# Anoop Rana @ Sattan v. State of U.P. & Ors

- **Citation:** (2020) 7 ILRA 293
- **Court:** High Court of Judicature at Allahabad
- **Decided:** 2020
- **Case number:** Writ C No. 17554 of 2006
- **Bench:** Ravi Nath Tilhari
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/allahabad-high-court/anoop-rana-sattan-v-state-of-u-p-ors-45880
- **Pages:** 7

## Headnote

294 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
A. Civil Law - Arms Act, 1959-Section
17(3) - The Constitution of India,1950Article 226 - challenge to-cancellation of
licence- The Petitioner misused his fire arm and
opened fire in the premises in which some
persons were seriously injured, resulting into
breach of peace, law and order -licensing
authority revoked licence as it deems it
necessary for the security of public peace or
public safety-the authority considered the police
report and reply of the show cause notice-the
Authority found that the petitioner has long
criminal history and he misused the fire arm-this
finding has been affirmed by the appellate
authority-present proceedings are independent
of the earlier proceedings-subject matter of
both the notice is different and the earlier order
does not come in the way of the authorities in
giving further notice and passing order u/s
17(3) of the Arms Act, 1959.(Para 4 to 24)

The writ petition is dismissed. (E-6)

List of Cases Cited:-

## Text

7 All. Anoop Rana @ Sattan Vs. State of U.P. & Ors.
293
refunded. The first proviso which has been
inserted by notification dated 10.07.2008
shows that if lease deed was executed in
reference to Industrial and Service Sector
Investment Policy, 2004 and District
Magistrate or GM, DIC have not signed the
instrument as witness, subsequently on an
application given by party such a certificate
can be issued by District Magistrate or GM,
DIC which will have the same effect as if
the document was signed and witnessed by
District Magistrate or GM, DIC but this
validation by way of second proviso will
not result in refund of any amount of stamp
duty. The power to issue notification under
Section 9 with retrospective effect has been
validly conferred and it could not be said
that notification second proviso is ultra
vires. In both the provisos which has been
inserted are integrally connected and a
lapse which earlier has occurred in lease
deeds in order to grant other benefits under
industrial policy etc., a method has been
provided to do away such flaw but with a
condition that amount already paid shall
not be refunded. Second proviso is
integrally connected with first proviso
inasmuch as first proviso applies to the case
where its compliance was not earlier done,
hence duty exemption could not have been
claimed.
In
order
to
protect
the
entrepreneur from other benefits he has
been allowed to get such mistake rectified
but with condition that no refund of amount
already paid shall be made. Therefore, both
provisos have to stay either together or not
and it cannot be said that first proviso
should stay but second proviso must go.
When a benefit under such document is
claimed, one has to claim as it is in its
entirety and not partially.

36. Learned counsel for petitioners
contended that denial of refund is illegal
but could not dispute that in absence of first
proviso, petitioners were not entitled to
seek any exemption of stamp duty under
Notification dated 19.01.2005. Moreover,
exemption has been granted by Notification
dated 19.01.2005 which is effective from
the date of notification published in official
gazette while amendment in Government
Notification dated 31.08.1998 has been
made by Government Notification dated
10.07.2008 w.e.f. 10.01.2005, meaning
thereby when exemption Notification dated
19.01.2005 came into force, second proviso
denying refund was already existing on the
statute book since 10.01.2005. Hence, it
cannot be said that something has been
done only to deny benefit to petitioners.
Therefore, the contention that refund has
been denied to petitioners only by singling
out them and it is discriminatory, is not
acceptable.

37. No other point has been argued.

38. The writ petition lacks merit.
Dismissed accordingly.
----------
(2020)07ILR A293
ORIGINAL JURISDICTION
CIVIL SIDE
DATED: ALLAHABAD 05.06.2020

BEFORE

THE HON'BLE RAVI NATH TILHARI, J.

Writ C No. 17554 of 2006

Anoop Rana @ Sattan ...Petitioner
Versus
State of U.P. & Ors. ...Respondents

Counsel for the Petitioner:
Sri
Akhlilesh
Srivastava,
Sri
Saksham
Srivastava, Sri Imran Ullah

Counsel for the Respondents:
C.S.C.
294 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
A. Civil Law - Arms Act, 1959-Section
17(3) - The Constitution of India,1950Article 226 - challenge to-cancellation of
licence- The Petitioner misused his fire arm and
opened fire in the premises in which some
persons were seriously injured, resulting into
breach of peace, law and order -licensing
authority revoked licence as it deems it
necessary for the security of public peace or
public safety-the authority considered the police
report and reply of the show cause notice-the
Authority found that the petitioner has long
criminal history and he misused the fire arm-this
finding has been affirmed by the appellate
authority-present proceedings are independent
of the earlier proceedings-subject matter of
both the notice is different and the earlier order
does not come in the way of the authorities in
giving further notice and passing order u/s
17(3) of the Arms Act, 1959.(Para 4 to 24)

The writ petition is dismissed. (E-6)

List of Cases Cited:-

1. Mahendra Singh Dhantwal Vs Hindustan
Motors Ltd. (1976) 4 SCC 606

2. Ashok Kumar Vs Sita Ram (2001) 4 SCC 478

(Delivered by Hon'ble Ravi Nath Tilhari, J.)

1. Heard Shri Saksham Srivastava,
Advocate holding brief of Shri Akhilesh
Srivastava,
learned
counsel
for
the
petitioner and Shri Ajay Kumar Tiwari,
learned counsel for the respondents.

2. The petitioner has challenged the
order dated 02.09.2004 suspending the
petitioner's fire arm license, the order
dated 15.07.2005 cancelling his fire arm
license and the appellate order dated
20.02.2006 dismissing the petitioner's
appeal.

3. The facts of the case are that the
petitioner was granted fire arm License
No. 198 for DBBL Gun No. 73393 and
License No. 36 for Pistol No. 59539
which were renewed from time to time.

4. In view of the police report dated
04.08.2004 of Police Station-Banne Devi
the arm license of the petitioner were
suspended and a show cause notice dated
02.09.2004 was issued to the petitioner
for cancellation of the arm licenses on the
ground that on 14.07.2004, the petitioner
and others opened fire from their fire
arms, in the premises of Tehsil Kaul, in
which Shahabudeen and Dinesh Kumar
Sharma were seriously injured by bullet
in Case Crime Nos. 289 of 2004 and 290
of 2004 under Sections 147, 148, 149 and
307 I.P.C. Police Station-Banne Devi,
District-Aligarh were registered against
the petitioner. The petitioner misused his
fire arms resulting into breach of peace,
law and order. Besides, previously, many
criminal cases were also registered
against the petitioner.

5. The petitioner filed reply to the
effect that he was not named in the FIR
of the incident dated 14.07.2004 lodged
against unknown persons and in the two
case crime nos. 289 of 2004 and 290 of
2004
the
petitioner
was
falsely
implicated.
The
petitioner
had
not
misused the fire arms. The petitioner also
submitted that previously a showcause
notice dated 03.08.2003 for cancellation
of the petitioner's fire arm licenses was
issued but the same was withdrawn by
order dated 28.10.2003 after considering
the petitioner's reply. As such, the
petitioner submitted that the notice dated
02.09.2004 deserved to be withdrawn.

6. The Licensing Authority/District
Magistrate Aligarh after considering the
petitioner's reply and the police report but
not being satisfied with the reply passed the
7 All. Anoop Rana @ Sattan Vs. State of U.P. & Ors.
295
order of cancellation on 15.07.2005. The
petitioner filed appeal no. 2 under Section
18 of the Indian Arms Act (Anoop Rana @
Sattan versus State of U.P.) which was
dismissed by the Commissioner Agra
Division, Agra by order dated 20.02.2006.

7. Learned counsel for the petitioner
has argued that in the FIR the petitioner
was not named and in Case Crime No. 289
of 2004 and 290 of 2004, the petitioner was
falsely implicated. He has also submitted
that as the previous show cause notice
dated 03.08.2003 was withdrawn by order
dated 28.10.2003, the present proceedings
for cancellation of the petitioner's fire arm
licenses could not be initiated and his
license could not be cancelled. by the order
under challenge.

8. Learned Standing Counsel has
submitted that the petitioner has long
criminal history. There were several cases
registered against him. He was creating
nuisance in the society showing power and
barrels. The order of cancellation had
rightly been passed by the licensing
authority in the interest of public security
and public safety. The petitioner had
misused the fire arm in the incident dated
14.07.2004. Even if the petitioner's name
was not in the FIR, his name came to light
during investigation and consequently the
case crime nos. 289 of 2004 and 290 of
2004 were registered against the petitioner.

9. Learned Standing Counsel has next
submitted that the present proceedings were
initiated in view of the petitioner's
involvement and misuse of fire arm in the
incident on 14.07.2004 and with respect to
the same two criminal cases were pending
against the petitioner. This has nothing to
do with the previous show cause notice
dated 03.08.2003 and the order dated
28.10.2003. The same would not come in
the way of initiation of the present
proceedings and in passing of the order of
cancellation under challenge.

10. I have considered the submissions
advanced by learned counsel for the parties
and have perused the material on record.

11. It is necessary to reproduce the
provisions of Section 17 of the Arms Act,
1959 as following.

"17. Variation, suspension and
revocation of licences.―(1) The licensing
authority may vary the conditions subject
to which a licence has been granted except
such of them as have been prescribed and
may for that purpose require the licenceholder by notice in writing to deliver-up the
licence to it within such time as may
specified in the notice.

(2) The licensing authority may,
on the application of the holder of a
licence, also vary the conditions of the
licence except such of them as have been
prescribed.

(3) The licensing authority may
by order in writing suspend a licence for
such period as it thinks fit or revoke a
licence,―

(a) if the licensing authority is
satisfied that the holder of the licence is
prohibited by this Act or by any other law
for the time being in force, from acquiring,
having in his possession or carrying any
arms or ammunition, or is of unsound
mind, or is for any reason unfit for a
licence under this Act; or

(b) if the licensing authority
deems it necessary for the security of the
296 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
public peace or for public safety to suspend
or revoke the licence; or

(c) if the licence was obtained by
the suppression of material information or
on the basis of wrong information provided
by the holder of the licence or any other
person on his behalf at the time of applying
for it; or

(d) if any of the conditions of the
licence has been contravened; or

(e) if the holder of the licence has
failed to comply with a notice under subsection (1) requiring him to deliver-up the
licence.

(4) The licensing authority may
also revoke a licence on the application of
the holder thereof.

5) Where the licensing authority
makes an order varying a licence under
sub-section (1) or an order suspending or
revoking a licence under sub-section (3), it
shall record in writing the reasons therefor
and furnish to the holder of the licence on
demand a brief statement of the same
unless in any case the licensing authority is
of the opinion that it will not be in the
public interest to furnish such statement.

(6) The authority to whom the
licensing authority is subordinate may by
order in writing suspend or revoke a
licence on any ground on which it may be
suspended or revoked by the licensing
authority; and the foregoing provisions of
this section shall, as far as may be, apply in
relation to the suspension or revocation of
a licence by such authority.

(7) A court convicting the holder
of a licence of any offence under this Act or
the rules made thereunder may also
suspend or revoke the licence:

Provided that if the conviction is
set aside on appeal or otherwise, the
suspension or revocation shall become
void.

(8) An order of suspension or
revocation under sub-section (7) may also
be made by an appellate court or by the
High Court when exercising its powers of
revision.

(9) The Central Government may,
by order in the Official Gazette, suspend or
revoke or direct any licensing authority to
suspend or revoke all or any licences
granted under this Act throughout India or
any part thereof.

(10)
On
the
suspension
or
revocation of a licence under this section
the holder thereof shall without delay
surrender the licence to the authority by
whom it has been suspended or revoked or
to such other authority as may be specified
in this behalf in the order of suspension or
revocation."

12. A bare reading of Section 17(3)
of the Arms Act, 1959 makes it clear that
licensing authority may by order in
writing suspend a license for such period
as he thinks fit and revoke the license (b)
if the Licensing Authority deems it
necessary for the security of public peace
or for public safety suspend or revoke a
license.

13. It is settled in law that the
licensing authority has to satisfy itself
that it is necessary for the security of the
public peace or for public safety to
revoke or cancel the license.
7 All. Anoop Rana @ Sattan Vs. State of U.P. & Ors.
297

14. The satisfaction of the licensing
authority must be based on the material on
record. The order of cancellation or
revocation must be passed after affording
opportunity of hearing to the licensee in
consonance with the principle of natural
justice.

15. In the present case, the petitioner's
license has been cancelled by the licensing
authority on its satisfaction that it was
necessary for the security of the public
peace and public safety that the fire arm
license should not continue with the
petitioner.

16. In this respect the licensing
authority has considered the police report
and the reply of the petitioner to the show
cause notice and on such consideration the
licensing authority found that the petitioner
has long criminal history and he misused
the fire arm in the incident dated
14.07.2004. Thus, the licensing authority
has recorded its satisfaction on the pre
requisite under Section 17(3) of the Arms
Act for cancellation of the fire arm licenses
which is based on material on record. This
finding has been affirmed by the appellate
authority. The finding thus, is a concurrent
finding of fact, the petitioner's counsel has
not been able to demonstrate as to how the
finding suffers from any illegality or
perversity.

17. In the case of Mahendra Singh
Dhantwal versus Hindustan Motors Ltd.
1976 4 SCC 606 the Hon'ble Supreme
Court in paragraph no. 32 has held as
under:-

"It is true that on the face of the
order of termination the company invoked
clause (1) of the agreement and even so it
was open to the tribunal to pierce the veil
of the order and have a close look at all the
circumstances and come to a decision
whether the order was passed on account
of certain misconduct. This is a finding of
fact which could not be interfered with
under Article 226 of the Constitution unless
the conclusion is perverse, that is to say,
based on no evidence whatsoever. We are,
however, unable to say so having regard to
the facts and circumstances described by
the tribunal in its order."

18. In the case of Ashok Kumar
versus Sita Ram 2001 4 SCC 478, the
Hon'ble Supreme Court has held as under
in paragraph nos. 10 and 17 which are
being reproduced as under.

"10. The position is too well
settled to admit of any controversy that the
finding of fact recorded by the final Court
of fact should not ordinarily be interfered
with by the High Court in exercise of writ
jurisdiction, unless the Court is satisfied
that the finding is vitiated by manifest error
of law or is patently perverse. The High
Court should not interfere with a finding of
fact simply because it feels persuaded to
take a different view on the material on
record.

17. The question that remains to
be considered is whether the High Court in
exercise of writ jurisdiction was justified in
setting aside the order of the Appellate
Authority. The order passed by the
Appellate Authority did not suffer from any
serious illegality, nor can it be said to have
taken a view of the matter which no
reasonable person was likely to take. In
that view of the matter there was no
justification for the High Court to interfere
with the order in exercise of its writ
jurisdiction . In a matter like the present
case where orders passed by the Statutory
298 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
Authority vested with power to act quasijudicially is challenged before the High
Court, the role of the Court is supervisory
and corrective. In exercise of such
jurisdiction the High Court is not expected
to interfere with the final order passed by
the Statutory Authority unless the order
suffers from manifest error and if it is
allowed to stand it would amount to
perpetuation of grave injustice. The Court
should bear in mind that it is not acting as
yet another Appellate Court in the matter.
We are constrained to observe that in the
present case the High Court has failed to
keep the salutary principles in mind while
deciding the case."

19. Thus, in exercise of writ
jurisdiction a finding of fact recorded by
the final court of fact or the statutory
authority should not ordinarily be interfered
with by the High Court unless the court is
satisfied that the finding is vitiated by
manifest error of law or is patently
perverse. The role of the Court is
supervisory and corrective. The High Court
is not expected to interfere with the final
order passed by the statutory authority
unless the order suffers from manifest error
of law and if it is allowed to stand it would
amount to perpetuation of grave injustice. It
should also not interfere with the finding of
fact simply because on the material on
record a different view is also possible.
This Court would not act as yet another
court of appeal in the matter.

20. The finding recorded by the
statutory authority in the present case being
based on material on record and also
having been recorded after affording
opportunity of hearing to the petitioner in
consonance with the principle of natural
justice, this Court does not find any reason
to interfere with the concurrent finding of
fact that the continued existence of fire arm
license with the petitioner would endanger
security of public peace and public safety.
Once there is material to support the
finding, this Court will also not enter into
the aspect of sufficiency of the material for
the satisfaction of the licensing authority.

21. The petitioner might not have
been named in the FIR and the FIR might
have been against unknown persons but it
is not denied by the petitioner that the case
crime nos. 289 of 2004 and 290 of 2004
under Sections 147, 148, 149 and 307
I.P.C. were registered against the petitioner.
The petitioner's name must have appeared
and come to light during investigation. For
that reason the criminal cases were
registered against him. For the purposes of
the satisfaction of the licensing authority in
terms of Section 17(3) of the Arms Act,
1959 it hardly matters if the licensee is
named in the FIR or his name comes to
knowledge
during
investigation,
particularly, when after investigation, the
criminal cases have been registered finding
the involvement of the licensee.

22. The next submission of the
petitioner's counsel is that in view of the
previous order dated 28.10.2003, by which
the earlier show cause notice dated
03.08.2003 was withdrawn and as such the
present proceedings for cancellation of the
fire arm license could not be initiated by
issue of notice dated 29.04.2004 and the
impugned order could not be passed, does
not appeal to the court and deserves to be
rejected.

23. A perusal of the order dated
28.10.2003 shows that the subject matter of
the earlier notice dated 03.08.2003 was
entirely different than the subject matter of
present notice dated 02.09.2004. The
7 All. Motilal Nehru Farmers Training Institute (CORDET) Vs. The Presiding Officer & Ors.
299
proceedings by notice dated 02.09.2004
were initiated against the petitioner in view
of many criminal cases against him as
mentioned in the said notice, which was
withdrawn by order dated 28.10.2003. In so
far as the initiation for proceedings of
cancellation by notice dated 02.09.2004 is
concerned, the same were initiated on the
ground
that
in
the
incident
dated
14.07.2004, the petitioner misused his fire
arm and opened fire in the premises of
Tehsil Kaul in which Shahbudeen and
Dinesh Kumar Sharma were seriously
injured, resulting into breach of peace, law
and order and consequently case crime nos.
289 of 2004 and 290 of 2004 were
registered against the petitioner. These are
the criminal cases registered after the order
dated 28.10.2003 and can very well form
the basis of initiation of fresh proceedings
for cancellation of fire arm license, even if
the earlier notice dated 03.08.2003 was
withdrawn by order dated 28.10.2003.

24. Mere mention of the earlier criminal
cases in the present notice dated 02.09.2004
is not sufficient to quash the impugned order
dated 15.07.2005 in as much as the court
finds that the same was mentioned only to
show the petitioner's criminal history. These
cases are not the basis of the initiation of the
proceedings nor the impugned order has been
passed on the basis of those criminal cases.
The present proceedings, the court finds that,
are independent of the earlier proceedings.
The subject matter of both the notices is
different and as such the order dated
28.10.2003 does not come in the way of the
authorities in giving notice dated 02.09.2004
and passing the order dated 15.07.2005 under
Section 17(3) of the Arms Act, 1959.

25. Thus, considered, I do not find any
illegality in the order of cancellation dated
15.07.2005 passed by the licensing authority.

26. The appellate order has also been
rightly passed by the appellate authority,
affirming the order of the licensing authority.

27. The writ petition lacks merits and is
dismissed. No orders as to cost.
----------
(2020)07ILR A299
ORIGINAL JURISDICTION
CIVIL SIDE
DATED: ALLAHABAD 04.05.2020 &
12.05.2020

BEFORE

THE HON'BLE J.J. MUNIR, J.

Writ C No. 25221 of 1995
And
CIVIL MISC. CORRECTION NO. 1 of 2020

Motilal Nehru Farmers Training Institute
(CORDET) ...Petitioner
Versus
The Presiding Officer & Ors.
 ...Respondents

Counsel for the Petitioner:
Sri V.R. Agarwal, Sri Piyush Bhargava

Counsel for the Respondents:
C.S.C., Sri K.P. Agarwal, Seema Singh, Ms.
Sumati Rani Gupta

A. Labour Law - The Uttar Pradesh
Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 - Section 4K - Validity of Award (Impugned) directing
reinstatement with continuity in service and
payment of full back-wages -- Reference by
state government - Section 2-A - Conciliation -
Section 6-N,6-P,6-Q - retrenchment - Labour
Court is a Court of referred jurisdiction - derives
its jurisdiction to adjudicate a dispute from the
terms of the order of reference, under Section
4-K of the Act - Labour Court cannot venture
into questions that are not part of the reference
or the necessary incidents of it - Issues or
questions
that
are
concomitant
of
the
substantial dispute referred, can well be gone
into - matters that would give rise to a different