# Anil Singh (In Jail) v. U.O.I. & Ors

- **Citation:** (2021) 2 ILRA 44
- **Court:** High Court of Judicature at Allahabad
- **Decided:** 2021-01-11
- **Case number:** Habeas Corpus Writ Petition No. 329 of 2020
- **Bench:** Pritinker Diwaker, Subhash Chandra Sharma
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/allahabad-high-court/anil-singh-in-jail-v-u-o-i-ors-46820
- **Pages:** 10

## Headnote

A. Constitution of India ,1950-Article 226
&
National
Security
Act,1980-Section
3(2)-challenge to -validity of detention
order
passed
by
District
Magistrategrounds of detention is not communicated
to the detenu while communicated to the
petitioner-petitioner were prejudicial to
the maintenance of public order and had
disturbed the normalcy of the societythere was enmity between the parties
over the defeat of election of Chairman,
Nagar panchayat-they opened fire to the
deceased-there
were
seven
criminal
history of the petitioner-at the time of
incident all shopkeepers located nearby
shut their shops immediately-people were
in fear and felt unsafe, they closed their
doors since this was the murder of present
Chairman-the atmosphere remained panic
for
few
days-Hence,the
apprehension
entertained by the detaining authority is
genuine and well founded-no illegality
found in the impugned orders.(Para 1 to
22)

The petition is dismissed. (E-5)

List of Cases cited:

## Text

44 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
and (3) if it is felt essential to detain him to
prevent him from so doing."

21. So far as the argument relating to
non supply of grounds of order of detention
and further extension thereof is concerned, it
is noteworthy to mention that the grounds of
detention
were
communicated
to
the
petitioner at the time of passing the impugned
detention order dated 15.01.2020. It was
further extended by the State which was
communicated to the petitioner in due time.
There was no such requirement to furnish
grounds of extension to the detenue because
the grounds of detention were the same, so no
any prejudice was likely to be caused to the
petitioner.

22. Having considered the matter in the
light of the facts and circumstances, noted
above, we are of the opinion that the
apprehension entertained by the Detaining
Authority, to the effect that petitioner's
activities are prejudicial to the maintenance
of public order, is genuine and well founded.
Thus, we do not find any illegality in the
impugned
orders,
warranting
our
interference. The writ petition, being bereft of
any merit, is dismissed accordingly. There
will, however, be no order as to costs.
----------
(2021)02ILR A44
ORIGINAL JURISDICTION
CIVIL SIDE
DATED: ALLAHABAD 11.01.2021

BEFORE

THE HON'BLE PRITINKER DIWAKER , J.
THE HON'BLE SUBHASH CHANDRA
SHARMA, J.

Habeas Corpus Writ Petition No. 329 of 2020

Anil Singh ...Petitioner(In Jail)
Versus
U.O.I. & Ors. ...Respondents
Counsel for the Petitioner:
Sri Vinay Kumar Singh, Sri Mohd. Raghib
Ali, Sri Saghir Ahmad(Senior Adv.)

Counsel for the Respondents:
A.S.G.I., G.A., Sri Santosh Kr. Singh Paliwal

A. Constitution of India ,1950-Article 226
&
National
Security
Act,1980-Section
3(2)-challenge to -validity of detention
order
passed
by
District
Magistrategrounds of detention is not communicated
to the detenu while communicated to the
petitioner-petitioner were prejudicial to
the maintenance of public order and had
disturbed the normalcy of the societythere was enmity between the parties
over the defeat of election of Chairman,
Nagar panchayat-they opened fire to the
deceased-there
were
seven
criminal
history of the petitioner-at the time of
incident all shopkeepers located nearby
shut their shops immediately-people were
in fear and felt unsafe, they closed their
doors since this was the murder of present
Chairman-the atmosphere remained panic
for
few
days-Hence,the
apprehension
entertained by the detaining authority is
genuine and well founded-no illegality
found in the impugned orders.(Para 1 to
22)

The petition is dismissed. (E-5)

List of Cases cited:

1. Ashok Kumar Vs Delhi Administration, (1982)
AIR SC 1143

2. Victoria Fernandes Vs Lalmal Sawma, (1992)
AIR SC 687

3. St. of U.P. & anr. Vs Sanjay Pratap Gupta
@ Pappu & ors. (2004) 8 SCC 591

4. Kuso Sah Vs St. of Bih. (1974) 1 SCC 185

5. Harpreet Kaur Vs St. of Mah.(1992) 2 SC
177

6. T.K Gopal @ Gopi Vs St. of Karn. (2000) 6
SCC 168
2 All. Anil Singh vs. U.O.I. & Ors.
45
7. St. of Mah. Vs Mohd. Yakub (1980) 2 SC
1158

8. Mustakmiya Jabbarmiya Shaikh Vs. M.M
Mehta , (1995) 3 SCC 237

9. Amanulla Khan Kudeatalla Khan Pathan Vs.
St. of Guj., (1999) 5 SCC 613

10. Hasan Khan Ibne Haider Khan Vs R.H.
Mendonca, (2000) 3 SCC 511.

11. Smt Bimla Rani Vs U.O.I. (1989) 26 ACC 589
SC

12. Alijan Mian Vs D.M., Dhanbad,(1983) 3 SCR
930 AIR 1983 SC 1130

13. Attorney General of India Vs Amratlal
Prajivandas ,(1994) AIR SC 2179

14. Kamarunnissa & ors. Vs U.O.I.(1991) 1 SCC
128

15. Champion R. Sangma Vs St. of Meghalaya
(2015) 16 SCC 253

(Delivered by Hon'ble Subhash Chandra
Sharma, J.)

1. Heard Sri Saghir Ahmad, learned
Senior Advocate assisted by Sri Vinay
Kumar Singh, learned counsel for the
petitioner, Ms. Kumari Meena, learned
A.G.A. for the State-respondents and Sri
Santosh Kumar Singh Paliwal, for Union
of India.

2. By this writ petition under Article
226 of the Constitution of India petitioner
Anil Singh prays for issuance of a writ,
order or direction in the nature of Habeas
Corpus challenging the validity and
constitutionality
of
the
impugned
detention order dated 20.11.2019 passed
by
District
Magistrate,
Sonebhadra/respondent no.3 (hereinafter
referred to as ' the detaining authority')
under sub section (2) of Section 3 of
National Security Act, 1980 (for short the
'NSA') on being satisfied that petitioner's
detention was necessary with a view to
prevent him from acting in any manner
prejudicial to the maintenance of public
order as well as confirmation order dated
29.11.2020
passed
by
the
Under
Secretary
Home
(Confidential)
Department,
Government
of
U.P.,
Lucknow/respondent no.2. Petitioner has
also prayed for a direction to the
respondents to set him at liberty and to
award cost to him.

3. The order of detention alongwith
the grounds of detention was served upon
the petitioner on 20.11.2019. Against the
said
order,
the
petitioner
made
a
representation dated 26.11.2019 to the
Detaining
Authority,
the
Secretary,
Department
of
Home
and
another
representation to the Advisory Board
constituted under Section 9 of the N.S.A.
The case of the petitioner alongwith his
representation was placed before the
Advisory Board who opined that there
was sufficient cause for the detention of
the petitioner. Accordingly, in exercise of
powers conferred under Section 12 (1) of
the
NSA,
the
State
Government
confirmed
the
aforesaid
order
of
detention and directed that the petitioner
be detained for a period of three months
from the date of detention vide order
dated
31.12.2020
which
was
communicated
to
the
petitioner
on
06.01.2020.

4. According to the grounds of
detention the activities of the petitioner
were prejudicial to the maintenance of
public order and had disturbed the
normalcy of the society. An F.I.R. was
lodged against him on 01.10.2019 at 5:30
O'clock as Crime No.180/2019 under
46 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
Sections 147, 148, 149, 302, 506 & 120B
I.P.C. at Police Station Pipri, District
Sonebhadra. While petitioner was in jail in
that case, the in-charge of Police Station
Pipri sent a report to Superintendent of
Police,
Sonebhadra
alleging
that
on
30.09.2019 at about 10:00 P.M. Chairman
Renukoot, Shiv Pratap Singh aged about 38
years R/o Hanuman Singh Katra, Renukoot
was present in his residential office. Ajit
Kushwaha, Dilip Pareeda and Rinku were
also there. Younger brother of Shiv Pratap
Singh @ Dablu Singh was sitting out of
office. While Shiv Pratap Singh was
hearing the problems of public, all of a
sudden two boys on motorcycles arrived at
opposite side of the road and getting their
motorcycles stood there, came towards the
office. One of the boy was standing out of
office and other boy entered into the room.
He bade namaste to Chairman Shiv Pratap
Singh. He could not heed towards the boy
on account of talk on phone. That boy
opened fire upon him which pierced on the
left side chest of Shiv Pratap Singh.
Meanwhile, other boy also opened fire
which stroke at the door. People present
there tried to catch them but failed and
culprits having reached at the divider on the
road, fired in the air and fled away. Shiv
Pratap Singh was brought to the Hospital at
Hindalco from where he was referred to
Trauma Center, Varanasi. On 01.10.2019 at
about 2:30 A.M. he succumbed to injuries.

5. During investigation, it came into
light that petitioner was Ex-Chairman of
Renukoot and deceased Shiv Pratap Singh
was present Chairman. There was enmity
because petitioner was defeated in election
of Chairman, Nagar Panchayat. Shiv Pratap
Singh and members of his family caused
injuries to the brother of petitioner and
Jamuna Singh with danda, knife and sword
in which Jamuna Singh and one Rohit
Singh got injured. Jamuna Singh said to
take revenge instead of lodging F.I.R., but
uncle of Jamuna Singh namely Santosh
Singh lodged F.I.R. at Police Station Pipri
as Crime No.12/2019, under Sections 147,
148, 149, 506, 307 & 7 Criminal Law
Amendment Act. Meanwhile, there was
altercation between petitioner's brother
Vijay Pratap Singh and brother of the
deceased. As a result, petitioner engaged
himself in conspiracy to murder Shiv
Pratap Singh through Rakesh Prasad
Maurya. Brajesh Singh brother of petitioner
continued to talk to Jamuna Singh who was
told to arrange shooters. On whose instance
Bhagwan Singh arranged and sent Gandhi
Yadav, Lav Singh, Sudhanshu Singh, Ravi
Singh, Anda, Manish and other 12 people
to Renukoot. They were stayed at Hotel
Glory on 07.09.2019 by Brajesh, brother of
petitioner on the I.D. of his driver Ramjaan.
Brajesh Singh and shooters were seen
together in C.C.T.V. Brajesh Singh was in
contact with Jamuna Singh during this
period. The shooters lived in Hotel Glory
from
07.09.2019
to
09.09.2019.
Meanwhile, deceased Shiv Pratap Singh
was got identified by the shooters. Again
on 28.09.2019,
shooters
were
called
through phone by Jamuna Singh on the
instance of Brajesh Singh, brother of
petitioner. On 29.09.2019 shooters were
stayed
in
Jwalamukhi
Guest
House.
Brajesh Singh also provided Rs.25,000/-
for purchasing motorcycle to Gandhi
Yadav. In this way, on 30.09.2019 the
incident was got caused by the petitioner as
a result of long hatched conspiracy with
other accused persons and after the
commission of incident, vehicle Scorpio,
Bearing No. UP 67 F 4444 owned by the
petitioner and driven by Ramjaan was
deployed
to
escort
the
shooters.
Investigating Officer recorded statements
of witnesses and collected other evidence
2 All. Anil Singh vs. U.O.I. & Ors.
47
in which involvement of petitioner was
found established and on 02.10.2019 he
was arrested by police. There is criminal
history of the petitioner i.e. seven criminal
cases are registered at Police Station and all
are pending before the Court after chargesheet. This incident took place at 10:00
P.M. in the mid of Renukoot market. All
shop-keepers located nearby shut their
shops immediately. People were in fear and
they closed their doors since this was a
murder of Chairman so people were
affected adversely and felt unsafe. The
atmosphere remained panic for few days.
Even students did not attend their schools
due to fear. Public order was totally
disturbed. Extra Forces and P.A.C. were
also deployed to bring the situation under
control. On 02.10.2019, he applied for bail
before the Court which created possibility
of petitioner being released on bail and
again to indulge himself in such activities
those were likely to affect adversely public
order, therefore, his detention became
necessary under the N.S.A.

6. In the aforementioned circumstances,
Station House Officer, Pipri sent a report with
relevant papers to Superintendent of Police,
Sonebhadra for detaining the petitioner under
Section
3(2)
of
N.S.A.
Thereupon,
Superintendent of Police, Sonebhadra, after
considering the matter became satisfied with the
report sent by Station House Officer and
submitted his report to District Magistrate,
Sonebhadra for detaining the petitioner under
Section 3(2) of N.S.A. to prevent him from
indulging in such activities causing disturbance
of public order.

7. On the basis of material placed before
him, as briefly referred to above, Detaining
Authority came to the conclusion that
petitioner's activities are prejudicial to the
maintenance of public order and his activities
have disturbed the normalcy of the society.
Thus, keeping in view his criminal record and
activities, the Detaining Authority felt satisfied
that there was every apprehension/imminent
possibility that just after his release from jail he
will again indulge in such type of activities
which will adversely affect the maintenance of
public order and, therefore, to prevent him from
committing similar activities prejudicial to the
maintenance of public order it became
necessary to detain him with immediate effect
under Section 3(2) of the N.S.A. Hence, the
Detaining Authority passed impugned order
dated 20.11.2019 for detaining the petitioner
under Section 3(2) of the N.S.A. The Detaining
Authority communicated the grounds of
detention to petitioner on 20.11.2019. On
26.11.2019,
petitioner
has
sent
his
representation through Jail Superintendent,
Sonebhadra to Detaining Authority which was
rejected on 28.11.2019 by the Detaining
Authority and other representation was sent to
State, which was also rejected on 09.12.2020.

8. We have also gone through the record
including counter-affidavits of respondents and
rejoinder affidavits of petitioner. The petitioner
has challenged the impugned order on
following grounds :-

(I) Because since 03.10.2019, the
petitioner is languishing in jail in connection
with F.I.R. No.180/2019 dated 01.10.2019
whereas he is quite innocent and has committed
no offence at all.

(II) Because since 20.11.2019, the
petitioner has been detained in pursuance to
the detention and in as much as also
detention extension order dated 18.02.2020
and 14.05.2020 for a period of 9 months
w.e.f 20.11.2019 till 16.08.2020 in a
District Jail, Sonebhadra at Robertsganj.

(III) Because, in any manner
there is no prejudice to the security of the
state or from acting in any manner
48 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
prejudicial of the maintaining of the public
order, if the petitioner wouldn't be detained
so as such there is no necessity to make an
order directing to the petitioner to detain
him into jail.

(IV) Because, there is no credible
information or cogent reason apparent on
record to believe that either the petitioner
would be released from jail or he would act
prejudicial to the maintenance to the
security of the State or to maintenance of
the public order.

(V) Because, there is only bald
statement and stale ground. It is further
submitted, mere ipse dixit of the detaining
authority to pass the detention order.

(VI) Because, the petitioner has
neither taken law and order in his own hand
nor disturbed the public tranquility. It is
further submitted, the alleged so called
apprehension is the creation of the mind of
the sponsoring recommending/authorities.

(VII) Because, the intent of the
legislation to enact the National Security
Act is preventive not punitive. But the
respondent no.3 by misusing his power has
passed the detention order, in order to
punish the petitioner.

(VIII) Because, the continuous
detention of the petitioner is against the
intent of the Section 3(2), (4), and 8 to 12
of the Act and in as much as also contrary
to the Article 22(5) readwith Article 21 and
14 of the Constitution of India.

(IX) Because, in this case the
constitutional safeguard embodied in the
Article 22(5) of the Constitution of India
has not been followed.

(X)
Because,
either
in
the
detention order dated 20.11.2019 and
approval order dated 29.11.2019 the period
of detention has not been disclosed.

(XI) Because, the detention order
dated 20.11.2019 and in as much as also
detention extension order dated 18.02.20
and
14.05.2020
are
illegal
and
unconstitutional and without application of
independent mind, hence not sustainable
and the petitioner deserves to be set at
liberty forthwith from the District Jail,
Sonebhadra at Robertsganj, in the interest
of justice, so the justice may be done.

9. The respondents have filed counteraffidavits wherein they have denied the
points
raised
by
the
petitioner
and
reiterated their claim that the activities of
the petitioner were prejudicial to the
maintenance of public order, his activities
have disturbed the normalcy of the society
and then there was every possibility that
just after his release from jail, he will again
indulge in such activities which will
adversely affect the public orders and
therefore, to prevent him from further
committing
similar
criminal
activities
prejudicial to the maintenance of public
order, the impugned orders were justified.

10. It is strenuously urged by learned
counsel for the petitioner that the impugned
orders are wholly arbitrary and the
petitioner has been illegally detained by
misusing the provisions of the N.S.A. on
the basis of unfounded apprehension that if
the detenue was released on bail, he would
again carry on criminal activities in the
area. Except the alleged criminal cases,
there was no criminal record of the
petitioner and petitioner did not indulge in
any such activity which may form the basis
for satisfaction of the Detaining Authority
to come to conclusion that he is likely to
disturb the public order. At the best, it
could be a matter of law and order and not
disturbance of public order. The reliance on
the alleged criminal case is misplaced. In
nutshell, the case of the petitioner is that
there was absolutely no cogent material
before the Detaining Authority to form the
2 All. Anil Singh vs. U.O.I. & Ors.
49
requisite belief that the petitioner was
indulging in criminal activities which were
prejudicial to the maintenance of public
order and unless prevented, he would
indulge in similar activities in future.
Learned counsel for the petitioner also
contended
that
even
if
the
allegation/instances relied upon by the
Detaining Authority are taken a face value,
still at best, these may tantamount "to law
and order" and by no stretch of imagination
can be construed as activities prejudicial to
the maintenance of public order within the
meaning of sub section (2) of Section 3 of
N.S.A. It is alleged that the detention order
against the petitioner has been passed only
with a view to frustrate the bail. It is urged
that instead of clamping the impugned
order on the petitioner, the best course open
to the respondents was to oppose the bail
application. It is urged that the detention
order as well as it's confirmation order are
mala fide inasmuch as they were made
merely to circumvent the petitioner's
enlargement on bail. It is also urged by the
learned counsel that the grounds of order of
detention and further extension thereof
were not communicated to him, which
caused prejudice to the petitioner. In this
way, the impugned order becomes arbitrary
and suffers from illegality and material
irregularity, therefore, the same are liable to
be interfered with and quashed by this
Hon'ble Court.

11. Per contra, learned counsel for the
State, while supporting the order of
detention and denying the allegation that it
has been passed only with a view to
frustrate the bail order, has submitted that
the activities of the petitioner were directed
against the public at large and were
sufficient to bring them within the ambit of
public order. The satisfaction of the
Detaining Authority is based on reliable
and relevant material and that there was no
illegality in the impugned orders. It is urged
that if the Detaining Authority arrives at the
subjective satisfaction that the activities of
the
detenue
are
prejudicial
to
the
maintenance of public order and passes the
detention order, that cannot be interfered by
this Hon'ble Court. The grounds of
detention were promptly communicated to
the petitioner within the stipulated time and
there is no need of supplying the grounds
of extension of such detention order to the
detenue. In addition to this, there is a long
criminal history of the petitioner.

12. Thus, the main question for
consideration before this Court is whether
the activities of the petitioner highlighted in
the grounds of detention fall within realm
of public order or law and order.

13. The distinction between the two
concepts of "public order" and "law and
order" has been lucidly explained by the
Apex Court in Ashok Kumar Vs. Delhi
Administration, AIR 1982 SC 1143. Inter
alia, observing that the true distinction
between the areas of "public order" and
"law and order", being fine and sometimes
overlapping, does not lie in the nature or
quality of the act but in the degree and
extent of its reach upon society, their
Lordships said that the act by itself is not
determinant of its own gravity. It is the
potentiality of the act to disturb the even
tempo of the life of the community which
makes it "prejudicial to the maintenance of
public order". If the contravention in its
effect is confined only to a few individuals
directly involved, as distinct from a wide
spectrum of public, it would raise the
problem of "law and order" only. It is the
length, magnitude and intensity of the
terror wave unleashed by a particular act or
violence
creating
disorder
that
50 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
distinguishes it as an act affecting "public
order" from that concerning "law and
order". On the facts of that case the Court
held that whenever there is an armed hold
up by gangsters in a residential area of the
city and persons are deprived of their
belongings at the point of knife or revolver
they become victims of organised crime
and such acts when enumerated in the
grounds of detention, clearly show that the
activities of a detenu cover a wide field
falling within the ambit of the concept of
"public order".

14. To the same effect are the
observations of the Apex Court in Victoria
Fernandes Vs. Lalmal Sawma, AIR 1992
SC 687, wherein, relying on its earlier
decisions, including Ashok Kumar's case
(supra), it was reiterated that while the
expression "law and order" is wider in
scope, in as much as contravention of law
always affects order, "public order" has a
narrower ambit and public order would be
affected by only such contravention which
affects the community and public at large.

15. The distinction between violation
of 'law and order' and an act that would
constitute disturbing the maintenance of
'public
order'
had
also
fallen
for
consideration of the Hon'ble Supreme
Court in State of U.P. & Anr. V. Sanjay
Pratap Gupta @ Pappu and others
reported in 2004 (8) SCC 591, where the
Apex Court after an extensive survey of
authority on the issue brought out the
distinction in fine detail thus:-

"12. The true distinction between
the areas of law and order and public order
lies not merely in the nature or quality of
the act, but in the degree and extent of its
reach upon society. Acts similar in nature,
but committed in different contexts and
circumstances,
might
cause
different
reactions. In one case it might affect
specific individuals only, and therefore
touches the problem of law and order only,
while in another it might affect public
order. The act by itself, therefore, is not
determinant of its own gravity. In its quality
it may not differ from other similar acts,
but in its potentiality, that is, in its impact
on society, it may be very different.

13. The two concepts have welldefined contours, it being well established
that stray and unorganized crimes of theft
and assault are not matters of public order
since they do not tend to affect the even
flow of public life. Infractions of law are
bound in some measure to lead to disorder
but every infraction of law does not
necessarily result in public disorder. Law
and order represents the largest scale within
which is the next circle representing public
order and the smallest circle represents the
security
of
State.
"Law
and order"
comprehends disorders of less gravity than
those affecting "public order" just as
"public order" comprehends disorders of
less gravity than those affecting "security
of State". (See Kuso Sah v. State of Bihar
1974 1 SCC 185, Harpreet Kaur v. State
of Maharashtra 1992 2 SCC 177, T.K
Gopal Alias Gopi v. State Of Karnataka
2000
6
SCC
168
and
State
of
Maharashtra v. Mohd. Yakub 1980 2 SC
1158).

14. The stand that a single act
cannot be considered sufficient for holding
that public order was affected is clearly
without substance. It is not the number of
acts that matters. What has to be seen is the
effect of the act on the even tempo of life,
the extent of its reach upon society and its
impact."

16. The issue has also been dealt with
in the case of Sant Singh vs. District
2 All. Anil Singh vs. U.O.I. & Ors.
51
Magistrate, Varanasi reported in 2000 Cri
LJ 2230 wherein paragraph 7 of the report
dealing with the point it was held thus:-

"7. The two connotations 'law
and order' and 'public 'order' are not the
words of magic but of reality which
embrace
within
its
ambit
different
situations, motives and impact of the
particular criminal acts. As a matter of
fact, in a long series of cases, these two
expressions have come to be interpreted by
the apex Court. It is not necessary to refer
all those cases all over again in every
decision for one simple reason that they
have been quoted and discussed in earlier
decision of this Court dated 14-10-1999 in
Habeas Corpus Writ Petition No. 33888 of
1999- Udaiveer Singh v. State of U.P. and
the decision dated 1-12-1999 in Habeas
Corpus Writ Petition No. 38159 of 1999
Rajiv Vashistha v. State of U.P. (Reported in
1999 All Cri R 2777). The gamut of all the
above decisions in short is that the true
distinction between the areas of 'public
order' and 'law and order' lies not in nature
and quality of the act, but in the degree and
extent of its reach upon society. Sometimes
the distinction between the two concepts of
law and order' and 'public order' is so fine
that it overlaps. Acts similar in nature but
committed
in
different
contexts
and
circumstances
might
cause
different
reactions. In one case it might affect
specific individuals only and therefore,
touch the problem of 'law and order', while
in another it might affect 'public order'. The
act by itself, therefore, is not determination
of its own gravity. It is the potentiality of
the act to disturb the even tempo of the
community which makes it prejudicial to
the maintenance of 'public order''.

17. The scope of expression "acting in
any manner prejudicial to the maintenance
of public order" as appearing in SubSection 2 of Section 3 of the NSA also
came up for consideration of the Supreme
Court
in
Mustakmiya
Jabbarmiya
Shaikh Vs. M.M. Mehta, (1995) 3 SCC
237; Amanulla Khan Kudeatalla Khan
Pathan Vs. State of Gujarat, (1999) 5
SCC 613 and Hasan Khan Ibne Haider
Khan Vs. R.H. Mendonca, (2000) 3 SCC
511. The Apex Court held that the fallout,
the extent and reach of the alleged activities
must be of such a nature that they travel
beyond the capacity of the ordinary law to
deal with the person concerned or to
prevent his subversive activities affecting
the community at large or a large section of
the society. It is the degree of disturbance
and its impact upon the even tempo of life
of the society or the people of a locality
which determines whether the disturbance
caused by such activities amounts only to a
breach of "law and order" or it amounts to a
breach of "public order". In Amnulla
Khan's case (supra), it has been held that
the activities involving extortion, giving
threat to public and assaulting businessmen
near their place of work were sufficient to
affect the even tempo of life of the society
and in turn amounting to the disturbance of
the "public order" and not mere disturbance
of "law and order".

18. Dealing with the question as to
whether one solitary instance can be the
basis of an order of detention, the Apex
Court in Smt. Bimla Rani v. Union of
India, 1989 (26) ACC 589 SC observed
that the question is whether the incident
had prejudicially affected the 'public order'.
In other words, whether it affected the even
tempo of the life of the community. In
Alijan Mian v. District Magistrate
Dhanbad, 1983 (3) SCR 930 AIR 1983
SC 1130 it was held that even one incident
may be sufficient to satisfy the detaining
52 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
authority in this regard, depending upon the
nature of the incident. Similar view has
been expressed in the host of other
decisions. The question was answered more
appropriately and with all clarity in the case
of Attorney General of India v. Amratlal
Prajivandas, AIR 1994 SC 2179, wherein
the apex Court ruled that it is beyond
dispute that the order of detention can be
passed on the basis of a single act. The test
is whether the act is such that it gives rise
to an inference that the person would
continue to indulge in similar prejudical
activities. It cannot be said as a principle
that one single act cannot be constituted the
basis for detention. Thus, the argument of
learned counsel for the petitioner that since
it is solitary incident of the petitioner, he
deserves sympathy, is rejected. Now the
law, as it stands, is that even one solitary
incident may give rise to the disturbance of
'public order'. It is not the multiplicity but
the fall out of various criminal acts. Though
there is consistency in the various decisions
of the apex Court about the interpretation
of the expressions of 'law and order' and
'public order' undue insistence on the case
law is not going to pay any dividend as
each case revolves round its own peculiar
facts and has to be viewed in the light of
the various attending factors. It is difficult
to find a case on all fours with the case in
hand.

19. In the instant case, examining the
grounds of detention, briefly referred to
above, on the touchstone of the legal
position
as
emerging
from
the
aforementioned decisions, we are of the
view that the activities relied upon by the
Detaining Authority to come to the
aforementioned conclusion, cannot be said
to be mere disturbance of "law and order".
As noted in the grounds of detention, the
activities of the petitioner pertains to
engage into conspiracy to get a person
assassinated who being elected by the
people as Chairman of Nagar Panchayat
and so creating a menace in the society at
large. There is material on record to show
that petitioner, being ex-Chairman of Nagar
Panchayat, engaged into conspiracy to get
the elected Chairman murdered through
hired shooters which created panic in the
public affecting the normal tempo of life.
Shops in the market remained closed.
Students also not attended their schools for
several days. Ordinary life in the city was
paralysed. It will certainly result in
disturbance of public order. To assassinate
an elected person, while discharging his
duties in his office, strikes at the root of the
State's authority and is directly connected
to 'public order'. This act of petitioner was
not directed against a single individual, but
against the public at large having the effect
of disturbing even tempo of life of the
community and thus, breaching the "public
order". Thus, we are unable to hold that
there was no material before the Detaining
Authority to come to the conclusion, it did,
to say that the activities of petitioner can be
construed as activities prejudicial to the
maintenance of "public order," within the
meaning of Sub-Section (2) of Section 3 of
the NSA. We have, therefore, no hesitation
in holding that the instances of petitioner's
activities, enumerated in the grounds of
detention, clearly show that his activities
cover a wide field and fall within the
contours
of
the
concept
of
"public
order"and the Detaining Authority was
justified in law in passing the impugned
order of detention as its confirmation order
against the petitioner.

20. As regards the plea of learned
counsel for the petitioner that the impugned
order is vitiated because it has been passed
with a mala fide intention to frustrate the
2 All. Master Advait Sharma Vs. The State of U.P. & Ors.
53
bail likely to be allowed to the petitioner,
we are of the view that there is no
substance in the contention. No doubt,
when
the
proceedings
of
clamping
provisions of NSA were initiated, the
petitioner was in jail but it is settled by a
catena of decisions of the Apex Court that
even when a person is in custody, a
detention order can validly be passed if the
authority passing the order is aware of the
fact of his being in custody and he has
reason to believe, on the basis of material
placed before him, that there is imminent
possibility of his being released on bail and
that on being so released, he would in all
probability indulge in prejudicial activities
and to prevent him from doing so, it is
necessary to detain him. A detention order
cannot be struck down on the ground that
the proper course for the authority was to
oppose the bail application and if bail is
granted notwithstanding such opposition, to
question it before a higher Court, as is
sought be pleaded by learned counsel for
the petitioner. In this regard, criteria was
laid down by the Hon'ble Apex Court in the
case of Kamarunnissa and others vs.
Union of India (1991) 1 SCC 128 also
fortified in Champion R. Sangma vs.
State of Meghalaya (2015) 16 SCC 253, it
was held :-

"13. In case of a person in
custody a detention order can validly be
passed (1) if the authority passing the
order is aware of the fact that he is
actually in custody; (2) if he has reason
believe on the basis of reliable material
placed before him (a) that there is a real
possibility of his being released on bail,
and (b) that on being so released he
would in all probability indulge in
prejudicial activity and (3) if it is felt
essential to detain him to prevent him
from so doing."

21. So far as the argument relating to
non supply of grounds of order of detention
and further extension thereof is concerned,
it is noteworthy to mention that the grounds
of detention were communicated to the
petitioner at the time of passing the
impugned
detention
order
dated
20.11.2019. It was further extended by the
State which was communicated to the
petitioner in due time. There was no such
requirement to furnish grounds of extension
to the detenue because the grounds of
detention were the same, so no any
prejudice was likely to be caused to the
petitioner.

22. Having considered the matter in
the light of the facts and circumstances,
noted above, we are of the opinion that the
apprehension entertained by the Detaining
Authority, to the effect that petitioner's
activities are prejudicial to the maintenance
of public order, is genuine and well
founded. Thus, we do not find any illegality
in the impugned orders, warranting our
interference. The writ petition, being bereft
of any merit, is dismissed accordingly.
There will, however, be no order as to
costs.
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(2021)02ILR A53
ORIGINAL JURISDICTION
CIVIL SIDE
DATED: ALLAHABAD 19.02.2021

BEFORE

THE HON'BLE J.J. MUNIR, J.

Habeas Corpus Writ Petition No. 450 of 2020

Master Advait Sharma ...Petitioner
Versus
The State of U.P. & Ors. ...Respondents

Counsel for the Petitioner:
Sri Vibhu Rai, Mr. Abhinav Gaud