# Anil Kumar v. State of U.P. & Anr

- **Citation:** (2024) 10 ILRA 1013
- **Court:** High Court of Judicature at Allahabad
- **Decided:** 2024-10-24
- **Case number:** Writ A No. 1382 of 2022
- **Bench:** Rajan Roy, Om Prakash Shukla
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/allahabad-high-court/anil-kumar-v-state-of-u-p-anr-51099
- **Pages:** 21

## Headnote

A. Service Law - Compulsory Retirement -
An order of compulsory retirement is not a
punishment. It implies no stigma nor any
suggestion of misbehavior. The order has
to be passed by the competent authority
on forming an opinion that it is in public
interest to retire a government servant
compulsorily. The order is passed on a
subjective
satisfaction
of
the
Government/competent
authority.
Principle of natural justice has no place in
the context of an order of compulsory
retirement.

The Screening Committee or the competent
authority as the case may be has to consider
the entire service record before taking a
decision in the matter. Of course, the records
pertaining to the later years may be given more
importance. F.R. 56 (C) read with Explanation
(ii) empowers the St. Government with an
absolute right to retire an employee on attaining
the age of fifty years. Deadwood need to be
removed to maintain efficiency in service.
Integrity of a government employee is foremost
consideration in public service.

## Text

_Characters 0–39,933 of 71,805. This is a partial read: ask again with offset=39933 for what follows._

10 All. Anil Kumar Vs. State of U.P. & Anr.
1013
apprehensions,
specially
when,
the
apprehension is far-fetched. The Act is
absolutely clear that it does not interfere in
the ownership rights of the owner and it is
only there to take care of interest of the
allottees, in case, the project is not
completed or handed over in time to the
allottee, the Authority has to ensure the
refund of his money along with interest.
Section 18 of the RERA Act is answer to
the apprehensions raised by learned counsel
for the respondents wherein return of
amount and compensation has been laid
down.

185. Hon'ble Supreme Court in the
matter of S. Rangarajan vs. P. Jagjivan
Ram has observed that, "The anticipated
danger should not be remote, conjectural or
far-fetched. It should have proximate and
direct nexus with the expression."

CONCLUSION

A. The definition of the Promoter is
clear that a person, who does not own the land
but is constructing for selling would fall under
the definition of "promoter" as per Section
2(zk) of the RERA Act. There is no provision
under the Act which calls for the owner of the
land to co-sign as a promoter. Hence, the
objections raised by the UPRERA for not
according the registration to the petitioner, on
this ground, is baseless and incorrect.

B. Section 5 (2) of the Act is clear
that UPRERA has only two choices either
allow the application for registration of the
project within 30 days, or reject the same, but
for any reason if the same is kept pending
beyond the prescribed period of 30 days it
would amount to a "deemed registration".
Hence, the application of the petitioner is
deemed to have been registered after lapse of
the mandatory period, since the same was not
rejected, and it is mandatory on UPRERA to
provide the registration number, Login ID and
Password to the petitioner.

C. Once the project is deemed to
have been approved under the deeming
provision, it is beyond the jurisdiction of
UPRERA to reject the application. The
application could only be rejected as per
Section 7 of the RERA Act.

D. The petitioner is not entitled for
the negative parity with the other builders as
their registration was granted on self
certification and that too without scrutinizing,
the act of UPRERA is justified on this
account.

E. In view of the above discussions,
the order and rejection of the petitioner's
application taken in the meeting dated
16.05.2024 and communicated on 23.06.2024
are set aside.

F. As per Section 5 (2) of the RERA
Act, the petitioner is entitled to the benefit of
deemed approval, hence, the advertisement
given by the third party would not be an
offence under Section 3 of the RERA Act and
no penalty under the RERA Act can be
imposed on the petitioner.

186.
The
instant
writ
petition,
accordingly, stands allowed.
----------
(2024) 10 ILRA 1013
ORIGINAL JURISDICTION
CIVIL SIDE
DATED: LUCKNOW 24.10.2024

BEFORE

THE HON'BLE RAJAN ROY, J.
THE HON'BLE OM PRAKASH SHUKLA, J.

Writ A No. 1382 of 2022

Anil Kumar ...Petitioner
Versus
State of U.P. & Anr. ...Respondents

Counsel for the Petitioner:
1014 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
Sheikh Wali Uz Zaman

Counsel for the Respondents:
C.S.C., Gaurav Mehrotra

A. Service Law - Compulsory Retirement -
An order of compulsory retirement is not a
punishment. It implies no stigma nor any
suggestion of misbehavior. The order has
to be passed by the competent authority
on forming an opinion that it is in public
interest to retire a government servant
compulsorily. The order is passed on a
subjective
satisfaction
of
the
Government/competent
authority.
Principle of natural justice has no place in
the context of an order of compulsory
retirement.

The Screening Committee or the competent
authority as the case may be has to consider
the entire service record before taking a
decision in the matter. Of course, the records
pertaining to the later years may be given more
importance. F.R. 56 (C) read with Explanation
(ii) empowers the St. Government with an
absolute right to retire an employee on attaining
the age of fifty years. Deadwood need to be
removed to maintain efficiency in service.
Integrity of a government employee is foremost
consideration in public service.

1. If conduct of a government employee
becomes unbecoming to the public interest or
obstructs the efficiency in public services, the
government has absolute right to compulsorily
retire such an employee in public interest.

2.
Even
uncommunicated
entries
in
the
Confidential
Record
can
be
taken
into
consideration
for
compulsory
retirement.
Compulsory retirement cannot be imposed as a
punitive measure nor can it be passed as a
shortcut to avoid departmental inquiry when such
course is much desirable. Merely because the
officer has been given promotions after the
adverse entries/material by itself would not attract
the principle of washing off the said entries
especially in a case of a judicial officer. (Para 7)

Apart from assessment of the work and conduct
of the petitioner as fair for the year 1996-97
and 2007-2008, the Screening Committee also
considered a warning by the Administrative
Judge, Saharanpur dated 21.07.2000 to the
effect -'the officer, Sri Anil Kumar, Civil Judge
(Senior Division), Deoband, Saharanpur is
warned for addressing him as a VIP level
officer'. The officer in some correspondence had
referred to himself as a VIP level officer,
therefore, the aforesaid warning was ordered to
be placed by the Administrative Judge in his
confidential report for the relevant year. Apart
from it, for the year 1999- 2000, there were
adverse
remarks
against
the
petitioner
regarding not taking proper interest in disposal
of execution cases which was ordered by the
Administrative Judge on 08.01.2000 to be
communicated to him so that he may make a
representation against the same. The officer
submitted the said representation which was
rejected by the Administrative Committee on
22.03.2002. The aforesaid warning which was
placed in the confidential report and the
rejection of the petitioner's representation as
aforesaid was never challenged by him. (Para
27)

In the opinion the District Judge, petitioner's
private character brought down the image of
administration of justice. Flaws were detected in
maintenance of Presiding Officer's diary and
listing of cases by the officer. Flaws were
detected in the judgments rendered by the
petitioner wherein according to the District
Judge, the points for determination u/s 354(b)
Cr.P.C. were not determined by the officer and
nothing had been discussed as to the credibility
of the side of prosecution (whether fully credible
or partly credible), nor anything had been
discussed as to the place of occurrence and
motive and in this manner, as per the District
Judge, the decision arrived at by the officer
were not sound and reasoned. (Para 28)

B. Once the master-servant relationship
ceased then the Disciplinary proceedings
should have been dropped and should not
have continued any further as there was
no
provision
under
which
such
proceedings
could
have
continued
thereafter unless of course a decision was
taken under Civil Services Regulation
351A for forfeiture/withholding etc of
pension etc but no such decision had been
10 All. Anil Kumar Vs. State of U.P. & Anr.
1015
taken to continue the proceedings under the
said provision.

In the said report (dated 23.12.2021), the
petitioner was exonerated of Charge No.1 and 2
which were similar to the adverse remarks made
by the District Judge in the A.C.R. for the year
2012-13 and the report mentioned hereinabove.
Much emphasis has been laid by the petitioner
that this exoneration in the inquiry report which
was accepted by the Administrative Committee
on 10.01.2022 was itself sufficient to show that
remarks of the District Judge and the report
sent by him which was taken into consideration
by the Screening Committee and thereafter, by
the Administrative Committee and the Full Court
of the High Court were unjustified and
therefore, the basis for the satisfaction recorded
for compulsory retirement of the petitioner was
not tenable on facts and in law.

However, the said exoneration by the
Inquiry
Judge
is
absolutely
without
jurisdiction. The Inquiry report dated
23.12.2021 has no legal significance in the
eyes of law. So far as the dropping of charges
by the Administrative Committee meeting dated
10.01.2022 while considering the inquiry report
dated 23.12.2021 is concerned, the said
decision appears to have been in view of the
fact that the petitioner had already compulsorily
retired and no purpose would be served as
punishment could not have been imposed on a
retired employee.

Additionally, this plea is liable to be rejected
because the inquiry report in this case was
without
jurisdiction
and
therefore,
no
advantage could enure to the petitioner on
account of its submission. Moreover, the
subjective satisfaction arrived at by the
District Judge in the A.C.R. recorded by him
for the year 2012-13 and in his report which
led to a vigilance inquiry does not get
washed away by this inquiry report. (Para
31)

C. Merely because a chargesheet had
been issued to him and a disciplinary
proceeding had been initiated did not
preclude
the
High
court
from
considering
the
petitioner
for
compulsory retirement. The law does not
preclude the High Court from doing so. Once
a
decision
to
compulsorily
retire
the
petitioner was taken, it was implied therein
that the disciplinary proceedings which had
been initiated for imposing a punishment
stood dropped but merely because the
Inquiry Judge may not have been informed
about the said fact resulting in an inquiry
report dated 23.12.2021 would not enure to
the benefit of the petitioner. Proceedings
for
compulsory
retirement
and
disciplinary
proceedings
are
two
distinct proceedings. (Para 35)

D. The assessment of the work and
conduct of a judicial officer by his
immediate
superior
is
of
immense
importance especially in view of the
report of the Vigilance Officer. The law
is settled that a single adverse remark
regarding integrity of a judicial officer
is
sufficient
for
his
compulsory
retirement. In this case, there is sufficient
material to sustain the order of compulsory
retirement and also subjective satisfaction
arrived at in this regard. As observed by the
Supreme Court of India, it is not always
possible to have positive evidence in matters
of integrity of a judicial officer and the
assessment
by
the
immediate
superior
officer regarding his work and conduct
including his integrity should not be brushed
aside lightly, unless of course, any malafide
is proved which is not the case here.
Therefore, the decision of the Screening
Committee, the Administrative Committee
and the Full Court based on the material
before it, are required to be given due
weightage. (Para 35)

Writ Petition dismissed. (E-4)

Precedent followed:

1. Arun Kumar Saxena Vs High Court of
Judicature at Allahabad through R.G. & anr.,
2018 SC OnLine All 5728 (Para 6)

2. Raman Kumar Saxena Vs St. of U.P., 2008
SCC OnLine All 1230 (Para 6)

3. Ram Muriti Yadav Vs St. of U.P. & anr.,
(2020) 1 SCC 801 (Para 6)
1016 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
4. Pyare Mohan Lal Vs St. of Jharkhand & ors.,
(2010) 10 SCC 693 (Para 6)

5. Shiv Kant Tripathi Vs St. of U.P. & ors., 2008
SCC OnLine All 70 (Para 6)

6. Rajendra Singh Verma Vs Lt. Governor (NCT)
of Delhi, (2011) 10 SCC 1 (Para 6)

7. Ram Kumar Tripathi Vs St. of U.P. & ors.,
judgment and order dated 04.09.2018 in W.P.
No. 10551 (S/B) of 2018) (Para 6)

8. Rajasthan High Court Vs Ved Priya & anr.,
2020 SCC OnLine 337 (Para 6)

9. Registrar General, HC of Patna Vs Pandey
Gajendra Prasad & ors., 2012 (6) SCC 357 (Para
6)

10. Baikuntha Nath Das & anr. Vs Chief District
Medical Officer, AIR 1992 SC 1020 (Para 6)

11. Arun Kumar Gupta Vs St. of Jharkhand &
anr., judgment and order dated 27.02.2020 in
W.P. (Civil) No. 190 of 2018) (Para 6)

12. HC of Judicature, Rajasthan Vs Bhanwar Lal
Lamror & ors., (2021) 8 SCC 377 (Para 6)

13. St. of U.P. Vs Vijay Kumar Jha, (2002) 3 SCC
641 (Para 6)

14. Ram Murit Yadav Vs St. of U.P., judgment
and order dated 02.05.2018 in W.P. No. 17566
(S/B) of 2016 (Para 6)

15. Shyam Shankar-II Vs St. of U.P. & ors.,
judgment and order dated 16.03.2018 in W.P.
No. 17566 (S/B) of 2016) (Para 6)

16. Shrirang Yadavrao Waghmare Vs St. of Mah.
& ors., judgment and order dated 16.09.2019,
Civil appeal No. 7306 of 2019

17. Gurpal Singh Vs High Court of Judicature of
Raj., (2012) 2 SCC 94 (Para 6)

18. R.C. Chandel Vs High Court of M.P. & anr.,
(2012) 8 SCC 58 (Para 6)

19. Muzaffar Hussain Vs St. of U.P. & anr., 2002
SCC OnLine SC 567
20. U.O.I. Vs K.K. Dhawan, (1993) 2 SCC 56
(Para 9)

21. U.O.I. Vs Duli Chand, (2006) 5 SCC 680
(Para 9)

22. T.A. Naqshbandi Vs St. of J&K, (2003) 9 SCC
592 (Para 10)

23. High Court of Bombay Vs Shashikant S.
Patil, (2011) 10 SCC 1 (Para 10)

24. Nawal Singh Vs St. of U.P. & anr., (2003) All
LJ 2491 (Para 14)

25. U.O.I. Vs M.E. Reddy, (1980) 2 SCC 15
(Para 15)

26. Swatantra Singh Vs St. of Har., (1997) 4
SCC 14 (Para 16)

27. Tarak Singh Vs Jyoti Basu, (2005) 1 SCC
201 (Para 19)

28. Nand Kumar Verma Vs St. of Jharkhand &
ors., (2012) 3 SCC 580 (Para 21)

29. M.S. Bindra Vs U.O.I., (1998) 7 SCC 310
(Para 22)

Precedent distinguished:

1. Ram Ekbal Sharma Vs St. of Bihar & anr.,
(1993) 3 SCC 396 (Para 5)

2. Madan Mohan Choudhary Vs St. of Bihar &
ors., (2001) 3 SCC 314(Para 5)

3. St. of Gujarat Vs Umedbhai M. Patel, 2009 (1)
SCC (L&S) 663 (Para 5)

4.
Madhya
Pradesh
St.
Cooperative
Dairy
Federation Ltd. & anr. Vs Rajnesh Kumar Jamindar
& ors., 2012 (1) SCC (L&S) 663 (Para 5)

5. Nand Kumar Verma Vs St. of Jharkhand &
ors., 2019 (10) SCC 640 (Para 5)

6. Krishna Prasad Verma (D) through Lrs. Vs St.
of Bihar, (2022) LiveLaw (SC) 128 (Para 5)

7. Central Industrial Security Force Vs HC (GD)
Om Prakash (Para 5)
10 All. Anil Kumar Vs. State of U.P. & Anr.
1017
8. Avinash Chandra Tripathi Vs St. of U.P. &
anr., Writ Petition No. 33451 of 2016, decided
on 31.05.2018 (Para 5)

Present
petition
challenges
the
recommendations
of
the
Screening
Committee
dated
11.06.2020
and
15.06.2020, the Resolution of Full Court of
the
Allahabad
High
Court
dated
25.11.2021 for his compulsory retirement
as also his compulsory retirement order
dated 29.11.2024. ReinSt.ment in service
with
all
consequential
benefits
of
seniority, arrears of salary etc. has been
sought.

(Delivered by Hon'ble Rajan Roy, J.)

(1) Heard Sri Sheikh Wali Uz Zaman,
learned counsel for the petitioner, Sri
Gaurav Mehrotra, learned counsel for the
High Court, Sri M.K. Dwivedi, learned
Standing Counsel for State-respondent.

(2) By means of this petition, the
petitioner, a compulsorily retired judicial
officer in the State of U.P., has challenged
the recommendations of the Screening
Committee
dated
11.06.2020
and
15.06.2020, the Resolution of Full Court of
the Allahabad High Court dated 25.11.2021
for his compulsory retirement as also his
compulsory
retirement
order
dated
29.11.2024.
He
has
sought
his
reinstatement
in
service
with
all
consequential benefits of seniority, arrears
of salary etc.

(3) The facts of the case in brief are
that the petitioner was appointed on the
post of Munsif/ Civil Judge (Junior
Division) and became a member of U.P.
Nyayik Sewa on 22.03.1996. He was
promoted as Civil Judge (Senior Division)
on 15.12.2003. Thereafter, he was further
promoted to Higher Judicial Service and
was posted as Additional District Judge on
16.08.2013. For the year 2012-13, the
District Judge, Badaun recorded an adverse
Confidential Report and did not certify his
integrity for the said period. Vide his letter
dated 24.09.2016 addressed to the Registrar
General,
he
communicated
various
instances of misconduct on his part
requiring a full-fledged inquiry especially
with regard to his integrity and the
properties amassed by him. Based thereon,
a vigilance inquiry was ordered by Hon'ble
the Chief Justice on 11.05.2013 which was
registered
as
Vigilance
Inquiry
No.28/2013.
The
Vigilance
Officer
submitted his report on 04.03.2016 wherein
he found the allegations to be correct. The
matter
was
placed
before
the
Administrative Committee of the High
Court which accepted the report in its
meeting dated 14.09.2016 and 16.11.2016
and recommended a regular departmental
proceeding against the petitioner, which
was
in
fact
initiated,
bearing
D.P.
No.12/2016. The Administrative Judge did
not record his comments for the A.C.R
period 2013-14 on account of pendency of
the vigilance inquiry at the relevant time.
The compulsory retirement of the judicial
officer was considered in the year 2020 by
a Screening Committee of the High Court
in its meeting dated 11.06.2020 and
15.06.2020. In these meetings, service
records
of
the
petitioner
were
also
scrutinized and the Screening Committee
recommended his compulsory retirement
taking into considering his entire service
record. The recommendations of the
Screening Committee were placed before
the Administrative Committee of the High
Court which in its meeting date 18.11.2021
accepted the recommendations of the
Screening Committee dated 11.06.2020 and
15.06.2020 and recommended withdrawal
of judicial work of the petitioner as also his
compulsory retirement to the Full Court.
1018 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
The matter was placed before the Full
Court
which
in
its
meeting
dated
25.11.2021, on a consideration of entire
material before it, opined in its wisdom for
compulsory retirement of the petitioner.

(4) Based on the aforesaid exercise,
the State Government passed the order of
compulsory retirement on 29.11.2021 in
exercise of its powers under Fundamental
Rule 56(C). Be that as it may, for some
explicable reason, the Inquiry Judge who
had been assigned D.P. No.12/2016 was
not
intimated
about
the
aforesaid
compulsory retirement of the petitioner.
Consequently, he went ahead with the
inquiry and even the petitioner himself, it
appears, did not inform him about the said
fact and ultimately, the Inquiry Judge
submitted
a
report
on
23.12.2021
exonerating the petitioner. The inquiry
report was placed before the Administrative
Committee which was informed about
compulsory retirement of the petitioner and
accordingly, it dropped the charges against
the
petitioner
in
its
meeting
dated
10.01.2022 and this decision of the
Administrative
Committee
was
communicated to the District & Sessions
Judge, Bulandshahr on 09.02.2022. Against
the aforesaid background, the petitioner has
filed this petition seeking the reliefs as
mentioned earlier.

(5) The contention of learned counsel
for the petitioner in nutshell was that based
on the material on record, no prudent
person could have arrived at the conclusion
that the petitioner was a deadwood who had
outlived its utility for the judicial services,
therefore,
the
impugned
compulsory
retirement
is
liable
to
be
quashed.
Compulsory retirement could not have been
resorted as a shortcut to avoid result of the
disciplinary proceedings. The fact that the
Inquiry Judge subsequently exonerated the
petitioner of the charges leveled against
him and the Administrative Committee
accepted the same is itself proof of the fact
that the remarks of the District Judge
pertaining to the A.C.R. period 2012-13
were unfounded and a result of malafide.
Therefore, this material, that is, the remarks
of District Judge in this regard and the
report of Vigilance Officer cannot be made
the basis for sustaining the order of
compulsory retirement and his subsequent
exoneration
itself
shows
that
the
compulsory retirement was illegal and
without any factual and legal basis.
Learned counsel also alleged malafide
against the then District Judge. However,
we find that the said District Judge has not
been impleaded as an opposite party in the
writ petition, therefore, the allegations
cannot be looked into. The Screening
Committee had taken into consideration the
chargesheet issued to the petitioner in
disciplinary proceedings and the report of
Vigilance Officer which was the basis for
initiation of disciplinary proceedings and
therefore, in view of the subsequent
exoneration, these material cannot form the
basis for the petitioner's compulsory
retirement and in fact, a shortcut method
was adopted to compulsorily retire the
petitioner without waiting for the result of
disciplinary proceedings. The Screening
Committee did not consider the work done
by the petitioner nor the entire service
record
but
has
considered
irrelevant
material such as entries for the year 19961997 and 2007-2008 which were not
adverse.
The
order
of
compulsory
retirement has been passed in colourable
exercise of power without there being any
material to sustain the same, therefore, it is
liable to be quashed. Learned counsel for
the petitioner relied upon various decisions
in support of his contention which are
10 All. Anil Kumar Vs. State of U.P. & Anr.
1019
reported in 1990 (3) SCC 504 'Ram Ekbal
Sharma vs. State of Bihar & anr.'; (1993)
3 SCC 396 'Madan Mohan Choudhary
vs. State of Bihar & Ors.'; (2001) 3 SCC
314 'State of Gujarat vs. Umedbhai M.
Patel'; 2009 (15) SCC 221 'Madhya
Pradesh
State
Cooperative
Dairy
Federation Limited and Anr. vs. Rajnesh
Kumar Jamindar & Ors.'; 2012 (1) SCC
(L&S) 663 'Nand Kumar Verma vs. State
of Jharkhand & Ors.'; 2019 (10) SCC
640 'Krishna Prasad Verma (D) Thr.
Lrs. vs. State of Bihar'; (2022) LiveLaw
(SC) 128 'Central Industrial Security
Force vs. HC (GD) OM Prakash' and
judgment passed by Division Bench of
Allahabad High Court passed in Writ-A
No.33451 of 2016 'Avinash Chandra
Tripathi vs. State of U.P. & Anr.' on
31.05.2018.

(6) On the other hand, Sri Gaurav
Mehrotra, learned counsel for the High
Court first and foremost invited our
attention to the scope of judicial review of
an order of compulsory retirement in a case
involving a judicial officer. He submitted
that the said scope was very limited and
would be confined to cases where the order
has been passed without any material or
malafide. He submitted that sufficiency of
material is not open for consideration for
the High Court under Article 226 of the
Constitution of India and it is only the
decision making process which can be seen
while evaluating the validity of an order of
compulsory retirement, that too, pertaining
to a judicial officer. He also emphasized
upon the fact that the decision has been
taken firstly by the Screening Committee
comprising of Hon'ble Judges of the High
Court and thereafter, by the senior most
Judges of the High Court who were part of
Administrative Committee and then the
Full Court of the High Court presided by
Hon'ble the Chief Justice, therefore, due
and proper weightage has to be given to the
satisfaction arrived at by the High Court
and also subsequently by the State
Government in this regard and an order of
compulsory retirement of a judicial officer
is not be interfered lightly. A judicial
officer has to maintain highest standards of
conduct and integrity throughout his career,
therefore, his evaluation has to be on a
higher platform than that of an ordinary
officer. The Screening Committee as also
the High Court has formed a subjective
satisfaction on the basis of objective
material available before it and such
satisfaction is not to be interfered lightly on
the judicial side. It is not a case where there
is no material for sustaining the order of
compulsory
retirement.
As
regards
subsequent exoneration of the petitioner in
the inquiry wherein the charges were
similar to those referred in the remarks of
the District Judge for the A.C.R. 2012-13,
he submitted that once the master-servant
relationship had ceased on the compulsory
retirement of the petitioner then any
subsequent report exonerating him would
be of no consequence rather it would be
without jurisdiction. As regards acceptance
of the said report by the Administrative
Committee,
he
submitted
that
the
Committee appears to have accepted the
report presumably because the petitioner
had already been retired and no punishment
could be imposed upon him based on such
inquiry even if the Committee took a
different view that what had been taken by
the Inquiry Judge. Therefore, it appears that
only for this reason the report was accepted
as it was veritably of no consequence so far
as imposition of punishment upon the
officer is concerned. He took us through
the material which was considered by the
Screening Committee for recommending
compulsory retirement of the petitioner. He
1020 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
emphasized that the entire service record of
the petitioner had been considered by the
Screening Committee and a subjective
satisfaction had been recorded based on
such consideration. He also emphasized the
fact that the general reputation of a judicial
officer is also a factor to be taken into
consideration in the matter of compulsory
retirement and in every case there may not
be tangible proof pointing towards lack of
integrity or grave misconduct. In such
cases, compulsory retirement is justified
and there are catena of decisions on this
aspect. A wrong judicial order may not
entail disciplinary proceedings but it can
certainly be taken into consideration for
recording the Annual Confidential Report.
He also contended that the judgments relied
upon by the petitioner are not applicable as
the facts in those cases were different. The
Screening Committee had not taken into
consideration the report of the Inquiry
Judge as it was not available by then and in
fact, the said report could not have been
submitted after the compulsory retirement
of the petitioner. The High Court was
justified in compulsorily retiring the
petitioner and the resolutions of the
Administrative Committee and the Full
Court in this regard veritably amounted to
dropping
the
disciplinary
proceedings
against the petitioner but merely because
the said inquiry continued even after the
petitioner's compulsory retirement will not
enure to the benefit of the petitioner and he
cannot be permitted to take advantage of
the same. He also submitted that the
adverse material which is the basis for
compulsory retirement has never been
challenged by the petitioner, therefore, its
validity
cannot
be
seen
in
these
proceedings. The collective wisdom of the
Full Court is to be given due respect and
weightage. He took us through various
decisions relied upon by him which are
'Arun Kumar Saxena vs. High Court of
Judicature at Allahabad Thru' R.G. and
Another' 2018 SCC OnLine All 5728;
'Raman Kumar Saxena vs. State of U.P.
and Ors.' 2008 SCC OnLine All 1230;
'Ram Murti Yadav vs. State of U.P. &
Another' (2020) 1 SCC 801; 'Pyare
Mohan Lal vs. State of Jharkhand and
Ors.' (2010) 10 SCC 693; 'Shiv Kant
Tripathi vs. State of U.P. & Ors.' 2008
SCC OnLine All 70; 'Rajendra Singh
Verma vs. Lt. Governor (NCT of Delhi)'
(2011) 10 SCC 1; 'Ram Kumar Tripathi
vs. State of U.P. and Ors.' (Judgment
and Order dated 04.09.2018 in W.P. No.
10551 (S/B) of 2018); 'Rajasthan High
Court vs. Ved Priya and another' 2020
SCC OnLine 337; 'Registrar General, HC
of Patna vs. Pandey Gajendra Prasad
and Ors.' 2012 (6) SCC 357; 'Baikuntha
Nath Das & another vs. Chief District
Medical Officer' AIR 1992 SC 1020;
'Arun Kumar Gupta Vs. State of
Jharkhand and Anr.' [Judgment and
Order dt. 27.02.2020 in W.P. (Civil)
No.190 of 2018]; 'HC of Judicature,
Rajasthan vs. Bhanwar Lal Lamror &
Ors.' (2021) 8 SCC 377; 'State of U.P. vs.
Vijay Kumar Jain' (2002) 3 SCC 641;
'Ram Murti Yadav vs. State of U.P. and
Ors.'
[Judgment
and
order
dt.
02.05.2018 in W.P. No. 17566 (S/B) of
2016]; 'Shyam Shankar-II vs. State of
U.P. and Ors.' [Judgment and Order dt.
16.03.2018 in W.P. No. 17566 (S/B) of
2016]; 'Shrirang Yadavrao Waghmare
vs. State of Maharastra and Others'
Judgment and Order dated 16.09.2019
[Civil Appeal No. 7306 of 2019]; 'Gurpal
Singh Vs. High Court of Judicature of
Rajasthan' (2012) 2 SCC 94; 'R.C.
Chandel Vs. High Court of Madhya
Pradesh and Another' (2012) 8 SCC 58
and 'Muzaffar Hussain vs. State of U.P.
and Anr.' 2002 SCC OnLine SC 567.
10 All. Anil Kumar Vs. State of U.P. & Anr.
1021

(7) Before proceeding to consider the
facts and issues involved in this petition,
we would first of all like to dwell upon the
law
on
the
subject
of
compulsory
retirement of a judicial officer. An order of
compulsory retirement is not a punishment.
It implies no stigma nor any suggestion of
misbehavior. The order has to be passed by
the competent authority on forming an
opinion that it is in public interest to retire a
government servant compulsorily. The
order is passed on a subjective satisfaction
of the Government/ competent authority.
Principle of natural justice has no place in
the context of an order of compulsory
retirement. The Screening Committee or
the competent authority as the case may be
has to consider the entire service record
before taking a decision in the matter. Of
course, the records pertaining to the later
years may be given more importance. F.R.
56 (C) read with Explanation (ii) empowers
the State Government with an absolute
right to retire an employee on attaining the
age of fifty years. Deadwood need to be
removed to maintain efficiency in service.
Integrity of a government employee is
foremost consideration in public service1.
If conduct of a government employee
becomes unbecoming to the public interest
or obstructs the efficiency in public
services, the government has absolute right
to compulsorily retire such an employee in
public interest. A government's right to
compulsorily retire is a method to ensure a
efficiency
in
public
service2.
Even
uncommunicated entries in the Confidential
Record can be taken into consideration for
compulsory
retirement.
Compulsory
retirement cannot be imposed as a punitive
measure nor can it be passed as a shortcut
to avoid departmental inquiry when such
course is much desirable. Merely because
the officer has been given promotions after
the adverse entries/ material by itself would
not attract the principle of washing off the
said entries especially in a case of a judicial
officer3.

(8) We may in this very context refer
to certain decisions regarding scope of
judicial review of an order of compulsory
retirement of a judicial officer. We may in
this context refer to decision of Hon'ble the
Supreme Court of India in the case of
Pyare Mohan Lal (supra) wherein it was
inter alia held that single adverse entry
regarding the integrity of an officer even in
remote
past
is
sufficient
to
award
compulsory retirement4. The case of a
Judicial Officer is required to be examined,
treating him to be differently from other
wings of the society, as he is serving the
State in a different capacity. The case of a
Judicial Officer is considered by a
Committee of Judges of the High Court
duly constituted by Hon'ble the Chief
Justice and then the report of the
Committee is placed before the Full Court.
A decision is taken by the Full Court after
due deliberation on the matter. Therefore,
there is hardly any chance to make the
allegations of non- application of mind or
malafide.

(9) We may in this very context refer
to decision of Hon'ble the Supreme Court
in the case of Ram Murti Yadav (supra)
wherein after noticing the fact that the
service records of the appellant therein had
been
examined
by
the
Screening
Committee, the Full Court as also by the
Division Bench of the High Court it was
held that the scope for judicial review of an
order of compulsory retirement based on
the subjective satisfaction of the employer
is extremely narrow and restricted. Only if
it is found to be based on arbitrary or
capricious grounds, vitiated by malafides,
overlooks relevant materials, could there be
1022 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
limited scope for interference. The court, in
judicial review, cannot sit in judgment over
the same as an Appellate Authority. The
submission in the said case that compulsory
retirement could not have been ordered for
mere error of judgment in decision making
was repelled with the observation that the
same merited no consideration in view of
the decision in K.K. Dhawan5 and Duli
Chand6.

(10) In Ram Murti Yadav (supra),
Hon'ble the Supreme Court reiterated that a
single adverse entry could suffice for an
order of compulsory retirement as held in
Pyare Mohan Lal (supra). It referred to
another
decision
of
Supreme
Court
rendered in 'T.A. Naqshbandi vs. State of
J&K'7 regarding scope of judicial review
in such matters wherein it has been held
that judicial review is permissible only to
the extent of finding whether the process in
reaching the decision has been observed
correctly and not the decision itself, as
such. Critical or independent analysis or
appraisal of the materials by the courts
exercising powers of judicial review unlike
the case of an appellate court, would
neither be permissible nor conducive to the
interests of either the officers concerned or
the
system
and
institutions
of
administration of justice with which it was
concerned in the said case, by going into
the correctness as such of ACRs or the
assessment made by the Committee and
approval accorded by the Full Court of the
High Court. It then referred to the decision
in the case of 'Rajendra Singh Verma vs.
State (NCT of Delhi)8' wherein the
principles laid down in 'High Court of
Bombay vs. Shashikant S. Patil'9 were
reiterated and it was observed that in case
where the Full Court of the High Court
recommends compulsory retirement of an
officer, the High Court on the judicial side
has
to
exercise
great
caution
and
circumspection in setting aside that order
because it is a complement of all the Judges
of the High Court who go into the question
and it is possible that in all cases evidence
would not be forthcoming about integrity
doubtful of a judicial officer.

(11) It then once again referred to the
observation in Rajendra Singh Verma
(supra) that if that authority bona fide
forms an opinion that the integrity of a
particular
officer
is
doubtful,
the
correctness of that opinion cannot be
challenged before courts. When such a
constitutional function is exercised on the
administrative side of the High Court, any
judicial review thereon should be made
only with great care and circumspection
and it must be confined strictly to the
parameters set by this Court in several
reported decisions. When the appropriate
authority forms bona fide opinion that
compulsory retirement of a judicial officer
is in public interest, the writ court under
Article 226 or this Court under Article 32
would not interfere with the order.

(12) It also considered the decision of
Supreme Court in 'Ram Ekbal Sharma vs.
State of Bihar'10 and observed that, that
was a decision where the issue was that the
form of the order was not conclusive and
veil could be lifted to determine if it was
ordered as punishment and the said
decision was not found relevant to the
issues involved. It further went on to
observe as under:-

"14. A person entering the
judicial service no doubt has career
aspirations including promotions. An order
of compulsory retirement undoubtedly
affects the career aspirations. Having said
so, we must also sound a caution that
10 All. Anil Kumar Vs. State of U.P. & Anr.
1023
judicial service is not like any other
service. A person discharging judicial
duties acts on behalf of the State in
discharge of its sovereign functions.
Dispensation of justice is not only an
onerous duty but has been considered as
akin to discharge of a pious duty, and
therefore, is a very serious matter. The
standards of probity, conduct, integrity that
may be relevant for discharge of duties by
a careerist in another job cannot be the
same for a judicial officer. A judge holds
the office of a public trust. Impeccable
integrity,
unimpeachable
independence
with moral values embodied to the core are
absolute imperatives which brooks no
compromise. A judge is the pillar of the
entire justice system and the public has a
right to demand virtually irreproachable
conduct from anyone performing a judicial
function. Judges must strive for the highest
standards of integrity in both their
professional and personal lives.

15. It has to be kept in mind that
a person seeking justice, has the first
exposure to the justice delivery system at
the level of subordinate judiciary, and thus
a sense of injustice can have serious
repercussions not only on that individual
but can have its fall out in the society as
well. It is, therefore, absolutely necessary
that the ordinary litigant must have
complete faith at this level and no
impression can be afforded to be given to a
litigant which may even create a perception
to the contrary as the consequences can be
very damaging. The standard or yardstick
for judging the conduct of the judicial
officer, therefore, has necessarily to be
strict. Having said so, we must also observe
that it is not every inadvertent flaw or error
that will make a judicial officer culpable.
The State Judicial Academies undoubtedly
has a stellar role to perform in this regard.
A bona fide error may need correction and
counselling. But a conduct which creates a
perception beyond the ordinary cannot be
countenanced. For a trained legal mind, a
judicial order speaks for itself."

(13) In the case of Rajendra Singh
Verma (supra), it was observed as under:-

'191. Further, in case where the
Full Court of the High Court recommends
compulsory retirement of an officer, the
High Court on the judicial side has to
exercise great caution and circumspection
in setting aside that order because it is a
complement of all the judges of the High
Court who go into the question and it is
possible that in all cases evidence would
not be forth coming about integrity
doubtful of a Judicial Officer. As observed
by this Court in High Court of Punjab &
Haryana v.s. Ishwar Chand Jain (1999) 4
SCC 579, at times, the Full Court has to
act on the collective wisdom of all the
Judges and if the general reputation of an
employee is not good, though there may
not be any tangible material against him,
he may be given compulsory retirement in
public interest and judicial review of such
order is permissible only on limited
grounds. The reputation of being corrupt
would gather thick and unchaseable
clouds around the conduct of an officer
and gain notoriety much faster than the
smoke. Sometimes there may not be
concrete or material evidence to make it
part of the record. It would, therefore, be
impracticable for the reporting officer or
the competent controlling officer writing
the confidential report to give specific
instances of shortfalls, supported by
evidence.

192. Normally, the adverse entry
reflecting on the integrity would be based
on formulations of impressions which
would be result of multiple factors
1024 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
simultaneously playing in the mind.
Though the perceptions may differ, in the
very nature of things there is a difficulty
nearing an impossibility in subjecting the
entries in the confidential rolls to judicial
review.
Sometimes,
if
the
general
reputation of an employee is not good
though there may not be any tangible
material
against
him,
he
may
be
compulsorily retired in public interest.
The duty conferred on the appropriate
authority to consider the question of
continuance of a judicial officer beyond a
particular age is an absolute one. If that
authority bona fide forms an opinion that
the integrity of a particular officer is
doubtful, the correctness of that opinion
cannot be challenged before courts.