# Anil Kumar v. State of U.P. & Ors

- **Citation:** (2026) 2 ILRA 616
- **Court:** High Court of Judicature at Allahabad
- **Decided:** 2026-02-05
- **Case number:** Writ C No. 107 of 2026
- **Bench:** Subhash Vidyarthi
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/allahabad-high-court/anil-kumar-v-state-of-u-p-ors-54260
- **Pages:** 9

## Text

616 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
supplied with the OEM reports forming the basis of the impugned action prior to passing of the
termination order.

33. Consequently, the appellate authority, while dismissing the petitioner's appeal by order
dated 23.5.2019, also failed to consider the aforesaid procedural infirmities and merely affirmed the
decision of the original authority without independently examining whether the allegations against
the petitioner had been established in accordance with law.

34. In view of the aforesaid discussion, this Court is of the considered opinion that the
impugned orders dated 30.1.2018 passed by respondent No.2 and 23.5.2019 passed by the Dispute
Resolution Panel cannot be sustained in the eyes of law. Accordingly, the writ petition deserves to
be allowed.

35. The impugned order dated 30.1.2018 terminating the petitioner's retail outlet dealership
agreement as well as the appellate order dated 23.5.2019 passed by the Dispute Resolution Panel
are hereby quashed. The respondents are directed to permit the petitioner to continue to operate the
retail outlet in accordance with law and strictly in terms of the dealership agreement, subject to
compliance of all applicable conditions.

36. However, it is left open to the competent authority of the respondent-Corporation to
proceed afresh from the stage of issuance of show cause notice, after supplying to the petitioner all
documents proposed to be relied upon, including the reports of the Original Equipment
Manufacturers. In case show cause notice is issued in accordance with law, necessary order in
accordance with law shall be passed after affording fullest opportunity of hearing to the petitioner.

37. The aforesaid exercise shall be completed expeditiously, preferably within a period of four
months from the date a certified copy of this order is produced before the concerned authority.

38. The writ petition is accordingly allowed. No order as to costs.
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(2026) 2 ILRA 616
ORIGINAL JURISDICTION
CIVIL SIDE
DATED: LUCKNOW 05.02.2026

BEFORE

THE HON'BLE SUBHASH VIDYARTHI, J.

Writ C No. 107 of 2026

Anil Kumar ...Petitioner
Versus
State of U.P. & Ors. ...Respondents

Issue(s) for consideration
2 All. Anil Kumar Vs. State of U.P. & Ors.
617
Whether the Prescribed Authority has to act in accordance with the majority opinion of the Members of the
concerned Gram Panchayat while nominating the officiating Pradhan?

Headnotes
A. Panchayat Election Law - U.P. Panchayat Raj Act, 1947: Section 12-J - The Prescribed
Authority has to act in accordance with the majority opinion of the Members of the concerned
Gram Panchayat while nominating the officiating Pradhan. The law laid down is in consonance
with the spirit of the provisions of Chapter IX inserted in our Constitution by the Constitution
(Seventy third) Amendment Act 1992 which provides for constitution of Panchayats at the village,
empowering the villagers to manage their affairs at the local level themselves. (Para 9, 10)

B. The requirement of consultation with the members cannot be said to be contrary to the intent
of the legislature or adding words which have not been provided by the Statute. The office of
Pradhan of a village is filled in by elections. The legislature, aware of this position, has made a specific
provision under the Act, conferring powers on the Prescribed Authority to nominate a member to discharge
the duties and exercise the powers of Pradhan until the vacancy of the office of Pradhan is filled in. This
exercise is for the purpose of seeing that the functions of the Panchayat proceed smoothly and that there is
no vacancy in the post till the vacancy is filled, as the Panchayat constitutes the basic unit of our democratic
structure. Those in majority, shall have their nominee elected as an elected Pradhan should have the
confidence of the members. (Para 11)

C. Longstanding precedents should not ordinarily be interfered with. Even the Hon'ble Supreme
Court does not ordinarily interfere with the long standing precedents of High Courts regarding
State legislations. (Para 16 to 18)

D. The rule of reservation has to be applied even while making nomination of a member of a
village Panchayat u/s 12-J of the U. P. Panchayat Raj Act to perform the duties of a Pradhan
against a casual vacancy of Pradhan. (Para 21)

It is apparent that the arrangement made for filling up temporary vacancy in the office of
Pradhan which may cause, because of certain factors including removal of Pradhan would not mean that
the office of Pradhan is filled up by a person or member or Up-Pradhan who is otherwise not
eligible or was not eligible to contest for the seat of Pradhan in a particular reserved
constituency. This being only a simple arrangement during a temporary vacancy, no exception of the same
can be taken and it cannot be read in derogation with the provisions regarding reservation made under the
Act and prescribed under the Rules. (Para 20)

The impugned order dated 26.06.2025, passed by the District Panchayat Raj Officer, Sitapur, whereby the
District Panchayat Raj Officer has nominated the opposite party No. 4 to perform the duties of Gram Pradhan
of Gram Panchayat, Sikauha, Development Block Reusa, District Sitapur until further orders, or until a Pradhan
is appointed, is unsustainable in law and the same is quashed. The District Magistrate/District Panchayat Raj
Officer, Sitapur is directed to make a fresh appointment of officiating Pradhan, keeping in view the
observations made in this judgment. (Para 22)

Writ petition allowed. (E-4)

Case Law Cited
1. Savitri Devi Vs. State of U.P. and 4 others, 2017:AHC:70818 (Para 4)
2. Udaivir Vs. State Election Commission of U.P., 2008 SCC OnLine All 2132 (Para 6)
3. Pushpendra Kumar Vs. State of U.P., 2010 SCC OnLine All 3140 (Para 6)
4. Shyamu Vs. State of U.P. & Ors., 2010 SCC OnLine All 1250 (Para 6)
5. Smt. Usha Singh Vs. District Magistrate, Gorakhpur & Ors., 1992 RD 337; 1992 SCC OnLine All 184 (Para 6)
6. Kusma Devi Vs. State of U.P., 1992 RD 337 (Para 11)
618 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
7. Union of India Vs. Dharmendra Textile Processors, (2008) 13 SCC 369 (Para 13)
8. Dattatraya Ganesh Kulkarni Vs. Appa Tukaram Mude, (1998) 8 SCC 717 (Para 17)
9. Shri Sant Sadguru Janardan Swami (Moingiri Maharaj) Sahakari Dugdha Utpadak Sanstha Vs. State of
Maharashtra, (2001) 8 SCC 509 (Para 18)
10. Brij Rani Singh Vs. State of U.P., 2000 SCC OnLine All 1249; 2000 All LJ 1854 (Para 20)

List of Acts
U.P. Panchayat Raj Act, 1947.

List of Keywords
Pradhan, nomination, reservation, majority, panchayat, prescribed authority.

Appearances for Parties
For Petitioner(s): Prabhat Kumar, Lalla Ji Maurya
For Respondent(s): C.S.C., Narsingh, Satish Kumar Sharma

(Delivered by Hon'ble Subhash Vidyarthi, J.)

1. Heard Sri Prabhat Kumar Advocate, the learned counsel for the petitioner, and Shri Rahul
Shukla, the learned Additional Chief Standing Counsel for the State of U.P. and Sri. Anurag Shukla
Senior Advocate assisted by Sri. Aman Dwivedi Advocate, the learned Counsel for the opposite
party no. 4.

2. By means of the instant petition filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, the
petitioner has challenged the validity of an order dated 26.06.2025, passed by the District
Panchayat Raj Officer, Sitapur, whereby the District Panchayat Raj Officer has nominated the
opposite party No. 4 to perform the duties of Gram Pradhan of Gram Panchayat, Sikauha,
Development Block Reusa, District Sitapur until further orders, or until a Pradhan is appointed, as
the post had fallen vacant consequent to the death of the Village Pradhan Ori Lal on 06.06.2025.

3. The learned counsel for the petitioner has submitted that the post of Gram Pradhan in
question is reserved for persons belonging to the Other Backward Class Category whereas the
opposite party No. 4 is not a person belonging to that category. The petitioner is a member of the
Gram Panchayat and he belongs to the Other Backward Class Category, and he ought to have been
nominated as the officiating Gram Pradhan.

4. The learned counsel for the petitioner has next submitted that the appointment has been
made without obtaining the consent of members of the Panchayat. In this regard, he has relied on a
judgment dated 19.05.2017 passed by a Coordinate Bench of this court in the case of Savitri Devi
v. State of U.P. and 4 others: 2017:AHC:70818, wherein this court has held that it is imperative
for the District Magistrate to seek opinion of the members of the Gram Panchayat before taking a
final decision for nomination of a suitable member to officiate as Gram Pradhan until the vacancy
is filled up by a regular election.

5. Shri S.K. Khare, the learned Additional Chief Standing Counsel has opposed the writ
petition on the basis of written instructions dated 24.09.2025 and he has submitted that Section 12-J
of the U.P. Panchayat Raj Act, 1947, does not provide that the provision for reservation will be
2 All. Anil Kumar Vs. State of U.P. & Ors.
619
observed even while appointing an officiating Pradhan. Shri Khare has also received supplementary
instructions dated 06.10.2025, informing that prior to making the appointment of opposite party
No. 4 as officiating Pradhan, the consent of the Village Panchayat Members had not been obtained.

6. Sri. Anurag Shukla, Senior Advocate appearing for the opposite party no. 4 has vehemently
opposed the Writ Petition and he too has submitted that Section 12-J of the U.P. Panchayat Raj Act,
1947, does not provide that the provision for reservation will be observed even while appointing an
officiating Pradhan and that there is no statutory requirement for obtaining consent of the members
of gram panchayat before nominating any person to perform the duties of village pradhan in case of
any casual vacancy. IN support of his contentions, the learned Counsel for the opposite party no. 4
has placed reliance upon the judgments in the cases of Udaivir v. State Election Commission of
U.P.: 2008 SCC OnLine All 2132, Pushpendra Kumar v. State of U.P., 2010 SCC OnLine All
3140, Shyamu v. State of U.P. & Ors., 2010 SCC OnLine All 1250, Smt. Usha Singh v. District
Magistrate, Gorakhpur & Ors., 1992 RD 337 = 1992 SCC OnLine All 184.

7. In Smt. Usha Singh v. District Magistrate, Gorakhpur & Ors. (Supra), a Single Judge
Bench of this Court held that: -

"7. ... Literally construed the said provisions gives absolute discretion to the Prescribed
Authority to nominate any member of the Gaon Panchayat for this purpose. Such an interpretation,
however, would make the provision arbitrary and also unconstitutional since no guiding principle
has been laid down as to how the discretion of the prescribed authority is to be exercised and in
favour of which member of the Gaon Panchayat...."

After so observing, the learned Single Judge, then, proceeded to hold as under: -

"... In my opinion, since the Gaon Sabha and Gaon Panchayat are democratic bodies
elected by the people, the proper interpretation of sub-section (2) of Section 12-J would be that in
case where the offices of both Pradhan and Up Pradhan are vacant, or when both Pradhan and Up
Pradhan are incapable to act, the Prescribed Authority should ask the members of the Gaon
Panchayat to hold a meeting, and such members should decide among themselves which member
should be nominated as Pradhan for the interim period until regular election, and such member
should be nominated as officiating Pradhan under Section 12-J (2). Such an interpretation would
be in consonance with the democratic principle underlying the U.P. Panchayat Raj Act, and would
also make the statute constitutional."

8. In Kusma Devi v. State of U.P.: (Supra), another Single Judge Bench considered the
judgment in Smt. Usha Singh, but did not follow the same in view of the following discussion: -

"6. In the aforesaid backdrop, the Court in the case of Smt. Usha Singh (supra) also
observed that "Literally construed the said provisions gives absolute discretion to the Prescribed
Authority to nominate any member of the Gaon Panchayat for this purpose". However, after
opining that the aforesaid Gaon Sabha and Gram Panchayat may be taken into evidence, the Court
in para 7 has held that no doubt such an interpretation is to some extent exercise of legislative
620 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
functions by the Court, and has relied upon the observations made by the Apex Court in Ratan
Chand Hira Chand v. Askar Nawasjung which is as under:

"The legislature often fails to keep pace with the changing needs and values nor is it
realistic to expect that it will have provided for all contingencies and eventualities. It is, therefore
not only necessary but obligatory on the courts to step in to fill the lacuna.

7. When courts performs this function undoubtedly they legislate judicially. But that is a
kind of legislation which stands implicitly delegated to them to further the object of the legislation
and to promote the goals of the society, or to put it negatively, to prevent the frustration of the
legislation or perversion of the goals and values of the society"

8. In my opinion, there is no lacuna in Section 12-J which is required to be filled up by
this Court. The provision of Section 12-J sub clause (2) is clear that temporary Gram Pradhan is to
be nominated by the Prescribed Authority. Nothing can be added by reading in between the lines or
to give strength one's own opinion. The Prescribed Authority has power to nominate any person
under the Act which cannot be said to be arbitrary and the Registrar has acted in its wisdom as
conferred under the Act."

9. In Udaivir v. State Election Commission of U.P., 2008 SCC OnLine All 2132, a Division
Bench of this Court held that: -

"4. Considering the basic concept of the democracy set up for the Panchayat Raj under
the provisions of Article 243 of the Constitution, we are of the opinion that respondent No. 3, i.e.
District Magistrate, Aligarh ought to have ascertained the wishes of the elected members of the
Gram Panchayat, as to who should be the officiating Pradhan for the period till the regular
election of the Gram Pradhan is held. Further every attempt should be made to elect the new
Pradhan at the earliest possible."

10. The aforesaid judgment was followed by another Division Bench of this Court in the case
of Pushpendra Kumar v. State of U.P., 2010 SCC OnLine All 3140, wherein it was held that: -

"9. .....The provisions of section 12-J came up for consideration before a Division Bench
in the case of Udaivir (supra) and this Court has held that the Prescribed Authority has to act in
accordance with the majority opinion of the Members of the concerned Gram Panchayat while
nominating the officiating Pradhan. The law laid down in the aforesaid case is in consonance with
the spirit of the provisions of Chapter IX inserted in our Constitution by the Constitution (Seventy
third) Amendment Act 1992 which provides for constitution of Panchayats at the village,
empowering the villagers to manage their affairs at the local level themselves. ......"

11. In Shyamu v. State of U.P. & Ors.: 2010 SCC OnLine All 1250 yet another Division
Bench of this Court noted the contradictory judgments given by coordinate Benches in Smt. Usha
Singh v. District Magistrate, Gorakhpur & Ors., (Supra) and Kusma Devi v. State of U.P.1992
RD 337 (Supra) and the Division Bench held that: -

"8. It is a cardinal principle of our jurisprudence, that if a learned Single Judge
disagrees with the view taken by another learned Judge on the interpretation of a provision, in the
normal course, the learned Judge should refer the matter to a larger Bench unless the ratio of the
2 All. Anil Kumar Vs. State of U.P. & Ors.
621
judgment is clearly distinguishable. Judicial discipline requires such an approach to avoid
inconsistency in judicial pronouncements and further to enable the authorities to exercise their
powers in terms of the interpretation given by the Court to the provisions. We may gainfully refer
to the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Tribhuvandas Purshottamdas Thakur v. Ratilal
Motilal Patel, AIR 1968 SC 372, wherein the Supreme Court has observed that where a learned
Single Judge chooses to take a view different from the view taken by another learned Single Judge,
he is ordinarily bound to refer the matter to a Division Bench. We may only quote the following
observations:-

"... It has been held time and again that a Single Judge of a High Court is ordinarily
bound to accept as correct judgments of courts of coordinate jurisdiction and of Division Benches
and of the Full Benches of his Court and of this Court. The reason of the rule which makes a
precedent binding lies in the desire to secure uniformity and certainty in the law."

9. This principle flows on the proposition that if decisions of the same or a superior Court
are ignored, even though directly applicable, by a Judge in deciding a case arising before him, on
the view that every Judge is entitled to take such view as he chooses on the question of law arising
before him, the law will be bereft of all its utility if it should be thrown into a state of uncertainty by
reasons of conflicting decisions. In this regard, the observation of Gajendragadkar, C.J., in Lala
Shri Bhagwan v. Shri Ram Chand, (1965) 3 SCR 218, is quoted below:-

"It is hardly necessary to emphasise that considerations of judicial propriety and
decorum require that if a learned Single Judge hearing a matter is inclined to take the view that the
earlier decisions of the High Court, whether of a Division Bench or of a Single Judge, need to be
reconsidered, he should not embark upon that enquiry sitting as a Single Judge, but should refer
the matter to a Division Bench or, in a proper case, place the relevant papers before the Chief
Justice to enable him to constitute a larger Bench to examine the question. That is the proper and
traditional way to deal with such matters and it is founded on healthy principles of judicial
decorum and propriety."

The Division Bench concluded that: -

"14. We have earlier quoted Section 12-J of the Act. The Section, literally read, confers
power on the Prescribed Authority alone to nominate a member of the Gram Panchayat. There is
no provision for the Prescribed Authority to mandatorily consult the members of the Gram
Panchayat. The settled legal principle of the interpretation is, in the first instance, to read the
language of the Section in its literal sense. It is only in the event, when the reading of the literal
language would result into the absurdity or detract from the intent of the legislature, the Court
steps into read the provision in consonance of the intent of the legislature. The intention of the
legislation is primarily to be gathered from the language used, which means that attention should
be paid to what has been said as also what has not been said. As a consequence, a construction,
which requires for its support addition or substitution of words or which results in rejection of
words as meaningless has to be avoided. [(See Shyam Kishori Devi v. The Patna Municipal
Corporation & Anr., AIR 1966 SC 1678, and A.R. Antulay v. Ramdas Sriniwas Nayak & Anr.,
(1984) 2 SCC 500].

The learned Single Judge, who decided Smt. Usha Singh (supra), was of the opinion that
the provision gives absolute discretion to the Prescribed Authority and such an interpretation
would make the provision arbitrary and also unconstitutional since no guiding principle has been
622 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
laid down as to how the discretion of the Prescribed Authority is to be exercised and in favour of
which member of the Gram Panchayat. It cannot be said that this was not a possible interpretation
considering that the object of the Section is to nominate a member to act as a Pradhan. The
member nominated should normally enjoy the confidence of other members and/or atleast the
majority of the members so that the functions of the Gram Panchayat can proceed smoothly.
Secondly, this view has been holding the field atleast since the year 1992. In these circumstances,
in our opinion, the requirement of consultation with the members cannot be said to be contrary
to the intent of the legislature or adding words which have not been provided by the Statute. We,
therefore, overrule the view taken in Smt. Kusma Devi.

15. The office of Pradhan of a village is filled in by elections. The legislature, aware of
this position, has made a specific provision under the Act, conferring powers on the Prescribed
Authority to nominate a member to discharge the duties and exercise the powers of Pradhan
until the vacancy of the office of Pradhan is filled in. This exercise is for the purpose of seeing
that the functions of the Panchayat proceed smoothly and that there is no vacancy in the post till
the vacancy is filled, as the Panchayat constitutes the basic unit of our democratic structure.

To that extent, the observations made by the learned Division Bench in Udaivir (supra),
in our opinion, can be said to reflect this basic concept of our democratic body that those in
majority, shall have their nominee elected as an elected Pradhan should have the confidence of
the members."

(Emphasis added)

12. The learned counsel for the opposite party no. 4 has submitted that as Section 12-J of the
U.P. Panchayat Raj Act does not contain any provision mandating the prescribed authority to take
into consideration the views of majority of members as expressed in a meeting held for this
purpose, for nominating a person to discharge the duties of pradhan in a case of a casual vacancy,
the casus omissus cannot be supplied by the courts except in the case of clear necessity and except
where reason for the same is found in the corners of the statute itself but at the same time a casus
omissus should not be readily inferred and for this purpose all the parts of statute or sections must
be construed together and every clause of a section should be construed with reference to the
context with other clauses thereof so that the construction to be put on a particular provision makes
a consistent enactment of the whole statute. He has submitted that for the aforesaid reasons, this
Court should refer the point decided in the aforesaid cases for reconsideration by a larger Bench.

13. The learned Counsel for the opposite party no. 4 has placed reliance on the judgment of
the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Union of India versus Dharmendra Textile
Processors: (2008) 13 SCC 369, wherein the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that: -

"18. Two principles of construction - one relating to casus omissus and the other in
regard to reading the statute as a whole, appear to be well settled. Under the first principle a casus
omissus cannot be supplied by the court except in the case of clear necessity and when reason for it
is found in the four corners of the statute itself but at the same time a casus omissus should not be
readily inferred and for that purpose all the parts of a statute or section must be construed together
and every clause of a section should be construed with reference to the context and other clauses
thereof so that the construction to be put on a particular provision makes a consistent enactment of
2 All. Anil Kumar Vs. State of U.P. & Ors.
623
the whole statute. This would be more 45 so if literal construction of a particular clause leads to
manifestly absurd or anomalous results which could not have been intended by the legislature. "An
intention to produce an unreasonable result", said Danckwerts, L.J. in Artemiou v. Procopiou
(1965) 3 ALL ER 539 (All ER p. 544 I) "is not to be imputed to a statute if there is some other
construction available". Where to apply words literally would "defeat the obvious intention of the
legislation and produce a wholly unreasonable result", we must "do some violence to the words"
and so achieve that obvious intention and produce a rational construction. [Per Lord Reid in Luke
v. IRC (1963) AC 557 where at AC p. 577 he also observed: (All ER p.664 I) "This is not a new
problem, though our standard of drafting is such."

(The above paragraph has been quoted from the text of the judgment available on the web
portal of the Hon'ble Supreme Court because there is an error in paragraph numbering in SCC)

14. Having gone through the law laid down in Udaivir (supra) and affirmed by two different
division benches in Pushpendra Kumar (supra) and Shyamu (supra), I find myself bound by the
proposition of law laid down by the Division Benches in the aforesaid cases.

15. I agree with the submission made by Sri. Anurag Shukla, the learned Senior Counsel for
the opposite party no. 4 that a Single Judge Bench can refer the decision rendered by a Division
Bench for reconsideration to a larger Bench, but this can only be done when the Single Bench
doubts correctness of the view taken by the Division Bench. However, I am in respectful agreement
of the view taken by the Single Judge Bench in the case of Smt. Usha Singh v. District
Magistrate, Gorakhpur & Ors., (Supra) decided way back in the year 1992, which view was also
taken by the Division Benches in the cases of Udaivir (supra) and affirmed in Pushpendra Kumar
(supra) and finally explained and settled in Shyamu (Supra) and I find no ground for making a
reference for reconsideration of the issue by a larger Bench.

16. It is also a settled principle of law that longstanding precedents should not ordinarily be
interfered with. Even the Hon'ble Supreme Court does not ordinarily interfere with the long
standing precedents of High Courts regarding State legislations.

17. In Dattatraya Ganesh Kulkarni v. Appa Tukaram Mude: (1998) 8 SCC 717, the
Hon'ble Supreme Court held that: -

"Those judgments are in the nature of stare decisis insofar as the interpretation of the local
legislation on the subject is concerned. These having remained in the field for decades would not warrant us
now to be giving a different interpretation as sought by the learned counsel for the appellant."

18. In Shri Sant Sadguru Janardan Swami (Moingiri Maharaj) Sahakari Dugdha
Utpadak Sanstha v. State of Maharashtra: (2001) 8 SCC 509, the Hon'ble Supreme Court again
held that:

"7. ...This being the consistent view of the High Court on the interpretation of provisions
of a State Act, the same is not required to be disturbed unless it is shown that such a view of the
624 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
High Court is palpably wrong or ceased to be good law in view of amendment in the Act or any
subsequent declaration of law."

19. In view of the foregoing discussion, I am unable to accept the request of the learned
Senior Counsel for the opposite party no. 4 for referring the aforesaid well settled issue for
reconsideration by a larger Bench and this request of the learned Counsel for the opposite party no.
4 is turned down.

20. Regarding the other submission of the learned Counsel for the petitioner that even while
filling up a casual vacancy of Pradhan under Section 12-J of the Panchayat Raj Act, the principle of
reservation has to be followed, the judgment of a coordinate Bench of this Court in Brij Rani
Singh v. State of U.P.: 2000 SCC OnLine All 1249 : 2000 All LJ 1854 had as follows: -

"25. ...it is apparent that the arrangement made for filling up temporary vacancy in the office of
Pradhan which may cause, because of certain factors including removal of Pradhan would not mean that the
office of Pradhan is filled up by a person or member or Up-Pradhan who is otherwise not eligible or was not
eligible to contest for the seat of Pradhan in a particular reserved constituency. This being only a simple
arrangement during a temporary vacancy, no exception of the same can be taken and It can not be read in
derogation with the provisions regarding reservation made under the Act and prescribed under the Rules...."

21. Therefore, the rule of reservation has to be applied even while making nomination of a member of a
village Panchayat under Section 12-J of the U. P. Panchayat Raj Act to perform the duties of a Pradhan
against a casual vacancy of Pradhan.

22. In view of the foregoing discussion, I am of the considered view that the impugned order dated
26.06.2025, passed by the District Panchayat Raj Officer, Sitapur, whereby the District Panchayat Raj
Officer has nominated the opposite party No. 4 to perform the duties of Gram Pradhan of Gram Panchayat,
Sikauha, Development Block Reusa, District Sitapur until further orders, or until a Pradhan is appointed, is
unsustainable in law and the same is quashed. The District Magistrate/District Panchayat Raj Officer, Sitapur
is directed to make a fresh appointment of officiating Pradhan, keeping in view the observations made in this
judgment.

23. With the aforesaid observations/directions the petition stands allowed.
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(2026) 2 ILRA 624
ORIGINAL JURISDICTION
CIVIL SIDE
DATED: LUCKNOW 20.02.2026

BEFORE

THE HON'BLE ALOK MATHUR, J.

Writ C No. 526 of 2026
Jag Prasad & Ors. ...Petitioners
Versus
Additional Commissioner, Administration, 2nd, Devi Patan Division, Gonda & Ors. ...Respondents