# Anjali Chaurasiya v. State of U.P. & Ors

- **Citation:** (2023) 2 ILRA 699
- **Court:** High Court of Judicature at Allahabad
- **Decided:** 2023-02-01
- **Case number:** Special Appeal Defective No. 40 of 2023
- **Bench:** Ramesh Sinha, Subhash Vidyarthi
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/allahabad-high-court/anjali-chaurasiya-v-state-of-u-p-ors-49732
- **Pages:** 10

## Headnote

A. Service Law - Disciplinary Proceedings
- Allahabad High Court Rules: Rule 5 of
Chapter VIII; Code of Civil Procedure
1908: Section 2(9).

Maintainability - Impugned order dated
28.11.2022
granting
liberty
to
respondents
to
proceed
with
the
disciplinary proceedings and post the
appellant at any place, tentamounts to a
"judgment" within the meaning of Chapter
VIII Rule 5 of the Rules of Court making it
amenable to special appeal - In the instant
case, it transpires from the impugned order that
the direction given by the Hon'ble Single Judge
in the impugned order, granting liberty to the
respondents
to
continue
disciplinary
proceedings, has the traits and trappings of
finality and also such a nature that would cause
serious injustice to the appellant. Thus, the
instant special appeal is maintainable and the
preliminary objection raised by the learned
Standing Counsel is not sustainable under the
facts and circumstances of the case. (Para 13,
23)

B. The disciplinary proceedings against an
officer cannot take place on information,
which
is
vague
and
indefinite
and
suspicion has no role to play in such
matters when the department has taken a
conscious decision not to challenge the
order passed by the appellant (which has
formed the basis for her suspension and
initiation of disciplinary proceedings against her)
and has allowed the same to attain
finality. The disciplinary proceedings against
the appellant have been initiated merely
because the assessee has deposited the penalty
within a very short span of time which raised a
suspicion w.r.t. the penalty order passed by the
appellant. Prima facie, it appears at this stage
that the disciplinary proceedings cannot be
drawn against the appellant to punish her for
having passed the aforesaid order. (Para 24, 26)

The respondents ought not to have been given
liberty
to
proceed
with
the
disciplinary
proceedings against the appellant and to post
her anywhere considering the facts that the
disciplinary proceedings are pending against
her. (Para 27)

C. Words and Phrases - "Judgment" - It
would not be appropriate to project the
definition appearing in S. 2(9) of CPC, 1908 into
the meaning of that expression for the purposes
of the Letters Patent and the word "judgment"
for the purposes of Clause 15 of the Letters
Patent should receive a wider and more liberal
interpretation than the expression "judgment" in
the CPC. It was further held that 'judgment'
imports a concept of finality in a broader and
not in a narrower sense and can be of three
kinds:

(i) a final judgment;
(ii) a preliminary judgment; and
(iii) an intermediary or interlocutory judgment..

There may be such interlocutory orders which
are not covered by Order XLIII Rule 1 C.P.C. but
also possess a characteristic of finality. Every
interlocutory order is not a judgment. Only
certain categories of interlocutory orders can be
regarded as judgments, which decide matters of
moment or affect vital and valuable rights of the
parties and which work serious injustice to the
party concerned. (Para 17)

Special appeal allowed.(E-4)

Precedent followed:

## Text

2 All. Anjali Chaurasiya Vs. State of U.P. & Ors.
699

(16) Admittedly, the respondent had
attained the age of superannuation and retired
from service on 30.06.2018. After obtaining
permission from his excellency the Governor,
charge-sheet was served upon the respondent
on 25.10.2019, indicating the misconduct
having been committed by him during 201314, which is admittedly more than four years
prior to date of service of charge-sheet.

(17) The Hon'ble Single Judge, after
appreciating the submissions advanced by the
learned Counsel for the parties and noting the
provisions sub-clause (a) (ii) of Article 351-A of
the Civil Services Regulations, has opined that
''the question which arises for consideration of
this Court is as to whether the respondents were
under duty to follow the provisions of Article
351-A (a) (ii) of Civil Service Regulations, or
the disciplinary proceedings could have been
conducted in violation of Article 351-A of CSR,
in pursuance to the order of this Court'.

(18) The Hon'ble Single Judge, after
going through the record, noted the fact that
appellants/respondents have not disputed the
fact that disciplinary proceedings are sought to
be
initiated
against
the
writ
petitioner/respondent after four years from the
date when the charge-sheet was given to him.
The Hon'ble Single Judge, after going through
the order dated 12.12.2017 passed in Writ
Petition No. 19975 of 2015, noted the fact that
''From perusal of the entire order, it could not
be shown that this Court was informed of the
fact that either the petitioner or other persons
against whom disciplinary proceedings were
initiated have retired, had this fact been brought
to the knowledge of this Court, they would have
adhered to the provisions of Article 351-A of the
Civil Service Regulations.'

(19)

Noting
the
aforesaid
observations, the Hon'ble Single Judge
came to the conclusion that the inquiry has
been proceeded against the respondent in
gross violation of Article 351-A (a) (ii) of
the Civil Services Regulations and as such,
the entire disciplinary proceedings are hit
by the mandatory provisions of Article 351A of the Civil Service Regulations. In these
backdrops, the Hon'ble Single Judge setaside the order of punishment dated
14.03.2022 and allowed the writ petition by
means of the impugned order.

(20) The learned Standing Counsel
also did not dispute before us that
disciplinary proceedings initiated against
the respondent arose out of incident that
took place more than four years prior to
institution of the proceedings.

(21) In view of the aforesaid
observation, we are in full agreement with
the view taken by the Hon'ble Single Judge
and we do not find any reason to interfere
with the same.

(22)

The
special
appeal
is,
accordingly, dismissed. However, there
will be no order as to costs under the facts
and circumstances of the case.
----------
(2023) 2 ILRA 699
APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL SIDE
DATED: LUCKNOW 01.02.2023

BEFORE

THE HON'BLE RAMESH SINHA, J.
THE HON'BLE SUBHASH VIDYARTHI, J.

Special Appeal Defective No. 40 of 2023

Anjali Chaurasiya ...Appellant
Versus
State of U.P. & Ors. ...Respondents

Counsel for the Appellant:
Avinash Chandra
700 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
Counsel for the Respondents:
C.S.C.

A. Service Law - Disciplinary Proceedings
- Allahabad High Court Rules: Rule 5 of
Chapter VIII; Code of Civil Procedure
1908: Section 2(9).

Maintainability - Impugned order dated
28.11.2022
granting
liberty
to
respondents
to
proceed
with
the
disciplinary proceedings and post the
appellant at any place, tentamounts to a
"judgment" within the meaning of Chapter
VIII Rule 5 of the Rules of Court making it
amenable to special appeal - In the instant
case, it transpires from the impugned order that
the direction given by the Hon'ble Single Judge
in the impugned order, granting liberty to the
respondents
to
continue
disciplinary
proceedings, has the traits and trappings of
finality and also such a nature that would cause
serious injustice to the appellant. Thus, the
instant special appeal is maintainable and the
preliminary objection raised by the learned
Standing Counsel is not sustainable under the
facts and circumstances of the case. (Para 13,
23)

B. The disciplinary proceedings against an
officer cannot take place on information,
which
is
vague
and
indefinite
and
suspicion has no role to play in such
matters when the department has taken a
conscious decision not to challenge the
order passed by the appellant (which has
formed the basis for her suspension and
initiation of disciplinary proceedings against her)
and has allowed the same to attain
finality. The disciplinary proceedings against
the appellant have been initiated merely
because the assessee has deposited the penalty
within a very short span of time which raised a
suspicion w.r.t. the penalty order passed by the
appellant. Prima facie, it appears at this stage
that the disciplinary proceedings cannot be
drawn against the appellant to punish her for
having passed the aforesaid order. (Para 24, 26)

The respondents ought not to have been given
liberty
to
proceed
with
the
disciplinary
proceedings against the appellant and to post
her anywhere considering the facts that the
disciplinary proceedings are pending against
her. (Para 27)

C. Words and Phrases - "Judgment" - It
would not be appropriate to project the
definition appearing in S. 2(9) of CPC, 1908 into
the meaning of that expression for the purposes
of the Letters Patent and the word "judgment"
for the purposes of Clause 15 of the Letters
Patent should receive a wider and more liberal
interpretation than the expression "judgment" in
the CPC. It was further held that 'judgment'
imports a concept of finality in a broader and
not in a narrower sense and can be of three
kinds:

(i) a final judgment;
(ii) a preliminary judgment; and
(iii) an intermediary or interlocutory judgment..

There may be such interlocutory orders which
are not covered by Order XLIII Rule 1 C.P.C. but
also possess a characteristic of finality. Every
interlocutory order is not a judgment. Only
certain categories of interlocutory orders can be
regarded as judgments, which decide matters of
moment or affect vital and valuable rights of the
parties and which work serious injustice to the
party concerned. (Para 17)

Special appeal allowed.(E-4)

Precedent followed:

1. Ashutosh Shrotriya& ors. Vs Vice-Chancellor,
Dr. B.R. Ambedkar University & ors., AIR 2015
All 187 (FB) (Para 5)

2. Prof. Y.C. Simhadri, Vice-Chancellor, B.H.U.&
ors. Vs Deena Bandhu Pathak, Student, 2001
(4) A.W.C. 2688 (Para 6)

3.
Hind
Lamps
Ltd.
Vs
Deputy
Labour
Commissioner, Agra & anr., 2002 (3) A.W.C.
1908 (Para 6)

4. Zunjarro Bhikaji Nagarkar Vs U.O.I. & ors.,
(1999) 7 SCC 409 (Para 10)

5. Shah Babulal Khimji Vs Jayaben D Kania,
1981 (4) SCC 8 (Para 17)
2 All. Anjali Chaurasiya Vs. State of U.P. & Ors.
701
6. Central Mine Planning and Design Institute
Ltd. VsU.O.I., 2001 (2) SCC 588 (Para 18)

7. Midnapore Peoples' Cooperative Bank Ltd. Vs
Chunilal Nanda, 2006 (5) SCC 399 (Para 19)

Present special appeal assails the interim
order dated 28.11.2022 passed by the
Hon'ble Single Judge.

(Delivered by Hon'ble Ramesh Sinha, J.
&
Hon'ble Subhash Vidyarthi, J.)

C.M. Application No. 1 of 2023 :
Application for Condonation of Delay

(1) This intra Court appeal has been
filed beyond 25 days.

(2) Heard Shri Vivek Raj Singh,
learned Senior Advocate assisted by Shri
Avinash
Chandra,
learned
Counsel
appearing on behalf of the appellant and
Shri V.P. Nag, learned Standing Counsel
appearing
on
behalf
of
the
State/respondents.

(3) Since cause shown in the affidavit
filed in support of the aforesaid application
is
satisfactory,
the
application
for
condonation of delay is allowed. Delay in
filing the instant appeal is condoned.

(Order on Memo of Appeal)

(4) Feeling aggrieved and dissatisfied
with the direction given in paragraph-14 of
the interim order dated 28.11.2022 passed
by Hon'ble Single Judge in Writ-A No.
7888 of 2022 : Anjali Chaurasia Vs. State
of U.P. and 5 others, whereby Hon'ble
Single Judge granted liberty to the
respondents/State to proceed with the
disciplinary proceedings, without being
influenced by the findings recorded in the
order and also to post the writ petitioner at
any place, considering the fact that
disciplinary
proceedings
are
pending
against her, the appellant/writ petitioner has
preferred the instant appeal.

(5) Placing reliance upon paragraphs
25, 27 and 36 of the Full Bench decision of
this Court in Ashutosh Shrotriya and
others Vs. Vice-Chancellor, Dr. B.R.
Ambedkar University and others : AIR
2015 All 187 (FB), Shri V.P. Nag, learned
Standing Counsel submits that the order
under appeal passed by Hon'ble Single
Judge does not fall within the meaning of
''judgment' but it is an interlocutory order,
therefore, in view of the provisions of Rule
5 of Chapter VIII of the Allahabad High
Court Rules, the instant intra Court appeal
filed by the writ petitioner/appellant against
the impugned interim order passed Hon'ble
Single Judge while exercising the powers
under Article 226 of the Constitution of
India, is not maintainable.

(6) Shri Vivek Raj Singh, learned
Senior Advocate, appearing on behalf of
the appellant/writ petitioner, on the other
hand, has placed reliance upon judgment of
Division Bench of this Court in Prof. Y.C.
Simhadri, Vice-Chancellor, B.H.U. and
others Vs. Deen Bandhu Pathak, Student
: 2001 (4) A.W.C. 2688 and Hind Lamps
Limited
Vs.
Deputy
Labour
Commissioner, Agra and another : 2002
(3) AWC 1908 and has submitted that the
order under appeal passed by Hon'ble
Single Judge has trappings of finality since
the Hon'ble Single Judge has granted
liberty to the respondents to continue the
disciplinary proceedings and also to post
the writ petitioner at any place. His
submission is that if the disciplinary
proceedings initiated in pursuance of the
order dated 21.04.2022 on the basis of
702 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
anonymous complaint is completed and the
appellant/writ petitioner is punished, the
writ
petition
filed
by
the
writ
petitioner/appellant
would
ultimately
become infructuous.

(7) Elaborating his submission, Shri
Vivek Raj Singh has contended that on
19.11.2022, the appellant, while working as
Assistant Commissioner, Commercial Tax,
Mobile Squad, Barabanki, intercepted a
vehicle,
bearing
registration
No.
HR38AA6286 and found that there was
metallic scrap of 2.5 M.T. goods, which
was held undisclosed in the garb of the
plastic scraps being transported through the
aforesaid vehicle and as such, the appellant
has exercised its quasi judicial powers and
after due process of law, levied penalty of
Rs.90,000/-. Thereafter, one Raj Kumar has
made an anonymous complaint, alleging
that metallic scrap was being transported
by the said vehicle, but the appellant only
levied penalty treating that to be only 2.5
MT of goods of metallic scrap rather than
imposing penalty on the entire goods as
metallic scrap.

(8) Shri Singh has further submitted
that except the name of the complainant,
the complaint did not disclose any other
particulars so as to ascertain the identity of
the complainant. The respondents took
cognizance
on
the
said
anonymous
complaint
and
initiated
disciplinary
proceedings against the appellant and
suspended the appellant vide order dated
21.04.2022, which was challenged by the
appellant before this Court by means of
Writ-A No. 7888 of 2022.

(9)

Shri
Singh
submits
that
Government Orders dated 09.05.1997,
01.08.1997, 19.04.2012 and 06.08.2018
specifically provide that the purpose of
issuance of these orders is not only to
safeguard the government officers from
unnecessary harassment but also to curb the
tendency
of
making
frivolous
and
anonymous
complaint
against
the
government servant. His submission is that
the disciplinary proceedings initiated by the
respondents on the basis of the said
anonymous complaint are contrary to the
aforesaid Government Orders.

(10) Shri Vivek Raj Singh has next
contended that before the Hon'ble
Single Judge, the appellant has placed
reliance upon the decision of the Apex
Court in Zunjarrao Bhikaji Nagarkar
Vs. Union of India and others : (1999)
7 SCC 409, wherein the Apex Court
held that the disciplinary proceedings
cannot be initiated against an officer on
information
which
is
vague
and
indefinite and suspicion has no role to
play in such matter. The Hon'ble Single
Judge, while passing the impugned
interim
order,
though
noted
the
aforesaid dictum of the Apex Court but
erred in issuing direction in paragraph14 of the impugned interim order,
granting liberty to the respondents to
continue the disciplinary proceedings
and to post the appellant at any place.

(11)

Making
the
aforesaid
submissions, Shri Vivek Raj Singh, the
learned Senior Advocate appearing on
behalf of the appellant prays that the
instant special appeal is maintainable
and direction contained in paragraph-14
of the impugned interim order dated
28.11.2022 is liable to be set-aside.

(12)

We
have
examined
the
submissions advanced by the parties and
gone through the impugned order as well as
material brought on record.
2 All. Anjali Chaurasiya Vs. State of U.P. & Ors.
703

(13) The core issue for consideration
is whether the direction issued by Hon'ble
Single Judge in paragraph-14 of the
impugned order dated 28.11.2022, granting
liberty to the respondents to proceed with
the disciplinary proceedings and post the
appellant at any place, tentamounts to a
"judgment" within the meaning of Chapter
VIII Rule 5 of the Rules of Court making it
amenable to special appeal under Chapter
VIII Rule 5 of the Rules of Court.

(14) Chapter VIII Rule 5 of the Rules
of Court reads as under :

"5. Special appeal.- An appeal
shall lie to the Court from a judgment (not
being a judgment passed in the exercise of
Appellate Jurisdiction) in respect of a
decree or order made by a Court subject to
the Superintendence of the Court and not
being an order made in the exercise of
revisional jurisdiction or in the exercise of
its power of Superintendence or in the
exercise of criminal jurisdiction or in the
exercise of jurisdiction conferred by Article
226 or Article 227 of the Constitution in
respect of any judgment, order or award-(a)
of a tribunal, Court or statutory arbitrator
made or purported to be made in the
exercise
or
purported
exercise
of
jurisdiction under any Uttar Pradesh Act or
under any Central Act, with respect to any
of the matters enumerated in the State List
or the Concurrent List in the Seventh
Schedule to the Constitution or (b) of the
Government or any Officer or authority,
made or purported to be made in the
exercise or purported exercise of Appellate
or Revisional Jurisdiction under any such
Act of one Judge."

(15) A perusal of the aforesaid
provision goes to show that appeal has been
provided from a judgment or order of one
judge of the High Court subject to excepted
categories or exclusion where special
appeal will not be maintainable. Thus,
everything turns upon the meaning of
expression "judgment" used in Chapter
VIII Rule 5 of the Rules of Court.

(16) The issue as to what constitute a
judgment so as to make it amenable to
special appeal under Chapter VIII Rule 5 of
the Rules of the Court is no longer res
integra.

(17) The issue as to when a decision
of the Hon'ble Single Judge could be
regarded as a 'judgment' within the
meaning and scope of Clause 15 of the
Letters Patent of Bombay High Court came
up for consideration before the Apex Court
in the case of Shah Babulal Khimji Vs.
Jayaben D Kania : 1981 (4) SCC 8,
wherein the Apex Court has held that it
would not be appropriate to project the
definition appearing in Section 2 (9) of the
Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 into the
meaning of that expression for the purposes
of the Letters Patent and the word
"judgment" for the purposes of Clause 15
of the Letters Patent should receive a wider
and more liberal interpretation than the
expression "judgment" in the CPC. It was
further held that ''judgment' imports a
concept of finality in a broader and not in a
narrower sense and can be of three kinds :

(i) a final judgment;

(ii) a preliminary judgment; and

(iii)
an
intermediary
or
interlocutory judgment..

The Apex Court further went to
observe
that
there
may
be
such
interlocutory orders which are not covered
by Order XLIII Rule 1 C.P.C. but also
possess a characteristic of finality. It was
observed as under :
704 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES

"(3) Intermediary or Interlocutory
judgment.- Most of the interlocutory orders
which contain the quality of finality are
clearly specified in clause (a) to (w) of
Order 43 Rule 1 and have already been
held by us to be judgments within the
meaning of the Letters Patent and,
therefore, appealable. There may also be
interlocutory orders which are not covered
by Order 43 Rule 1 but which also possess
the characteristics and trappings of finality
in that, the orders may adversely affect a
valuable right of the party or decide an
important aspect of the trial in an ancillary
proceeding. Before such an order can be a
judgment the adverse effect on the party
concerned must be direct and immediate
rather than indirect or remote."

The Apex Court further went to
observe that every interlocutory order is not
a judgment. Only certain categories of
interlocutory orders can be regarded as
judgments. In this connection, it was held
as under :

"...every interlocutory order
cannot be regarded as a judgment but
only those orders would be judgments
which decide matters of moment or
affect vital and valuable rights of the
parties and which work serious injustice
to the party concerned."

 (emphasis supplied)

(18) In the case of Central Mine
Planning and Design Institute Ltd. Vs.
Union of India: 2001 (2) SCC 588 while
laying down the test when interlocutory
order would fall within the meaning of
''judgment' for the purposes of Letters
Patent, the Apex Court has observed as
under :

"...to determine the question
whether an interlocutory order passed
by one Judge of a High Court falls
within the meaning of "judgment" for
purposes of Letters Patent the test is:
Whether
the
order
is
a
final
determination
affecting
vital
and
valuable rights and obligations of the
parties concerned. This has to be
ascertained on the facts of each case."

(19)

In
Midnapore
Peoples'
Cooperative Bank Ltd Vs Chunilal
Nanda : 2006 (5) SCC 399, the Apex Court
has examined following two questions : -

(i) Where the High Court in a
contempt proceedings renders a decision on
the merits of a dispute between the parties,
either by an interlocutory order or final
judgment,
whether
that
would
be
appealable under Section 19 of the
Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 and if not,
what would be the remedy to the person
aggrieved; and

(ii) Where such a decision on
merits is rendered by an interlocutory order
of a learned Single Judge, whether an intracourt appeal would be maintainable under
Clause 15 of the Letters Patent of the High
Court of Calcutta.

The Apex Court, thus, observed
that interlocutory or interim orders which
are passed during the pendency of a case
would fall under one or the other of the
following categories :-

"(i) Orders which finally decide a
question or issue in controversy in the main
case;

(ii) Orders which finally decide
an issue which materially and directly
affects the final decision in the main case;

(iii) Orders which finally decide a
collateral issue or question which is not the
subject-matter of the main case;

(iv) Routine orders which are
passed to facilitate the progress of the case
till its culmination in the final judgment;
2 All. Anjali Chaurasiya Vs. State of U.P. & Ors.
705

(v) Orders which may cause some
inconvenience or some prejudice to a party,
but which do not finally determine the
rights and obligations of the parties."

(20) In Ashutosh Shrotriya and
others Vs. Vice-Chancellor, Dr. B. R.
Ambedkar University and others (supra),
upon which learned Standing Counsel has
placed reliance, noticing conflict in two
Division Bench's judgment, following
questions were referred for decision to the
Full Bench :

"(1) Where a learned Single
Judge while hearing a writ petition calls for
counter and rejoinder affidavits, but does
not pass any order on the stay application
either granting or refusing a stay, will the
order amount to a refusal of interim relief
to the petitioner either temporarily or
impliedly and a 'judgment' within the
meaning of Chapter VIII Rule 5 of the
Rules of the Court, 1952;

(2)
Does
an
order
which
adversely affects the valuable rights of a
party by a temporary or implied refusal of
interim relief have the trappings of a
judgment."

(21) After discussing the law on the
subject, Full Bench answered the questions
as under :

"44. We, accordingly, are of the
view that a direction issued by the learned
Single Judge in the course of the hearing of
a writ petition, calling for the filing of a
counter and a rejoinder or, in other words,
for the completion of pleadings is a
direction of a procedural nature, in aid of
the ultimate progression of the case. The
object and purpose of such a direction is to
enable the Single Judge to have the
considered benefit of a response to the
petition so as to enable the Court to deal
with an application of an interlocutory
nature upon a fair consideration of the rival
perspectives and eventually for the purpose
of the disposal of the case at the final stage.
A purely procedural direction of this nature
would ordinarily not be amenable to the
remedy of a special appeal even if the
consequence of the issuance of such a
direction is to cause some inconvenience or
prejudice to one or other party. The Court,
in order to decide a lis, either at the
interlocutory or at a final stage, would
generally require the benefit of a response
filed by a party which would be affected by
the order which is sought and the reliefs
which are claimed. Compliance with the
principles of natural justice is as much a
safeguard for the parties as it is for the
Court of having considered the matter in all
its perspectives before rendering a final
decision. If a party to the proceeding seeks
to press an application for ad interim relief
even before a reply is filed on grounds of
extreme urgency or on the ground that the
situation would be irreversibly altered or
that irretrievable injustice would result
unless a protective order is passed, such a
submission must be urged before the Single
Judge. If such a submission is urged, it
must be recorded and dealt with however
briefly to obviate a grievance that an
application for ad interim relief was
pressed but not dealt with. A purely
procedural direction of calling for a counter
affidavit and rejoinder would not be
amenable to a special appeal since it
decides no rights and does not affect the
vital and substantive rights of parties.
However, the appellate court has the
unquestioned jurisdiction to decide whether
the direction is of a procedural nature
against which a special appeal is not
maintainable or whether the interlocutory
order decides matters of moment or affects
706 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
vital and valuable rights of parties and
works serious injustice to the party
concerned. Where the Division Bench in a
special appeal is of the view that the order
of the learned Single Judge is not just a
procedural direction but would result in a
grave detriment to substantive rights of an
irreversible nature, the jurisdiction of the
Court is wide enough to intervene at the
behest of an aggrieved litigant. The Rules
of Court are in aid of justice. We, therefore,
affirm the principle that a purely processual
order of the nature upon which the
reference is made would not be amenable
to a special appeal not being a judgement.
The Division Bench will have to decide in
the facts of each case, the nature of the
order passed by a Single Judge while
determining
whether
the
appeal
is
maintainable.

44.
In
view
of
the
aforesaid
discussions, we answer the question of law
referred to the Full Bench by holding that,
an order of a learned Single Judge upon a
petition under Articles 226 or 227 of the
Constitution only calling for counter and
rejoinder affidavits is merely a procedural
order in aid of the progression of the case.
An order of this nature which is purely of a
procedural nature in aid of the progression
of the case and to enable the Court to form
a considered view after a counter affidavit
and a rejoinder are filed would not be
amenable to a special appeal under Chapter
VIII Rule 5. Such an order does not decide
anything nor does it have the trappings of
finality. If a party to the proceedings seeks
to press an application for ad interim relief
of a protective nature even before a counter
affidavit is filed, on the ground that a
situation of irretrievable injustice may
result or that its substantive rights would be
adversely affected in the meantime, such an
argument must be addressed before the
Single Judge. If such an argument is urged,
it should be dealt with however briefly,
consistent with the stage of the case, by the
Single Judge. It is for the Division Bench
hearing the special appeal to consider
whether the order decides matters of
moment or is of such a nature that would
affect the vital and valuable rights of the
parties and causes serious injustice to the
concerned party."

 (emphasis supplied)

(22) Keeping in mind the aforesaid
settled law on the subject, what we find in
the instant case is that a disciplinary
proceeding under U.P. Government Servant
(Discipline and Appeal) Rules, 1999 was
initiated against the appellant by placing
her under suspension by means of order
dated 21.04.2022 on the pretext that the
appellant, while working as Assistant
Commissioner, Commercial Tax, Mobile
Team
Unit,
Barabanki,
has
violated
provisions of the Goods and Service Tax
Act as she, by arranging wrong facts,
evidences and fabricated documents at her
own convenience as well as with the
collusion of traders, declared less valuable
and less taxable plastic scraps in place of
more valuable and more taxable metal/nonmetal items and deposited very less amount
in the State treasury instead of required
tax/penalty, which causes revenue loss to
the
Government.
The
appellant
has
challenged
the
aforesaid
order
of
suspension dated 21.04.2022 by filing WritA No. 7888 of 2022. By means of the
impugned order, Hon'ble Single Judge,
after noting the submissions advanced by
the learned Counsel for the parties as well
as judgment of the Apex Court in
Zunjarrao Bhikaji Nagarkar (supra)
relied by the appellant/writ petitioner,
stayed the operation and implementation of
the order of suspension dated 21.04.2022,
2 All. Anjali Chaurasiya Vs. State of U.P. & Ors.
707
however, liberty has been granted to the
respondents
to
proceed
with
the
disciplinary proceedings.

(23) In the instant case, it transpires
from the impugned order that the direction
given by the Hon'ble Single Judge in
paragraph-14 of the impugned order,
granting liberty to the respondents to
continue disciplinary proceedings, has the
traits and trappings of finality and also such
a nature that would cause serious injustice
to the appellant. Thus, the instant special
appeal is maintainable and the preliminary
objection raised by the learned Standing
Counsel is not sustainable under the facts
and circumstances of the case.

(24) The Hon'ble Single Judge has
recorded that in case where there is no
infirmity in the order of penalty, weight
etc., or it lacked in quantum of quality of
the goods, the respondents should have
adhered to the provisions of the U.P. Goods
and Services Tax Act and revised the said
order in accordance with Section 108 of the
U.P. Goods and Service Tax Act. However,
the order passed by the appellant, which
has formed the basis for her suspension and
initiation
of
disciplinary
proceedings
against her, has not been revised or
cancelled by the respondents. Rather, a
conscious decision was taken not to take
any action against the order passed by the
appellant.
When
the
respondents
themselves have allowed the order passed
by the appellant to attain finality and they
have taken a conscious decision not to
challenge
the
order,
the
disciplinary
proceedings initiated on the basis of a mere
suspicion raised on the basis that the
assessee has deposited the penalty within a
very short span of time after passing of the
order, appears to be no good ground for
initiation
of
disciplinary
proceedings
against the appellant.

(25) The Hon'ble Single Judge has
quoted the following passage from the case
of Zunjarrao Bhikaji Nagarkar Vs.
Union of India and others (supra) :-

"41. When penalty is not levied,
the assessee certainly benefits. But it
cannot be said that by not levying the
penalty the officer has favoured the
assessee or shown undue favour to him.
There has to be some basis for the
disciplinary authority to reach such a
conclusion even prima facie. Record in the
present case does not show if the
disciplinary authority had any information
within its possession from where it could
form an opinion that the appellant showed
'favour' to the assessee by not imposing the
penalty. He may have wrongly exercised
his jurisdiction. But that wrong can be
corrected in appeal. That cannot always
form basis
for initiating disciplinary
proceedings for an officer while he is
acting as quasi judicial authority. It must be
kept in mind that being a quasi judicial
authority, he is always subject to judicial
supervision in appeal.

42.
Initiation
of
disciplinary
proceedings against an officer cannot take
place on an information which is vague or
indefinite. Suspicion has no role to play in
such matter. There must exist reasonable
basis for the disciplinary authority to proceed
against the delinquent officer. Merely because
penalty was not imposed and the Board in the
exercise of its power directed filing of appeal
against that order in the the Appellate
Tribunal could not be enough to proceed
against the appellant. There is no other
instance to show that in similar case the
appellant invariably imposed penalty.
708 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES

43. If, every error of law were to
constitute a charge of misconduct, it would
impinge upon the independent functioning of
quasi judicial officers like the appellant. Since
in sum and substance misconduct is sought to
be inferred by the appellant having committed
an error of law, the charge-sheet on the face of it
does not proceed on any legal premise
rendering it liable to be quashed. In other
words, to maintain any charge-sheet against a
quasi judicial authority something more has to
be alleged than a mere mistake of law, e.g., in
the nature of some extraneous consideration
influencing the quasi judicial order. Since
nothing of the sort is alleged herein the
impugned charge-sheet is rendered illegal. The
charge- sheet, if sustained, will thus impinge
upon
the
confidence
and
independent
functioning of a quasi judicial authority. The
entire system of administrative adjudication
whereunder quasi judicial powers are conferred
on administrative authorities, would fall into
disrepute if officers performing such functions
are inhibited in performing their functions
without fear or favour because of the constant
threat of disciplinary proceedings."

(26) The disciplinary proceedings against
the appellant have been initiated merely
because the assessee has deposited the penalty
within a very short span of time which raised a
suspicion with regard to the penalty order
passed by the appellant. In Zunjarrao Bhikaji
Nagarkar (Supra), the Hon'ble Supreme Court
has categorically held that the disciplinary
proceedings against an officer cannot take place
on information, which is vague and indefinite
and suspicion has no role to play in such
matters when the department has taken a
conscious decision not to challenge the order
passed by the appellant and has allowed the
same to attain finality. Prima facie, it appears at
this stage that the disciplinary proceedings
cannot be drawn against the appellant to punish
her for having passed the aforesaid order.

(27) In view of the aforesaid
discussion, we are of the view that the
respondents ought not to have been given
liberty to proceed with the disciplinary
proceedings against the appellant and to
post her anywhere considering the facts
that the disciplinary proceedings are
pending against her.

(28) Accordingly, the instant special
appeal
is
allowed.
The
order
dated
28.11.2022 passed by the Hon'ble Single
Judge in Writ-A No. 7888 of 2022 : Anjali
Chaurasia Vs. State of U.P. and 5 others, so
far as it provides that "Respondents are at
liberty to proceed with the disciplinary
proceedings, without being influenced by the
findings
recorded
in
this
order.
The
respondents are also at liberty to post the
petitioner at any place, considering the fact
that disciplinary proceedings are pending
against her" is hereby set-aside.

(29) It is clarified that while deciding the
case on merits, Hon'ble Single Judge shall not
be guided or influence by any observations
made hereinabove, which have been made only
for the purposes of disposal of the instant
appeal.
----------
(2023) 2 ILRA 708
APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL SIDE
DATED: ALLAHABAD 19.01.2023

BEFORE

THE HON'BLE RAJESH BINDAL, C.J.
THE HON'BLE J.J. MUNIR, J.

Special Appeal Defective No. 122 of 2022

C/M, Gandhi Rashtriya Vidyalaya, Rath,
Dist. Hamirpur & Anr.
 ...Appellants
Versus
State of U.P. & Ors. ...Respondents