Vehicles Act, 1988,
Section - 163-A, 168, 173, UP Motor
Vehicles Rules, 1998, Rule 220-A(3), 220A(3)(ii), 220-A(6): - claimant's Appeal -
quantum of compensation - determination
of compensation towards conventional
heads - bearing in mind the price index,
falling bank interest, escalation of rates in
different cases - Rules, 1998 do not serve
as realistic index to award compensation -
as such law laid down in case of Pranay
Sethi would be applicable - hence, appeal
succeeds
&
allowed
with
costs
-
compensation
enhanced
as
from
Rs.
2,54,000 to a sum of Rs. 5,96,000/- with
7% rate of interest - impugned award
modified accordingly. (Para - 22, 24, 34)

Appeal Dismissed. (E-11)

List of Cases cited: -

1. Laxmi Devi & ors. Vs Mohammad Tabbar &
anr., (2008) 12 SCC 165

2. National Insurance Co. Vs Pranay Sethi &
ors., (2017) 16 SCC 680

3. New India Assurance Co. Ltd Vs Urmila
Shukla & ors., 2021 SCC OnLine SC 822

4. Sarla Verma Vs DTC, (2009) 6 SCC 121 :
(2009) 2 SCC (Civ) 770 : (2009) 2 SCC (Cri)
1002

5. United India Insurance Company Ltd. Vs
Satinder Kaur @ Satwinder Kaur & ors., 2020
SCC OnLine SC 410

6. Amrit Bhanu Shali & ors. Vs National
Insurance Co. Ltd. & ors., (2012) 11 SCC 738

7. Magma General Insurance Co. Ltd. Vs Nanu
Ram alias Chuhru Ram & ors., (2018) 18 SCC
130

(Delivered by Hon'ble J.J. Munir, J.)

1. This is a claimants' appeal under
Section 173 of the Motor Vehicles Act,
1988
(for
short,
''the
Act')
seeking
enhancement of the award made by the
Motor Accident Claims Tribunal (for short,
''the Tribunal').

2. The facts giving rise to this appeal
are these:

On 28.03.2012 at about 02:30 p.m.,
one Rahul Tiwari was on board a Vikram
tempo bearing Registration No. UP-42AT-
7 All. Angad Tiwari & Anr. Vs. National Insurance Co. Ltd. & Anr.
567
2014 owned by his father, Angad Tiwari. He
was proceeding on board the said vehicle
along with some of his friends in a funeral
procession from Gonda to Ayodhya. The
tempo was moving on the left side of the road
towards Ayodhya. As the vehicle reached
near village Balapur on the Nawabganj-Katra
Road within the local limts of P.S.
Nawabganj, District Gonda, Rahul Tiwari
met some relatives of his. The tempo was
parked on the left hand side of the road and
Rahul Tiwari was engaged in a conversation
with the relatives. Suddenly, a tanker bearing
Registration No. HR38K/0913 came on from
the Nawabganj side driven recklessly at a
high speed. The tanker hit the tempo and
those standing around it, leading to Rahul
Tiwari's death besides that of some others on
the spot. Still others from amongst occupants
of the Tempo were left injured. The deceased
was
employed
on
a
vehicle
bearing
Registration No. UP43T/1057 as a Khalasi, a
job that yielded him an income in the sum of
Rs. 7000/- per mensem. He further earned a
sum of Rs. 3000/- per month from his
agricultural pursuits. The deceased Rahul
Tiwari, therefore, had a monthly income of
Rs. 10,000/-.

3. A First Information Report about the
accident was lodged, giving rise to Crime No.
115 of 2012, under Sections 275, 337, 338,
304A and 427 IPC, P.S. Nawabganj, District
Gonda. It is on the basis of these facts that the
two claimants here, who are the father and
the mother of the deceased Rahul Tiwari,
instituted a claim petition before the Motor
Accident Claims Tribunal, Faizabad. They
claimed in compensation for the untimely
death of their son, a sum of Rs. 21,60,000/-
together with interest. The National Insurance
Company Limited, Civil Lines, Faizabad
through its Manager were impleaded as
opposite party no. 1 to the claim petition, who
are respondent no. 1 to this appeal. Smt.
Urmila Rungta, who was the owner of the
offending vehicle-tanker, was impleaded as
opposite party no. 2 to the claim petition and
respondent no. 2 to this appeal. Both the
Insurance Company and the owner filed their
separate written statements. The Insurance
Company and the owner both denied the
involvement of the offending vehicle. The
owner further pleaded that the driver of the
offending vehicle, Prahlad had a valid and
effective driving licence on the date of
accident and the vehicle was insured with
respondent-Insurance
Company
from
14.01.2012 to 13.01.2013. The liability, if
any, would, therefore, fall on the shoulders of
the Insurance Company.

4. Upon pleadings of parties, the
following issues were framed (translated
into English from Hindi):

(1) Whether on 28.03.2012 at
about 02:30 in the day at village Balapur
Nawabganj-Katra Road falling under the
Police Station Nawabganj, District Gonda
when the deceased Rahul Tiwari was
proceeding on a Vikram tempo with his
friends towards Ayodhya, and had parked
the tempo on the left hand side of the road
to talk to some relatives, tanker bearing
Registration No. HR38K/0913 driven by its
driver negligently and at a high speed hit
the tempo and its occupants who were
standing resulting in the death of Rahul
Tiwari and some others?

(2) Whether the driver of the
tanker
bearing
Registration
No.
HR38K/0913 had a valid driving licence at
the time of the accident?

(3) Whether at the time of
accident, the tanker bearing Registration
No.
HR38K/0913
was
insured
with
opposite party no. 1?
568 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES

(4) Whether the claim petition is
bad for non-joinder of the owner and the
driver of the tempo?

(5) Whether the claimants are
entitled to compensation? If yes, from
whom and how much?

5. In support of the claim petition,
claimant-appellant no. 1 Angad Tiwari has
testified as CPW-1 and Harishyam Tiwari
as CPW-2. Documentary evidence was also
filed, which includes the Ration Card, a
copy of the First Information Report, the
Registration Certificate of the offending
vehicle, the driving licence of the vehicle's
driver, the offending vehicle's insurance
papers, its permit, the offending vehicle's
fitness certificate, its pollution clearance
certificate, the accident inspection report,
the charge sheet filed in the criminal case
and a copy of the family register. No
evidence was led on behalf of the insurance
company, either oral or documentary.

6. On behalf of the owner of the
offending
vehicle,
the
registration
certificate of the said vehicle, its permit,
fitness certificate and the driving licence of
its Driver, Prahlad were filed.

7. Issue no. 1 was answered in favour
of the claimant-appellants, holding the
offending vehicle to be responsible for the
accident on account of being driven
negligently and at a high speed. It was held
that the offending vehicle hit the tempo and
the persons standing around it, resulting in
the death of Rahul Tiwari and others. Issue
nos. 2 and 3 were both answered in favour
of the claimant-appellants, holding that the
driver of the offending vehicle held a valid
and effective driving licence on the date
and time of the accident and the offending
vehicle was insured with respondentInsurance Company. In answering Issue
No. 4, the non-joinder of the owner and the
driver of the tempo was held to be not fatal
to the claim.

8. In working out the compensation
payable to the claimants, the Tribunal held
the deceased to be aged between 15-20
years, though it was asserted that he was 21
years old. The Tribunal held that there was
no proof about the income of the deceased,
and, therefore, the deceased's income had
to be worked out on a notional basis,
relying on the decision of the Supreme
Court in Laxmi Devi and others vs.
Mohammad Tabbar and another, (2008)
12 SCC 165. The annual income was held
to be Rs. 36,000/-. This notional income
was worked out on the basis of an unskilled
daily wager's prevalent wages, which were,
in the opinion of the Tribunal, not more
than Rs. 100/- per day. Since the deceased
was unmarried, 50% was directed to be
deducted towards his personal expenses.
The annual dependency of the claimants
was, therefore, held to be Rs. 18000/-. The
Tribunal applied a multiplier of ''13' by
taking into consideration the age of the
dependents, both of whom were held to be,
on an average, aged 47 years. The age of
the deceased was not made the basis to
determine the applicable multiplier. Thus,
to the annual income of Rs. 18,000/-, a
multiplier of 13 was applied to arrive at a
total dependency of Rs. 2,34,000/-. To the
aforesaid figure were added, under the
conventional
heads,
funeral
expenses,
compensation for the loss of estate and love
and affection, a sum of Rs. 5000/-, Rs.
5000/- and Rs. 10,000/- in that order.
Adding up the figure of Rs. 20,000/- under
the conventional heads to the substantive
total dependency of Rs. 2,34,000/-, the
Tribunal passed an award directing the
Insurance Company to pay the claimants a
7 All. Angad Tiwari & Anr. Vs. National Insurance Co. Ltd. & Anr.
569
sum of Rs. 2,54,000/- with 6% simple
interest per annum from the date of
institution of the claim petition until
realization. Both the claimants were held
entitled
to
an
equal
share
of
the
compensation. It was further directed that a
sum of Rs. 50,000/- in favour of each of the
claimants
shall
be
invested
with
a
Nationalized Bank, in an interest bearing
account, for a period of five years. It is the
aforesaid order that the claimant-appellants
have assailed in this appeal, seeking
enhancement of the compensation awarded.

9. Heard Mr. Mukesh Singh, learned
Counsel for the claimant-appellants and
Mr. Deepak Mehrotra, learned Counsel
appearing on behalf of the Insurance
Company.

10. It is submitted by the learned
Counsel for the claimants that the award
made is grossly inadequate and deserves to be
enhanced. He submits that the Tribunal has
erred in inferring the income of the deceased
on a notional basis and pegging it down to a
figure of Rs.100/- per day. It is also argued
that the multiplier of 13, applied on the basis
of the age of the dependents, is manifestly
illegal, inasmuch as what is relevant is the
age of the deceased. It is also submitted that
nothing has been added to the deceased's
income towards future prospects, which he is
entitled to in view of the decision of the
Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court in
National Insurance Company vs. Pranay
Sethi and others, (2017) 16 SCC 680. It is
argued that going by the principles laid down
in Pranay Sethi (supra), the Tribunal has
also erred in granting a miserably low
compensation under the conventional heads.

11. Mr. Deepak Mehrotra, learned
Counsel for the Insurance Company has
supported the impugned award and says
that it is a just award, which ought not to be
disturbed by this Court.

12. This Court has considered the
submissions advanced on behalf of both
parties and carefully perused the record.
There is not much to be said in criticism of
the Tribunal's opinion about the income of
the deceased. The reason is that there is
hardly any evidence offered on behalf of
the claimants to establish the deceased's
income from his employment as a Khalasi
on a commercial vehicle or the other
component earned out of agricultural
exploits. The Tribunal may not be perfectly
right in determining the deceased's income
on a notional basis, considering the fact
that the deceased was a young man, held to
be aged between 15-20 years; asserted by
the claimants to be 21 years old. The
deceased, no doubt, was in the prime of his
youth and has to be credited with actual
income from his exertions. The Tribunal,
however, is not wrong in estimating the
deceased's income on the basis of that
earned at the relevant time by an unskilled
labourer, because there is no evidence
about any skilled profession that the
deceased pursued, or about his income
from employment in agriculture. Therefore,
this Court is of opinion that the Tribunal
was right in holding the deceased's income
to be Rs.100/- per day on the basis of
contemporary daily-wages earned by an
unskilled labourer. In consequence, the
monthly income of the deceased would be
Rs.3000/-, which the Tribunal has rightly
determined. The Tribunal has erred in not
adding anything towards future prospects.
The deceased, at his youthful age, had the
entire future open to him and would, in
course of time, earn much higher wages.
The question about the entitlment to
compensation
on
account
of
future
prospects is no longer res integra in view of
570 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
the law laid down by the Supreme Court in
Pranay Sethi, where it is held:

"56. The seminal issue is the
fixation of future prospects in cases of
deceased who are self-employed or on a
fixed salary. Sarla Verma [Sarla Verma v.
DTC, (2009) 6 SCC 121 : (2009) 2 SCC
(Civ) 770 : (2009) 2 SCC (Cri) 1002] has
carved out an exception permitting the
claimants to bring materials on record to
get the benefit of addition of future
prospects. It has not, per se, allowed any
future prospects in respect of the said
category.

57. Having bestowed our anxious
consideration, we are disposed to think
when
we
accept
the
principle
of
standardisation, there is really no rationale
not to apply the said principle to the selfemployed or a person who is on a fixed
salary. To follow the doctrine of actual
income at the time of death and not to add
any amount with regard to future prospects
to
the
income
for
the purpose
of
determination of multiplicand would be
unjust. The determination of income while
computing compensation has to include
future prospects so that the method will
come within the ambit and sweep of just
compensation as postulated under Section
168 of the Act. In case of a deceased who
had held a permanent job with inbuilt grant
of annual increment, there is an acceptable
certainty. But to state that the legal
representatives of a deceased who was on a
fixed salary would not be entitled to the
benefit of future prospects for the purpose
of computation of compensation would be
inapposite. It is because the criterion of
distinction between the two in that event
would be certainty on the one hand and
staticness on the other. One may perceive
that the comparative measure is certainty
on the one hand and uncertainty on the
other but such a perception is fallacious. It
is because the price rise does affect a selfemployed person; and that apart there is
always an incessant effort to enhance one's
income for sustenance. The purchasing
capacity of a salaried person on permanent
job when increases because of grant of
increments and pay revision or for some
other change in service conditions, there is
always a competing attitude in the private
sector to enhance the salary to get better
efficiency from the employees. Similarly, a
person who is self-employed is bound to
garner
his
resources
and
raise
his
charges/fees so that he can live with same
facilities. To have the perception that he is
likely to remain static and his income to
remain
stagnant
is
contrary
to
the
fundamental concept of human attitude
which
always
intends
to
live
with
dynamism and move and change with the
time. Though it may seem appropriate that
there cannot be certainty in addition of
future prospects to the existing income
unlike in the case of a person having a
permanent job, yet the said perception does
not really deserve acceptance. We are
inclined to think that there can be some
degree of difference as regards the
percentage that is meant for or applied to in
respect of the legal representatives who
claim on behalf of the deceased who had a
permanent job than a person who is selfemployed or on a fixed salary. But not to
apply the principle of standardisation on
the foundation of perceived lack of
certainty would tantamount to remaining
oblivious to the marrows of ground reality.
And, therefore, degree-test is imperative.
Unless the degree-test is applied and left to
the parties to adduce evidence to establish,
it would be unfair and inequitable. The
degree-test has to have the inbuilt concept
of percentage. Taking into consideration
7 All. Angad Tiwari & Anr. Vs. National Insurance Co. Ltd. & Anr.
571
the cumulative factors, namely, passage of
time, the changing society, escalation of
price, the change in price index, the human
attitude to follow a particular pattern of
life, etc., an addition of 40% of the
established income of the deceased towards
future prospects and where the deceased
was below 40 years an addition of 25%
where the deceased was between the age of
40 to 50 years would be reasonable.

58. The controversy does not end
here. The question still remains whether
there should be no addition where the age
of the deceased is more than 50 years. Sarla
Verma [Sarla Verma v. DTC, (2009) 6
SCC 121 : (2009) 2 SCC (Civ) 770 : (2009)
2 SCC (Cri) 1002] thinks it appropriate not
to add any amount and the same has been
approved
inReshma
Kumari
[Reshma
Kumari v. Madan Mohan, (2013) 9 SCC 65
: (2013) 4 SCC (Civ) 191 : (2013) 3 SCC
(Cri) 826] . Judicial notice can be taken of
the fact that salary does not remain the
same. When a person is in a permanent job,
there is always an enhancement due to one
reason or the other. To lay down as a
thumb rule that there will be no addition
after 50 years will be an unacceptable
concept. We are disposed to think, there
should be an addition of 15% if the
deceased is between the age of 50 to 60
years and there should be no addition
thereafter. Similarly, in case of selfemployed or person on fixed salary, the
addition should be 10% between the age of
50 to 60 years. The aforesaid yardstick has
been fixed so that there can be consistency
in the approach by the tribunals and the
courts."

13. The question, however, to be
considered is whether the future prospects
are to be awarded in accordance with the
principles laid down in Pranay Sethi or
under Rule 220-A(3) of the Uttar Pradesh
Motor Vehicles Rules, 1998 (for short, ''the
Rules of 1998') framed under the Act. This
issue engaged the attention of the Supreme
Court in New India Assurance Co. Ltd v.
Urmila Shukla and others, 2021 SCC
OnLine SC 822. The aforesaid decision
was rendered by their Lordships of the
Supreme Court in the context of a motor
accident claim that arose from the State of
Uttar Pradesh and, therefore, squarely
applies to the determination of future
prospects in the State of U.P. The said
decision holds that future prospects are to
be determined in accordance with the Rules
of 1998, which provide a precise statutory
guide and scale for assessment of such
prospects. In Urmila Shukla (supra), the
question that arose before their Lordships is
set forth in Paragraph No.4 of the report. It
reads:

"4. The basic ground of challenge
by the appellant is that sub-rule 3(iii) of
Rule 220A is contrary to the conclusions
arrived at by the Constitution Bench of this
Court in National Insurance Company Ltd
v. Pranay Sethi reported in (2017) 16 SCC
680."

14. In answer to the question, it was
held in Urmila Shukla thus:

"9. It is to be noted that the
validity of the Rules was not, in any way,
questioned in the instant matter and thus
the only question that we are called upon to
consider is whether in its application, subRule 3(iii) of Rule 220A of the Rules must
be given restricted scope or it must be
allowed to operate fully.

10.The discussion on the point
inPranay Sethiwas from the standpoint of
arriving at "just compensation" in terms of
572 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
Section 168 of the Motor Vehicles Act,
1988.

11.If an indicia is made available in
the form of a statutory instrument which
affords a favourable treatment, the decision
inPranay Sethicannot be taken to have limited
the operation of such statutory provision
specially when the validity of the Rules was
not put under any challenge. The prescription
of 15% in cases where the deceased was in
the age bracket of 50-60 years as stated
inPranay Sethicannot be taken as maxima. In
the absence of any governing principle
available in the statutory regime, it was only
in the form of an indication. If a statutory
instrument has devised a formula which
affords better or greater benefit, such
statutory instrument must be allowed to
operate unless the statutory instrument is
otherwise found to be invalid.

12. We, therefore, reject the
submission advanced on behalf of the
appellant and affirm the view taken by the
Tribunal as well as the High Court and
dismiss this appeal without any order as to
costs."

15. There is little doubt that future
prospects in the State of Uttar Pradesh have
to be determined in accordance with the
Rules of 1998 and not by the principles laid
down in Pranay Sethi. Rule 220-A(3)
confers greater benefit upon the claimant and
going by the principle in Urmila Shukla, it
embodies the preferred principle to apply in
order to determine future prospects. The
deceased was aged below 40 years and,
therefore, the claimants are entitled to add
50% to his monthly emoluments by way of
future prospects.

16. So far as the deduction towards
personal expenses of the deceased goes, the
decision of the Supreme Court in Sarla
Verma (Smt.) and others v. Delhi
Transport Corporation and another,
(2009) 6 SCC 121 that has been approved
in the decision of the Constitution Bench of
the Supreme Court in Pranay Sethi and
followed in United India Insurance
Company Ltd. v. Satinder Kaur alias
Satwinder Kaur and others, 2020 SCC
OnLine SC 410, lays down the clear
principle that "for bachelors, normally,
50% is deducted as personal and living
expenses", to borrow the precise expression
of their Lordships. In Sarla Verma
(supra), it has been held:

"30. Though in some cases the
deduction to be made towards personal and
living expenses is calculated on the basis of
units indicated in Trilok Chandra [(1996) 4
SCC 362], the general practice is to apply
standardised
deductions.
Having
considered several subsequent decisions of
this Court, we are of the view that where
the deceased was married, the deduction
towards personal and living expenses of the
deceased, should be one-third (1/3rd)
where the number of dependent family
members is 2 to 3, one-fourth (1/4th) where
the number of dependent family members
is 4 to 6, and one-fifth (1/5th) where the
number of dependent family members
exceeds six.

31. Where the deceased was a
bachelor and the claimants are the parents,
the deduction follows a different principle.
In regard to bachelors, normally, 50% is
deducted as personal and living expenses,
because it is assumed that a bachelor would
tend to spend more on himself. Even
otherwise, there is also the possibility of his
getting married in a short time, in which
event the contribution to the parent(s) and
siblings is likely to be cut drastically.
7 All. Angad Tiwari & Anr. Vs. National Insurance Co. Ltd. & Anr.
573
Further, subject to evidence to the contrary,
the father is likely to have his own income
and will not be considered as a dependant
and the mother alone will be considered as
a dependant. In the absence of evidence to
the contrary, brothers and sisters will not be
considered as dependants, because they
will either be independent and earning, or
married, or be dependent on the father.

32. Thus even if the deceased is
survived by parents and siblings, only the
mother would be considered to be a
dependant, and 50% would be treated as
the personal and living expenses of the
bachelor and 50% as the contribution to the
family. However, where the family of the
bachelor is large and dependent on the
income of the deceased, as in a case where
he has a widowed mother and large number
of younger non-earning sisters or brothers,
his personal and living expenses may be
restricted to one-third and contribution to
the family will be taken as two-third."

17. It must be remarked that the scale
regarding deduction towards personal and
living expenses of a deceased bachelor is
also 50% under Rule 220-A(2)(i) of the
Rules of 1998, unless the family of the
bachelor is large and dependent on the
income of the deceased, in which case the
deduction shall be one-third. The case here
is not one where the deceased, who was
decidedly a bachelor, left behind a large
family, dependent on his income. He has
left behind two dependents who are his
parents. Therefore, in the opinion of this
Court, deduction of 50% would apply,
whether the rule in Sarla Verma is applied
or the provisions of Rule 220-A(2)(i) are
followed.

18. The multiplier adopted by the
Tribunal, in the opinion of this Court, is
grossly inadequate. The Tribunal seems to
have applied the multiplier, going by the
age of the dependents. The multiplier is to
be determined in accordance with the age
of the deceased; not his dependents. In this
connection, reference may be made to the
decision of the Supreme Court in Amrit
Bhanu Shali and Ors. vs National
Insurance Co. Ltd. and Ors., (2012) 11
SCC 738. In Amrit Bhanu Shali (supra),
it was held:

"15. The selection of multiplier is
based on the age of the deceased and not on
the basis of the age of the dependent. There
may be a number of dependents of the
deceased whose age may be different and,
therefore, the age of the dependents has no
nexus
with
the
computation
of
compensation.

16. In Sarla Verma [(2009) 6
SCC 121 : (2009) 2 SCC (Civ) 770 : (2009)
2 SCC (Cri) 1002] this Court held that the
multiplier to be used should be as
mentioned in Column (4) of the table of the
said judgment which starts with an
operative multiplier of 18. As the age of the
deceased at the time of the death was 26
years, the multiplier of 17 ought to have
been applied. The Tribunal taking into
consideration the age of the deceased
rightly applied the multiplier of 17 but the
High Court committed a serious error by
not giving the benefit of multiplier of 17
and bringing it down to the multiplier of
13."

19. The deceased here was placed in
the age bracket of 15-20 years and going by
his age, the multiplier, as mentioned in
Paragraph No.42 of the judgment of the
Supreme Court in Sarla Verma, would be
18; and not 13, that the Tribunal has
applied.
574 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES

20. So far as the compensation
awarded under the conventional heads is
concerned, the principles laid down by the
Constitution Bench in Pranay Sethi are of
decisive importance, where it is observed:

"48. This aspect needs to be
clarified
and
appositely
stated.
The
conventional sum has been provided in the
Second Schedule to the Act. The said
Schedule has been found to be defective as
stated by the Court in Trilok Chandra [UP
SRTC v. Trilok Chandra, (1996) 4 SCC
362] . Recently, in Puttamma v. K.L.
Narayana
Reddy
[Puttamma
v.K.L.
Narayana Reddy, (2013) 15 SCC 45 :
(2014) 4 SCC (Civ) 384 : (2014) 3 SCC
(Cri) 574] it has been reiterated by stating :
(SCC p. 80, para 54)

"54. ... we hold that the Second
Schedule as was enacted in 1994 has now
become
redundant,
irrational
and
unworkable due to changed scenario
including the present cost of living and
current rate of inflation and increased life
expectancy."

49. As far as multiplier or
multiplicand is concerned, the same has
been put to rest by the judgments of this
Court. Para 3 of the Second Schedule also
provides for general damages in case of
death. It is as follows:

"3. General damages (in case of
death):

The following general damages
shall
be
payable
in
addition
to
compensation outlined above:

(i)
Funeral expenses
Rs 2000
(ii)
Loss
of Rs 5000
consortium,
if
beneficiary is the
spouse
(iii)
Loss of estate
Rs 2500
(iv)
Medical expenses -
- actual expenses
incurred
before
death supported by
bills/vouchers but
not exceeding
Rs 15,000"

50. On a perusal of various
decisions of this Court, it is manifest that
the Second Schedule has not been followed
starting from the decision in Trilok
Chandra [UP SRTC v.Trilok Chandra,
(1996) 4 SCC 362] and there has been no
amendment to the same. The conventional
damage amount needs to be appositely
determined. As we notice, in different cases
different amounts have been granted. A
sum of Rs 1,00,000 was granted towards
consortium inRajesh [Rajesh v. Rajbir
Singh, (2013) 9 SCC 54 : (2013) 4 SCC
(Civ) 179 : (2013) 3 SCC (Cri) 817 : (2014)
1 SCC (L&S) 149] . The justification for
grant of consortium, as we find fromRajesh
[Rajesh v. Rajbir Singh, (2013) 9 SCC 54 :
(2013) 4 SCC (Civ) 179 : (2013) 3 SCC
(Cri) 817 : (2014) 1 SCC (L&S) 149] , is
founded on the observation as we have
reproduced hereinbefore.

51. On the aforesaid basis, the
Court has revisited the practice of awarding
compensation under conventional heads.

52. As far as the conventional
heads are concerned, we find it difficult to
agree
with
the
view
expressed
in
Rajesh[Rajesh v. Rajbir Singh, (2013) 9
SCC 54 : (2013) 4 SCC (Civ) 179 : (2013)
3 SCC (Cri) 817 : (2014) 1 SCC (L&S)
149] . It has granted Rs 25,000 towards
7 All. Angad Tiwari & Anr. Vs. National Insurance Co. Ltd. & Anr.
575
funeral expenses, Rs 1,00,000 towards loss
of consortium and Rs 1,00,000 towards loss
of care and guidance for minor children.
The head relating to loss of care and minor
children does not exist. ThoughRajesh
[Rajesh v. Rajbir Singh, (2013) 9 SCC 54 :
(2013) 4 SCC (Civ) 179 : (2013) 3 SCC
(Cri) 817 : (2014) 1 SCC (L&S) 149] refers
to Santosh Devi [Santosh Devi v. National
Insurance Co. Ltd., (2012) 6 SCC 421 :
(2012) 3 SCC (Civ) 726 : (2012) 3 SCC
(Cri) 160 : (2012) 2 SCC (L&S) 167] , it
does not seem to follow the same. The
conventional
and
traditional
heads,
needless to say, cannot be determined on
percentage basis because that would not be
an
acceptable
criterion.
Unlike
determination of income, the said heads
have to be quantified. Any quantification
must have a reasonable foundation. There
can be no dispute over the fact that price
index, fall in bank interest, escalation of
rates in many a field have to be noticed.
The court cannot remain oblivious to the
same. There has been a thumb rule in this
aspect. Otherwise, there will be extreme
difficulty in determination of the same and
unless the thumb rule is applied, there will
be immense variation lacking any kind of
consistency as a consequence of which, the
orders passed by the tribunals and courts
are likely to be unguided. Therefore, we
think it seemly to fix reasonable sums. It
seems to us that reasonable figures on
conventional heads, namely, loss of estate,
loss of consortium and funeral expenses
should be Rs 15,000, Rs 40,000 and Rs
15,000 respectively. The principle of
revisiting the said heads is an acceptable
principle. But the revisit should not be factcentric or quantum-centric. We think that it
would be condign that the amount that we
have quantified should be enhanced on
percentage basis in every three years and
the enhancement should be at the rate of
10% in a span of three years. We are
disposed to hold so because that will bring
in consistency in respect of those heads."

(Emphasis by Court)

21. The award of compensation under
the conventional heads, particularly, the
one for loss of consortium, came up for
consideration of the Supreme Court in
Magma General Insurance Company
Ltd. v. Nanu Ram alias Chuhru Ram
and others, (2018) 18 SCC 130. In
Magma General Insurance Company
Ltd. (supra), it has been held:

"21. A Constitution Bench of this
Court in Pranay Sethi[National Insurance
Co. Ltd. v. Pranay Sethi, (2017) 16 SCC
680 : (2018) 3 SCC (Civ) 248 : (2018) 2
SCC (Cri) 205] dealt with the various heads
under which compensation is to be awarded
in a death case. One of these heads is loss
of
consortium.
In
legal
parlance,
"consortium" is a compendious term which
encompasses
"spousal
consortium",
"parental
consortium",
and
"filial
consortium". The right to consortium
would include the company, care, help,
comfort, guidance, solace and affection of
the deceased, which is a loss to his family.
With respect to a spouse, it would include
sexual relations with the deceased spouse :
[Rajesh v. Rajbir Singh, (2013) 9 SCC 54 :
(2013) 4 SCC (Civ) 179 : (2013) 3 SCC
(Cri) 817 : (2014) 1 SCC (L&S) 149]

21.1.
Spousal
consortium
is
generally defined as rights pertaining to the
relationship of a husband-wife which
allows compensation to the surviving
spouse for loss of "company, society,
cooperation, affection, and aid of the other
in every conjugal relation". [Black's Law
Dictionary(5th Edn., 1979).]
576 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES

21.2.
Parental
consortium
is
granted to the child upon the premature
death of a parent, for loss of "parental aid,
protection, affection, society, discipline,
guidance and training".

21.3. Filial consortium is the right
of the parents to compensation in the case
of an accidental death of a child. An
accident leading to the death of a child
causes great shock and agony to the parents
and family of the deceased. The greatest
agony for a parent is to lose their child
during their lifetime. Children are valued
for their love, affection, companionship and
their role in the family unit.

22. Consortium is a special prism
reflecting changing norms about the status
and worth of actual relationships. Modern
jurisdictions world-over have recognised
that the value of a child's consortium far
exceeds the economic value of the
compensation awarded in the case of the
death of a child. Most jurisdictions
therefore permit parents to be awarded
compensation under loss of consortium on
the death of a child. The amount awarded
to the parents is a compensation for loss of
the love, affection, care and companionship
of the deceased child.

23. The Motor Vehicles Act is a
beneficial legislation aimed at providing
relief to the victims or their families, in
cases of genuine claims. In case where a
parent has lost their minor child, or
unmarried son or daughter, the parents are
entitled to be awarded loss of consortium
under the head of filial consortium.
Parental consortium is awarded to children
who lose their parents in motor vehicle
accidents under the Act. A few High Courts
have awarded compensation on this count [
Rajasthan High Court in Jagmala Ram v.
Sohi Ram, 2017 SCC OnLine Raj 3848 :
(2017) 4 RLW 3368; Uttarakhand High
Court in Rita Rana v. Pradeep Kumar, 2013
SCC OnLine Utt 2435 : (2014) 3 UC 1687;
Karnataka High Court in Lakshman v.
Susheela Chand Choudhary, 1996 SCC
OnLine Kar 74 : (1996) 3 Kant LJ 570] .
However, there was no clarity with respect
to the principles on which compensation
could be awarded on loss of filial
consortium.

24. The amount of compensation
to be awarded as consortium will be
governed by the principles of awarding
compensation under "loss of consortium"
as laid down inPranay Sethi [National
Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Pranay Sethi, (2017)
16 SCC 680 : (2018) 3 SCC (Civ) 248 :
(2018) 2 SCC (Cri) 205] . In the present
case, we deem it appropriate to award the
father and the sister of the deceased, an
amount of Rs 40,000 each for loss of filial
consortium."

(Emphasis by Court)

22.