# Anwar Dhebar v. State of U.P. & Ors

- **Citation:** (2025) 5 ILRA 1186
- **Court:** High Court of Judicature at Allahabad
- **Decided:** 2025-05-30
- **Case number:** Criminal Misc. Writ Petition No. 12507 of 2024
- **Bench:** Siddhartha Varma, Madan Pal Singh
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/allahabad-high-court/anwar-dhebar-v-state-of-u-p-ors-53442
- **Pages:** 18

## Headnote

Criminal Law - Constitution of India,1950
- Article 19(1), 21, 22(1), 39-A & 226 -
5 All. Anwar Dhebar Vs. State of U.P. & Ors.
1187
Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 - Sections
50, 167 & 304 - Indian Penal Code, 1860 -
Sections 120-B, 384, 420, 467, 468 & 471
- Prevention of Corruption Act, 1961 -
Sections 7 & 12 - Writ Petition - assailing the
arrest and to declare illegal all the successive
remand orders - ECIR - FIR - lodged by ACB -
earlier petitioner was arrested along with other
co-accused in Chhattisgarh by ACB for offenses
under IPC and the Prevention of Corruption Act,
for which he was granted bail - however, on
same day after his release, he was re-arrested
by the UP Police at Raipur, within 20 minutes
after his bail release - Transit remand - the
Special Judge, Meerut remanded him to
judicial custody, despite his objections citing
violations of Articles 19(1), 22(1) of the
Constitution and Section 50 of Cr.P.C. - His
arrest memo and intimation to his son were
duly made on the same day - Court finds that,
- the arrest memo lacked a column for stating
reasons, and the petitioner was not informed
of his right to legal aid, which is protected
under
Articles
21,
22(1),
39A
of
the
Constitution and Section 304 Cr.P.C. - held,
Right to access legal aid is a valuable right of
an accused and he must be informed of that
right before his arrest - therefore, due to
non-compliance with Article 22(1) of the
Constitution and Section 50 of the Cr.P.C. as
the
grounds
of
arrest
were
never
communicated
in
writing,
nor
was
the
petitioner given an opportunity to defend his
custodial
remand,
the
arrest
and
all
subsequent remand orders were quashed -
however, the charge-sheet remains unaffected
and proceedings may continue as per law -
direction
issued,
for
circulation
of
the
judgment by the Director General of Police to
all police personnel in U.P. to prevent future
procedural lapses. (Para - 16, 17, 18, 19)

Writ petition stands allowed. (E-11)

Result: - Writ Petition - Allowed.

List of Cases cited:

## Text

_Characters 0–39,705 of 62,821. This is a partial read: ask again with offset=39705 for what follows._

1186 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
prohibition, is untenable. Such an approach
would effectively render the legislative bar
meaningless and open the door to judicial
overreach.

17. Any perceived hardship or
injustice that may arise from the strict
application of the statutory bar is a matter for
the
legislature
to
address
through
amendment. It is not for the Courts to fill
perceived gaps in the law by exercising
discretion contrary to the express provisions
of the statute. However, as settled by the
Supreme Court in the case of Prithvi Raj
Chauhan (supra), the Court in its inherent
jurisdiction under Section 482 Cr.P.C. or
under Article 226/227 of the Constitution of
India can still grant interim protection from
arrest if prima facie, the offences alleged are
not made out from the contents of the
complaint. Further, even an interim bail can
be granted by a Court, in appropriate cases,
pending a regular bail application.

18. In light of the clear and
unequivocal wording of Section 438 of the
Cr.P.C., which prohibits filing of anticipatory
bail application in cases where the offence is
punishable by death sentence, this Court is of
the opinion that no judicial discretion can be
exercised to entertain anticipatory bail
application in such cases.

19. The answer to the question
referred to this Bench is, therefore, in the
negative. The Courts cannot entertain
anticipatory bail application in cases where
the State amendment prohibits it."

20. Taking into consideration of
reasons stated in foregoing paragraphs, I do
not find any merit in the arguments
advanced by learned counsel for applicant
and contents made in the bail application
for the following reasons:-

Firstly, the applicant allegedly
involved in commission of heinous offence
punishable under Section 302 IPC, in
which the sentence may be awarded life
imprisonment or death sentence.

Secondly,
in
the
statement
recorded under Section 161 Cr.P.C. of the
informant has corroborated the contents of
the F.I.R., the other materials on record,
which have been collected by the police
during investigation prima facie linked the
applicant for commission of said offence.

Thirdly, applicant has history of
17 criminal cases.

Fourthly, Taking into consideration
of criminal history of applicant, there are
great apprehension of threat to the witnesses
as stated by learned counsel appearing on
behalf of the informant.

21. In view of the aforesaid reasons, I
do not find any merit in the instant
application. Therefore, without expressing
any opinion on merits, the instant bail
application is rejected.
----------
(2025) 5 ILRA 1186
ORIGINAL JURISDICTION
CIVIL SIDE
DATED: ALLAHABAD 30.05.2025

BEFORE

THE HON'BLE SIDDHARTHA VARMA, J.
THE HON'BLE MADAN PAL SINGH, J.

Criminal Misc. Writ Petition No. 12507 of 2024

Anwar Dhebar ...Petitioner
Versus
State of U.P. & Ors. ...Respondents

Counsel for the Petitioner:
Utkarsh Malviya, Varad Nath

Counsel for the Respondent:
G.A.

Criminal Law - Constitution of India,1950
- Article 19(1), 21, 22(1), 39-A & 226 -
5 All. Anwar Dhebar Vs. State of U.P. & Ors.
1187
Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 - Sections
50, 167 & 304 - Indian Penal Code, 1860 -
Sections 120-B, 384, 420, 467, 468 & 471
- Prevention of Corruption Act, 1961 -
Sections 7 & 12 - Writ Petition - assailing the
arrest and to declare illegal all the successive
remand orders - ECIR - FIR - lodged by ACB -
earlier petitioner was arrested along with other
co-accused in Chhattisgarh by ACB for offenses
under IPC and the Prevention of Corruption Act,
for which he was granted bail - however, on
same day after his release, he was re-arrested
by the UP Police at Raipur, within 20 minutes
after his bail release - Transit remand - the
Special Judge, Meerut remanded him to
judicial custody, despite his objections citing
violations of Articles 19(1), 22(1) of the
Constitution and Section 50 of Cr.P.C. - His
arrest memo and intimation to his son were
duly made on the same day - Court finds that,
- the arrest memo lacked a column for stating
reasons, and the petitioner was not informed
of his right to legal aid, which is protected
under
Articles
21,
22(1),
39A
of
the
Constitution and Section 304 Cr.P.C. - held,
Right to access legal aid is a valuable right of
an accused and he must be informed of that
right before his arrest - therefore, due to
non-compliance with Article 22(1) of the
Constitution and Section 50 of the Cr.P.C. as
the
grounds
of
arrest
were
never
communicated
in
writing,
nor
was
the
petitioner given an opportunity to defend his
custodial
remand,
the
arrest
and
all
subsequent remand orders were quashed -
however, the charge-sheet remains unaffected
and proceedings may continue as per law -
direction
issued,
for
circulation
of
the
judgment by the Director General of Police to
all police personnel in U.P. to prevent future
procedural lapses. (Para - 16, 17, 18, 19)

Writ petition stands allowed. (E-11)

Result: - Writ Petition - Allowed.

List of Cases cited:

1. Vimal Kishore Mehrotra Vs St. of U.P. & anr.-
AIR 1956 All 56,

2. Ashish Kakkar Vs UT of Chandigarh -
MANU/SCOR/31085/2025;
3. Vihaan Kumar Vs St. of Har. & ors.-
MANU/SC/0161/2025;

4. Manjeet Singh @ Inder @ Manjeet Singh
Chana Vs St. of U.P. & ors.- Order Dt.
09.04.2025 passed in Criminal Misc. Writ
Petition No. 934 of 2025;

5. Marfing Tamang Vs St. (NCT of Delhi) -
MANU/ DE/0755/2025;

6. Air India Statutory Corporation & ors.Vs
United Labour Union & ors.- (1997) 9 SCC 377,

7. Vidhu Gupta Vs St. of U.P. & ors.- SLP
(Criminal) No. 10178 of 2024;

8. Christie Vs Leachinsky (1947 A.C. 573),

9. Prabir Purkayastha Vs State (NCT of Delhi)
(supra) - LAWS (SC)-2024-5-46,

10. Pankaj Bansal Vs U.O.I.- LAWS (SC)-202310-3,

11. Vihaan Kumar Vs St. of Har. - LAWS (SC)-
2025-2-20 (Para-21)

12. Ashish Kakkar Vs UT of Chandigarh -
Criminal Appeal No.1518 of 2025 arising out of
SLP (Crl.) No.1662 of 2025 decided on
25.03.2025.

(Delivered by Hon'ble Siddhartha Varma, J.
&
Hon'ble Madan Pal Singh, J.)

1. Heard Sri Anoop Trivedi, learned
Senior Advocate assisted by Sri Utkarsh
Malviya, Sri Varad Nath and Sri Vikash
Walia, learned counsel for the petitioner;
Sri Manish Goyal, learned Additional
Advocate General assisted by Sri Rupak
Chaubey, Sri J.K. Upadhyay and Sri Vikas
Sahay, learned counsel appeared for the
State.

2. This writ petition has been filed
with a prayer to declare the arrest of the
petitioner
as
illegal
vide
the
first
1188 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
information report dated 30.07.2023 which
had given rise to Case Crime No. 196 of
2023. A further relief has been prayed for
and that is to declare illegal all the
successive
remand
orders
passed
subsequent to the arrest of the petitioner.

3. The petitioner namely Anwar
Dhebar in the instant case was arrested with
regard to a case which was registered by
way of an Enforcement Case Information
Report (hereinafter referred to as the
"ECIR") No. ECIR/RPZO/11/2022. This
matter
was
being
contested
by
the
petitioner alongwith the other co-accused
and the ECIR therein was challenged.
However on 17.01.2024, an F.I.R. which
gave rise to Case Crime No. 4 of 2024 was
lodged by the Anti Corruption Bureau,
Chhattisgarh under Sections 420, 467, 468,
471 and 120-B of I.P.C. read with section 7
and 12 of the Prevention of Corruption Act
and therein the petitioner was arrested on
04.04.2024. When the petitioner was so
arrested, the High Court of Chhattisgarh
granted
him
bail
on
14.06.2024.
Simultaneously, with regard to the events
which happened in the same sequence of
event, in the State of Uttar Pradesh, a first
information report was lodged by the Uttar
Pradesh Police on 30.07.2023 under
Sections 420, 468, 471, 473, 484 and 120-B
of I.P.C. and that had given rise to Case
Crime No. 196 of 2023. When the
petitioner, in Case Crime No. 4 of 2024 by
the High Court of Chhattisgarh, was
released on bail by an order dated
18.06.2024 at 09:20 PM the Uttar Pradesh
Police thereafter arrested him on the very
same date i.e. on 18.06.2024 at 09:40 PM
at Raipur itself. The Investigating Officer
of the State of Uttar Pradesh, Sri A.C.
Srivastava applied under Section 167 of the
Cr.P.C. for a transit remand from the
Magistrate at Raipur which was granted for
48 hours. On 21.06.2024, the Special
Judge, Prevention of Corruption Act,
Meerut took the petitioner into judicial
custody till 01.07.2024 despite the fact that
the petitioner had categorically applied
before the Special Judge, Prevention of
Corruption Act, Meerut that his arrest was
in violation of Article 19(1) and 22(1) of
the Constitution of India. He had also
stated that the arrest was in violation of the
provisions of Section 50 of the Cr.P.C. At
the time when the petitioner had got
arrested at Raipur by the Uttar Pradesh
Police on 18.06.2024, there was a memo of
arrest. The information regarding the arrest
was also sent to his son on the very same
date i.e. on 18.06.2024. The information
which was given to the son of the petitioner
is being reproduced here as under:

"तगरफ्िारी की सूचना

प्रति

र्जुनैद ढेबर 5/0 अनवर ढेबर उम्र 28 वषथ तनवासी
ओथमचौक के पास तहन्द्द घरथकोल के सामने कैरन बाजार रायपुर
ििीसगढ। आपको सूतचि तकया र्जािा है तक िाना कसना गौिम
बुद्ध नगर तक न०: 196/23 िारा 420, 419, 467, 468,
471, 120B, 384 IPC व 7 क भ्रष्टाचार तनरोिक में आर्ज
तदनाांक 18.06.24 को 21:40 अपने तपिा अनवर ढेबर को
िाना तसतवल लाईनस में तगरफ्िार तकया गया तर्जन्द्हें न्द्यायालय समय
पर सांबांतिि न्द्यायालय में पेश तकया र्जायेगा"

The memo of arrest is also being
reproduced hereas under:

"तगरफ्िारी का प्रपत्र

1. अतभयुक्त का नाम अनवर ढेबर तपिा का नाम
थव० र्जीकर भाई ढेबर तनवासी औकम चौक तहन्द्दू हाईसूख के सामने
बैगम बार्जार रामपुर ित्तीसगढ वषथ 52 वषथ लगभग

2. अन्द्िगथि मु०अ०सां० / िारा 196/23 िारा
419, 420, 467, 468, 471, 120ए, 384 आई.पी.सी.
व 8क 17/13 भ्रष्ट्राचार तन० अति० िाना कासना गौिमबुद्धनगर
में वाांतिि है।

3. तगरफ्िारी का थिान र्जेल गेट के सामने तदनाांक
18.6.24 समय 21:40
5 All. Anwar Dhebar Vs. State of U.P. & Ors.
1189

4. तगरफ्िारी करने वाले पुतलस अति०/कमथचारीगण
का तववरण-एसआई श्री पवन कुमार, एसआई श्री िैर्जूददीन तसटली
एच.सी. रमाशांकर चौिरी, एचसी राघवेन्द्र तिवारी, एचसी सूरर्ज
कुमार सी/ सुिीर कुमार एचसी प्रवीन शुक्ला

5. थिानीय साक्षी तर्जसकी उपतथिि में तगरफ्िारी की
गयी---

6. तगरफ्िारी के समय अतभयुक्त के कब्र्जे से प्राप्त
वथिु इत्यातद का तववरण---

7. तगरफ्िारी साक्षीगण के हथिाक्षर

8. अतभयुक्त के तन०अ० / हथिाक्षर

9. पुतलस अतिकारी/कमथचारी का हथिाक्षर शांकर
एचसी राघवेन्द्र तिवारी सी / सुिीर कुमार एचसी सूरर्ज कुमार रमा
प्रारूप-2

गिरफ्तारी सूचना पत्र गिला गिगिक सेिा
प्रागिकरण को दी िाने िाली सूचना

1. जिपद िा िाम - रामपुर छत्तीसिढ़

2. अकर्रिा में कलए िये व्यकक्त िा िाम अिवर
ढेबर कपता िा िाम स्व० जीिर र्ाई ढेबर पता किवासी ओिम चौि
कहन्दू हाईसुख िे सामिे बैिम बाजार रामपुर छत्तीसिढ़

3. अकर्रिा में लेिे िी कतकथ 18.6.24

4. अपराध संख्या थािा व धारा 196/23 धारा
419, 420, 467, 468, 471, 120बी, 384 आई.पी.सी.
व 7 ि भ्रष्टाचार कि० अकध०

5. किसिे द्वारा किरफ्तार किया िया - एसआई श्री
पवि कसंह, एसआई श्री फैजूददीि कसददीिी, एचसी प्रवीि शुक्ल,
एचसी राघवेन्द्र कतवारी, एचसी सूरज, एचसी रमा शंिर, सी / सुधीर

6. किरफ्तारी िे बाद िहााँ रखा िया

7. कमत्र सम्बन्धी िा िाम व पता कजसे सूचिा देिी
है- सोरव देवर (पुत्र) मो० 8881383333

कदिांि : 18.06.2024

(पवि िुमार कसंह)

उ०कि०

एस०र्ी०एफ०

लखिऊ"

4. It is the contention of the learned
counsel for the petitioner that as per Article
22(1) of the Constitution of India, no
person could be arrested or detained in
custody without him being informed as
soon as may be of the ground for such
arrest. He also stated that he shall also not
be denied the right to consult and be
defended by a legal practitioner of his
choice. Since, the learned counsel for the
petitioner relied upon Article 22(1) of the
Constitution of India and therefore the
same is being reproduced here as under:

"22. Protection against arrest
and detention in certain cases. - (1) No
person who is arrested shall be detained in
custody without being informed, as soon as
may be, of the grounds for such arrest nor
shall he be denied the right to consult, and
to be defended by, a legal practitioner of
his choice"

5. He has also relied upon Section 50
of the Cr.P.C. and submitted that every
police officer, who arrested a person
without a warrant, shall have to forthwith
communicate to the arrested person full
particulars of the offences for which he was
arrested. He would also inform the arrested
person the grounds for such arrest. Section
50 of the Cr.P.C is being reproduced here as
under:

"50. Person arrested to be
informed of grounds of arrest and of right
to bail.

(1) Every police officer or other
person arresting any person without
warrant shall forthwith communicate to
him full particulars of the offence for which
he is arrested or other grounds for such
arrest.

(2) Where a police officer
arrests without warrant any person other
than a person accused of a non-bailable
offence, he shall inform the person
arrested that he is entitled to be released
on bail and that he may arrange for
sureties on his behalf.
1190 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES

6. Learned counsel for the petitioner
relying upon a celebrated Division Bench
judgment of the Allahabad High Court
reported in AIR 1956 All 56 (Vimal
Kishore Mehrotra vs. State of Uttar
Pradesh and another) submitted that the
object underlying the provision was that
when the ground of arrest would be
communicated to the person who was being
arrested then that arrested person would be
in a position to make an application to the
appropriate Court for bail or move the High
Court for appropriate relief. He also
submitted that the information would
enable the arrested person to prepare his
defence in time for the purposes of his trial.
For that purpose, he relied upon paragraph
no. 31 of the abovementioned judgment
and therefore the same is being reproduced
here as under :

"The
object
underlying
the
provision that the ground for arrest should
be communicated to the person arrested
appears to be this. On learning about the
ground for arrest, the man will be in a
position to make an application to the
appropriate Court for bail, or move the
High Court for a writ of habeas corpus.
Further, the information will enable the
arrested person to prepare his defence in
time for purposes of his trial. For these
reasons, it has been provided by the
Constitution that, the ground for the arrest
must be communicated to the person ??? as
soon as possible. In the present case it was
not contended on behalf of the respondents
that, it was impracticable to give the
information to the petitioner soon after the
arrest. The contention on behalf of the
respondents
is
that,
the
necessary
information has already been supplied to
the petitioner. The alleged occurrence
described in annexure 'C' took place at
Kanpur. The petitioner was arrested in
Kanpur City. The jail is located at Kanpur.
The necessary information could easily be
supplied to the petitioner within a week of
his arrest."

7. The paragraph no. 31 was a part of
the order which was delivered by a
Division Bench of Hon'ble Mr. Justice Oak
and Hon'ble Mr. Justice Desai, in which,
Hon'ble Mr. Justice Desai who was also a
part of the Bench gave his judgment
separately though he came to the same
conclusion as was arrived at by Hon'ble
Mr. Justice Oak, and the learned counsel
for the petitioner relied upon paragraph
nos. 42, 43, 44, 45, 46, 47, 48 and 49 of the
judgment for bringing home his point. The
paragraphs are being reproduced here as
under:

"42. It is the fundamental right of
every person that on being arrested he must
be "informed, as soon as may be, of the
grounds for such arrest"; he cannot be
detained in custody without being so
informed. It is the common case of the
parties before us that the applicant on
being arrested was informed merely that he
had been arrested under Section 7 of the
Act; there is no allegation that any other
information was given to him. Section 7 is a
wide section containing several provisions
and he was not informed under which
particular provision he was arrested.
Nothing was said to him about the
allegation made against him or the act
alleged to have been done by him and
amounting, to an offence punishable under
Section 7.

43. The rule in Article 22(1) that
a person on being arrested must be
informed of the grounds for the arrest is
similar to, though not exactly identical
with, the rules prevailing in England and in
5 All. Anwar Dhebar Vs. State of U.P. & Ors.
1191
United States of America. The rule
prevailing in England is that

"in normal circumstances an
arrest
without
warrant
either
by
a
policeman or by a private person can be
justified only if it is an arrest on a charge
made known to the person arrested"; (per
Viscount Simon L.C. in - 'Christie v.
Leachinsky (1947 AC 573 at p. 586(F).

44. It is a rule of the common law
and is described in different languages by
different authorities, but the meaning is the
same; the arrested person must be told for
what he is arrested or the cause of his
arrest. In the United States the accused has
the constitutional right "to be informed of
the nature and cause of the accusation";
see 6th Amendment to the American
Constitution. In - 'Hooper v. Lane',
(1857) 6 HLC 443 : 10 ER 1368 (G), one of
the reasons for the rule was said to be that
the person arrested should know whether
he is or is not bound to submit to the arrest.
In 'Leachinsky's case (F)' Lord Simonds
observed at page 591:

"Putting first tilings first, I would
say that it is the right of every citizen to be
free from arrest unless there is in some
other citizen, whether a constable or not,
the right to arrest him. And I would say
next that it is the corollary of the right of
every citizen to be thus free from arrest that
he should be entitied to resist arrest unless
that arrest is lawful. How can these rights
be reconciled with the proposition that he
may be arrested without knowing why he is
arrested?
.......
Blind,
unquestioning
obedience is the law of tyrants and of
slaves: it does not yet flourish on English
soil".

45.
Professor
Glanvile
L.
Williams in his article "Requisites of a
Valid Arrest in (1954) Criminal Law
Review, page 6 at page 16, criticised the
reason
given
by
Lord
Simonds
as
"somewhat legalistic" because few people
know the law of arrest in such a way that
they can decide on the spot whether the
arrest to which they are being subjected is
legal. In his opinion the true reason is a
different one, e.g., the reason given by
Viscount 11th Simon L.C. in the same case
at page 588 in the following words:

"If the charge on suspicion of
which the man if arrested is then and there
made known to him, he has the opportunity
of
giving
an
explanation
of
any
misunderstanding or of calling attention to
other persons for whom he may have been
mistaken with the result that further
inquiries
may
save
him
from
the
consequences of false accusation."

46. Another reason given by Lord
Simonds at page 592 is that the arrested
person may without a moment's delay take
such steps as will enable him to regain
freedom. One more reason is that it acts as
a safeguard against despotism and overzeal. As remarked by Professor Glanville L.
Williams (supra, at page 17)

"the rule has the effect of
preventing the police from arresting on
vague general suspicion, not knowing the
precise crime suspected but hoping to
obtain evidence of the commission of some
crime for which they have power to arrest".

47. In 'McNabb v. United States
of America', (1943) 318 US 332 (H),
Frankfurter, J. observed at page 343:

'Experience
has
therefore
counselled
that
safeguards
must
be
provided against the dangers of the
overzeaious as well as the despotic
................ Legislation such as this,
requiring that the police must with
reasonable promptness show legal cause
for detaining arrested persons, constitutes
an important safeguard".

48.
In
'Unted
States
v.
Cruikshank', (1876) 92 US 542 at page 559
1192 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
: 23 Law Ed 588 at p. 594(I), it was
observed by Waite C.J. that the accused is
given the right to have a specification of
the charge against him in order that he may
decide whether he should present his
defence by motion to quash, demurrer or
plea. The debates of the Constituent
Assembly which framed the Constitution
are relevant for the purpose of ascertaining
the reason behind a certain enactment. In
the Draft Bill of the Constitution the Article
corresponding
to
the
Article
under
consideration was 15A. The reason given
for the provisions of the Article was that
they were safeguards against illegal or
arbitrary arrests (9 Constituent Assembly
Debates, p. 1497).

49. The words "grounds for such
arrest" or curing in Article 22(1) should be
interpreted in the light of the reasons given
above for the provision. If a person is
arrested on a warrant, the grounds fir
reasons for the arrest are the warrant; if
the warrant is read over to him, that is
sufficient compliance with the requirement
that he should be informed of the grounds
for his arrest. If he is arrested without a
warrant, he must be told why he has been
arrested. If he is arrested for committing an
offence, he must be told that he has
committed a certain offence for which he
would be placed on trial. In order to inform
him that he has committed a certain
offence, he must be told of the act done by
him which amounts to the offence."

8. Learned counsel for the petitioner
further relied upon the recent judgments of
the Supreme Court which are Ashish
Kakkar vs. UT of Chandigarh reported in
MANU/SCOR/31085/2025;
Prabir
Purkayastha vs. State (NCT of Delhi)
reported in (2024) 8 SCC 254; Vihaan
Kumar vs. State of Haryana and Ors.
reported
in
MANU/SC/0161/2025;
Manjeet Singh @ Inder @ Manjeet
Singh Chana vs. State of U.P. And 2
Others
dated
09.04.2025
passed
in
Criminal Misc. Writ Petition No. 934 of
2025 and Marfing Tamang Vs. State
(NCT
of
Delhi)
reported
in
MANU/DE/0755/2025. While relying upon
the judgment of Prabir Purkayastha
(Supra), learned counsel for the petitioner
relied upon specifically paragraph no. 8 of
that judgment and therefore the same is
being reproduced here as under:

"8. Shri Kapil Sibal, learned
senior counsel representing the appellant
canvassed the following submissions in
order to question the proceedings of arrest
and remand of the appellant:-

(i) That the FIR No. 224 of
2023(FIR in connection of which appellant
was arrested) is virtually nothing but a
second FIR on same facts because prior
thereto, another FIR No. 116 of 2020 dated
26th August, 2020 had been registered by
PS EOW, Delhi Police("EOW FIR")
alleging
violation
of
Foreign
Direct
Investment(FDI) regulations and other
laws of the country by the appellant and the
company, thereby causing loss to the
exchequer. A copy of the said FIR was,
however, not provided to the appellant. By
treating the EOW FIR as disclosing
predicate offences, the Directorate of
Enforcement(for short "ED") registered an
Enforcement Case Information Report(for
short 'ECIR') for the offences punishable
under Sections 3 and 4 of the Prevention of
Money Laundering Act, 2002(for short
'PMLA'). The ED carried out extensive
search and seizure operations at various
places including the office of the companyM/s. PPK Newsclick Studio Pvt. Ltd., of
which the appellant is the Director.

(ii) The company assailed the
ECIR by filing Writ Petition(Crl.) Nos.
5 All. Anwar Dhebar Vs. State of U.P. & Ors.
1193
1129 of 2021 and 1130 of 2021 wherein
interim protection against coercive steps
was granted by High Court of Delhi on
21st June, 2021. The appellant was also
provided
interim
protection
in
an
application seeking anticipatory bail vide
order dated 7th July, 2021.

(iii) The FIR No. 224 of 2023 has
been registered purely on conjectures and
surmises without there being any substance
in the allegations set out in the report. The
contents of the FIR which were provided to
the appellant at a much later stage
discloses a purely fictional story without
any
fundamental
facts
or
material
warranting registration of the FIR.

(iv) Admittedly, the copy of FIR
No. 224 of 2023 was neither made
available in the public domain nor a copy
thereof supplied to the appellant until his
arrest and remand which is in complete
violation of the fundamental Right to Life
and Personal Liberty enshrined in Articles
20, 21 and 22 of the Constitution of India.

(v) Shri Sibal pointed out that the
learned Remand Judge, vide order dated
5th October, 2023, allowed the application
filed by the appellant seeking certified copy
of the said FIR which was provided to the
learned counsel for the appellant in the late
evening on 5th October, 2023, i.e., well
after the appellant had been remanded to
police custody.

(vi) That the grounds of arrest
were not informed to the appellant either
orally or in writing and that such action is
in gross violation of the constitutional
mandate under Article 22(1) of the
Constitution of India and Section 50 of
the
Code
of
Criminal
Procedure,
1973(hereinafter being referred to as the
'CrPC').

(vii) Reliance was placed by the
learned senior counsel on the judgment of
this Court in Pankaj Bansal v. Union of
India and Others1 and it was contended
that the mere passing of successive remand
orders would not be sufficient to validate
the initial arrest, if such arrest was not in
conformity with law. Learned senior
counsel urged that this Court in the case of
Pankaj
Bansal(supra)
interpreted
the
provision of Section 19(1) of PMLA which
is pari materia to the provisions contained
in Section 43B(1) of the UAPA. Thus, the
said judgment fully applies to the case of
the appellant.

(viii) Shri Sibal referred to the
observations made in the judgment of
Pankaj Bansal(supra) and urged that since
the grounds of arrest were not furnished to
the appellant at the time of his arrest and
before remanding him to police custody, the
continued custody of the appellant is
rendered grossly illegal and a nullity in the
eyes of law because the same is hit by the
mandate of Article 22(1) of the Constitution
of India.

(ix) Shri Sibal further urged that
the view taken by a two- Judge Bench of
this Court in Ram Kishor Arora v.
Directorate of Enforcement2 holding the
judgment in Pankaj Bansal(supra) to be
prospective in operation would also not
come in the way of the appellant in seeking
the relief. He pointed out that the judgment
in the case of Pankaj Bansal(supra) was
pronounced on 3rd October, 2023 whereas
the illegal remand order of the appellant
was passed on 4th October, 2023 and
hence, the law laid down in the case of
Pankaj Bansal(supra) is fully applicable to
the case of the appellant despite the
interpretation
given
in
Ram
Kishor
Arora(supra).

(x) That the arrest of the
appellant is in gross violation of the
provisions contained in Article 22 of the
Constitution of India, hence, the appellant
is entitled to seek a direction for quashment
1194 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
of the remand order and release from
custody forthwith.

(xi) That the action of the
Investigating Officer in arresting and in
seeking remand of the appellant is not only
mala fide but also fraught with fraud of the
highest order. 2 2023 SCC OnLine SC 1682

(xii) Referring to the remand
order dated 4th October, 2023, it was
contended that the appellant was kept
confined overnight by the Investigating
Officer without conveying the grounds of
arrest to him. He was presented in the
Court of the learned Remand Judge on 4th
October, 2023 in the early morning without
informing Shri Arshdeep Khurana, the
Advocate engaged on behalf of the
appellant who was admittedly in contact
with the Investigating Officer because he
had attended the proceedings at the Police
Station Lodhi Colony, post the appellant's
arrest. In order to clandestinely procure
police custody remand of the appellant, the
Investigating
Officer,
presented
the
appellant at the residence of learned
Remand Judge before 6:00 a.m. by
informing
a
remand
Advocate
Shri
Umakant Kataria who had never been
engaged by the appellant to plead his
cause.

(xiii) Learned Remand Judge
remanded the accused to police custody at
6:00 a.m. sharp as is evident from the
remand
order(supra).
Shri
Arshdeep
Khurana, the appellant's Advocate was
informed about the order granting remand
by a WhatsApp message at 7:07 a.m. but
the same was an exercise in futility because
there was no possibility that the learned
Advocate could have reached the residence
of the learned Remand Judge in time to
oppose the prayer for remand.

(xiv) That, as a matter of fact, the
remand application had already been
accepted at 6:00 a.m. which fact is
manifested from the time appended at the
end of the remand order(supra). The
learned
Remand
Judge
signed
the
proceedings by recording the time as 6:00
a.m. Hence, there is no escape from the
conclusion that the remand order was
passed without supplying copy of the
grounds of arrest to the appellant or the
Advocate engaged by him. The appellant
was
intentionally
deprived
from
information about the grounds of his arrest
and thereby he and his Advocate were
prevented from opposing the prayer of
police custody remand and from seeking
bail.

(xv) He further urged that the
stand taken by the respondent that the
grounds of arrest were conveyed to the
learned counsel for the appellant well
before the learned Remand Judge passed
the remand order is unacceptable on the
face of the record because the time of
passing the remand order is clearly
recorded in the order dated 4th October,
2023 as 6:00 a.m. Admittedly, the grounds
of arrest were conveyed to Shri Arshdeep
Khurana, Advocate for the appellant well
after 7:00 a.m. It was contended that the
noting made by the learned Remand Judge
in the order dated 4th October, 2023 that
the learned counsel for the appellant was
heard on the application for remand is a
subsequent insertion clearly visible from
the remand order. The fact of subsequent
insertion of these lines is fortified from the
fact that the appellant had already been
remanded to police custody by the time the
Advocate was informed and the copy of the
remand
application
containing
the
purported
grounds
of
arrest
was
transmitted to him.

(xvi) That the foundational facts
in the FIR No. 224 of 2023 are almost
identical to the allegations set out in the
EOW FIR. The appellant had been granted
5 All. Anwar Dhebar Vs. State of U.P. & Ors.
1195
protection against arrest by the High Court
of Delhi in the EOW FIR. Owing to this
protection, the mala fide objective of the
authorities in putting the appellant behind
bars was not being served and, therefore, a
new FIR No. 224 of 2023 with totally
cooked up allegations came to be registered
and the appellant was illegally deprived of
his liberty without the copy of the FIR been
provided and without the grounds of arrest
being conveyed to the appellant."

9. He thereafter to further bolster his
case, relied upon paragraph nos. 20, 22, 29,
30, 46, 47, 48, 49, 50, 51 and 52 of that
judgment and therefore they are being
reproduced here as under:

"20. The right to life and
personal liberty is the most sacrosanct
fundamental
right
guaranteed
under
Articles 20, 21 and 22 of the Constitution of
India. Any attempt to encroach upon this
fundamental right has been frowned upon
by this Court in a catena of decisions. In
this regard, we may refer to the following
observations made by this Court in Roy
V.D. v. State of Kerala [Roy V.D. v. State of
Kerala, (2000) 8 SCC 590 : 2001 SCC
(Cri) 42] : (SCC p. 593, para 7)

"7. The life and liberty of an
individual is so sacrosanct that it cannot be
allowed to be interfered with except under
the authority of law. It is a principle which
has been recognised and applied in all
civilised countries. In our Constitution
Article 21 guarantees protection of life and
personal liberty not only to citizens of India
but also to aliens."

Thus, any attempt to violate such
fundamental right, guaranteed by Articles
20, 21 and 22 of the Constitution of India,
would have to be dealt with strictly."

22. The learned ASG referred to
the language of Article 22(5) of the
Constitution of India and urged that even in
a
case
of
preventive
detention,
the
constitutional scheme does not require that
the grounds on which the order of detention
has been passed should be communicated
to the detenu in writing. Ex facie, we are
not impressed with the said submission.

29. Hence, we have no hesitation
in reiterating that the requirement to
communicate the grounds of arrest or the
grounds of detention in writing to a
person arrested in connection with an
offence
or
a
person
placed
under
preventive detention as provided under
Articles
22(1)
and
22(5)
of
the
Constitution of India is sacrosanct and
cannot be breached under any situation.
Non-compliance of this constitutional
requirement and statutory mandate would
lead to the custody or the detention being
rendered illegal, as the case may be.

30. Furthermore, the provisions
of Article 22(1) have already been
interpreted by this Court in Pankaj Bansal
[Pankaj Bansal v. Union of India, (2024)
7 SCC 576] laying down beyond the pale
of doubt that the grounds of arrest must
be communicated in writing to the person
arrested of an offence at the earliest.
Hence, the fervent plea of the learned
ASG that there was no requirement under
law to communicate the grounds of arrest
in writing to the appellant-accused is
noted to be rejected.

46. Now, coming to the aspect as
to whether the grounds of arrest were
actually conveyed to the appellant in
writing before he was remanded to the
custody of the investigating officer.

47. We have carefully perused the
arrest memo (Annexure P-7) and find that
the same nowhere conveys the grounds on
which the accused was being arrested. The
arrest memo is simply a pro forma
1196 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
indicating the formal "reasons" for which
the accused was being arrested.

48. It may be reiterated at the
cost of repetition that there is a significant
difference in the phrase "reasons for
arrest" and "grounds of arrest". The
"reasons for arrest" as indicated in the
arrest memo are purely formal parameters
viz. to prevent the accused person from
committing any further offence; for
proper investigation of the offence; to
prevent the accused person from causing
the evidence of the offence to disappear or
tampering with such evidence in any
manner; to prevent the arrested person for
making inducement, threat or promise to
any person acquainted with the facts of
the case so as to dissuade him from
disclosing such facts to the court or to the
investigating officer. These reasons would
commonly apply to any person arrested on
charge of a crime whereas the "grounds
of arrest" would be required to contain all
such details in hand of the investigating
officer which necessitated the arrest of the
accused. Simultaneously, the grounds of
arrest informed in writing must convey to
the arrested accused all basic facts on
which he was being arrested so as to
provide him an opportunity of defending
himself against custodial remand and to
seek bail. Thus, the "grounds of arrest"
would invariably be personal to the
accused and cannot be equated with the
"reasons of arrest" which are general in
nature.

49. From the detailed analysis
made above, there is no hesitation in the
mind of the court to reach to a conclusion
that the copy of the remand application in
the purported exercise of communication of
the grounds of arrest in writing was not
provided to the appellant-accused or his
counsel before passing of the order of
remand dated 4-10-2023 which vitiates the
arrest and subsequent remand of the
appellant.

50. As a result, the appellant is
entitled to a direction for release from
custody by applying the ratio of the
judgment rendered by this Court in Pankaj
Bansal [Pankaj Bansal v. Union of India,
(2024) 7 SCC 576] .

51. Accordingly, the arrest of the
appellant followed by remand order dated
4-10-2023 and so also the impugned order
passed by the High Court of Delhi dated
13-10-2023 [Prabir Purkayastha v. State
(NCT of Delhi) Crl. MC No. 7278 of 2023
sub nom Amit Chakraborty v. State (NCT
of Delhi), (2023) 6 HCC (Del) 565] are
hereby declared to be invalid in the eye of
the law and are quashed and set aside.

52. Though we would have been
persuaded to direct the release of the
appellant without requiring him to furnish
bonds or security but since the chargesheet has been filed, we feel it appropriate
to direct that the appellant shall be
released from custody on furnishing bail
and bonds to the satisfaction of the trial
court.

10. Learned counsel for the petitioner,
while placing his arguments, submitted that
the petitioner had categorically stated in
paragraph nos. 24, 28, 29 and 30 of the writ
petition that during the arrest and thereafter
during
the
subsequent
remand,
the
petitioner was never provided with the
grounds of arrest and these paragraphs have
nowhere been denied by the State in the
counter affidavit. In fact, learned counsel
for the petitioner heavily relied upon the
order of the Special Judge, Prevention of
Corruption Act, Meerut dated 21.06.2024
wherein the petitioner had specifically
relied upon the provisions of Article 22(1)
of the Constitution of India and that of
Section 50 of the Cr.P.C. and had submitted
5 All. Anwar Dhebar Vs. State of U.P. & Ors.
1197
that no ground had been informed for the
arrest of the petitioner and to that the
Special Judge, Prevention of Corruption
Act, Meerut after going through all the
record had stated that only an information
was given to the son of the petitioner,
Shoeb Dhebar, and he had thereafter stated
nothing in the order. For ready reference,
the order dated 21.06.2024 is being
reproduced here as under:

"न्यायालय - कवशेि न्यायाधीश (भ्रष्टाचार किवारण
अकधकियम) कवशेि न्यायालय सं०-2/अपर सत्र न्यायाधीश, मेरठ ।

मुिदमा अपराध संख्या-196/2023

अन्तिभत धारा-419, 420, 467, 468, 471,
484 व 120बी र्ा०द०सं० व धारा 7ि भ्रष्टाचार किवारण
अकधकियम, थािा-िासिा, जिपद िौतमबुद्ध ििर, (ग्रेर्र िोएडा)

ररमाण्ड शीर्

कदिांि-21.06.2024

प्राथभिा पत्र पेश हुआ। उक्त प्रस्तुत मामले में अकर्युक्त
अिवार ढेबर िी ओर से अन्य प्राथभिा पत्र प्रस्तुत िर िथि किया
िया है कि अकर्युक्त िो किरफ्तार िरिे कववेचि द्वारा सकवधाि िे
अिुच्छेद 19 (1) एव 22 (1) िा उल्लघि किया िया है तथा
धारा 50 सीआर०पी०सी० िे प्रावधािों िा पालि िहीं किया िया
है। अतः कववेचि िो किदेकशत किया जाए कि किरफ््‌तारी िे िारण
से संबकधत िािजात िी छायाप्रकत प्रदाि िी जाए।

सुिा िया तथा समस्त प्रपत्रों िा अवलोिि किया
िया। प्रपत्रो िे अवलोिि से स्थष्ट है कि प्राथी / अकर्युक्त िो
कदिांि 18.06.2024 िो किरफ््‌तार किया िया है। 24 घण्र्े िे
अन्दर अकर्युक्त िो इस न्यायालय मे प्रस्तुत िहीं किया जा सिता
था इसकलए अकर्युक्त िो कदिाि 19.06.2024 िो कवशेि
न्यायाधीश, भ्रष्टाचार किवारण अकधकियम / प्रथम अपर सत्र
न्यायाधीश, रायपुर (छत्तीसिढ) िे समि प्रस्तुत किया िया, जहां से
उसिो 48 घण्र्े िा ढांकजर् ररमाण्ड स्वीिार किया िया कजसिे
अिुसार अकर्युक्त िो आज कदिांि 21.06.2024 िो इस
न्यायालय िे समि प्रस्तुत किया िया। किरफ््‌तारी िे समय अकर्युक्त
िो शोएब ढेबर पुत्र िो सूचिा कदया जािा किरफ््‌तारी प्रपत्र में
उल्लेख है। अकर्युक्त िो अन्तिभत धारा 419, 420, 467,
468, 471, 484 व 120थी र्ा०५०स० व धारा 7ि भ्रष्टाचार
किवारण अकधकियम में किरफ्तार किया िया है।