# Anil Kumar Singh v. State of U.P. Ors

- **Citation:** (2024) 4 ILRA 339
- **Court:** High Court of Judicature at Allahabad
- **Decided:** 2024-03-13
- **Case number:** Writ A No. 11555 of 2021
- **Bench:** Ajit Kumar
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/allahabad-high-court/anil-kumar-singh-v-state-of-u-p-ors-54577
- **Pages:** 5

## Headnote

A. Service Law - Suspension - Back
Wages - Petitioner, a Routine Grade Clerk,
suspended on 05.10.2009 due to detention in a
criminal case (Case Crime No. 177 of 2009,
under Sections 396, 412, 201, 120-B IPC) -
Acquitted
on
30.01.2016,
reinSt.d
on
04.10.2016 - Claim for salary during suspension
period rejected vide order dated 01.05.2018 -
Held,
no
departmental
inquiry
initiated;
suspension
solely
due
to
detention,
a
circumstance beyond petitioner's control -
Principle of 'no work no pay' inapplicable as
petitioner was in jail, not on bail - Acquittal not
challenged in appeal - Entitled to full salary for
suspension period (19.08.2009 to 06.02.2016)
as per Raj Narain Vs U.O.I., distinguished from
cases involving departmental proceedings -
Impugned
orders
quashed,
respondents
directed to pay arrears. (Para 7-18)

Writ petition allowed.

List of Cases cited:

## Text

4 All. Anil Kumar Singh Vs. State of U.P. Ors.
339
(2024) 4 ILRA 339
ORIGINAL JURISDICTION
CIVIL SIDE
DATED: ALLAHABAD 13.03.2024

BEFORE

THE HON'BLE AJIT KUMAR, J.

Writ A No. 11555 of 2021

Anil Kumar Singh ...Petitioner
Versus
State of U.P. Ors. ...Respondents

Counsel for the Petitioner:
Sri Vimal Chandra Mishra

Counsel for the Respondents:
C.S.C.

A. Service Law - Suspension - Back
Wages - Petitioner, a Routine Grade Clerk,
suspended on 05.10.2009 due to detention in a
criminal case (Case Crime No. 177 of 2009,
under Sections 396, 412, 201, 120-B IPC) -
Acquitted
on
30.01.2016,
reinSt.d
on
04.10.2016 - Claim for salary during suspension
period rejected vide order dated 01.05.2018 -
Held,
no
departmental
inquiry
initiated;
suspension
solely
due
to
detention,
a
circumstance beyond petitioner's control -
Principle of 'no work no pay' inapplicable as
petitioner was in jail, not on bail - Acquittal not
challenged in appeal - Entitled to full salary for
suspension period (19.08.2009 to 06.02.2016)
as per Raj Narain Vs U.O.I., distinguished from
cases involving departmental proceedings -
Impugned
orders
quashed,
respondents
directed to pay arrears. (Para 7-18)

Writ petition allowed.

List of Cases cited:

1. Brahma Chandra Gupta Vs U.O.I.; AIR 1984
SC 380

2. Raj Narain Vs U.O.I.; (2019) 5 SCC 809

(Delivered by Hon'ble Ajit Kumar, J.)

1. Heard Sri Vimal Chandra Mishra,
learned counsel for the petitioner and
learned Additional Chief Standing Counsel
for the State respondents.

2. Petitioner before this Court, who is
working as a Routine Grade Clerk in the
institution, namely Government Girls Inter
College, Fatehpur, is aggrieved by the
order dated 1st May, 2018, whereby
petitioner's claim for regular payment of
salary for the period he remained under
suspension on account of involvement in a
criminal case, has come to be rejected.

3. Briefly stated facts of the case are
that petitioner while working as Routine
Grade Clerk in the institution came to be
implicated in connection with criminal
offence registered as Case Crime No.- 177
of 2009 under Sections 396, 412, 201 &
120-B I.P.C., District - Fatehpur and
remained in jail from 9th August, 2009 to
1st August, 2010 and then continued in
detention from 1st August, 2010 on-wards
until he was finally released pursuant to the
judgment of the acquittal passed by the
Sessions Court dated 30th January, 2016 in
Sessions Trial No.- 606 of 2010, on 6th
February, 2016. As a consequence to the
implication of the petitioner in a criminal
case and detention in jail, he had also been
placed under suspension by the disciplinary
authority vide order dated 5th October,
2009, however, no disciplinary proceeding
was initiated ever against the petitioner and
after his acquittal in the criminal case and
consequentially being released from jail, he
came and joined the institution pursuant to
the order of reinstatement dated 4th
October, 2016 revoking his suspension.

4. It is further submitted by learned
counsel for the petitioner that since the
respondents did not proceed to hold
340 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
disciplinary
inquiry
by
holding
departmental
proceedings
against
the
petitioner and petitioner was simply placed
under suspension on account of his
detention in jail, upon his reinstatement
with the revocation of suspension order,
petitioner became entitled to salary for the
period he remained under suspension. It is
submitted that petitioner since has been
finally acquitted in the criminal case then
on the principle that petitioner has been
restrained under a circumstances beyond
his control and also there being order of
suspension, from discharging his duties as a
clerk in the institution, the respondents
could not have denied payment of salary to
the petitioner for the period in question. He
further submits that order of reinstatement
dated 4th October, 2016 clearly recorded
that this order was being passed subject to
any contrary order being passed in appeal
against the acquittal and since no appeal to
the best knowledge of the petitioner has
been
preferred
against
the
acquittal
inasmuch as the counter affidavit is also
silent about the same, respondents are not
justified in rejecting the claim of the
petitioner for payment of salary for the
period in question on the principle of 'no
work no pay'. He submits that petitioner
could not have worked on account of being
under detention in jail which was beyond
his control and so it was his legitimate
expectation that as and when he would be
released after grant of bail or acquittal, he
would not only resume his duty as clerk but
he would be compensated for the period he
had
remained
under
suspension
for
implication in the criminal case.

5. Learned counsel for the petitioner
has also placed reliance upon a judgment of
Supreme Court in the case of Brahma
Chandra Gupta v. Union of India, AIR
1984 SC 380.

6. Per contra, learned Additional
Chief Standing Counsel, defending the
order impugned herein this petition, has
sought to contend that the department
cannot be blamed for petitioner not being
permitted
to
discharge
his
duty
as
admittedly petitioner was under detention
and as per the relevant service rules he was
required to be placed under suspension. It
is also sought to be urged that even though
petitioner has been acquitted but every
acquittal is not a honourable acquittal so as
to make him entitled for the payment of
salary for the period he had remained under
a lawful detention. However, upon a
pointed query being made as to whether the
State
respondents
ever
initiated
any
departmental inquiry against the petitioner,
learned Additional Chief Standing Counsel
could not give any satisfactory reply. He
also could not deny that records do not
reveal factum of any departmental inquiry
except order of suspension.

7. Having heard learned counsel for
the respective parties and their arguments
raised across the bar and having perused
the record, I find that petitioner was placed
under suspension only on account of being
under detention in jail for implication in a
criminal case in the year 2009 in which
ultimately he came to be acquitted in the
year 2016. The order of suspension though
was passed by the disciplinary authority but
the suspension was not in contemplation of
any inquiry as the order does not disclose
that competent authority intended to hold
disciplinary inquiry. So it should be taken
as a suspension simpliciter for detention of
the petitioner in jail. The department also
did not proceed further in the matter and
upon acquittal of the petitioner in a
criminal case, he came to be reinstated
under the order of reinstatement revoking
his suspension. The order of reinstatement
4 All. Anil Kumar Singh Vs. State of U.P. Ors.
341
only records that reinstatement would abide
by the result of the criminal appeal, if any
filed. The respondents have not come out
with any case that criminal appeal has been
preferred against the order of acquittal.

8. The principle that has been argued
before me by learned Additional Chief
Standing Counsel that petitioner was not
honourably acquitted would have carried
weight provided the department had
proceeded against the petitioner holding
disciplinary proceeding.

9. While the petitioner preferred an
appeal against the order impugned, I find
that appellate authority to have relied upon
certain reports of authorities of education
department
especially
Finance
and
Accounts Officer that petitioner since was
reinstated subject to the appeal being
preferred against the acquittal which was a
conditional reinstatement, so no question of
payment of arrears of salary would have
arisen but I find that upon a fact being
brought to its notice that no such criminal
appeal was preferred, even the appellate
authority has rejected the claim of the
petitioner for salary on the same ground
which was taken earlier by the Joint
Director of Education.

10.

In
the
absence
of
any
departmental proceeding being drawn, the
only conclusion that can be drawn is that
petitioner was restrained from discharging
duties on account of his detention in jail in
connection
with
a
criminal
case
a
circumstance to be taken as beyond his
control and his innocence ultimately being
proved by way of acquittal in the said
criminal case, he should not be penalized.

11. The principle of 'no work no pay'
could have been attracted if petitioner had
enjoyed bail in criminal case and had been
merely kept under suspension but this is not
the case either. Petitioner remained in
detention until he was acquitted. There was
no question of petitioner giving any
certificate that he was not gainfully employed
anywhere during the period he was under
suspension. One must draw difference
between an under-trial on bail and convicted
person in jail.

12. In the judgment cited by learned
counsel for the petitioner I find that the some
observations regarding payment of salary for
the period during the employee was under
detention, but there was a decree of trial court
which is not a case here. In principle
petitioner might have been simply acquitted
but petitioner was not responsible in any
manner for not discharging his duties in the
department.

13. There is nothing in the counter
affidavit to demonstrate that even otherwise
the conduct of the petitioner has not been
good and fair while discharging his official
duties. The averments raised in the counter
affidavit are quite sketchy as they only refer
to the criminal case and detention of
petitioner in jail.

14. On the backwages to the petitioner
for the period he remained suspended due to
detention in jail and upon his reinstatement
by revoking his suspension for acquittal in
the criminal case, I find support of my view
in an authority of Supreme Court in the case
of Raj Narain v. Union of India and
others (2019) 5 SCC 809 in which an
identical issue was dealt with. In the said
case even though departmental inquiry was
set up but was later on dropped and upon
acquittal the employee was reinstated
revoking
his
suspension order.
Vide
paragraphs 7 and 8 the Court held thus:-
342 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES

"7. The point that remains to be
considered is whether the appellant is
entitled to payment of full wages
between 1979 and 1987. The appellant
was placed under suspension on 23-101979 and his suspension was revoked on
21-10-1987. An interesting development
took place during the interregnum by
which the disciplinary proceedings were
dropped on 21-3-1983. It is clear from
the record that the appellant was the one
who was seeking postponement of the
departmental enquiry in view of the
pendency of criminal case. The order of
suspension was in contemplation of
disciplinary proceedings. By virtue of
the
disciplinary
proceedings
being
dropped, the appellant becomes entitled
to claim full salary for the period from
the date of his suspension till the date of
closure of the departmental enquiry.
Thereafter, the respondents took four
years to reinstate him by revoking his
suspension. The order of suspension
dated 23-10-1979 came to an end on 213-1983 which is the date on which
disciplinary proceedings were dropped.
The appellant ought to have been
reinstated immediately thereafter unless
a fresh order was passed, placing him
under suspension during the pendency of
the criminal trial which did not happen.
Ultimately, the appellant was reinstated
by an order dated 21-10-1987 by
revocation of the order of suspension.
Though,
technically,
the
learned
Additional Solicitor General is right in
submitting that the impugned judgment
does not even refer to the IA, we are not
inclined to remit the matter to the High
Court
at
this
stage
for
fresh
consideration of this point. We hold that
the appellant is entitled for full wages
from 23-10-1979 to 21-10-1987 after
adjustment of the amounts already paid
towards subsistence allowance.

8. For the reasons mentioned
above, we approve the judgment of the
High Court by holding that the appellant
shall be entitled for back wages only from
the date of acquittal on 31-8-2001, till the
date of his reinstatement on 20-1-2003.
Further, the appellant shall be entitled to
full salary from 23-10-1979 to 21-101987."

15. I find petitioner's case to be on a
much better footing as he was only
suspended for detention in jail without
there being any inquiry in contemplation
and
his
suspension
was
revoked
immediately upon his acquittal in the
criminal case and no appeal was preferred
against the judgment of acquittal.

16. In view of the above, therefore,
the Court is of the considered view that
respondents are not justified in denying
salary to the petitioner applying the
principle of 'no work no pay'.

17. Accordingly, writ petition
succeeds and is allowed. The order
passed by the Joint Director of Education,
Prayagraj Region, Prayagraj dated 1st
May, 2018 and also the order passed by
the Additional Director of Education
(Basic) dated 28th January, 2020 are
hereby quashed.

18. Respondents are directed to
make payment of arrears of salary to the
petitioner for the period petitioner has
remained under suspension i.e. from 19th
August, 2009 to 6th February, 2016
within a period of 30 days from the date
of production of certified copy of this
order.
----------
4 All. Ms. Priti Upadhyay Vs. Banaras Hindu University & Ors.
343
(2024) 4 ILRA 343
ORIGINAL JURISDICTION
CIVIL SIDE
DATED: ALLAHABAD 12.03.2024

BEFORE

THE HON'BLE AJIT KUMAR, J.

Writ A No. 11734 of 2023

Ms. Priti Upadhyay ...Petitioner
Versus
Banaras Hindu University & Ors.
 ...Respondents

Counsel for the Petitioner:
Sri Ishwar Kumar Upadhyay, Sri Sanjeev
Singh

Counsel for the Respondents:
Sri Dhananjay Awasthi, Sri Hem Pratap
Singh, Ms. Pooja Agarwal, Sri Sudhanshu
Srivastava

Service Law - UGC Regulations, 2018 -
Banaras Hindu University
- Assistant
Professor Recruitment - Qualification for
Genetics and Plant Breeding - Challenge to
rolling advertisement no. 01 of 2023-24
(28.06.2023)
prescribing
4-year
B.Sc.
(Agriculture)/B.Sc. (Hons.) (Agriculture)/B.Sc.
(Horticulture) as essential qualification for
Assistant Professor in the Department of
Genetics and Plant Breeding dismissed. UGC
Regulations, 2018, under Regulations 1, 1.1,
3.1, 3.2, 3.4, 3.5, 4, 4.1, mandate a Master's
degree with 55% marks and NET/SLET/SET or
Ph.D. as minimum qualifications for Assistant
Professor, applicable to disciplines including
Agriculture. Employer (University) has discretion
to prescribe specific Bachelor's degree (e.g., 4year B.Sc. Agriculture) to suit departmental
needs, provided it does not dilute the minimum
qualification of a Master's degree. Prescription of
specific Bachelor's degree is not a modification
of
UGC's
minimum
standards
but
an
enhancement within employer's prerogative to
ensure
quality.
Ministry
of
Agriculture's
endorsement (02.08.2010) of UGC Regulations
for Agriculture faculties does not preclude
additional
qualifications
by
the
University.
Petitioner, holding B.Sc. (Biology), failed to
plead equivalence to 4-year B.Sc. (Agriculture).
No illegality in University's requirement, upheld
as within its discretion. (Paras 5-19)

Writ Petition Dismissed.

List of Cases cited:

1. St. of T.N. Vs S.VS Bratheep (Minor), (2004)
4 SCC 513 (Para 15)

2. Maharashtra Public Services Commission Vs
Sandeep Sriram Varade, (2019) 6 SCC 362 (Para
15)

3.
P.U.
Joshi
Vs
Accountant
General,
Ahmedabad, (2003) 2 SCC 632 (Para 15)

4. Dr. Thingujam Achouba Singh Vs Dr. H.N.
Nabachandra Singh, (2020) 20 SCC 312 (Paras
11, 16)

(Delivered by Hon'ble Ajit Kumar J.)

1. Heard Sri Sanjeev Singh, learned
counsel for the petitioner, Ms. Pooja
Agarwal, learned counsel for the University
and Sri Sudhanshu Srivastava, learned
counsel
for
the
Indian
Council
of
Agricultural Research.

2. Petitioner before this Court
questions the rolling advertisement no. 01
of 2023-24 dated 28.06.2023 issued by
Banaras Hindu University (6th respondent)
in so far as it provides for 4 years Honor's
Bachelor's
Degree
as
an
essential
qualification for the post of Assistant
Professor in the Department of Genetics
and Planned Breeding.

3. The argument is two fold: (i) for
the purpose of appointment on the post of
Assistant
Professor
in
a
recognized
University at Master's level the minimum
qualification
prescribed
for
by
the