# Anuj Pandey v. State of U.P. & Anr

- **Citation:** (2024) 5 ILRA 609
- **Court:** High Court of Judicature at Allahabad
- **Decided:** 2024-05-10
- **Case number:** Application U/S 482. No. 4327 of 2024
- **Bench:** Shamim Ahmed
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/allahabad-high-court/anuj-pandey-v-state-of-u-p-anr-51925
- **Pages:** 7

## Headnote

A. Criminal Law-Criminal Procedure Code,
1973-Section
482-Indian
Penal
Code,
1860-Sections 498-A, 323, 504 & 506 - 3⁄4
D.P. Act,1984 -quashing of-summoning
order-parties entered into an amicable
settlement and they already filed a divorce
petition by mutual consent- Held, keeping
in view the nature and gravity of the
offence which are private dispute, it deems
proper to quash the proceeding of the
instant case.(Para 1 to 17)

B. In the exercise of the power u/s 482 and
while dealing with the plea that the dispute
has been settled, the high court must have
due regard to the nature and gravity of the
offence. The High court may quash the
criminal proceeding if in view of the
compromise between the disputants, the
possibility of a conviction is remote and the
continuation of a criminal proceeding
would cause oppression and prejudice.
(Para 11)

The application is allowed. (E-6)

List of Cases cited:

## Text

5 All. Anuj Pandey Vs. State of U.P. & Anr.
609
demarcation proceedings were directed by
this Court and the Committee of seven
members failed to demarcate, even chargesheet does not disclose the appreciation of
any particular material on record against the
petitioners. The order of taking cognizance
passed by the Magistrate is also passed in a
cursory manner, even without mentioning
the contents of case diary, hence, the
criminal action proposed against the accused
is a result of inadvertent taking of
cognizance. In view of the discussions as
above, F.I.R., charge-sheet and the criminal
proceedings initiated against the applicants
vide order dated 23.06.2022 in case crime
No. 82783 of 2022 in First Information
Report No. 0631 of 2018 under Section 447
I.P.C. and 2/3 of Prevention of Damage to
Public Property Act, 1984, Police StationAshiyana, District-Lucknow pending the
Court of learned Additional Chief Judicial
Magistrate-V, Lucknow deserves to be setaside.

22. In view of the discussions as above,
impugned order dated 23.06.2022 passed by
the learned Additional Chief Judicial
Magistrate-V, Lucknow, in case No. 82783
of 2022 in First Information Report No.
0631 of 2018 under Section 447 I.P.C. and
2/3 Prevention of Damage to Public
Property
Act,
1984,
Police
StationAshiyana, District-Lucknow is hereby setaside and instant petition is hereby allowed.
----------
(2024) 5 ILRA 609
ORIGINAL JURISDICTION
CRIMINAL SIDE
DATED: LUCKNOW 10.05.2024

BEFORE

THE HON'BLE SHAMIM AHMED, J.

Application U/S 482. No. 4327 of 2024

Anuj Pandey ...Applicant
Versus
State of U.P. & Anr. ...Opposite Parties

Counsel for the Applicant:
Devarshi Mishra, Ayush Tandon, Rajiv Misra

Counsel for the Opposite Parties:
G.A.

A. Criminal Law-Criminal Procedure Code,
1973-Section
482-Indian
Penal
Code,
1860-Sections 498-A, 323, 504 & 506 - 3⁄4
D.P. Act,1984 -quashing of-summoning
order-parties entered into an amicable
settlement and they already filed a divorce
petition by mutual consent- Held, keeping
in view the nature and gravity of the
offence which are private dispute, it deems
proper to quash the proceeding of the
instant case.(Para 1 to 17)

B. In the exercise of the power u/s 482 and
while dealing with the plea that the dispute
has been settled, the high court must have
due regard to the nature and gravity of the
offence. The High court may quash the
criminal proceeding if in view of the
compromise between the disputants, the
possibility of a conviction is remote and the
continuation of a criminal proceeding
would cause oppression and prejudice.
(Para 11)

The application is allowed. (E-6)

List of Cases cited:

1. Amardeep Singh Vs Harveen Kaur (2017) AIR
SC 4417

2. Shalini Massey Vs Neeraj Samuel Dass, FAPLD
No. 392 of 2019

3. B.S Joshi Vs St. of Har. & ors. (2003) 4 ACC
675

4. Gian Singh Vs St. of Punj. (2012) 10 SCC
303

5. Dimpey Gujral & ors. Vs U.T. Thru Admin.
(2013) 11 SCC 697
610 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
6. Narendra Singh & ors. Vs St. of Punj. & ors.
(2014) 6 SCC 466

7. Yogendra Yodav & ors. Vs St. of Jhar. (2014)
9 SCC 653

8. Parbatbhai Aahir @ Parbatbhai Bhimsinhbhai
Karmur & ors. Vs St. of Guj. & anr.(2017) 9 SCC
641

9. R.P. Kapoor Vs St. of Punj. (1990) AIR SC 866

10. St. of Har. Vs Bhajanlal (1992) SCC (Crl.) 426

11. St. of Bih. Vs P.P. Sharma (1992) SCC (Crl.)
192

12. Zandu Pharmaceutical Works Ltd. Vs Mohd.
Saraful Haq & anr.(2005) SCC (Crl.) 283 para 10

13. S.W. Palankattkar & ors. Vs St. of Bih. (2002)
44 ACC 168

(Delivered by Hon'ble Shamim Ahmed, J.)

1. Sri Vijay Prakash Tiwari, Advocate
has put in appearance on behalf of the
opposite party no.2 by filing vakalatnama,
which is taken on record.

2. Heard Sri Devarshi Mishra, learned
counsel for the applicant, Sri Vijay Prakash
Tiwari, learned counsel for the opposite
party no.2 and Ms. Ankita Tripathi, learned
A.G.A. for the State.

3. The instant application under
Section 482 Cr.P.C. has been filed by the
applicant with a prayer to quash the charge
sheet dated 30.12.2020, cognizance and
summoning order dated 27.07.2021 passed
by learned Chief Judicial Magistrate,
Lucknow in Case No.26775 of 2021 (State
of U.P. Vs. Anuj Pandey), arising out of
Complaint dated 08.06.2020 filed by
Respondent No.2, under Sections 498-A,
323, 504, 506 I.P.C. and Section 3/4 of
Dowry Prohibition Act, Police Station
Gomti Nagar, District Lucknow pending in
the
court of
learned
Chief
Judicial
Magistrate, Lucknow.

4. Today, the applicant, namely, Anuj
Pandey and the opposite party no.2, namely,
Ms. Saumya Dwivedi are present before this
Court and they have been identified by their
respective counsel.

5. Learned counsel for the parties
submit that the applicant as well as the
opposite party no.2 have entered into an
amicable settlement and they are ready to
take divorce by mutual consent. The parties
have already filed a petition under Section
13-B of the Hindu Marriage Act, which is
pending before the learned Principal Judge,
Family Court, Lucknow. Copy of the
petition has been annexed as annexure no.5
of the affidavit filed alongwith the instant
Application under Section 482 Cr.P.C. The
terms and conditions have also been laid
down in the aforesaid petition. In para 7 of
the aforesaid petition, a condition regarding
one time alimony has been mentioned. Para
7 of the petition filed under Section 13-B of
the Hindu Marriage Act is being quoted
hereunder:-

"7- ;g fd ;kph la0&01 }kjk ekuuh;
U;k;ky; esa :0 70]00]000@& 1⁄4lRRkj yk[k :i;k1⁄2
tfj;s rhu fMek.M Mak¶V ukfer fizfliy tt QSfeyh
dksVZ] y[kuÅ fMek.M Mak¶V la0&708388 fnukad 1612-23 cSad vkbZ0Mh0,Q0lh0 cSad 'kk[kk&eqa'kh iqfy;k
fMek.M Mak¶V la0&444624 fnukad&16-12-23 cSad
;wfu;u cSad 'kk[kk foHkwfr [k.M] xkserh uxj fMek.M
Mak¶V
la0&708309
fnukad
16-12-23
cSad&vkbZ0Mh0,Q0lh0 cSad 'kk[kk&eqa'kh iqfy;k ekuuh;
U;k;ky; Jheku iz/kku U;k;k/kh'k th ds dks"k esa VsUMj
}kjk tek fd;k tk jgk gSA mDr /kujkf'k ;kph la0&2
ds Hkj.k&iks"k.k o thou;kiu gsrq ;kph la0&1 }kjk tek
dh tk jgh gS ftls ;kph la0&2 ;kfpdk ds fuLrkj.k
ds ckn ;kfpdk ds fu.kZ; dh lR;kfir izfr nsdj
U;k;ky; Jheku iz/kku U;k;k/kh'k th ds dk;kZy; ls
tfj;s psd izkIr dj ysxhA mijksDr rhuks fMek.M Mak¶V
5 All. Anuj Pandey Vs. State of U.P. & Anr.
611
dh Nk;kizfr o VsUMj dh dkWih mijksDr ;kfpdk ds
lkFk layXud gSA"

6. Further, in para 8 of the aforesaid
petition, it has been clearly stated that apart
from the above amount, now nothing
remains to be paid to the opposite party no.2
and the opposite party no.2 will not demand
any further Stree Dhan from the applicant.
Para 8 of the petition filed under Section 13B of the Hindu Marriage Act is being quoted
hereunder:-

"8- ;g fd ;kph la0&1 o ;kph la0&2 ds
e/; fdlh Hkh izdkj dksbZ Hkh ysu&nsu 'ks"k ugh jg x;k
gS vkSj ;kph la0&2 Hkfo"; esa ;kph la0&1 ls fdlh Hkh
izdkj ds L=h/ku dh ekax ugh djsxh vkSj u gh ;kph
la0&1 dh lEifRRk ij fdlh Hkh izdkj ds vf/kdkj dh
ekax djsxhA "

7. Learned counsel for the parties
further submit that as the parties have
already settled their dispute and they do not
want to linger on any further, thus, the entire
proceeding of the case may be quashed and
the learned Principal Judge, Family Court,
Lucknow be directed to decide the divorce
petition of the parties filed under Section
13(B) of the Hindu Marriage Act in light of
the judgment rendered by Hon'ble Supreme
Court in the case of Amardeep Singh Vs.
Harveen Kaur: AIR 2017 SC 4417 and
further order passed by the Division Bench
of this Court in First Appeal Defective No.
392 of 2019: Shalini Massey Vs. Neeraj
Samuel Dass decided on 07.01.2020.
Paragraph Nos. 19 and 20 of Amardeep
Singh (Supra) are reproduced hereinunder:-

"19. Applying the above to the
present situation, we are of the view that
where the court dealing with a matter is
satisfied that a case is made out to waive
the statutory period under Section 13B(2), it can do so after considering the
following:

(i) the statutory period of six
months specified in Section 13-B(2), in
addition to the statutory period of one year
under Section 13-B(1) of separation of
parties is already over before the first
motion itself;

(ii)
all
efforts
for
mediation/conciliation including efforts in
terms of Order 32-A Rule 3 CPC/Section
23(2) of the Act/Section 9 of the Family
Courts Act to reunite the parties have
failed and there is no likelihood of success
in that direction by any further efforts;

(iii) the parties have genuinely
settled
their
differences
including
alimony, custody of child or any other
pending issues between the parties;

(iv) the waiting period will only
prolong their agony.

The waiver application can be
filed one week after the first motion giving
reasons for the prayer for waiver. If the
above conditions are satisfied, the waiver
of the waiting period for the second
motion will be in the discretion of the
court concerned.

20. Since we are of the view that
the period mentioned in Section 13-B(2) is
not mandatory but directory, it will be
open to the court to exercise its discretion
in the facts and circumstances of each
case where there is no possibility of
parties resuming cohabitation and there
are chances of alternative rehabilitation."

8. Further, this Court has been pleased
to observe in paragraph No.12 in the case of
Shalini
Massey
(Supra)
which
is
reproduced hereinunder:-

"12. The provisions contained in
Section 10A of the Divorce Act, 1869, are, in
substance, a verbatim reproduction of the
612 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
provisions contained in Section 13B of the
Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 and Section 28 of
the Special Marriage Act, 1954. The only
substantial difference is that, instead of the
period of one year mentioned in Section
13B(1) of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 and
Section 28(1) of the Special Marriage Act,
1954, a period of two years of separate
residence is provided under Section 10A(1)
of the Divorce Act, 1869. The beneficiaries
under the abovementioned provisions of
different statutes are persons who want
divorce by mutual consent and who file joint
petition for that relief. There can be no
discrimination among them on the ground of
religion. Divorce by mutual consent is a
secular concept. When the Apex Court has
declared the law that the "cooling off
period" of six months provided under
Section 13B(2) of the Hindu Marriage Act,
1955 is not mandatory but directory and
such period can be allowed to be waived by
the court on satisfaction of certain
conditions, denying that benefit to persons
who are governed by the Divorce Act, 1869
would amount to unjust discrimination.
Therefore, we are of the considered opinion
that the dictum laid down by the Apex Court
in Amardeep Singh (supra) is applicable to
a petition for divorce filed under Section
10A of the Divorce Act, 1869 and on
satisfaction of the conditions laid down in
that decision, the Family Court can waive
the period of six months stipulated under
Section 10A(2) of that Act.

In
view
of
the
foregoing
discussion, we find that but for the
difference in period provided for making the
second motion, the provisions of Section
13B (1) of Act of 1955 and 28 (1) of the Act
of 1954 and 10A (1) of the Act, the aforesaid
provisions are verbatim reproduction of
each other. Since the Hon'ble Apex Court
while considering the question whether the
minimum period of six months stipulated u/s
13B (2) of Act of 1955 in the case of
Amardeep Singh v. Harveen Kaur reported
in AIR 2017 SC 4417, for a motion for
passing decree of divorce on the basis of
mutual consent is mandatory or directory
and whether such period can be relaxed in
exceptional situations or circumstances,
held that the period mentioned in Section
13B (2) of Act of 1955 is not mandatory but
directory and it will be open to the Court to
exercise its discretion in the facts and
circumstances of each case where there is
no
possibility
of
parties
resuming
cohabitation and there are chances of
alternative rehabilitation.

We have no hesitation in holding
that the view taken by the Kerala High Court
in the case of TOMY JOSEPH (supra) that
the dictum laid down by the Apex Court in
Amardeep Singh (supra) is applicable to a
petition for divorce filed u/s 10A of the Act
and on satisfaction of the conditions laid
down in that decision, the Family Court can
waive the period of six months stipulated u/s
10A (2) of the Act."

9. Learned A.G.A. for the State has
also made an agreement with the proposal
made by learned counsel for the respective
parties and she further submits that no useful
purpose would be served if the proceedings
of the instant case go on further before the
learned trial court, therefore, the same may
be quashed by this Hon'ble Court.

10. Learned counsel for the parties
have drawn the attention of this Court and
placed reliance on the judgment of the
Hon'ble Apex Court in support of their case.

(i) B.S. Joshi Vs. State of
Haryana & Others 2003 (4) ACC 675.

(ii) Gian Ssingh Vs. State of
Punjab 2012 (10) SCC 303.
5 All. Anuj Pandey Vs. State of U.P. & Anr.
613

(iii) Dimpey Gujral And Others
Vs.
Union
Territory
Through
Administrator 2013 (11) SCC 697.

(iv) Narendra Singh And Others
Vs. State of Punjab And Others 2014

(6) SCC 466.

(v) Yogendra Yadav And Others
Vs. State of Jharkhand 2014 (9) SCC 653.

11. Summarizing the ratio of all the
above cases the latest judgment pronounced
by Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of
Parbatbhai
Aahir
@
Parbatbhai
Bhimsinhbhai Karmur & Ors. Vs. State
of Gujarat & Anr,; reported in (2017) 9
SCC 641 and in paragraph no.16, the
Hon'ble Apex Court has summarized the
broad principles with regard to exercise of
powers under Section 482 Cr.P.C. in the
case of compromise/settlement between the
parties which emerges from precedent of the
subjects as follows:-

i. "Section 482 preserves the
inherent powers of the High Court to
prevent an abuse of the process of any court
or to secure the ends of justice. The
provision does not confer new powers. It
only recognizes and preserves powers which
inhere in the High Court.

ii.The
invocation
of
the
jurisdiction of the High Court to quash a
First Information Report or a criminal
proceeding on the ground that a settlement
has been arrived at between the offender
and the victim is not the same as the
invocation of jurisdiction for the purpose of
compounding
an
offence.
While
compounding an offence, the power of the
court is governed by the provisions of
Section 320 of the Code of Criminal
Procedure, 1973. The power to quash under
Section 482 is attracted even if the offence is
non-compoundable.

iii. In forming an opinion whether
a criminal proceeding or complaint should
be quashed in exercise of its jurisdiction
under Section 482, the High Court must
evaluate whether the ends of justice would
justify the exercise of the inherent power;

iv. While the inherent power of the
High Court has a wide ambit and plenitude
it has to be exercised; (i) to secure the ends
of justice or (ii) to prevent an abuse of the
process of any court;

v. The decision as to whether a
complaint or First Information Report
should be quashed on the ground that the
offender and victim have settled the dispute,
revolves ultimately on the facts and
circumstances of each case and no
exhaustive elaboration of principles can be
formulated;

vi. In the exercise of the power
under Section 482 and while dealing with a
plea that the dispute has been settled, the
High Court must have due regard to the
nature and gravity of the offence. Heinous
and serious offences involving mental
depravity or offences such as murder, rape
and dacoity cannot appropriately be
quashed though the victim or the family of
the victim have settled the dispute. Such
offences are truly speaking not private in
nature but have a serious impact upon
society. The decision to continue with the
trial in such cases is founded on the
overriding element of public interest in
punishing persons for serious offences;

vii. As distinguished from serious
offences, there may be criminal cases which
have an overwhelming or predominant
element of a civil dispute. They stand on a
distinct footing in so far as the exercise of
the inherent power to quash is concerned;

viii. Criminal cases involving
offences which arises from commercial,
financial, mercantile, partnership or similar
transactions with an essentially civil flavour
614 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
may in appropriate situations fall for
quashing where parties have settled the
dispute;

ix. In such a case, the High Court
may quash the criminal proceeding if in
view of the compromise between the
disputants, the possibility of a conviction is
remote and the continuation of a criminal
proceeding would cause oppression and
prejudice; and

x. There is yet an exception to the
principle set out in propositions (viii) and
(ix) above. Economic offences involving the
financial and economic well-being of the
state have implications which lie beyond the
domain of a mere dispute between private
disputants. The High Court would be
justified in declining to quash where the
offender is involved in an activity akin to a
financial
or
economic
fraud
or
misdemeanour. The consequences of the act
complained of upon the financial or
economic system will weigh in the balance."

12. The Apex Court has also laid down
the
guidelines
where
the
criminal
proceedings could be interfered and quashed
in exercise of its power by the High Court in
the following cases:-(i) R.P. Kapoor Vs.
State of Punjab, AIR 1960 S.C. 866, (ii)
State of Haryana Vs. Bhajanlal, 1992
SCC (Crl.)426, (iii) State of Bihar Vs. P.P.
Sharma, 1992 SCC (Crl.)192 and (iv)
Zandu Pharmaceutical Works Ltd. Vs.
Mohd. Saraful Haq and another, (Para10) 2005 SCC (Cri.) 283.

13. From the aforesaid decisions the
Apex Court has settled the legal position for
quashing of the proceedings at the initial
stage. The test to be applied by the court is
to whether uncontroverted allegation as
made prima facie establishes the offence and
the chances of ultimate conviction is bleak
and no useful purpose is likely to be served
by allowing criminal proceedings to be
continued. In S.W. Palankattkar & others
Vs. State of Bihar, 2002 (44) ACC 168, it
has been held by the Hon'ble Apex Court
that quashing of the criminal proceedings is
an exception than a rule. The inherent
powers of the High Court under Section 482
Cr.P.C itself envisages three circumstances
under which the inherent jurisdiction may be
exercised:-(i) to give effect an order under
the Code, (ii) to prevent abuse of the process
of the court ; (iii) to otherwise secure the
ends of justice. The power of High Court is
very wide but should be exercised very
cautiously to do real and substantial justice
for which the court alone exists.

14. With the assistance of the aforesaid
guidelines, keeping in view the nature and
gravity and the severity of the offence which
are more particularly is private dispute and
differences and a petition under Section
13(B) of the Hindu Marriage Act has already
been filed for mutual divorce, it deems
proper and meet to the ends of justice, the
proceeding of the instant case be quashed by
this Court.

15. Keeping in view the law laid down
by the Hon'ble Apex Court in the above
referred judgment and in view of the
statement/compromise made by the parties
and the observation made above, the entire
proceedings
of
charge
sheet
dated
30.12.2020, cognizance and summoning
order dated 27.07.2021 passed by learned
Chief Judicial Magistrate, Lucknow in Case
No.26775 of 2021 (State of U.P. Vs. Anuj
Pandey), arising out of Complaint dated
08.06.2020 filed by Respondent No.2, under
Sections 498-A, 323, 504, 506 I.P.C. and
Section 3/4 of Dowry Prohibition Act,
Police Station Gomti Nagar, District
Lucknow pending in the court of learned
Chief Judicial Magistrate, Lucknow are
5 All. Jitendra Vs. State of U.P. & Anr.
615
hereby quashed so far as it relates to the
instant applicant.

16. Learned Principal Judge, Family
Court, Lucknow is also directed to decide
the decree of divorce filed by the parties
under Section 13(B) of the Hindu Marriage
Act within two months from the date of
filing of certified copy of this judgment
before it by diluting the period of motions in
view of the judgment of Hon'ble Supreme
Court in the case of Amardeep Singh
(Supra) and Division Bench of this Court in
the case of Shalini Massey (Supra).

17. With the aforesaid directions, the
instant application under Section 482
Cr.P.C. stands allowed.
----------
(2024) 5 ILRA 615
ORIGINAL JURISDICTION
CRIMINAL SIDE
DATED: LUCKNOW 10.05.2024

BEFORE

THE HON'BLE SHAMIM AHMED, J.

Application U/S 482. No. 7662 of 2023

Jitendra ...Applicant
Versus
State of U.P. & Anr. ...Opposite Parties

Counsel for the Applicant:
Neeranjan, Pratyush Mishra

Counsel for the Opposite Parties:
G.A.

A.
Criminal
Law-Criminal
Procedure
Code,1973-Section 482, 239-Prevention of
Damage of Public Property Act, 1984section 2/3-challenge to -summoning
order-encroachment of land- The present
case originated from an FIR alleging that
the applicant (minor) and others had
placed straw on public property (a chak
marg in village Gata no. 625) with the
intent to encroach upon it-the applicant
claimed
that
the
straw
was
placed
temporarily and without any intent to
illegally occupy the land-The trial court had
rejected the discharge application without
properly considering the evidence-The act
emphasized
that
the
Act
applies
in
situations of actual damage to public
property, in this case, no actual damage
occurred-The court allowed the application
and quashed the entire proceedings.(Para
1 to 25)

The application is allowed. (E-6)

List of Cases cited:

1. In Re Vs St. of A.P. & ors. (2009) 5 SCC 212

2. Kodungallur Film Socy. & Anr. Vs U.O.I. & Ors
(2018) 10 SCC 713

(Delivered by Hon'ble Shamim Ahmed, J.)

1. The instant application has been
moved on behalf of the applicant with a
prayer to quash the order dated 16.05.2023
passed by Learned Additional Civil Judge
(C.D.) Fast/ACJM. Ambedkar Nagar in
Criminal Misc. Case No. 1223/2023 vide
Crime No. 12/2020, U/s 2/3 of Prevention of
Damage to Public Property Act, Police
Station Maharuwa, District- Ambedkar
Nagar, on the application of applicant under
Section 239 Cr.P.C and further be pleased to
discharge the applicant.

2. Heard Sri Neeranjan Singh, learned
counsel for the applicant and Sri Ashok
Kumar Singh, learned A.G.A.-1 for the
State.

3. Learned counsel for the applicant
submitted that the complainant-Lekhpal of
the village concerned had lodged an F.I.R.
dated 02.02.2020 bearing No. 12/2020 U/s
3/4 of Prevention of Damage to Public