# Ankur & Ors v. State of U.P. & Anr

- **Citation:** (2025) 8 ILRA 130
- **Court:** High Court of Judicature at Allahabad
- **Decided:** 2025-08-06
- **Case number:** Application U/S 482 No. 10217 of 2017
- **Bench:** Anish Kumar Gupta
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/allahabad-high-court/ankur-ors-v-state-of-u-p-anr-54645
- **Pages:** 10

## Headnote

Whether proceedings under SC/ST Act be
quashed under settlement or not.

Headnotes
Allegations in the FIR- do not relate to a private
dispute between the parties -affect the society
at large.-Application seek withdrawal of the
proceedings and alleging therein that no such
incident has taken place- this gives a reasonable
apprehension to the Court- that the witnesses
have either been win over or have been put
under some kind of fear -which compelled them
8 All. Ankur & Ors. Vs. State of U.P. & Anr.
131
to move such application in the instant casethough the parties have entered into the
settlement- the proceedings cannot be quashed,
which are affecting the society at large and do
not relate to a private dispute between the
parties. Application dismissed. (E-9)

Case Law Cited

## Text

130 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
expunction of disparaging remarks against
a person whose conduct comes in for
consideration before a Court of law. Those
tests are:

(a) Whether the party whose
conduct is in question is before the court or
has an opportunity of explaining or
defending himself;

(b) Whether there is evidence on
record bearing on that conduct justifying
the remarks; and

(c) Whether it is necessary for the
decision of the case, as an integral part
thereof, to animadvert on that conduct.

15. While it is of fundamental
importance in the realm of administration
of justice to allow the judges to discharge
their functions freely and fearlessly and
without interference by anyone, it is
equally important for the judges to be
exercising restraint and avoid unnecessary
remarks on the conduct of the counsel
which may have no bearing on the
adjudication of the dispute before the
Court."

19. It is apparent observation of the
Apex Court that offending remarks against
the counsels, are un-warranted and don't
touched upon the required parameters .

20. Needless to say that the learned
trial court has made some adverse remarks
against Senior Counsel, though such
remarks were not required under the facts
and circumstances of the present case.

21. For the forgoing reasons and
discussions, this court finds merit in the
application, thus, the impugned order dated
25.07.2025 passed by learned Special
Judge (Prevention of Corruption Act),
Court no. 6, Lucknow, in Sessions Case
No. 590 of 2023 (State v. Mohd. Abdul
Aleem Khan), arising out of Case Crime
No. 1262/2019, under Section 13(1)(b) r/w
13(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act,
1988 (as amended by Act of 2018), Police
Station Gomti Nagar, District Lucknow, is
hereby set aside.

22. The instant application is allowed
accordingly.

23. Liberty is granted to the trial court
concerned to revive the proceedings, if
sanction for prosecution is granted by the
appropriate Government, in accordance
with law.
---------
(2025) 8 ILRA 130
ORIGINAL JURISDICTION
CRIMINAL SIDE
DATED: ALLAHABAD 06.08.2025

BEFORE

THE HON'BLE ANISH KUMAR GUPTA, J.

Application U/S 482 No. 10217 of 2017

Ankur & Ors. ...Applicants
Versus
State of U.P. & Anr. ...Opposite Parties

Counsel for the Applicants:
Pawan Singh Pundir

Counsel for the Opposite Parties:
G.A., Om Prakash Tiwari

Issue for consideration
Whether proceedings under SC/ST Act be
quashed under settlement or not.

Headnotes
Allegations in the FIR- do not relate to a private
dispute between the parties -affect the society
at large.-Application seek withdrawal of the
proceedings and alleging therein that no such
incident has taken place- this gives a reasonable
apprehension to the Court- that the witnesses
have either been win over or have been put
under some kind of fear -which compelled them
8 All. Ankur & Ors. Vs. State of U.P. & Anr.
131
to move such application in the instant casethough the parties have entered into the
settlement- the proceedings cannot be quashed,
which are affecting the society at large and do
not relate to a private dispute between the
parties. Application dismissed. (E-9)

Case Law Cited
1. State of M.P. vs. Laxmi Narayan and Others,
2019 (5) SCC 688
2. Narinder Singh vs. State of Punjab, 2014 (6)
SCC 466
3. Parbatbhai Aahir vs. State of Gujarat, (2017)
9 SCC 641
4. Shiji vs. Radhika, (2011) 10 SCC 705

List of Acts
SC/ST Act
Indian Penal Code

List of Keywords
Private dispute; affect the society at large;
withdrawal of the proceedings; witnesses have
either been win over; parties have entered into
the settlement.

Appearances of parties
Counsel for Applicant :- Pawan Singh Pundir,
Counsel for Opposite Party :- G.A.,Om Prakash
Tiwari
Counsel for Applicant :- Pawan Singh Pundir
Counsel for Opposite Party :- G.A.,Om Prakash
Tiwari

(Delivered by Hon'ble Anish Kumar
Gupta, J.)

1. Heard Sri Rajiv Kumar, learned
counsel for the applicants, Sri Vijay
Kumar, Advocate holding brief of Sri
Awadh Pratap Singh Sisodiya, learned
counsel for opposite party no.2 and Sri
Rizwan Ahmad, learned AGA for the
State.

2. The instant application under
Section 482 Cr.P.C. has been filed seeking
quashing
of
the
charge
sheet
dated
05.09.2024 as well as the entire proceeding of
Case No. 9894/IX arising out of Case Crime
No. 403 of 2016 (Stte of U.P. vs. Abhishek
and others), under Sections 323, 452, 504 and
506 IPC & 3 (1) (10) of SC/ST Act, P.S.
Jhinjhana, District Shamli, pending in the
court
of
Chief
Judicial
Magistrate,
Muzaffarnagar.

3. During the pendency of the
proceeding before the trial court in the instant
case, the parties have settled their disputes
amicably.
The
compromise
was
also
executed. The aforesaid facts of settlement of
dispute and execution of compromise has
been admitted by learned counsel for
opposite party no.2 by filing the counter
affidavit in the instant case. This Court vide
order dated 06.04.2017 had directed the
parties to appear before the trial court for
verification of the compromise. In terms of
the aforesaid order, the compromise executed
between the parties was duly verified by the
trial court concerned vide order dated
29.06.2017. The certified copy of the said
order has been annexed along with the
supplementary affidavit dated 20.12.2017
filed by the applicants.

4. In view of the aforesaid facts,
since the instant case involved the provisions
of SC/ST Act, this Court passed the
following order on 04.07.2025:

"1. Learned counsel for the
opposite party no. 2 is directed to verify that
any amount was received by the opposite
party no. 2 from the Social Welfare Officer. If
any such amount has been received by the
opposite party no. 2, the same is directed to
be refunded to the Social Welfare Officer, in
view of the compromise.

2.
Put
up
this
matter
on
22.7.2025."

5. Pursuant to the aforesaid order,
another supplementary affidavit has been
132 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
filed by learned counsel for the opposite
party no.2 on 22.07.2025. In pursuant to the
aforesaid order the opposite party no.2 has
deposited an amount of Rs. 75,000/-, which
was received by opposite party no.2 from
the office of District Social Welfare
Officer, Shamli. In this regard, the copy has
already been produced by the District
Social Welfare Officer, Shamli. Thus, on
the basis of the aforesaid compromise
arrived at between the parties, learned
counsel for the applicants as well as
counsel for the opposite party no.2 seek
quashing of the entire proceeding of the
instant case.

6. Per contra, learned AGA has
raised objection that in the instant case,
the offence alleged in the FIR is not a
dispute of private nature, rather it affects
the society at large. Therefore, the
proceeding of the instant case cannot be
quashed on the basis of compromise
arrived at between the parties. In support of
his submission, learned AGA has relied
upon the judgments of Apex Court in State
of M.P. vs. Laxmi Narayan and Others,
2019 (5) SCC 688.

7. In the rejoinder, learned counsel
for
the
applicants
submits
that
the
applicants and the opposite party no.2 are
the neighbours and due to the trivial dispute
between them, the instant case was lodged
against the applicants herein by exonerating
the facts of the actual dispute between the
parties. Therefore, learned counsel for the
applicants submits that the nature of
dispute between the parties was a private,
thus the compromise executed between the
parties can be relied upon for quashing of
the proceeding.

8. Learned counsel for the opposite
party no.2 also submits that since the
victim, the daughter of opposite party no.2
herein has already been married and she is
residing happily in the matrimonial home
and if the instant criminal proceedings are
continued against opposite party no.2, that
will not only be stigmatic against the
daughter of opposite party no.2 but the
serious consequences will be there in the
matrimonial life of the daughter of opposite
party no.2.

9.
Having
heard
the
rival
submissions made by learned counsel for
the parties, this Court has carefully gone
through the record of the case. In the
instant case, an FIR was lodged by the
opposite party no.2 alleging therein that
the opposite party no.2 is Chamar by
caste and she had gone outside her house.
In the house, the daughter of the opposite
party no.2 was alone. On 30.05.2016, in
the evening around 6:00 P.M., in the
absence of the opposite party no.2 having
found the daughters of the opposite party
no.2 alone and neighbours Abhishek son of
Rampal, Sonu and Monu sons of Jayveer,
Rishipal son of Sita, Ankur son of
Chandraveer, Tanju and Sanjiv sons of
Jagbeer, Gullu son of Narendra, who are
Jats by caste forcefully pulled the younger
daughter of the opposite party no.2 in a
room and tried to molest her. When it was
objected by her then they had beaten up the
daughter of the opposite party no.2 saying
that she cannot do anything against them as
the police is with them and they would
lodge a false case against them. They also
pelted stones in the house of the opposite
party no.2 and the younger daughter of the
opposite party no.2, who is aged about 18
years sustained injury by the brick and
became unconscious. The other daughters
of the opposite party no.2 made a hue and
cry, then the villagers gathered there and
saved the daughter of the opposite party
8 All. Ankur & Ors. Vs. State of U.P. & Anr.
133
no.2. The aforesaid persons while going
away also threatened that whenever they
would get a chance, they would kill her. It
is further alleged in the FIR that on
31.05.2016, a complaint was made to the
SHO concerned and when no action was
taken, the opposite party no.2 approached
the District Magistrate and thereafter the
instant FIR was registered. The matter was
investigated by the police and thereupon
the charge sheet was filed against the
applicants herein for the offence under
Sections 323, 452. 504 and 506 IPC and
3(1) (10) of SC/ST Act. Thereupon the
applicants herein were summoned for the
aforesaid offences.

10. During the pendency of the
aforesaid case before the trial court
concerned, the parties have settled their
disputes amicably and a compromise was
executed. Thereupon the opposite party
no.2 along with her daughter moved an
application before the trial court concerned
on 28.03.2017 supported by the affidavits
alleging therein that no such incident has
happened with the opposite party no.2 or
her daughter. They do not want to falsely
implicate any person. In the affidavits, the
opposite party no.2 as well as her
daughter they have categorically denied the
incident in toto and alleged that the injury
was sustained by the opposite party no.2
due to slip of her feet while going towards
Talab
carrying
dung
on
a
basket.
Thereupon the false FIR was lodged. No
such incident as alleged in the FIR has
taken place nor any incident of insult to her
caste was made by the applicants and they
do not want any action against them. The
copy of the aforesaid compromise and
application has been annexed along with
the counter affidavit filed by the opposite
party no.2 dated 05.04.2017. On the basis
of the aforesaid compromise, application
moved by the opposite party no.2, this
Court has directed the parties to appear
before the trial court concerned for
verification of compromise vide order
dated 06.04.2017 as already noted. The
aforesaid compromise was duly verified by
the trial court in presence of the parties
vide order dated 29.06.2017. Certified copy
of the said order has been annexed along
with the supplementary affidavit dated
20.12.2017 filed by the applicants.

11. In State of M.P. vs. Laxmi
Narayan and Others (supra), the Apex
Court has held as under:

" 15.1. that the power conferred
under Section 482 of the Code to quash the
criminal
proceedings
for
the
noncompoundable offences under Section 320
of the Code can be exercised having
overwhelmingly and predominantly the
civil character, particularly those arising
out of commercial transactions or arising
out of matrimonial relationship or family
disputes and when the parties have
resolved
the
entire
dispute
amongst
themselves;

15.2. such power is not to be
exercised in those prosecutions which
involved heinous and serious offences of
mental depravity or offences like murder,
rape, dacoity, etc. Such offences are not
private in nature and have a serious impact
on society;

15.3. similarly, such power is not
to be exercised for the offences under the
special statutes Prevention of Corruption
Act or the offences committed by public
servants while working in that capacity are
not to be quashed merely on the basis of
compromise between the victim and the
offender;

15.4 . offences under Section 307
IPC and the Arms Act etc. would fall in the
134 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
category of heinous and serious offences
and therefore are to be treated as crime
against the society and not against the
individual
alone,
and
therefore,
the
criminal proceedings for the offence under
Section 307 IPC and/or the Arms Act etc.
which have a serious impact on the society
cannot be quashed in exercise of powers
under Section 482 of the Code, on the
ground that the parties have resolved their
entire
dispute
amongst
themselves.
However, the High Court would not rest its
decision merely because there is a mention
of Section 307 IPC in the FIR or the charge
is framed under this provision. It would be
open to the High Court to examine as to
whether incorporation of Section 307 IPC
is there for the sake of it or the prosecution
has collected sufficient evidence, which if
proved, would lead to framing the charge
under Section 307 IPC. For this purpose, it
would be open to the High Court to go by
the nature of injury sustained, whether such
injury is inflicted on the vital/delegate parts
of the body, nature of weapons used etc.
However, such an exercise by the High
Court would be permissible only after the
evidence is collected after investigation and
the charge sheet is filed/charge is framed
and/or during the trial. Such exercise is not
permissible when the matter is still under
investigation.
Therefore,
the
ultimate
conclusion in paragraphs 29.6 and 29.7 of
the decision of this Court in the case of
Narinder Singh (supra) should be read
harmoniously and to be read as a whole
and
in
the
circumstances
stated
hereinabove;

15.5. while exercising the power
under Section 482 of the Code to quash
the criminal proceedings in respect of
non-compoundable offences, which are
private in nature and do not have a
serious impart on society, on the ground
that there is a settlement/compromise
between the victim and the offender, the
High Court is required to consider the
antecedents of the accused; the conduct of
the accused, namely, whether the accused
was
absconding
and
why
he
was
absconding, how he had managed with the
complainant to enter into a compromise
etc."

12. In Gian Singh Vs State of
Punjab, (2012) 10 SCC 303, the Apex
Court has held as under:

 "61.The position that emerges
from
the
above
discussion
can
be
summarised thus: the power of the High
Court in quashing a criminal proceeding or
FIR or complaint in exercise of its inherent
jurisdiction is distinct and different from
the power given to a criminal court for
compounding the offences under Section
320 of the Code. Inherent power is of wide
plenitude with no statutory limitation but it
has to be exercised in accord with the
guideline engrafted in such power viz; (i) to
secure the ends of justice or (ii) to prevent
abuse of the process of any Court. In what
cases power to quash the criminal
proceeding or complaint or F.I.R may be
exercised where the offender and victim
have settled their dispute would depend on
the facts and circumstances of each case
and no category can be prescribed.
However, before exercise of such power,
the High Court must have due regard to
the nature and gravity of the crime.
Heinous and serious offences of mental
depravity or offences like murder, rape,
dacoity, etc. cannot be fittingly quashed
even though the victim or victim's family
and the offender have settled the dispute.
Such offences are not private in nature
and have serious impact on society.
Similarly, any compromise between the
victim and offender in relation to the
8 All. Ankur & Ors. Vs. State of U.P. & Anr.
135
offences
under
special
statutes
like
Prevention of Corruption Act or the
offences committed by public servants
while working in that capacity etc; cannot
provide for any basis for quashing criminal
proceedings involving such offences. But
the criminal cases having overwhelmingly
and pre-dominatingly civil flavour stand
on different footing for the purposes of
quashing, particularly the offences arising
from commercial, financial, mercantile,
civil, partnership or such like transactions
or the offences arising out of matrimony
relating to dowry, etc. or the family
disputes where the wrong is basically
private or personal in nature and the
parties have resolved their entire dispute.
In this category of cases, High Court may
quash criminal proceedings if in its view,
because of the compromise between the
offender and victim, the possibility of
conviction is remote and bleak and
continuation of criminal case would put
accused to great oppression and prejudice
and extreme injustice would be caused to
him by not quashing the criminal case
despite full and complete settlement and
compromise with the victim. In other words,
the High Court must consider whether it
would be unfair or contrary to the interest of
justice to continue with the criminal
proceeding or continuation of the criminal
proceeding would tantamount to abuse of
process of law despite settlement and
compromise
between
the
victim
and
wrongdoer and whether to secure the ends
of justice, it is appropriate that criminal case
is put to an end and if the answer to the
above question(s) is in affirmative, the High
Court shall be well within its jurisdiction to
quash the criminal proceeding."

13. In Narinder Singh vs. State of
Punjab, 2014 (6) SCC 466, the Apex
Court has held as under:
 "29. In view of the aforesaid
discussion, we sum up and lay down the
following principles by which the High
Court would be guided in giving adequate
treatment to the settlement between the
parties and exercising its power under
Section 482 of the Code while accepting the
settlement and quashing the proceedings or
refusing to accept the settlement with
direction to continue with the criminal
proceedings:

29.1. Power conferred under
Section 482 of the Code is to be
distinguished from the power which lies in
the Court to compound the offences under
Section 320 of the Code. No doubt, under
Section 482 of the Code, the High Court
has inherent power to quash the criminal
proceedings even in those cases which are
not compoundable, where the parties have
settled the matter between themselves.
However, this power is to be exercised
sparingly and with caution.

29.2. When the parties have
reached the settlement and on that basis
petition
for
quashing
the
criminal
proceedings is filed, the guiding factor in
such cases would be to secure:

(i) ends of justice, or

(ii) to prevent abuse of the
process of any Court.

While exercising the power the
High Court is to form an opinion on either
of the aforesaid two objectives.

29.3. Such a power is not be
exercised in those prosecutions which
involve heinous and serious offences of
mental depravity or offences like murder,
rape, dacoity, etc. Such offences are not
private in nature and have a serious
impact on society. Similarly, for offences
alleged to have been committed under
special statute like the Prevention of
Corruption Act or the offences committed
by Public Servants while working in that
136 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
capacity are not to be quashed merely on
the basis of compromise between the victim
and the offender.

29.4. On the other, those
criminal cases having overwhelmingly
and
pre-dominantly
civil
character,
particularly
those
arising
out
of
commercial transactions or arising out of
matrimonial
relationship
or
family
disputes should be quashed when the
parties have resolved their entire disputes
among themselves.

29.5.
While
exercising
its
powers, the High Court is to examine as to
whether the possibility of conviction is
remote and bleak and continuation of
criminal cases would put the accused to
great oppression and prejudice and
extreme injustice would be caused to him
by not quashing the criminal cases.

29.6. Offences under Section 307
IPC would fall in the category of heinous
and serious offences and therefore is to be
generally treated as crime against the
society and not against the individual
alone. However, the High Court would not
rest its decision merely because there is a
mention of Section 307 IPC in the FIR or
the charge is framed under this provision.
It would be open to the High Court to
examine as to whether incorporation of
Section 307 IPC is there for the sake of it
or the prosecution has collected sufficient
evidence, which if proved, would lead to
proving the charge Section 307 IPC. For
this purpose, it would be open to the High
Court to go by the nature of injury
sustained, whether such injury is inflicted
on the vital/delegate parts of the body,
nature of weapons used etc. Medical report
in respect of injuries suffered by the victim
can generally be the guiding factor. On the
basis of this prima facie analysis, the High
Court can examine as to whether there is a
strong possibility of conviction or the
chances of conviction are remote and
bleak. In the former case it can refuse to
accept the settlement and quash the
criminal proceedings whereas in the later
case it would be permissible for the High
Court to accept the plea compounding the
offence based on complete settlement
between the parties. At this stage, the Court
can also be swayed by the fact that the
settlement between the parties is going to
result in harmony between them which may
improve their future relationship.

29.7. While deciding whether to
exercise its power under Section 482 of the
Code or not, timings of settlement play a
crucial role. Those cases where the
settlement is arrived at immediately after
the alleged commission of offence and the
matter is still under investigation, the
High Court may be liberal in accepting
the settlement to quash the criminal
proceedings/investigation. It is because of
the
reason
that
at
this
stage
the
investigation is still on and even the charge
sheet has not been filed. Likewise, those
cases where the charge is framed but the
evidence is yet to start or the evidence is
still at infancy stage, the High Court can
show benevolence in exercising its powers
favourably,
but
after
prima
facie
assessment of the circumstances/material
mentioned above. On the other hand,
where the prosecution evidence is almost
complete or after the conclusion of the
evidence the matter is at the stage of
argument, normally the High Court
should refrain from exercising its power
under Section 482 of the Code, as in such
cases the trial court would be in a position
to decide the case finally on merits and to
come a conclusion as to whether the
offence under Section 307 IPC is
committed or not. Similarly, in those cases
where the conviction is already recorded
by the trial court and the matter is at the
8 All. Ankur & Ors. Vs. State of U.P. & Anr.
137
appellate stage before the High Court,
mere compromise between the parties
would not be a ground to accept the same
resulting in acquittal of the offender who
has already been convicted by the trial
court. Here charge is proved under
Section 307 IPC and conviction is already
recorded of a heinous crime and, therefore,
there is no question of sparing a convict
found guilty of such a crime."

14. In Parbatbhai Aahir vs. State
of Gujarat, (2017) 9 SCC 641, the Apex
Court has held as under:

 "(1) Section 482 preserves the
inherent powers of the High Court to
prevent an abuse of the process of any
court or to secure the ends of justice. The
provision does not confer new powers. It
only recognises and preserves powers
which inhere in the High Court;

(2)
The
invocation
of
the
jurisdiction of the High Court to quash a
First Information Report or a criminal
proceeding on the ground that a settlement
has been arrived at between the offender
and the victim is not the same as the
invocation of jurisdiction for the purpose of
compounding
an
offence.
While
compounding an offence, the power of the
court is governed by the provisions of
Section 320 of the Code of Criminal
Procedure, 1973. The power to quash
under Section 482 is attracted even if the
offence is non-compoundable.

(3)
In
forming
an
opinion
whether
a
criminal
proceeding
or
complaint should be quashed in exercise of
its jurisdiction under Section 482, the High
Court must evaluate whether the ends of
justice would justify the exercise of the
inherent power;

(4) While the inherent power of
the High Court has a wide ambit and
plenitude it has to be exercised; (i) to
secure the ends of justice or (ii) to prevent
an abuse of the process of any court;

(5) The decision as to whether a
complaint or First Information Report
should be quashed on the ground that the
offender and victim have settled the
dispute, revolves ultimately on the facts and
circumstances of each case and no
exhaustive elaboration of principles can be
formulated;

(6) In the exercise of the power
under Section 482 and while dealing with a
plea that the dispute has been settled, the
High Court must have due regard to the
nature and gravity of the offence. Heinous
and serious offences involving mental
depravity or offences such as murder, rape
and dacoity cannot appropriately be
quashed though the victim or the family of
the victim have settled the dispute. Such
offences are, truly speaking, not private in
nature but have a serious impact upon
society. The decision to continue with the
trial in such cases is founded on the
overriding element of public interest in
punishing persons for serious offences;

(7) As distinguished from serious
offences, there may be criminal cases
which
have
an
overwhelming
or
predominant element of a civil dispute.
They stand on a distinct footing in so far
as the exercise of the inherent power to
quash is concerned;

(8) Criminal cases involving
offences which arise from commercial,
financial,
mercantile,
partnership
or
similar transactions with an essentially
civil flavour may in appropriate situations
fall for quashing where parties have
settled the dispute;

(9) In such a case, the High
Court may quash the criminal proceeding
if in view of the compromise between the
disputants, the possibility of a conviction
138 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
is remote and the continuation of a
criminal
proceeding
would
cause
oppression and prejudice; and

(10) There is yet an exception to
the principle set out in propositions (8) and
(9) above. Economic offences involving
the financial and economic well-being of
the state have implications which lie
beyond the domain of a mere dispute
between private disputants. The High
Court would be justified in declining to
quash where the offender is involved in an
activity akin to a financial or economic
fraud
or
misdemeanour.
The
consequences of the act complained of
upon the financial or economic system
will weigh in the balance."

15. In Shiji vs. Radhika, (2011) 10
SCC 705, the Apex Court has held as
under:

"19. That being so, continuance
of the prosecution where the complainant is
not ready to support the allegations.....will
be a futile exercise that will serve no
purpose."

18.Having said so, we must
hasten to add that the plenitude of the
power under Section 48 Cr.P.C. by itself,
makes it obligatory for the High Court to
exercise the same with utmost care and
caution. The width and the nature of the
power itself demands that its exercise is
sparing and only in cases where the High
Court is, for reasons to be recorded, of the
clear view that continuance of the
prosecution would be nothing but an
abuse of the process of law. It is neither
necessary nor proper for us to enumerate
the situations in which the exercise of
power under Section 482 may be justified.
All that we need to say is that the exercise
of power must be for securing the ends of
justice and only in cases where refusal to
exercise that power may result in the
abuse of the process of law. The High
court may be justified in declining
interference if it is called upon to
appreciate evidence for it cannot assume
the role of an appellate court while
dealing with a petition under Section 482
of the Criminal Procedure Code. Subject
to the above, the High Court will have to
consider the facts and circumstances of
each case to determine whether it is a fit
case in which the inherent powers may be
invoked."

16.
Thus
from
the
aforesaid
judgments for the purposes of quashing of
the
proceedings
involving
the
noncompoundable offences on the basis of
compromise, the following are the basic
requirements :

(a) That the dispute is of a private
nature. It may be a commercial dispute,
financial dispute, matrimonial dispute or a
family dispute.

(b) The dispute does not affect
the society at large meaning thereby the
allegations as made in the case do not
affect the society at large. .

17. Only on those circumstances,
the proceedings can be quashed on the
basis of compromise arrived at between the
parties. If the allegations may affect the
society at large, the proceedings involving
non-compoundable offences cannot be
fittingly
quashed
on
the
basis
of
compromise, even though the victim or
victim's family and the offender have
settled the dispute, which is not the intent
of law nor it can be.

18. From perusal of the allegations
as made in the instant FIR, it is apparent
that those allegations do not relate to a
8 All. Sattar Ahmad & Ors. Vs. State of U.P. & Anr.
139
private dispute between the parties
rather the allegations which affect the
society at large. While moving the
application seeking withdrawal of the
proceedings and alleging therein that no
such incident has taken place, this gives a
reasonable apprehension to the Court that
the witnesses have either been win over or
have been put under some kind of fear
which compelled them to move such
application in the instant case.

18. In view thereof, though the
parties have entered into the settlement, in
the considered opinion of this Court on the
basis of such settlement as is being alleged,
the proceedings cannot be quashed, which
are affecting the society at large and do not
relate to a private dispute between the
parties. Thus the prayer for quashing of the
proceedings on the basis of the said
compromise is hereby rejected. Since the
proceedings are pending before the trial
court since long and due to the interim
orders granted by this Court in favour of
the applicants, therefore, the trial court is
directed to proceed in the matter as
expeditiously as possible.

19. The instant application is,
accordingly, dismissed. Interim order,
granted to the applicants herein, is hereby
vacated.
---------
(2025) 8 ILRA 139
ORIGINAL JURISDICTION
CRIMINAL SIDE
DATED: ALLAHABAD 12.08.2025

BEFORE

THE HON'BLE VINOD DIWAKAR, J.

Application U/S 482 No. 35994 of 2024

Sattar Ahmad & Ors. ...Applicants
Versus
State of U.P. & Anr. ...Opposite Parties

Counsel for the Applicants:
Vinod Singh

Counsel for the Opposite Parties:
G.A.

Issue for consideration
Whether the police is empowered to register an
FIR on the basis of a complaint submitted by
the "aggrieved person", carry out investigation,
and thereafter submit a charge-sheet under
Section 31 of the Act, 2005.

Headnotes
Protection of Women from Domestic
Violence Act, 2005-sec. 31; Code of
Criminal procedure-sec. 2(d)- Section 2(d)
of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973
explicitly stipulates that a "complaint" does not
include a police report- consequently, a police
report submitted after investigation under the
Domestic Violence Act, 2005 cannot be treated
as a 'complaint' for the purpose of taking
cognizance under the Act, 2005-if the police
report itself lacks legal foundation- it cannot
form the basis for taking cognizance and
treating it as a complaint amounts to a legal
error- Application allowed.
Held:
Therefore, in the absence of a prior protection
order duly passed by the Magistrate, the police
is not empowered per se to register an FIR
under Section 31 of the Act. The procedural
mandate of the Act requires that the process be
initiated through the civil mechanism envisaged
under Sections 12 to 23 of the Act, and only
upon breach of such an order does criminal
liability under Section 31 of the Act, 2005 arise.
(E-9)

Case Law Cited
1. V.D. Bhanot v. Savita Bhanot, (2012) 3 SCC
183
2. Inderjit Singh Grewal v. State of Punjab,
(2011) 12 SCC 588
List of Acts
1. Protection of Women from Domestic Violence
Act, 2005
2. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973