# Appeal No. 51 of 2012 (Smt. Bhavna Sharma v. Sanjeev Sharma) stands partly allowed and

- **Citation:** (2019) 2 ILRA 906
- **Court:** High Court of Judicature at Allahabad
- **Decided:** 2019-05-16
- **Case number:** Criminal Misc. Writ Petition No. 12281 of 2019
- **Bench:** Pankaj Naqvi, Umesh Kumar
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/allahabad-high-court/appeal-no-51-of-2012-smt-bhavna-sharma-v-sanjeev-sharma-stands-partly-allowed-44796
- **Pages:** 8

## Headnote

A. Indian Penal Code, 1860 - Sections
195/211/220/323/330/197
&
The
Narcotic
Drug
and
Psychotropic
Substance (N.D.P.S. ) Act, 1985 - Section
8/20 & Code of Criminal Procedure -
Section 195 - challenge to- recovery of
ganja from accused - The accused was
subjected to physical torture and the
alleged recovery is fake and planted- The
medical report of the accused prepared
by Doctor of C.H.C. did not indicate any
pain or injury - The Special Court
directed for fresh medical examination-
The Board examined the accused and
reported as many as 17 injuries- prima
facie the contention of the accused that
he was subjected to physical torture in
police custody, is made out and The
court below refused to grant further
remand of the accused, directed for his
immediate release on personal bond,
imposed a penalty of Rs.1000/- each on
the petitioners, which was directed to be
paid to the accused after deduction from
their salary-The order stand quashed
with the direction to the C.J.M. who shall
treat the same as a complaint on its own
merit and disciplinary / departmental
proceedings against the petitioners, if
any, shall continue.

B. If the court upon an application or
otherwise finds it in the interest of
justice that an inquiry in respect of
offences mentioned in Section 195 of the
Code is necessary, the court would make
a preliminary inquiry and after such
inquiry, record a finding to that effect
and make a complaint in writing to the
magistrate
of
1st
class
having
jurisdiction. where an act amounts to the
offence of contempt of the lawful
authority of public servants or to an
offence against public justice, private
prosecutions are barred and only the
court in relation to which the offence
was committed may initiate proceedings
by way of complaint. (Para 6, 9 to 12)

Crl. Misc. Writ Petition disposed of (E-6)

## Text

906 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
breakdown.
Apart
from
that,
the
agreement entered into between the
parties, which is on record bearing the
signature of the parties and is also not in
dispute, clearly reflects the intention of
the parties to go in for divorce. Apart
from that admittedly, the plaintiff wife
had filed cases against the defendant
under Section 498-A IPC and Domestic
Violence Act and under Section 125
Cr.P.C. and undisputedly, the defendant
had also undergone about two years of
incarceration.

27. Under such circumstances, I do not
find any good ground to set aside the
judgments passed by the court below
impugned in the leading appeal filed under
Section 12 of the Act, as well as in the
connected appeal passed filed under Section
19 of the Act. However, in view of the law as
discussed above, I find that it is a case of
irretrievable breakdown of marriage, where
marriage between the parties is beyond repair
and is dead, and no fruitful purpose would be
served by relegating the parties to the court
below to file fresh petition for divorce under
Section 13 of the Act, as more than 12 years
has already passed and the alternative relief
of divorce under Section 13 of the Act
claimed before the Court is liable to be
granted.

28. Accordingly, the relief claimed
by the wife in alternative in O.S. No.
1168 of 2008 is granted and a decree of
divorce between the parties is passed.

29. However, before parting with the
appeal I would like to put this on record
that on the last date, on 17.7.2019, in
order to settle the dispute between the
parties, when learned counsel for the
appellant (wife) in leading appeal was
pressing hard for grant of divorce, he was
pointedly asked to seek instructions from
his client (wife) if she is agreeable to forgo
any
kind
of
permanent
alimony/compensation, as the defendantrespondent (husband) present in the court
has narrated the pain of undergoing
imprisonment for about 2 years in a case
under Section 498-A IPC and stated that the
plaintiff (wife) is well of, today learned
counsel for the appellant Sri Pratik Nagar
on instructions from his client (wife) stated
that she is willing to forgo the same. I also
find that, in fact, there is no such prayer
also. There is yet another reason for the
same i.e., a compromise had already taken
place between the parties outside the court
as mentioned above.

30. No other point was pressed.

31.
For
the
discussions
made
hereinabove, the leading appeal being First
Appeal No. 51 of 2012 (Smt. Bhavna Sharma
vs. Sanjeev Sharma) stands partly allowed and
a decree of divorce is granted under Section
13 of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 and the
connected appeal being First Appeal No. 178
of 2012 stands dismissed.

32. Ordered accordingly.
----------

(2019)10ILR A 906

ORIGINAL JURISDICTION
CIVIL SIDE
DATED: ALLAHABAD 16.05.2019

BEFORE

THE HON'BLE PANKAJ NAQVI, J.
THE HON'BLE UMESH KUMAR, J.

Criminal Misc. Writ Petition No. 12281 of 2019

Raghvendra Singh & Ors. ...Petitioners
Versus
2 All. Raghvendra Singh & Ors. Vs State of U.P. & Ors.
907
State of U.P. & Ors. ...Respondents

Counsel for the Petitioners:
Sri V.P. Srivastava, Sri Sangam Lal
Kesharwani, Sri Manish Kesharwani

Counsel for the Respondents:
Sri A.N. Mulla, A.G.A.

A. Indian Penal Code, 1860 - Sections
195/211/220/323/330/197
&
The
Narcotic
Drug
and
Psychotropic
Substance (N.D.P.S. ) Act, 1985 - Section
8/20 & Code of Criminal Procedure -
Section 195 - challenge to- recovery of
ganja from accused - The accused was
subjected to physical torture and the
alleged recovery is fake and planted- The
medical report of the accused prepared
by Doctor of C.H.C. did not indicate any
pain or injury - The Special Court
directed for fresh medical examination-
The Board examined the accused and
reported as many as 17 injuries- prima
facie the contention of the accused that
he was subjected to physical torture in
police custody, is made out and The
court below refused to grant further
remand of the accused, directed for his
immediate release on personal bond,
imposed a penalty of Rs.1000/- each on
the petitioners, which was directed to be
paid to the accused after deduction from
their salary-The order stand quashed
with the direction to the C.J.M. who shall
treat the same as a complaint on its own
merit and disciplinary / departmental
proceedings against the petitioners, if
any, shall continue.

B. If the court upon an application or
otherwise finds it in the interest of
justice that an inquiry in respect of
offences mentioned in Section 195 of the
Code is necessary, the court would make
a preliminary inquiry and after such
inquiry, record a finding to that effect
and make a complaint in writing to the
magistrate
of
1st
class
having
jurisdiction. where an act amounts to the
offence of contempt of the lawful
authority of public servants or to an
offence against public justice, private
prosecutions are barred and only the
court in relation to which the offence
was committed may initiate proceedings
by way of complaint. (Para 6, 9 to 12)

Crl. Misc. Writ Petition disposed of (E-6)

(Delivered by Hon'ble Pankaj Naqvi, J.
Hon'ble Umesh Kumar, J.)

Heard Sri V.P. Srivastava, the
learned Senior Counsel assisted by Sri
Sangam
Lal
Kesharwani
for
the
petitioners and Sri A.N. Mulla, the
learned A.G.A.

This writ petition challenges the
order dated 25.4.2019, passed by the
Addl.
Sessions
Judge
/
F.T.C.-I,
Kushinagar at Padrauna, directing for
registration
of
cases
against
the
petitioners and the consequential FIR
dated
28.4.2019
as
Case
Crime
No.235/2019,
under
Sections
195/211/220/323/330/197
IPC,
P.S.
Taraya Sujan, Kushinagar.

1. Brief facts are as under:-

Petitioner no. 1, the Sub-Inspector,
no. 2, the Investigating Officer and no. 3,
the Constable of the P.S. concerned on
24.4.2019 allegedly recovered 1.9 kg. of
ganja from accused Sarwan Yadav in
Case Crime No.230/2019, under Section
8/20 of the N.D.P.S. Act, P.S. Taraya
Sujan, Kushinagar. The accused was
produced for remand before the Addl.
Sessions Judge / F.T.C.-I, Kushinagar
(Special
Court)
on
25.4.2019.
The
accused informed the court that he had
been illegally detained for the last 4 days
at the police station where he was
subjected to physical torture and the
alleged recovery is fake and planted. The
908 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
medical report of the accused prepared by
Dr. Sanjay Kumar, C.H.C., Tamkuhiganj
did not indicate any pain or injury. The
Special Court physically examined the
injuries of the accused and found several
injuries on his body and directed the
C.M.O., Kushinagar to get the accused
examined by a board of 2 doctors for
fresh medical examination. The Board
examined the accused and reported as
many as 17 injuries. The Board opined
that out of 17 injuries, injuries nos. 2, 7,
11, 12, 15, 16 & 17 are old, injuries nos.
1, 3, 4, 5, 8, 9 & 14 are 3-5 days old,
injury no. 6 is a week old, injury no. 13 is
an inflammatory lesion and injuries nos. 5
& 10 are hard blunt trauma. The court
below on above materials, was of the
view that prima facie the contention of the
accused that he was subjected to physical
torture in police custody, is made out and
while refusing to grant further remand of
the accused, directed for his immediate
release on personal bond, imposed a
penalty
of
Rs.1000/-
each
on
the
petitioners, which was directed to be paid
to the accused after deduction from their
salary with a simultaneous direction for
prosecution against the petitioners under
Section 195/211/220/323/330 IPC and
under Section 197 IPC against the doctor
concerned along with a direction to send a
copy of the order to the authorities
concerned. Pursuant thereto, respondent
no.4 lodged the above FIR against the
petitioners, i.e., the Sub-Inspector, the
Investigating Officer, the Constable of the
police station concerned and the doctor,
(non-petitioner).

2. Sri Srivastava, the learned Senior
Counsel for the petitioners challenged the
correctness of the order dated 25.4.2019
and the FIR dated 24.5.2019 on the
ground that Section 195(1) of the Code
specifically prohibits that no court shall
take cognizance except on a complaint in
writing of that court or by any designated
officer of the court in respect of the
offences specified therein, thus both the
order and the FIR are in teeth of the
statutory prohibition, same are liable to be
quashed.

3. Sri Mulla, the learned A.G.A.
submits that it would be in the fitness of
things if a direction is given to the
complaint magistrate to treat the FIR as a
complaint. He had already on the previous
date,
i.e.,
13.5.2019
submitted
that
considering the nature of issue involved,
he does not propose to file any counter
affidavit, writ petition be disposed off on
available materials.

4. Section 195 of the Code in so far
is relevant is extracted hereunder:

195. Prosecution for contempt of
lawful authority of public servants, for
offences against public justice and for
offences relating to documents given in
evidence.

(1) No Court shall take cognizance-

(a)

(i) .......

(ii) ......

(iii) .....

(b) (i) of any offence punishable
under any of the following sections of
the Indian Penal Code (45 of 1860 ),
namely, sections 193 to 196 (both
inclusive), 199, 200, 205 to 211 (both
inclusive) and 228, when such offence is
alleged to have been committed in, or in
relation to, any proceeding in any
Court, or

(ii) ......

(iii) ......
2 All. Raghvendra Singh & Ors. Vs State of U.P. & Ors.
909

except on the complaint in writing
of that Court, or by such officer of the
Court as that Court may authorise in
writing in this behalf, or of some other
court
to
which
that
court
is
subordinate.

5. The object of Section 195 is to
safeguard
against
irresponsible
and
reckless
prosecution
by
private
individuals in respect of offences which
relate to the administration of justice and
contempt of lawful authority, i.e., where
an act amounts to the offence of contempt
of the lawful authority of public servants
or to an offence against public justice,
private prosecutions are barred and only
the court in relation to which the offence
was committed may initiate proceedings
by way of complaint. Section 195(1)(b)(i)
prohibits
taking
cognizance
of
the
offences under Sections 193 to 196 IPC
(both inclusive), 199, 200, 205 to 211 IPC
(both inclusive) and 228 IPC when such
offence is alleged to have been committed
in, or in relation to any proceeding in any
court, except on the complaint in writing
of that court or by such other designated
officer of the court.

6. To attract the prohibition under
Section 195(1)(b)(i) of the Code, it will
have to be demonstrated that the alleged
specified offences were either committed
in the court or in relation to any
proceeding in any court (emphasis ours).
Admittedly, in the present case, no
offence is alleged to have been committed
in the court. But the issue is whether it
can be said that the offences were
committed in relation to any proceeding
in any court. The term "any proceeding in
any court" under Section 195(1)(b)(i) of
the Code came to be examined by the
Apex Court in M.L. Sethi vs. R.P. Kapoor
and others, AIR 1967 SC 528, wherein it
held in paragraphs 13 to 15 as under:

13. ..........

When examining the question
whether there is any proceeding in any
Court, there are three situations that
can be envisaged. One is that there may
be no proceeding in any Court at all.
The second is that a proceeding in a
Court may actually be pending at the
point of time when cognizance is sought
to be taken of the offence under s. 211,
I.P.C. The third is that, though there
may be no proceeding pending in any
Court in which, or in relation to which,
the offence under s. 211, I.P.C., could
have been committed, there may have
been a proceeding which had already
concluded and the offence under s. 211
may be alleged to have been committed
in, or in relation to, that proceeding. It
seems to us that in both the latter two
circumstances envisaged above, the bar
to taking cognizance under s. 195(1)(b)
would come into operation. If there be
a proceeding actually pending in any
Court and the offence under s. 211,
I.P.C.,
is
alleged
to
have
been
committed in, or in relation to, that
proceeding, s. 195(1)(b) would clearly
apply. Even if there be a case where
there was, at one stage, a proceeding in
any Court which may have concluded
by the time the question of applying the
provisions of s. 195(1)(b) arises, the bar
under that provision would apply if it is
alleged that the offence under s. 211
I.P.C., was committed in, or in relation
to, that proceeding. The fact that the
proceeding had concluded would be
immaterial, because s. 195(1)(b) does
not require that the proceeding in any
Court must actually be pending at the
910 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
time when the question of applying this
bar arises.
14. In the first circumstance envisaged
above, when there is no proceeding
pending in any Court at all at the time
when the applicability of s. 195(1)(b)
has to be determined, nor has there
been any earlier proceeding which may
have been concluded, the provisions of
this sub-section would not be attracted,
because the language used in it requires
that there must be a proceeding in
some Court in, or in relation to, which
the offence under s. 211, I.P.C. is
alleged to have been committed. In
such a case, a Magistrate would be
competent to take cognizance of the
offence under s. 211 I.P.C., if his
jurisdiction is invoked in the manner
laid down in s. 190 of the Code of
Criminal Procedure.
15. Mr. Frank Anthony on behalf of the
appellant urged before us that even in
those cases where there may be no
pending proceeding in any Court, nor
any proceeding which has already
concluded in any Court, the bar of s.
195(1)(b)
should
be
held
to
be
applicable if it is found that subsequent
proceeding in any Court is under
contemplation. We do not think that
the language of clause(b) of sub-s. (1) of
s.
195
can
justify
any
such
interpretation.
A
proceeding
in
contemplation cannot be said to be a
proceeding in a Court. When there is
mere contemplation of starting a
proceeding in future, there is no
certainty that the proceeding will come
into existence. It will always be
dependent on the decision to be taken
by the person who is contemplating
that the proceeding be started; and any
interpretation of the law, which will
make the applicability dependent on a
future decision to be taken by another
person, would, in our opinion, be
totally incorrect. The applicability of
this provision at the sweet will of the
person contemplating the proceeding
will
introduce
an
element
of
uncertainty in the applicability of the
law; and such an interpretation must
be avoided. In this case, apart from this
circumstance, the language used clearly
lends itself to the interpretation that the
bar has been placed by the Legislature
only in those cases where the offence is
alleged to have been committed in, or in
relation to, any proceeding actually
pending
in
any
Court,
or
any
proceeding which has already been
taken in any Court. There is nothing in
the language to indicate that the
Legislature also intended to lay down
this bar if a proceeding in a Court was
still under contemplation and if and
when that proceeding is taken, it may
be found that the offence alleged to
have been committed was, in fact,
committed in, or in relation to, that
proceeding. In this connection, the
question of time when the applicability
of this provision has to be determined,
assumes importance. It appears to us
that at the time when in the present
case
the
Judicial
Magistrate
at
Chandigarh had to determine the
applicability of this bar, he could not be
expected to come to a decision whether
any proceeding in any Court was under
contemplation in, or in relation to,
which the offence under s. 211, I.P.C.,
of which he was asked to take
cognizance, was alleged to have been
committed. In fact, it would be laying
on the Magistrate a burden which he
could not be expected to discharge
properly
and
judicially
as
no
Magistrate could determine in advance
2 All. Raghvendra Singh & Ors. Vs State of U.P. & Ors.
911
of a proceeding in a Court whether the
offence under s. 211, I.P.C., of which he
is required to take cognizance, will be
an
offence
which
will
be
found
subsequently to have been committed
in
relation
to
the
contemplated
proceeding to be taken thereafter. This
interpretation, sought to be placed on
this
provision
on
behalf
of
the
appellant,
cannot,
therefore,
be
accepted

7. The upshot of the above legal
position is that there could be three
contingencies which may arise under
Section 195(1)(b)(i):-

(i).. where there is no proceeding
pending at all,

(ii) where proceedings are pending,

(iii) where proceedings have been
concluded.

8. The 1st contengency will not
attract the prohibition but the 2nd and 3rd
i.e., prosecution relating to specified
offences therein would be maintainable
only by way of a complaint. The Apex
Court in paragraph -15 of the above
judgment ruled out the applicability of
prohibition in respect of a contemplated
proceeding.
But
once
contemplated
proceeding
is
converted
"into
a
proceeding", in a court, the statutory
prohibition
of
Section
195
shall
automatically come into operation. What
is
crucial
for
applicability
of
the
prohibition under Section 195 of the Code
is not the date when the alleged offence
under specified offence is committed,
rather it is the date on which a complaint /
FIR is lodged.

9. Thus, it is immaterial as to when
was the recovery effected in the present
case. But once a proceeding has been
initiated with request for remand in
respect of an offence under the N.D.P.S.
Act, the bar under Section 195 of the
Code shall come into play as the offences
under Sections 195/211/197 IPC are
alleged to have been committed in
relation to a proceeding under the
N.D.P.S. Act, pending before the court.

10. The order dated 25.4.2019 does
not specifically direct for lodging of an
FIR, rather it directs for registering a case
which could be interpreted both ways, i.e.,
FIR / complaint but the illegality crept in
when the learned Judge after conducting a
preliminary inquiry, instead of remitting
the matter to the complaint magistrate as a
complaint as envisaged under Section 340
Cr.P.C not only adjudicated the issue but
also
awarded
penalty
against
the
petitioners for an offence which was yet
to be established in a court of competent
jurisdiction, i.e., before the complaint
magistrate, we precisely for these reasons,
are not directing the FIR to be treated as
complaint
before
the
complaint
magistrate.

11. How a prosecution in respect of
specified offences under Section 195 of
Cr.P.C would proceed, is provided under
Section 340 Cr.P.C.

Section 340 of the Cr.P.C. Is
extracted hereunder:-

340. Procedure in cases mentioned
in section 195.
(1) When, upon an application made to
it in this behalf or otherwise, any Court
is of opinion that it is expedient in the
interests of justice that an inquiry
should be made into any offence
referred to in clause (b) of sub- section
(1) of section 195, which appears to
912 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
have been committed in or in relation
to a proceeding in that Court or, as the
case may be, in respect of a document
produced or given in evidence in a
proceeding in that Court, such Court
may, after such preliminary inquiry, if
any, as it thinks necessary,-

(a) record a finding to that effect;

(b) make a complaint thereof in
writing;

(c) send it to a Magistrate of the
first class having jurisdiction;

(d) take sufficient security for the
appearance of the accused before such
Magistrate, or if the alleged offence is
non- bailable and the Court thinks it
necessary so to do, send the accused in
custody to such Magistrate; and

(e) bind over any person to appear
and
give
evidence
before
such
Magistrate.

(2) The power conferred on a
Court by sub- section (1) in respect of
an offence may, in any case where that
Court has neither made a complaint
under sub- section (1) in respect of that
offence nor rejected an application for
the making of such complaint, be
exercised by the Court to which such
former Court is subordinate within the
meaning of sub- section (4) of section
195.

(3) A complaint made under this
section shall be signed,-

(a) where the Court making the
complaint is a High Court, by such
officer of the Court as the Court may
appoint;

(b) in any other case, by the
presiding officer of the Court.

(4) In this section," Court" has the
same meaning as in section 195.

12. From the aforesaid, it is evident
that if the court upon an application or
otherwise finds it in the interest of justice
that an inquiry in respect of offences
mentioned in Section 195 of the Code is
necessary, the court would make a
preliminary
inquiry
and
after
such
inquiry, record a finding to that effect and
make a complaint in writing to the
magistrate of 1st class having jurisdiction.

13. In view of above, this petition is
disposed
off
with
the
following
directions:

(i) The order dated 25.4.2019 and the
consequential FIR dated 28.4.2019 as
Case Crime No.235/2019, under Sections
195/211/220/323/330/197
IPC,
P.S.
Taraya Sujan, Kushinagar stand quashed.

(ii) The learned Special Court shall
reduce the substance of accusation along
with the relevant evidence and forward
the same to the C.J.M. who shall treat the
same as a complaint and endeavour to
conclude the same as expeditiously as
possible, preferably within 6 months,
from the date of receipt of certified copy
of the order, in accordance with law.

(iii) The complaint magistrate shall
decide the complaint on its own merit,
without
being
influenced
by
any
observation on merits by us, as the same
have been made only for a limited
purpose.

(iv) Quashing of the order dated
25.4.2019 and its consequential FIR dated
28.4.2019 shall not adversely affect
accused Sarwan Yadav in any manner but
the
disciplinary
/
departmental
proceedings against the petitioners, if any,
shall continue.

14. The O.S.D. (Criminal) is directed
to immediately send a copy of this order
to
the
court
concerned
and
the
Superintendent
of
Police
concerned.
2 All. Shri Raghav Bahl Vs Union of India & Anr.
913

Compliance report be submitted by
the complaint magistrate in the Chambers
on 25.2.2020 at 4.00 PM.
----------

(2019)10ILR A 913

ORIGINAL JURISDICTION
CIVIL SIDE
DATED: ALLAHABAD 22.08.2019

BEFORE

THE HON'BLE RAMESH SINHA, J.
THE HON'BLE RAJ BEER SINGH, J.

Criminal Misc. Writ Petition No. 15822 of 2019

Shri Raghav Bahl ...Petitioner
Versus
Union of India & Anr. ...Respondents

Counsel for the Petitioner:
Sri Rakesh Pandey, Sri Amit Kumar Singh,
Sri Prashant Kumar

Counsel for the Respondents:
C.S.C., Sri Ashish Agrawal

A. Black Money Act, 2015 - Sections 50, 51-
Undisclosed Foreign Income and Assetschallenge to-issuance of show cause notice,
sanction order and complaints without
giving opportunity of hearing to the
petitioner before granting sanction and
filing the impugned complaint- prima facie
case is made out against the petitioner or
that the petitioner deserves no relief
claimed by him-The criminal proceedings
can be quashed only in accordance with
parameters laid down by Hon'ble Apex
Court in catena of decisions-The present
petition does not fall in any of such
category, wherein, this Court can exercise
jurisdiction under Article 226 of the
Constitution
of
India
to
quash
the
impugned notice and complaints.

 B. As per prosecution manual it is not
incumbent upon the office of Principal
Director to grant opportunity hearing to
petitioner. Further, grant of sanction is
purely an administrative act and the
department is not under the obligation
to serve copy of the sanction on the
petitioner and thus, no principle of
judicial procedure has been violated. In
view of the material on record it cannot
be held that the impugned notice or
criminal
proceeding
are
manifestly
attended with mala fide and maliciously
instituted with an ulterior motive for
wreaking vengeance on the accused and
with a view to spite him due to private
and personal grudge. (Para 6 to 12)

Crl. Misc. Writ Petition dismissed (E-6)

Precedent followed: -

1. Srinidhi Karti Chidambaram Vs Principal Chief
Commissioner decided on 2 November, 2018

2. Medchl Chemicals & Pharma (P) Ltd. Vs
Biological E Ltd. & ors. 2000 SCC (Cri) 615

3. Union of India Vs W.N. Chadha AIR 1993 SC 1082

4. St. of HA. Vs Bhajan Lal & ors. (supra)

5. Rupan Deol Bajaj Vs K.P.S. Gill (1995) SCC (Cri) 1059

6. Rajesh Bajaj Vs St. of NCT of Delhi (1999) 3
SCC 259

7. St. of M.P. Vs Dr. Krishna Chandra Saksena
(1996) 11 SCC 439

8. Zenit Mataplast Prv. Ltd. Vs St. of Mah.
(2009) 10 SCC 388

9. S.P. (C.B.I.) Vs Deepak Chaudhary AIR
1996 SC 186

10. St. of Ori. Vs Saroj Kumar Sahoo (2005)
13 SCC 540

(Delivered by Hon'ble Ramesh Sinha, J.
&