# Anil Kumar Nanda v. State of U.P. Opp. Party

- **Citation:** (2022) 9 ILRA 483
- **Court:** High Court of Judicature at Allahabad
- **Decided:** 2022-09-12
- **Case number:** Crl. Misc. Bail Application No. 36197 of 2021
- **Bench:** Subhash Vidyarthi
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/allahabad-high-court/anil-kumar-nanda-v-state-of-u-p-opp-party-49077
- **Pages:** 11

## Headnote

(A) Criminal Law - Bail - economic
offences - Indian Penal Code, 1860 -
Sections 409, 420, 467, 468, 471, 477 A,
204, 120 B - The Information Technology
Act, 2000 - Sections 66 C and 66 D -
Jurisdictional Magistrate who otherwise
has the jurisdiction to try a criminal case
which
provides
for
a
maximum
punishment
of
either
life
or
death
sentence, has got ample jurisdiction to
consider the release on bail - there cannot
be any parity in rejecting an application
for grant of bail. (Para -15,24)

an embezzlement of an amount of Rs.
11,83,35,436.27/- - no criminal history - not
arrested - surrendered - undergone more than
15 months' incarceration - offences triable by
Magistrate - charge sheet submitted - services
terminated through a resolution - not in a
position to tamper with evidence - No material
placed by informant Bank to doubt. (Para -
3,27)

(B) Criminal Law - basic jurisprudence
relating to bail in economic offences -
remains same - grant of bail is the rule
and refusal is the exception - to ensure
that accused has opportunity of securing
fair trial - not advisable to categorize all
the economic offences into one group and
deny bail on that basis - Even if the
allegation is one of grave economic
offence - not a rule that bail should be
denied in every case - no bar created in
relevant enactment passed by legislature,
nor does bail jurisprudence provide so -
right to bail is not to be denied merely
484 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
because
of
the
sentiments
of
the
community against the accused. (Para -
19)

HELD:-Applicant entitled to be released on bail
pending conclusion of the trial. (Para -28)

Bail application allowed. (E-7)

List of Cases cited:-

## Text

9 All. Anil Kumar Nanda Vs. State of U.P.
483
the satisfaction of the arresting authority/
court
concerned
with
the
following
conditions:-

1. that the applicant shall make
himself available for interrogation made by
a police officer as and when required;

2. that the applicant shall not, directly
or indirectly make any inducement, threat
or promise to any person acquainted with
the facts of the case so as to dissuade his
from disclosing such facts to the court or to
any police officer or tamper with the
evidence;

3. that the applicant shall not leave
India without prior permission of the court;

4.
that
the
applicant
shall
not
pressurize/
intimidate
the
prosecution
witness;

5. that the applicant shall appear
before the trial court on each date fixed
unless personal presence is exempted;

6. that in case of breach of any of the
above conditions the court below shall have
the liberty to cancel the bail;

7. that in case the charge-sheet is
submitted the applicant shall not tamper
with evidence during trial;

8. that in default of any of the
conditions
mentioned
above,
the
investigating officer shall be at liberty to
file appropriate application for cancellation
of anticipatory bail granted to the applicant.

22. In view of the aforesaid terms, the
instant anticipatory bail application is
allowed
----------
(2022) 9 ILRA 483
APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CRIMINAL SIDE
DATED: ALLAHABAD 12.09.2022

BEFORE

THE HON'BLE SUBHASH VIDYARTHI, J.
Crl. Misc. Bail Application No. 36197 of 2021

Anil Kumar Nanda ...Applicant
Versus
State of U.P. ...Opp. Party

Counsel for the Applicant:
Sri Rajiv Lochan Shukla, Sri Arya Suman Pandey,
Sri Mritunjay Dwivedi, Ms. Sufia Saba

Counsel for the Respondents:
G.A., Sri Ashok Kumar Lal, Sri Kundan Rai, Sri
Uday Pratap Singh

(A) Criminal Law - Bail - economic
offences - Indian Penal Code, 1860 -
Sections 409, 420, 467, 468, 471, 477 A,
204, 120 B - The Information Technology
Act, 2000 - Sections 66 C and 66 D -
Jurisdictional Magistrate who otherwise
has the jurisdiction to try a criminal case
which
provides
for
a
maximum
punishment
of
either
life
or
death
sentence, has got ample jurisdiction to
consider the release on bail - there cannot
be any parity in rejecting an application
for grant of bail. (Para -15,24)

an embezzlement of an amount of Rs.
11,83,35,436.27/- - no criminal history - not
arrested - surrendered - undergone more than
15 months' incarceration - offences triable by
Magistrate - charge sheet submitted - services
terminated through a resolution - not in a
position to tamper with evidence - No material
placed by informant Bank to doubt. (Para -
3,27)

(B) Criminal Law - basic jurisprudence
relating to bail in economic offences -
remains same - grant of bail is the rule
and refusal is the exception - to ensure
that accused has opportunity of securing
fair trial - not advisable to categorize all
the economic offences into one group and
deny bail on that basis - Even if the
allegation is one of grave economic
offence - not a rule that bail should be
denied in every case - no bar created in
relevant enactment passed by legislature,
nor does bail jurisprudence provide so -
right to bail is not to be denied merely
484 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
because
of
the
sentiments
of
the
community against the accused. (Para -
19)

HELD:-Applicant entitled to be released on bail
pending conclusion of the trial. (Para -28)

Bail application allowed. (E-7)

List of Cases cited:-

1. Harshad Purushottam Mehta Vs The St. of
Maharashtra, 2020 (2) AIR Bombay R Criminal
785

2. Narendra Amratlal Dalal Vs St. of Guj., 1977
SCC OnLine Guj 61 = 1978 Cri LJ 1193

3. Satender Kumar Antil Vs C.B.I., 2022 Scc
OnLine SC 825

4. Y. S. Jag Mohan Reddy Vs C.B.I., 2013 (7)
SCC 439

5. Satender Kumar Antil Vs C.B.I., (2021) 10
SCC 773

6. 2022 Scc OnLine SC 825

7. St. B.O.I. Vs Bela Bagchi, (2005) 7 SCC 435

8. U.B.I. Vs Vishwa Mohan, (1998) 4 SCC 310

9. Sanjay Chandra Vs C.B.I., (2012) 1 SCC 40

10. Emperor Vs H. L. Hutchinson AIR 1931 All 356

(Delivered by Hon'ble Subhash Vidyarthi, J.)

1. Heard Ms. Sufia Saba, Mr. Rajiv
Lochan
Shukla
and
Mr.
Mrityunjay
Dwivedi, Advocates, the learned counsel
for the applicant, Mr. D.K. Srivastava,
Advocate, the learned A.G.A. for the State,
Mr. Ashok Kumar Lal and Mr. Kundan
Rai, Advocates, the learned counsel for the
informant.

2. The presentapplication has been
filed by the applicant seeking his release on
bail in Case Crime No. 146 of 2019 under
Sections 409, 420, 467, 468, 471, 477 A,
204, 120 B of I.P.C. and Sections 66 C and
66 D of the Information Technology Act,
Police Station Jawan, District Aligarh.

3. The aforesaid case has been
registered on the basis of a first information
report dated 07.05.2019 lodged by a Junior
Branch Manager of Zila Sahkari Bank
Private Limited Aligarh against eight
named accused persons, including the
applicant, alleging that a three member
committee had made an enquiry and
submitted a report dated 15.07.2019, as per
which the accused persons had made an
embezzlement of an amount of Rs.
11,83,35,436.27/-.

4. It has been stated in the affidavit
filed in support of the bail application that
the applicant is innocent and he has been
falsely implicated in the present case; that
the applicant had been transferred from the
concerned branch in September 2015 and
the FIR has been lodged on 07.05.2019
after an inordinate delay whereas the bank's
accounts are audited every year; that the
FIR does not make any mention of the
dates during which the alleged fraudulent
transactions took place; that it has wrongly
been mentioned in the enquiry report as
also in the FIR that the amount of Rs.
11,83,35,000/- has been embezzled; that a
committee constituted by the bank has reexamined the matter and had issued a
report dated 24.02.2020 stating that the
balance as on 30.08.2014 was Rs. 4.15
Crores only.

5. It has further been stated in the
affidavit that during pendency of the
criminal case, the bank has recovered a
sum of Rs.2,18,00,000/- till 31.03.2019
from the members who had taken loans
9 All. Anil Kumar Nanda Vs. State of U.P.
485
from the bank and, therefore, it cannot be
said that the entire amount of loan was
embezzled. The affidavit further states that
the bank does not give any loan to the
farmers directly. It has also been stated in
the affidavit that the services of the
applicant have already been terminated by
means of a resolution dated 15-06-2020
passed by the Board of Directors of the
Bank.

6. The affidavit further asserts that the
applicant has not done any embezzlement
or tampering of documents; that the
applicant belongs to a respectable family;
that he has clean antecedents and he was
not arrested by the police, rather he had
surrendered in the Court on 22.06.2021 and
since then he is languishing in jail and a
charge sheet has been submitted on
13.07.2021. The affidavit contains an
undertaking that if the applicant is enlarged
on bail, he will not abscond and he will not
tamper with the evidence.

7. The informant-bank has filed a
counter affidavit stating that the applicant
was posted as the Branch Manager in
Kasimpur Branch during the period 26-072006 to 07-09-2012 and 28-09-2012 to 0609-2015, along with two cashiers Sanjay
Kumar Maurya and Brijesh Awasthi, who
have also been made accused in the present
case.
During
this
period,
loans
of
Rs.9,52,04,742/- were disbursed to fake
persons. On 28.06.2018, a complaint was
made to the Secretary / Chief Executive
Officer of District Cooperative Bank, Aligarh
that the applicant had caused a loss of Rupees
03 Crores to the bank by making forgeries in
collusion with some employees of the bank
and
Cooperative
Societies.
Upon
the
aforesaid complaint, the Secretary / Chief
Executive Officer of the bank had constituted
a three member enquiry committee and on
27.02.2019, the three member committee
submitted a report alleging embezzlement of
an amount of Rs. 11,83,35,436.2 and that
many of the farmers were not found to be
residents of the villages mentioned in their
respective applications and it appeared that
the loans had been granted to fictitious
persons.

8. Sri Rajiv Lochan Shukla, the learned
counsel for the applicant has submitted that
the applicant was transferred from the branch
in
question
on
06.5.2015
and
loans
amounting to Rs. 4.57 Crores were disbursed
during the period 2015 to 2019 and during
the same period, an amount of Rs. 6.75
Crores was recovered by the bank, and the
maximum share of the recovery amount
belonged to old outstanding loans of Rs. 4.15
Crores. He has further submitted that the
applicant has already been dismissed from
service through a resolution passed by the
Board of Directors in its meeting held on
15.06.2020. He has submitted that the bank
does not grant any loan to any farmer
directory. The loan accounts are maintained
by primary Co-operative Societies and the
particulars of the Societies are certified by the
Secretary / Chief Executive Officer Society
before the bank. In the present case also, the
loan amounts had been disbursed to the
individual farmers from the accounts of the
societies, recovery of the loan amounts is also
made through the primary Co-operative
Societies and, therefore, the applicant, as the
manager of the bank branch was not directly
responsible either for disbursal or for
recovery of the loans and the applicant cannot
be held responsible for any irregularity
committed by any of the Societies in
disbursal / recovery of the loan amounts.

9. The learned counsel for the
applicant has next submitted that the
Branch Manager, who had taken over
486 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
charge after transfer of the applicant, did
not find any irregularity during the period
2015 to 2019, although the bank's accounts
were audited each year during this period.

10. The learned counsel for the
applicant has submitted that a co-accused
Rajendra Prasad Sharma (former CEO /
primary Cooperative Societies) had been
granted anticipatory bail by means of an
order dated 19.12.2020 passed by this
Court in Anticipatory Bail Application No.
8992 of 2020. He has submitted that none
of the other co-accused persons have been
arrested in the present case. The applicant
had surrendered on 22.06.2021 and he is
languishing in jail for the last about 15
months.

11. Shri Shukla has submitted that the
offences alleged against the applicant are
all triable by a Magistrate of First Class.
Although, offence under Section 409 IPC
carries
a
maximum
punishment
of
imprisonment for life or imprisonment for
ten years, as per Section 29 of Cr.P.C., a
Magistrate of the First Class can impose a
maximum punishment of three years
imprisonment. Even a Chief Judicial
Magistrate, to whom the matter can be
referred by a Magistrate of the First Class
under Section 325 Cr.P.C., cannot award a
punishment exceeding imprisonment for
seven years. The learned counsel for the
applicant has submitted that in view of the
aforesaid legal position and also keeping
into consideration the facts that the
applicant has already been dismissed from
service and that he is languishing in jail for
the past 15 months, the applicant is entitled
to be released on bail.

12. Per Contra, Sri. Kundan Rai, the
learned Counsel for the informant Bank has
relied upon a decision of the Bombay high
Court
in
the
case
of
Harshad
Purushottam Mehta vs. The State of
Maharashtra, 2020 (2) AIR Bombay R
Criminal 785, wherein the Bombay High
Court has held that "the Magistrate is
empowered to commit the case to the court
of Sessions if he is of the opinion that the
case "ought to be tried by it."

13. Replying to the aforesaid
submission made by the learned counsel for
the informant bank, Sri Rajiv Lochan
Shukla has submitted that the law regarding
power of referral contained in Section 325
Cr.P.C. has been discussed by the Gujarat
High Court in Narendra Amratlal Dalal
v. State of Gujarat, 1977 SCC OnLine
Guj 61 = 1978 Cri LJ 1193, and the
relevant portion of the aforesaid judgment
is being reproduced below: -

"6.The first question which arises for
consideration is, is it open to a Judicial.
Magistrate or a Metropolitan Magistrate,
in a case where he feels that the accused
ought to receive a punishment different in
kind from, or more severe than, that which
he is empowered to inflict, to commit the
case straightway to the Court of Session
under Sec. 323 instead of exercising his
powers in that connection under S. 325? A
bare reading of the two sections will show
that Section 323 is general in nature,
whereas Section 325 provides for specific
category of cases. In case of a Magistrate,
therefore, where he feels that the accused
ought to receive a punishment different in
kind or more severe than that which he can
impose, his only course is to resort to Sec.
325. That being a specific provision must
govern the case. This is a well-known rule
of interpretation. But then, it may well be
said, though it has not been argued before
this Court, that the Magistrate may feel
that the given case before him deserves
9 All. Anil Kumar Nanda Vs. State of U.P.
487
punishment exceeding seven years, which
the Chief Judicial Magistrate or, for the
matter of that, the Chief Metropolitan
Magistrate, cannot award. Therefore, in
such a case, it may be said that the
Magistrate or the Metropolitan Magistrate
can exercise his powers to commit the case
to the Court of Session under Sec. 323 of
the Code. Of course, it must be reemphasised that, in the present case, that
contingency never arose, and still, the
learned Magistrate committed the case to
the Court of Session, without applying his
mind to the provisions of Sec. 325 of the
new Code. But this possible contention
must also be dealt with by a process of
interpretation, so that, there may not be
any uncertainty left as to the scope of the
powers of a Magistrate or a Metropolitan
Magistrate who wants to act on the ground
that the accused before him ought to
receive a punishment different in kind from,
or more severe than the one which he is
competent to inflict. It is, at this stage, that
we can refer to Section 29 of the Code,
according to which a Magistrate of First
Class or a Metropolitan Magistrate can
award sentence, not exceeding three years,
or fine not exceeding Rupees 5,000/-, or
both. The approach that the Magistrate or
Metropolitan Magistrate should adopt in
such cases is, whether the accused before
him ought to receive punishment of more
than three years, or a fine of more than
rupees five thousand. He is not required to
consider whether the punishment called for
in the case before him is seven years or
more than seven years and, on that
consideration, to send the case to the Chief
Judicial Magistrate or Chief Metropolitan
Magistrate in one case and to the Sessions
Court in other. There is no indication of
legislative intent giving such free play in
the exercise of power to a Magistrate or
Metropolitan Magistrate in a case which
deserves sentence higher than the one he
could inflict. In fact, Sub-sec. (1) of Sec.
325 itself gives an indication that the
relevent
factor
for
consideration
is,
whether the punishment which ought to be
received by the accused in the case before
him should be more severethan the
punishment which he is competent to inflict.
Therefore, this is the only criterion which
he has to follow, without worrying himself
on the question whether the punishment
larger than that within the competence of
the Chief Judicial Magistrate or Chief
Metropolitan Magistrate is required to be
inflicted. If this is the correct criterion
which the Magistrate or Metropolitan
Magistrate should consider in such a
situation, it is obvious that he cannot
commit the case to the Court of Session
directly. He must hear the evidence for the
prosecution and the accused, form an
opinion that the accused is guilty, and
then, also form an opinion that the
accused should receive a punishment,
different in kind, or more severe than that
which he is competent to inflict Having
formed and recorded those two opinions,
he has to submit the proceedings to the
Chief Judicial Magistrate or to the Chief
Metropolitan Magistrate, as the case may
be. to whom he is subordinate. Therefore,
on a correct interpretation of the relevant
provisions, no Magistrate can straightway
commit a case to the Court of Session,
under Sec. 323, on the ground that the
punishment that the accused should
receive ought to be different in kind and
more severe than that which he is
competent to inflict he has got to follow
the procedure under Sec. 325 of the Code
and there is no other alternative left for
him in such a case. It follows as a
necessary
consequence
that,
after
following the procedure under Sec. 325, if
he comes to the opinion contemplated by
488 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
sub-sec. (1) thereof, he has to submit the
proceedings
to
the
Chief
Judicial
Magistrate or the Chief Metropolitan
Magistrate, as the case may be."

14. An offence may carry a maximum
punishment beyond the powers of a
Magistrate, yet the Magistrate has to
proceed with the trial, record evidence,
form an opinion that the accused is guilty
and thereafter form an opinion that the
accused should be given a punishment
higher than that which he is empowered to
inflict and it is only thereafter that he can
submit the proceedings to the Chief
Judicial Magistrate and the Magistrate
cannot commit the proceedings directly to
the Court of Sessions. Therefore, even
though the offences under Sections 409,
420, 467, 468, 471 and 477 A I.P.C. may
carry a punishment higher than the
maximum punishment which a Magistrate
is empowered to inflict, the offences would
still remain triable by a Magistrate.

15. Hon'ble Supreme court in the case
of Satender Kumar Antil versus Central
Bureau of Investigation, 2022 Scc OnLine
SC 825, reiterated that "the jurisdictional
Magistrate
who
otherwise
has
the
jurisdiction to try a criminal case which
provides for a maximum punishment of
either life or death sentence, has got ample
jurisdiction to consider the release on
bail."

16. Since the offences involved in the
present case are all triable by a Magistrate,
the Magistrate has power to grant bail to
the accused in the present case.

17. Sri. Ashok Kumar Lal, the learned
counsel for the informant has submitted that
the present case involves allegations of grave
economic offences and bail ought not to be
granted in economic offences. He has relied
upon the decision of Hon'ble Supreme Court
in the Case of Y. S. Jag Mohan Reddy vs.
C.B.I., 2013 (7) SCC 439, wherein the
Hon'ble Supreme Court has held as follows: -

"34. Economic offences constitute a
class apart and need to be visited with a
different approach in the matter of bail. The
economic
offences
having
deep-rooted
conspiracies and involving huge loss of
public funds need to be viewed seriously and
considered as grave offences affecting the
economy of the country as a whole and
thereby posing serious threat to the financial
health of the country.

35. While granting bail, the court has to
keep in mind the nature of accusations, the
nature of evidence in support thereof, the
severity of the punishment which conviction
will entail, the character of the accused,
circumstances which are peculiar to the
accused, reasonable possibility of securing
the presence of the accused at the trial,
reasonable apprehension of the witnesses
being tampered with, the larger interests of
the
public/State
and
other
similar
considerations."

18. In Satender Kumar Antil v. CBI,
(2021) 10 SCC 773, the Hon'ble Supreme
Court was pleased to lay down the following
guidelines
for
considering
the
bail
applications: -

"3..... The guidelines are as under:

Categories/Types of Offences

A)
Offences
punishable
with
imprisonment of 7 years or less not falling
in category B & D.

B) Offences punishable with death,
imprisonment for life, or imprisonment for
more than 7 years.

C) Offences punishable under Special
Acts containing stringent provisions for
9 All. Anil Kumar Nanda Vs. State of U.P.
489
bail like NDPS (S.37), PMLA (S.45), UAPA
(S.43D(5), Companies Act, 212(6), etc.
D) Economic offences not covered by
Special Acts.

REQUISITE CONDITIONS

1) Not arrested during investigation.

2) Cooperated throughout in the
investigation including appearing before
Investigating Officer whenever called.

(No need to forward such an accused
along
with
the
chargesheet
(Siddharthv.State of UP,2021 SCC OnLine
SC 615)

CATEGORY A

After filing of chargesheet/complaint
taking of cognizance

a)
Ordinary
summons
at
the
1stinstance/including
permitting
appearance through Lawyer.

b) If such an accused does not appear
despite service of summons, then Bailable
Warrant for physical appearance may be
issued.

c) NBW on failure to failure to appear
despite issuance of Bailable Warrant.

d)
NBW
may
be
cancelled
or
converted
into
a
Bailable
Warrant/Summons
without
insisting
physical appearance of accused, if such an
application is moved on behalf of the
accused before execution of the NBW on an
undertaking of the accused to appear
physically on the next date/s of hearing.

e) Bail applications of such accused
on appearance may be decided w/o the
accused being taken in physical custody or
by granting interim bail till the bail
application is decided.

CATEGORY B/D

On appearance of the accused in
Court pursuant to process issued bail
application to be decided on merits.

CATEGORY C

Same as Category B & D with the
additional condition of compli ance of the
provisions of Bail under NDPS S.37, 45
PMLA, 212(6) Companies Act 43 d(5) of
UAPA, POSCO etc."

Needless to say that the category A
deals with both police cases and complaint
cases.

The trial Courts and the High Courts
will keep in mind the aforesaid guidelines
while considering bail applications. The
caveat which has been put by learned ASG
is that where the accused have not co
operated in the investigation nor appeared
before the Investigating Officers, nor
answered summons when the Court feels
that judicial custody of the accused is
necessary for the completion of the trial,
where further investigation including a
possible recovery is needed, the aforesaid
approach
cannot
give
them
benefit,
something we agree with."

19. Thus the economic offences do
not form a class apart even in a case
involving
economic
offences,
the
application for grant of bail has to be
decided on its merits, in accordance with
the settled principles. It has further been
clarified in a subsequent order passed in the
aforesaid case, which has been reported in
2022 Scc OnLine SC 825, The relevant
part of the aforesaid judgment is being
reproduced below: -

"66.What is left for us now to discuss
are the economic offences. The question for
consideration is whether it should be
treated as a class of its own or otherwise.
This issue has already been dealt with by
this
Court
in
the
case
ofP.
Chidambaramv.Directorate
of
Enforcement,(2020) 13 SCC 791, after
taking note of the earlier decisions
governing the field. The gravity of the
offence, the object of the Special Act, and
the attending circumstances are a few of
490 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
the factors to be taken note of, along with
the period of sentence. After all, an
economic offence cannot be classified as
such, as it may involve various activities
and may differ from one case to another.
Therefore, it is not advisable on the part of
the court to categorise all the offences into
one group and deny bail on that basis.
Suffice it to state that law, as laid down in
the following judgments, will govern the
field:--

Precedents

P.
Chidambaramv.Directorate
of
Enforcement,(2020) 13 SCC 791:

23. Thus, from cumulative perusal of
the judgments cited on either side including
the one rendered by the Constitution Bench
of this Court, it could be deduced that the
basic
jurisprudence
relating
to
bail
remains the same inasmuch as the grant
of bail is the rule and refusal is the
exception so as to ensure that the accused
has the opportunity of securing fair trial.
However, while considering the same the
gravity of the offence is an aspect which is
required to be kept in view by the Court.
The gravity for the said purpose will have
to be gathered from the facts and
circumstances
arising
in
each
case.
Keeping in view the consequences that
would befall on the society in cases of
financial irregularities, it has been held
that even economic offences would fall
under the category of "grave offence" and
in such circumstance while considering the
application for bail in such matters, the
Court will have to deal with the same,
being sensitive to the nature of allegation
made against the accused. One of the
circumstances to consider the gravity of the
offence is also the term of sentence that is
prescribed for the offence the accused is
alleged
to
have
committed.
Such
consideration with regard to the gravity of
offence is a factor which is in addition to
the triple test or the tripod test that would
be normally applied. In that regard what is
also to be kept in perspective is that even if
the allegation is one of grave economic
offence, it is not a rule that bail should be
denied in every case since there is no such
bar created in the relevant enactment
passed by the legislature nor does the bail
jurisprudence provide so. Therefore, the
underlining conclusion is that irrespective
of the nature and gravity of charge, the
precedent of another case alone will not be
the basis for either grant or refusal of bail
though it may have a bearing on principle.
But ultimately the consideration will have
to be on case-to-case basis on the facts
involved therein and securing the presence
of the accused to stand trial.

Sanjay Chandrav.CBI,(2012) 1 SCC
40:

"39. Coming back to the facts of the
present case, both the courts have refused
the request for grant of bail on two grounds
: the primary ground is that the offence
alleged against the accused persons is very
serious involving deep-rooted planning in
which, huge financial loss is caused to the
State exchequer; the secondary ground is
that of the possibility of the accused
persons tampering with the witnesses. In
the present case, the charge is that of
cheating and dishonestly inducing delivery
of property and forgery for the purpose of
cheating using as genuine a forged
document. The punishment for the offence
is imprisonment for a term which may
extend to seven years. It is, no doubt, true
that the nature of the charge may be
relevant, but at the same time, the
punishment to which the party may be
liable, if convicted, also bears upon the
issue. Therefore, in determining whether to
grant bail, both the seriousness of the
charge and the severity of the punishment
should be taken into consideration.
9 All. Anil Kumar Nanda Vs. State of U.P.
491

40. The grant or refusal to grant bail
lies within the discretion of the court. The
grant or denial is regulated, to a large
extent, by the facts and circumstances of
each particular case. But at the same time,
right to bail is not to be denied merely
because of the sentiments of the community
against the accused. The primary purposes
of bail in a criminal case are to relieve the
accused of imprisonment, to relieve the
State of the burden of keeping him, pending
the trial, and at the same time, to keep the
accused constructively in the custody of the
court, whether before or after conviction,
to assure that he will submit to the
jurisdiction of the court and be in
attendance thereon whenever his presence
is required.

xxxxxxxxx

46. We are conscious of the fact that
the accused are charged with economic
offences of huge magnitude. We are also
conscious of the fact that the offences
alleged, if proved, may jeopardise the
economy of the country. At the same time,
we cannot lose sight of the fact that the
investigating
agency
has
already
completed investigation and the chargesheet is already filed before the Special
Judge, CBI, New Delhi. Therefore, their
presence in the custody may not be
necessary for further investigation. We are
of the view that the appellants are entitled
to the grant of bail pending trial on
stringent conditions in order to ally the
apprehension expressed by CBI."

20. The learned Counsel for the Bank
has relied upon the decision of the Hon'ble
Supreme Court in the case of State Bank
of India versus Bela Bagchi, (2005) 7
SCC 435, wherein it was held that "A bank
officer is required to exercise higher
standards of honesty and integrity. He
deals with money of the depositors and the
customers. Every officer/employee of the
bank is required to take all possible steps
to protect the interests of the bank and to
discharge his duties with utmost integrity,
honesty, devotion and diligence and to do
nothing which is unbecoming of a bank
officer. Good conduct and discipline are
inseparable from the functioning of every
officer/employee of the bank."

21. He has also relied upon Union
Bank of India v. Vishwa Mohan, (1998) 4
SCC 310, wherein the Supreme Court
observed that "in the banking business
absolute devotion, diligence, integrity and
honesty needs to be preserved by every
bank employee and in particular the bank
officer. If this is not observed, the
confidence of the public/depositors would
be impaired."

22. Both the aforesaid cases related to
disciplinary action taken against the bank
employees and the question of grant or
refusal of bail was not adjudicated in the
aforesaid cases. Therefore, these cases are
not relevant for deciding the prayer for
grant of bail to the applicant in the present
case.

23. Sri. Lal has submitted that
Criminal Miscellaneous Bail Application
No. 12842 of 2022 filed by a co-accused
Sanjay Kumar Maurya has been rejected by
a co-ordinate Bench of this Court by means
of an order dated 26-08-2022. The bail
rejection order dated 26-08-2022 reads
thus: -

"After hearing the rival contentions,
considering the material on record, this
Court does not finds that applicant is
involved in economic offence and has
conducted himself in a manner which is
unbecoming of a bank employee who holds
492 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
public money in trust. No ground for
enlarging the applicant on bail at this stage
is made out."

24. It is settled law that there cannot
be any parity in rejecting an application for
grant of bail. Moreover, from a bare
reading of the aforesaid order, I do not find
that the Court has recorded any reason for
rejection of bail which can be applied in the
present case also for rejecting the bail
application.

25. In Sanjay Chandra v. CBI, (2012)
1 SCC 40, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has
observed that:

"21. In bail applications, generally, it
has been laid down from the earliest times
that the object of bail is to secure the
appearance of the accused person at his
trial by reasonable amount of bail. The
object of bail is neither punitive nor
preventative. Deprivation of liberty must be
considered a punishment, unless it is
required to ensure that an accused person
will stand his trial when called upon. The
courts owe more than verbal respect to the
principle that punishment begins after
conviction, and that every man is deemed
to be innocent until duly tried and duly
found guilty.

22. From the earliest times, it was
appreciated that detention in custody
pending completion of trial could be a
cause of great hardship. From time to time,
necessity demands that some unconvicted
persons should be held in custody pending
trial to secure their attendance at the trial
but in such cases, "necessity" is the
operative test. In this country, it would be
quite contrary to the concept of personal
liberty enshrined in the Constitution that
any person should be punished in respect of
any matter, upon which, he has not been
convicted or that in any circumstances, he
should be deprived of his liberty upon only
the belief that he will tamper with the
witnesses if left at liberty, save in the most
extraordinary circumstances.

23. Apart from the question of
prevention being the object of refusal of
bail, one must not lose sight of the fact that
any imprisonment before conviction has a
substantial punitive content and it would be
improper for any court to refuse bail as a
mark of disapproval of former conduct
whether the accused has been convicted for
it or not or to refuse bail to an unconvicted
person for the purpose of giving him a taste
of imprisonment as a lesson."

26. In Emperor v. H. L. Hutchinson
AIR 1931 All 356, this Court had held that
an accused person who enjoys freedom is
in a much better position to look after his
case and to properly defend himself than if
he were in custody. As a presumably
innocent person he is therefore entitled to
freedom and every opportunity to look after
his own case. A presumably innocent
person must have his freedom to enable
him to establish his innocence.

27. Analysing the facts of the present
case in light of the legal position discussed
above, I find that the following facts are
relevant for considering the applicant's
prayer for grant of bail: -

(i) The applicant has no criminal
history;

(ii) The applicant was not arrested by
the Police, rather he had surrendered in the
Court on 22.06.2021

(iii)
The
applicant
has
already
undergone
more
than
15
months'
incarceration;

(iv) The offences alleged in the
present
case
are
all
triable
by
a
Magistrate;
9 All. Reshmi & Ors. Vs. State of U.P. & Ors.
493

(v) A charge sheet has already been
submitted on 13.07.2021;

(vi) The applicant's services have
already
been
terminated
through
a
resolution dated 15-06-2020 and he is not
in a position to tamper with the evidence.

(vii) The affidavit filed in support of
the bail application contains an undertaking
that if the applicant is enlarged on bail, he
will not abscond and he will not tamper
with the evidence.

(viii) No material has been placed by the
informant Bank to doubt the aforesaid
undertaking given in the affidavit and to
show that there is any circumstance
necessitating continuance of the applicant's
incarceration
without
his
guilt
being
established in trial and without his conviction.

28. Keeping in view the aforesaid facts,
I am of the view that the applicant is entitled
to be released on bail pending conclusion of
the trial. The bail application is accordingly
allowed.

29. Let the applicant - Anil Kumar
Nanda, be released on bail in Case
Crime No. 146 of 2019 under Sections
409, 420, 467, 468, 471, 477 A, 204, 120
B of I.P.C. and Sections 66 C and 66 D
of the Information Technology Act,
2000, Police Station Jawan, District
Aligarh, on his furnishing a personal
bond and two reliable sureties each of
the like amount to the satisfaction of the
court concerned subject to following
conditions:-

(i) The applicant will not tamper with
the evidence during the trial.

(ii) The applicant will not influence any
witness.

(iii) The applicant will appear before
the trial court on the dates fixed, unless
personal presence is exempted.

(iv) The applicant shall not directly or
indirectly make inducement, threat or
promise to any person acquainted with the
facts of the case so as to dissuade him from
disclosing such facts to the Court to any
police officer or tamper with the evidence.

30. In case of breach of any of the
above condition, the prosecution shall be at
liberty to move an application before this
Court seeking cancellation of bail.
----------
(2022) 9 ILRA 493
APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL SIDE
DATED: ALLAHABAD 16.12.2021

BEFORE

THE HON'BLE DR. KAUSHAL JAYENDRA
THAKER, J.

First Appeal From Order No. 79 of 1999

Reshmi & Ors. ...Appellants
Versus
State of U.P. & Ors. ...Respondents

Counsel for the Appellants:
Sri Vidya Kant Shukla, Sri Vidya Sagar Shukla

Counsel for the Respondents:
Sri Anil Kumar Rai, Sri Satish Chaturvedi, Sri
Shivendra Narayan Singh, Sri Rajiv Ojha

A. Civil Law - Motor Vehicle Act, 1988 -
Section
176
-
Enhancement
of
compensation-deceased was 25 years old
and driving tempo on his own earning a
sum of Rs. 2000/-per month-Tribunal
awarded compensation of Rs. 92,000/-
but not granted future loss of income-the
deceased
was
survived
by
seven
dependents- By applying the multiplier of
18, the total loss of dependency is
assessed
Rs.
4,03200/--Thus,
the
claimants
held

entitled
for
total
compensation Rs. 4,73,400/- @ 6% per
annum-Since deceased was not author or
co-author of accident-Thus deduction of