# Anuj Kudesia v. L.I.C. & Ors

- **Citation:** (2023) 12 ILRA 650
- **Court:** High Court of Judicature at Allahabad
- **Decided:** 2023-12-14
- **Case number:** Writ-C No. 9686 of 2007
- **Bench:** Vivek Chaudhary, Manish Kumar
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/allahabad-high-court/anuj-kudesia-v-l-i-c-ors-49496
- **Pages:** 9

## Headnote

P.K. Khare, Mahendra Pratap Singh, Mohd.
Altaf Mansoor

Insurance claim-The petitioner -advocate-
suffered from accident-result in amputation of
his right arm - claims for the insured amount
and disability benefits have been rejectedcannot
perform
his
profession
-can
be
concluded that his earning capacity has taken a
sufficient hit after his accident-petitioner is held
entitled to disability benefits.

W.P. allowed. (E-9)

List of Cases cited:

## Text

650 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
was wholly ineligible as he was deriving
payment of salary from an educational
institution where he was posted as Lecturer
and the second objection pertaining to the
NOC which was obtained by the original
allottee
on
the
basis
of
some
fraud/concealment of fact. The same was
also negated on the ground that the IOCL
has already accorded NOC in favour of the
original
allottee,
therefore,
the
only
recourse was available to question the NOC
under the suit proceedings. The Division
Bench has considered both the aspects and
grounds taken by the complainant and nonsuited the same on the ground that the
complainant had to press the relief in the
suit proceeding, moreover, the said order
was passed in presence of the counsel of
the IOCL, therefore, it was not open to the
respondent- IOCL to proceed to cancel the
dealership of the petitioner.

43. The conduct of the complainant
was dubious. He had made a complaint,
settled the dispute with the brother, taken
Rs. 17/- lakhs and withdrew the complaint.
Thereafter, it seems that he has turned
greedy and has again started making
complaints in order to extract some more
money.

44. Since there is no element of fraud
by the petitioner and also IOCL is bound
by doctrine of acquiescence, hence, the
impugned order dated 12.03.2022 passed
by respondent no. 2 terminating the
dealership of the petitioner is liable to be
set aside and accordingly, the termination
of dealership is set aside.

45. The writ petition is allowed. No
order as to costs.
----------
(2023) 12 ILRA 650
ORIGINAL JURISDICTION
CIVIL SIDE
DATED: LUCKNOW 14.12.2023

BEFORE

THE HON'BLE VIVEK CHAUDHARY, J.
THE HON'BLE MANISH KUMAR, J.

Writ-C No. 9686 of 2007

Anuj Kudesia ...Petitioner
Versus
L.I.C. & Ors. ...Respondents

Counsel for the Petitioner:
Anil
Kumar
Tiwari,
Apoorva
Tewari,
Prashant Puri

Counsel for the Respondents:
P.K. Khare, Mahendra Pratap Singh, Mohd.
Altaf Mansoor

Insurance claim-The petitioner -advocate-
suffered from accident-result in amputation of
his right arm - claims for the insured amount
and disability benefits have been rejectedcannot
perform
his
profession
-can
be
concluded that his earning capacity has taken a
sufficient hit after his accident-petitioner is held
entitled to disability benefits.

W.P. allowed. (E-9)

List of Cases cited:

1. Abhimanyu Pratap Singh Vs Namita Sekhon &
anr.; (2022) 8 SCC 489

2. Udai Shankar Singh Vs Branch Manager, LIC ;
1998 (2) AWC 1419

3. Prabir Kumar Nath Vs LIC & ors.; AIR 2003
CAl 318

4. LDA Vs M.K. Gupta, (1994) 1 SCC 243

5. Sangrur Sales Corp. Vs United India
Insurance Co. Ltd., (2020) 16 SCC 292

6. Peacock Plywood (P) Ltd. Vs Oriental
Insurance Co. Ltd., (2006) 12 SCC 673
12 All. Anuj Kudesia Vs. L.I.C. & Ors.
651
7. Haris Marine Products Vs Export Credit
Guarantee Corp. (ECGC) Limited: 2022 SCC
OnLine SC 509

8.
General
Assurance
Society
Ltd.
Vs
Chandumull Jain; AIR 1966 SC 1644

9. Non-Marine Underwriters, Lloyds of London
Vs Scalera reported as [2000] 1 SCR 551

10. Woods Vs Capita Insurance; [2017] UKSC 24

(Delivered by Hon'ble Vivek Chaudhary, J.
&
Hon'ble Manish Kumar, J.)

1. Heard Sri Apoorva Tewari, learned
counsel for the petitioner, Sri Mahendra
Pratap
Singh,
learned
counsel
for
respondents nos. 1 to 4 and Sri Tarun
Chaudhary, Advocate, holding brief of Sri
Mohd. Altaf Mansoor, learned counsel for
respondents nos. 5 and 6.

2. Present petition has been filed
challenging the order dated 27.07.2006
passed by respondent No. 4 and order dated
17.08.2006 passed by respondent No. 3,
whereby petitioner's claims for the insured
amount and disability benefits have been
rejected.

3. Brief facts of the case are that the
petitioner, a practising advocate, purchased
four insurance policies with same terms
and conditions on various dates for an
assured sum totalling Rs. 4,10,000 from
opposite party No. 1, Life Insurance
Corporation
of
India
(for
brevity
hereinafter referred to as 'Corporation').
Clause 10.2 (a) of the terms of which
stipulates waiver of future premiums and
payment
of
monthly
installments
as
disability benefits to the assured, in
addition to the assured sum, in case, the
insured person is involved in an accident
and suffers from a permanent disability as
defined under clause 10.4 of the terms and
conditions of the policy. On 14.06.2006,
petitioner unfortunately met with
an
accident while driving his car resulting in
amputation of his right arm from above his
elbow. On 07.07.2006, Chief Medical
Officer,
Lucknow
certified
that
the
petitioner is suffering from 80% disability
as
defined
under
the
Persons
with
Disabilities
(Equal
Opportunities,
Protection of Rights and Full Participation)
Act, 1995. Thereafter petitioner moved
claim applications under clause 10.2(a) for
disability benefits before the respective
Branch Managers of the Corporation. By
the impugned orders, petitioner's claim for
disability benefits have been rejected.
Petitioner is challenging the said orders in
the present writ petition.

4. Sri Apoorva Tewari, learned
counsel for the petitioner challenges the
impugned orders on the ground that the
amputation of the right hand of the
petitioner from above the elbow is a
permanent disability affecting earnings of
the petitioner and therefore the petitioner is
entitled to permanent disability claims as
per clause 10.2 and defined under clause
10.4 of the terms of the insurance policies.
The disabilities enumerated in second part
of clause 10.4 as well as in the impugned
orders are only examples and not an
exhaustive list of disabilities for entitlement
to disability benefits. He further submits
that his case is covered under the first part
of clause 10.4 of the policy. He submits
Clause 10.4 entitles disability benefits to
such policyholders who as a result of an
accident suffer from a total and permanent
disability and are unable to sufficiently
perform their occupation or earn wages,
compensation and profit. Petitioner being a
practising advocate suffered a financially
disadvantageous
position
due
to
his
652 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
physical disability and has to make an
extraordinary
effort
to
attend
Court
proceedings and is unable to sufficiently
perform
his
profession
as
earlier,
hampering his professional commitment to
his clients thereby affecting his earnings.
Without his right hand, he is unable to hold
and carry his files, handle books and briefs
effectively and even requires constant help
on dias of Court. He also needs to keep a
typist to prepare his petitions and other
applications. Thus, in totality he is unable
to conduct himself as sufficiently as his
able-bodied peers on the dias while arguing
a case. In support of his submission learned
counsel relies upon the judgment of
Supreme Court in the case of Abhimanyu
Pratap Singh vs. Namita Sekhon and
Another; (2022) 8 SCC 489. Counsel for
the petitioner further submits that the
clause relating to disability benefits is
beneficial and therefore should be given a
liberal and purposive interpretation. In
support of his submission counsel for the
petitioner places reliance upon a Division
Bench Judgment of this Court in the case of
Udai Shankar Singh vs. Branch Manager,
LIC ; 1998 (2) AWC 1419 and a reported
judgment of the Calcutta High Court in the
case of Prabir Kumar Nath vs. LIC and
others; AIR 2003 CAl 318.

5. Sri Mahendra Pratap Singh, learned
counsel for respondents nos. 1 to 4 supports
the impugned orders and submits that
disability claims of the petitioner are
rightfully rejected as clause 10.4 of the
terms and conditions of the insurance
policies
requires
permanent
disability
resulting in irrecoverable loss of entire
sight of both eyes or amputation of both
hands at or above the wrists, or amputation
of both feet at or above ankles, or
amputation of one hand at or above the
wrist and one foot at or above the ankle for
entitlement to disability benefits. Since
only the right hand of the petitioner is
amputated after his unfortunate accident
therefore he is not entitled to any disability
benefits. Sri Tarun Chaudhary, Advocate,
holding brief of Sri Mohd. Altaf Mansoor,
learned counsel for respondents nos. 5 and
6 also supports the impugned orders and
submits that there is no illegality in the
same.

6. The entire controversy with regard
to the entitlement of the petitioner for
disability
benefits
rests
upon
the
interpretation of clause 10.2(a) read with
clause 10.4 of the terms and conditions of
the insurance policies. For reference clause
10.2(a) and clause 10.4 are reproduced
below:

"10.2 Accident Benefit: If at any
time when the policy is in force for the full
Sum Assured the life Assured, before the
expiry of the period for which the premium
is payable or before the Policy anniversary
on which the age nearer the birthday of the
Life Assured is 70, whichever is earlier, is
involved in an accident resulting in either
permanent disability as hereinafter defined
or death and the same is proved to the
satisfaction
of
the
Corporation,
the
Corporation agree in the case of:

(a) Disability to the Life Assured:
(i) To pay in monthly instalment spread over
10 years an additional sum equal to the Sum
Assured under this Policy. If the Policy
becomes a claim before the expiry of the said
period of 10 years, the disability benefit
instalments which have not fallen due will be
paid along with the claim, (ii) to waive the
payment of future premiums.

The maximum aggregate limit of
assurance under all the policies issued
12 All. Anuj Kudesia Vs. L.I.C. & Ors.
653
under Jeevan Sanchay Plan on the same
life to which benefits (i) and (ii) above
apply shall not in any event exceeds Rs.
5,00,000 if there be more policies than one
and if the total assurance under Jeevan
Sanchay Plan exceeds Rs. 5,00,000 the
benefits shall apply to the first Rs. 5,00,000
sum assured in order of the date of the
Policies issued.

The waiver of premiums shall
extinguish all options under this Policy
except as to such assurance, if any as
exceeds the maximum aggregate limit of Rs
5,00,000 and which may have been kept in
force by continued payment of premiums."

"10.4
The
disability
above
referred to must be a disability which is
the result of an accident and must be total
and permanent and such that there is
neither then nor at any time there after any
work, occupation or profession that the
Life Assured can ever sufficiently do or
follow to earn or obtain any wages,
compensation or profit. Accidental injuries
which independently of all other causes
and within 180 days from the happening of
such accident, result in the irrecoverable
loss of the entire sight of both eyes or in the
amputation of both hands at or above the
wrists, or in the amputation of both feet at
or above ankles, or in the amputation of
one hand at or above the wrist and one foot
at or above the ankle shall also be deemed
to constitute such disability." (emphasis
supplied)

7. The sole ground for rejecting the
disability claims of the petitioner is the
interpretation given by respondents to
clause 10.4, which as per respondents
requires total disability to be necessarily
resulting in the irrecoverable loss of entire
sight of both eyes or amputation of both
hands at or above the wrists, or amputation
of both feet at or above ankles, or
amputation of one hand at or above the
wrist and one foot at or above the ankle,
while, only one limb of the petitioner is
amputated. A perusal of clause 10.4 of the
policy shows that it has two parts. The first
part explains total and permanent disability
to mean such disabilities due to which the
assured individual is unable to sufficiently
perform his work, occupation, or profession
and earn any wages, compensation, or
profit as a result of an accident. Whereas
the second part of clause 10.4 beginning
with the words "Accidental injuries which
independently
of
all
other
causes"
enumerates a number of disabilities and
ends with words "shall also be deemed to
constitute such disability".

8. First part of clause 10.4 defines the
total and permanent disability in terms of
adverse impact on the earning of the
assured due to a disability resulting from an
accident.
However,
use
of
words
"independently of all other causes" and
"shall also be deemed to constitute" in
second part of the said clause shows that
the disabilities enumerated in the second
part of clause 10.4 runs independently of
all other causes contained in the terms and
conditions of the policy and rather expands
the scope of types of disabilities covered
under policy including the first part.
Therefore, the first part of Clause 10.4 is
entirely separate from second part. The first
part only talks about such total and
permanent disabilities because of which
"neither then nor any time thereafter any
work, occupation or profession that the life
assured can ever sufficiently do or follow to
earn or obtain any wages, compensation or
profit."
Thereafter,
second
part
also
includes
such
"accidental
injuries
independent of all other causes (including
654 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
above
first
part),
which
result
in
irrecoverable
loss.........shall
also
be
deemed to constitute such disabilities."
Therefore loss of both eyes, both hands,
etc. included in the second part are not
relevant for interpretation of the first part.
In the present case, petitioner who is a
practicing lawyer has his right hand
amputated from above elbow which has
seriously impacted his performance as a
lawyer. He is, not at all, at par with any
other lawyer as he is unable to handle his
briefs, books, computer and any other
necessary
accessories/instruments
for
performing his duties as a lawyer properly.
He finds huge challenge in addressing
Court while performing at the dias due to
his inability to handle his briefs, books,
gadgets, etc. properly. Now after coming
into force of e-court system, it has also
become difficult for him to handle laptop or
any other instruments at dias. The same has
put him to great disadvantage viz-a-viz any
other lawyer. The same also impacts any
client's confidence in engaging him as
lawyer, thus, his earning is definitely
impacted in the above circumstances.
Supreme Court has also held in the case of
Abhimanyu Pratap Singh (supra) that
physical
challenge
impacts
earning
capacity
of
an
advocate
since
the
profession is very demanding. Relevant
paragraphs of the said judgment reads:

"21. Looking to the nature of
injuries and the permanent disablement
which the claimant has suffered i.e. lower
limb is completely paralysed while his
upper limb is partially paralysed having
100% permanent disability resulting in
bodily movements being hampered. The
capacity of the claimant being an advocate
cannot be equated with other practising
advocate having no deformity, in the same
profession. The claimant is required to
make extraordinary efforts to attend the
proceedings in the court and to come up to
the expectations of the client."

9.

Learned
counsel
for
the
Corporation tried to argue that term used in
the clause is "any wages, compensation or
profit" and submits that since petitioner is
able
to
earn
some
of
his
wages/compensation therefore, he cannot
claim disability benefits. However, in the
opinion of this Court it would be too farfetched an argument to make that petitioner
should become a person earning only from
hand to mouth to get the benefit of
insurance policy. The term "any wages,
compensation or profit" means ability to
earn proper wages, compensation or profit
as an able bodied person would do. A
serious impact in the earnings would make
a person entitled to the disability benefits as
provided under insurance policies. The
New Lexicon Webster's Dictionary defines
"any" as an adjective meaning "one", "one
or more", "some". Supreme Court in the
case of LDA v. M.K. Gupta, (1994) 1 SCC
243 has pondered upon the meaning of
word 'any' and held that its meaning would
depend upon the context in which it has
been used. Relevant parts of paragraph 4 of
the aforesaid judgment reads as follows-

"The word 'any' dictionarily
means 'one or some or all'. In Black's Law
Dictionary it is explained thus, "word 'any'
has a diversity of meaning and may be
employed to indicate 'all' or 'every' as well
as 'some' or 'one' and its meaning in a
given statute depends upon the context and
the subject-matter of the statute"."

10. Supreme Court has long held in a
catena of judgments that construction of
clauses of an insurance policy depends
upon the reasons for entering thereinto and
12 All. Anuj Kudesia Vs. L.I.C. & Ors.
655
the risks which are being covered in the
policy. Suffice would be to refer to the
following judgments:

In the case of Sangrur Sales
Corpn. v. United India Insurance Co. Ltd.,
(2020) 16 SCC 292, The Supreme Court
emphasized that the construction which
covers the risk should be adopted while
interpreting an insurance policy, relevant
paragraph of the said judgment reads:

"8. It is well settled that in the
event that two constructions are possible or
in the event of an ambiguity, that
construction which is beneficial to the
insured should be accepted consistent with
the purpose for which the policy was taken,
namely, to cover the risk on the happening
of a certain event. (See in this context, the
decision of this Court in United India
Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Pushpalaya Printers
[United India Insurance Co. Ltd. v.
Pushpalaya Printers, (2004) 3 SCC 694]
.)"

In the case of Peacock Plywood
(P) Ltd. v. Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd.,
(2006) 12 SCC 673, Supreme Court held
that State-run insurance corporations are
expected to act fairly and reasonably and in
case of any ambiguity, the interpretation
which is in favour of the insured should be
adopted. Relevant paragraph of the said
judgment reads:

"57. If the ship was stranded at
Singapore and goods were offloaded from
it, the appellant must be held to have
discharged its burden. Findings of fact
were arrived at by the learned Single Judge
on the basis of the pleadings of the parties.
If a clause of marine insurance policy
covers a broad fact, in our opinion, it
would be inequitable to deny the insured to
raise a plea, particularly when the insurer
being a State within the meaning of Article
12 of the Constitution of India is expected
to act fairly and reasonably. The purport
and object for which goods are insured
must be given full effect. In a case of
ambiguity, the construction of an insurance
policy should be made in favour of the
insured and not the insurer."

A three Judges Bench of the
Supreme Court in the case of Haris Marine
Products v. Export Credit Guarantee
Corporation (ECGC) Limited: 2022 SCC
OnLine SC 509 has held that interpretation
which is in favour of the insured and covers
the risk assured under the policy should be
adopted. Relevant paragraph of the said
judgment reads:

"27. While the court ultimately
denied insurer's liability, it laid down the
manner in which ambiguities were to be
interpreted. Since then, a catena of
judgments has upheld this approach. In
United India Insurance Co. Ltd. v.
Pushpalaya Printers19, a Division Bench
of
this
Court
was
confronted
with
interpreting the term 'impact' in an
insurance policy for protection against
damage caused to the insured building.
Interpreting the term to include damage
caused by strong vibrations by heavy
vehicles without 'direct' impact, this Court
held:

"The only point that arises for
consideration
is
whether
the
word
"impact" contained in clause 5 of the
insurance policy covers the damage caused
to the building and machinery due to
driving of the bulldozer on the road close
to the building... (I)t is also settled position
in law that if there is any ambiguity or a
term
is
capable
of
two
possible
656 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
interpretations, one beneficial to the
insured should be accepted consistent with
the purpose for which the policy is taken,
namely, to cover the risk on the happening
of certain event... Where the words of a
document are ambiguous, they shall be
construed against the party who prepared
the document. This rule applies to contracts
of insurance and clause 5 of the insurance
policy even after reading the entire policy
in the present case should be construed
against the insurer". (emphasis supplied).

A Constitution Bench of the
Supreme Court in the case of General
Assurance Society Ltd. v. Chandumull
Jain; AIR 1966 SC 1644 has held that
terms of an insurance contract should be
read against the insurance company in case
there exists any ambiguity. Relevant
portion of paragraph 11 of the said
judgment reads:

"In other respects there is no
difference between a contract of insurance
and any other contract except that in a
contract
of
insurance
there
is
a
requirement of uberrima fides i.e. good
faith on the part of the assured and the
contract is likely to be construed contra
proferentem that is against the company in
case of ambiguity or doubt. "

Supreme Court of Canada has in
paragraphs 68 and 70 of its judgment in the
case of Non-Marine Underwriters, Lloyds
of London v. Scalera reported as [2000] 1
SCR 551 held that the primary reason for
seeking insurance coverage is to mitigate
probable financial risks and therefore an
insurance contract should be construed
broadly and in favour of insured. Paragraph
68 and 70 of the said judgment reads:

"68 It is important to keep in
mind the underlying economic rationale for
insurance. C. Brown and J. Menezes,
Insurance Law in Canada (2nd ed. 1991),
state this point well at pp. 125-26:

Insurance is a mechanism for
transferring fortuitous contingent risks.
Losses that are neither fortuitous nor
contingent
cannot
economically
be
transferred because the premium would
have to be greater than the value of the
subject matter in order to provide for
marketing and adjusting costs and a profit
for the insurer. It follows, therefore, that
even where the literal working of a policy
might appear to cover certain losses, it
does not, in fact, do so if (1) the loss is from
the inherent nature of the subject matter
being insured, or (2) it results from the
intentional actions of the insured.

...

70 Since insurance contracts are
essentially
adhesionary,
the
standard
practice is to construe ambiguities against
the insurer: Brissette Estate v. Westbury
Life Insurance Co., [1992] 3 S.C.R. 87, at
p. 92; Wigle v. Allstate Insurance Co. of
Canada (1984), 49 O.R. (2d) 101 (C.A.),
per Cory J.A. A corollary of this principle
is that "coverage provisions should be
construed broadly and exclusion clauses
narrowly": Reid Crowther & Partners Ltd.
v. Simcoe & Erie General Insurance Co.,
[1993] 1 S.C.R. 252, at p. 269; Indemnity
Insurance Co. of North America v. Excel
Cleaning Service, [1954] S.C.R. 169, at pp.
179-80, per Estey J. Therefore one must
always be alert to the unequal bargaining
power at work in insurance contracts, and
interpret such policies accordingly."
12 All. Anuj Kudesia Vs. L.I.C. & Ors.
657

Supreme Court of the United
Kingdom in the case of Woods v. Capita
Insurance; [2017] UKSC 24 has held that a
commercial contract should not be strictly
construed in a literal sense, contextual facts
also play a vital role in the interpretation of
a commercial contract. Relevant paragraph
10 and 13 of the same reads:

"10. The court's task is to
ascertain the objective meaning of the
language which the parties have chosen to
express their agreement. It has long been
accepted that this is not a literalist exercise
focused solely on a parsing of the wording
of the particular clause but that the court
must consider the contract as a whole and,
depending on the nature, formality and
quality of drafting of the contract, give
more or less weight to elements of the
wider context in reaching its view as to that
objective meaning. In Prenn v Simmonds
[1971] 1 WLR 1381 (1383H-1385D) and in
Reardon Smith Line Ltd v Yngvar HansenTangen [1976] 1 WLR 989 (997), Lord
Wilberforce
affirmed
the
potential
relevance to the task of interpreting the
parties' contract of the factual background
known to the parties at or before the date of
the contract, excluding evidence of the
prior negotiations. When in his celebrated
judgment
in
Investors
Compensation
Scheme Ltd v West Bromwich Building
Society : [1998] 1 WLR 896 Lord
Hoffmann (pp 912-913) reformulated the
principles of contractual interpretation,
some saw his second principle, which
allowed consideration of the whole relevant
factual background available to the parties
at the time of the contract, as signalling a
break with the past. But Lord Bingham in
an extra-judicial writing, A new thing
under the sun? The interpretation of
contracts and the ICS decision Edin LR Vol
12, 374-390, persuasively demonstrated
that the idea of the court putting itself in
the shoes of the contracting parties had a
long pedigree.

...

13. Textualism and contextualism
are not conflicting paradigms in a battle
for exclusive occupation of the field of
contractual interpretation. Rather, the
lawyer and the judge, when interpreting
any contract, can use them as tools to
ascertain the objective meaning of the
language which the parties have chosen to
express their agreement. The extent to
which each tool will assist the court in its
task
will
vary
according
to
the
circumstances of the particular agreement
or agreements. Some agreements may be
successfully interpreted principally by
textual analysis, for example because of
their sophistication and complexity and
because they have been negotiated and
prepared with the assistance of skilled
professionals. The correct interpretation of
other contracts may be achieved by a
greater emphasis on the factual matrix, for
example because of their informality,
brevity
or
the
absence
of
skilled
professional assistance. But negotiators of
complex formal contracts may often not
achieve a logical and coherent text because
of, for example, the conflicting aims of the
parties,
failures
of
communication,
differing drafting practices, or deadlines
which require the parties to compromise in
order to reach agreement. There may often
therefore be provisions in a detailed
professionally drawn contract which lack
clarity and the lawyer or judge in
interpreting
such
provisions
may
be
particularly helped by considering the
factual matrix and the purpose of similar
provisions in contracts of the same type.
The iterative process, of which Lord Mance
658 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
spoke in Sigma Finance Corpn (above),
assists the lawyer or judge to ascertain the
objective meaning of disputed provisions."
(emphasis supplied)

11. Petitioner took insurance policy
with the intention to secure himself
financially in case he suffers from a
physical disability and his earning takes a
hit. The insurance policy itself undertakes
to indemnify the petitioner in the form of
disability benefits in case he suffers from
total and permanent disability. Therefore
any interpretation of indemnifying clauses
has to be construed with regard to
Insurance Corporation's undertaking to
indemnify the petitioner on occurrence of
certain events. Therefore the words "any
wages, compensation or profit" should be read
in conjunction with the entire first part of
clause 10.4 and would mean some adverse
impact on earning capacity, not necessarily
quantifiable, but enough to put assured in a
financially disadvantageous position. The
petitioner having suffered from amputation of
his right arm can not perform his profession as
efficiently as he was performing before his
unfortunate accident. His performance is
seriously impacted in handling his files, books,
laptops, and other necessities required in the
performance of his profession as a lawyer, not
to mention the hesitancy of prospective
litigators in hiring him due to his perceived
disability. Comparing his current situation
with his earlier situation as a person with
disability it can be concluded that petitioner
can not ever sufficiently do or follow his
profession as an advocate, to earn his
compensation, as he was doing before the
accident. Therefore it can be concluded that
his earning capacity has taken a sufficient hit
after his accident.

12. In view thereof, the petitioner is
held entitled to disability benefits. This
petition is allowed. Impugned orders dated
27.07.2006 and 17.08.2006 are hereby
quashed.
Respondent
Insurance
Corporation is directed to pay disability
benefits to the petitioner alongwith an
interest of 8% p.a. from the date they are
due, within 30 days of this order.
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(2023) 12 ILRA 658
ORIGINAL JURISDICTION
CIVIL SIDE
DATED: LUCKNOW 19.12.2023

BEFORE

THE HON'BLE RAJNISH KUMAR, J.

Writ-C No. 10931 of 2023

Qamar Abbas ...Petitioner
Versus
Addl. Commissioner (Judicial) I, Lko. &
Ors. ...Respondents

Counsel for the Petitioner:
Rohit
Tripathi,
Nida
Navi,
Shishir
Srivastava, Syed Zulfiqar Husain Naqvi

Counsel for the Respondents:
C.S.C., Abhitendra Singh, Dilip Kumar
Pandey, Jaibind Singh Rathour, Nritika
Singh

Civil Law-- The Constitution of India,
1950-Article 226 - The Uttar Pradesh
Revenue Code- 2006-Sections 24, 207 &
210--- Whether an order passed under Section
24 can be challenged in first appeal filed under
Section 207 or not?---Held---The first appeal
under Section 207 can be filed against an order
passed by the Sub-Divisional Officer under
Section 24 is misconceived and not tenable and
the appeal against an order passed by the SubDivisional Officer under Section 24 can be filed
only under Section 24(4) of Code- 2006 before
the Commissioner and the order passed by the
Commissioner shall, subject to the provision of
Section 210, be final.

Petition dismissed. (E-15)