# Aryavart Bank v. Appellate Auth. Payment of Gratuity Act, 1972 & Dy. Chief Labour Commissioner

- **Citation:** (2019) 4 ILRA 1255
- **Court:** High Court of Judicature at Allahabad
- **Decided:** 2019-11-07
- **Case number:** Writ-C No. 35512 of 2019
- **Bench:** Dr. Yogendra Kumar Srivastava
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/allahabad-high-court/aryavart-bank-v-appellate-auth-payment-of-gratuity-act-1972-dy-chief-labour-44913
- **Pages:** 3

## Headnote

A. Civil Law - Payment of Gratuity Act, 1972
- Section 7(7) - Ist Proviso - Limitation for
filing Appeal - Extension of time - It is only
the case where the appeal has been filed
beyond the prescribed time period of 60
days from the date of receipt of the order
passed under subsection (4), the first
proviso to sub section (7) would be
required to be invoked by filing an
application for condonation of delay -
Appellate Authority would thereafter be
required to exercise its discretion in the
matter and in case it records its satisfaction
that the appellant was prevented by
sufficient cause from preferring the appeal
within the prescribed period of 60 days, the
said period may be extended by a further
period of 60 days. (Para 12)

Held - In this view of the matter, the order
dated 05/06.08.2019 having been passed by
the Appellate Authority without consideration
of the facts relevant for deciding the issue of
limitation the same cannot be legally sustained
and is thus set aside.

Writ Petition allowed. (E-1)

## Text

4 All. Aryavart Bank Vs. Appel. Auth. Payment of Gratuity Act, 1972 & Dy. Chief Labour Commis. Kanpur & Ors. 1255
Government departments since various
Offices,
Workshops,
Parks,
Parking
places etc. have to be constructed. The
land in dispute has been found suitable for
erection
of
building
for
'Industrial
Tribunal
cum
Labour
Court'
and
construction of 'Multipurpose Building'
by A.D.A. and development whereof is
public purpose. In fact, on this aspect, no
substantial argument has been made and
in our view, resumption of land by State
is for 'public purpose'.

86. In view of above discussion, we
do not find any merit in both the petitions.
The
writ
petitions
are
accordingly
dismissed.

87. No costs.
----------
(2019)12 ILR A1255

ORIGINAL JURISDICTION
CIVIL SIDE
DATED: ALLAHABAD 07.11.2019

BEFORE
THE HON'BLE DR. YOGENDRA KUMAR
SRIVASTAVA, J.

Writ-C No. 35512 of 2019

Aryavart Bank ...Petitioner
Versus
Appellate Auth. Payment of Gratuity Act,
1972 & Dy. Chief Labour Commissioner
(Central) Kanpur & Ors. ...Respondents

Counsel for the Petitioner:
Sri Amrish Sahai

Counsel for the Respondents:
C.S.C., Sri Girish Kumar Srivastava, Sri
Chandra Bhan Gupta

A. Civil Law - Payment of Gratuity Act, 1972
- Section 7(7) - Ist Proviso - Limitation for
filing Appeal - Extension of time - It is only
the case where the appeal has been filed
beyond the prescribed time period of 60
days from the date of receipt of the order
passed under subsection (4), the first
proviso to sub section (7) would be
required to be invoked by filing an
application for condonation of delay -
Appellate Authority would thereafter be
required to exercise its discretion in the
matter and in case it records its satisfaction
that the appellant was prevented by
sufficient cause from preferring the appeal
within the prescribed period of 60 days, the
said period may be extended by a further
period of 60 days. (Para 12)

Held - In this view of the matter, the order
dated 05/06.08.2019 having been passed by
the Appellate Authority without consideration
of the facts relevant for deciding the issue of
limitation the same cannot be legally sustained
and is thus set aside.

Writ Petition allowed. (E-1)

(Delivered by Hon'ble Dr. Yogendra
Kumar Srivastava,J.)

1. Heard Sri Amrish Sahai, learned
counsel for the petitioner, Sri Girish
Kumar Srivastava, learned counsel for the
first and second respondents and Sri
Chandra Bhan Gupta, learned counsel
appearing for the third respondent.

2. Counsel for the petitioner has confined
his prayer to the prayer clause no.1 in terms of
which a challenge has been raised to the order
dated 05/06.08.2019 passed by the Appellate
Authority under the Payment of Gratuity Act,
1972/Deputy Chief Labour Commissioner
(Central), Kanpur in File No.K-36(89)2019/C.1.,
whereby the appeal under Section 7(7) of the
Payment of Gratuity Act, 19721 has been rejected
as being barred by limitation.

3. Contention of the counsel for the
petitioner is that as per the terms of
1256 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
Section 7(7) of the P.G. Act, 1972 the
limitation prescribed for filing an appeal
is 60 days from the date of receipt of the
order
under
challenge,
which
is
extendable by a further period of 60 days
upon sufficient cause being shown.

4. It is submitted that in the instant
case the application filed by the third
respondent for a direction for payment of
gratuity amount, registered as Case
No.JHS-36(23)/2018, was allowed by the
Controlling Authority under the P.G. Act,
1972/Assistant
Labour
Commissioner
(Central), Jhansi by means of an order
dated 18.03.2019, and the said order was
received by the petitioner on 09.04.2019.

5. It is further submitted that the
order dated 18.03.2019 was modified in
terms of a corrigendum bearing the same
date i.e. 18.03.2019 and this corrigendum
was received by the petitioner on
16.04.2019. Accordingly, learned counsel
for the petitioner submits that the appeal
under Section 7(7) of the P.G. Act, 1972
which had been preferred before the
Appellate Authority on 13.06.2019 was
within the period of limitation of 60 days
as provided for.

6. It is contended that the appeal
having been filed within the prescribed
period of limitation there was no occasion
for filing of an application seeking
condonation of delay and in this view of
matter the order passed by the Appellate
Authority dismissing the appeal as being
barred by limitation for the reason of nonfiling of the application for condonation
of delay, cannot be sustained.

7. Sri Chandra Bhan Gupta, learned
counsel for the third respondent raises a
dispute with regard to the date of receipt
of
the
corrigendum
order
dated
18.03.2019 and submits that there is no
material on record to demonstrate that the
appeal was filed within a period of 60
days from the date of receipt of the
corrigendum order.

8. Be that as it may, the order passed
in appeal does not show any consideration
of the facts relevant for deciding the issue
with regard to limitation so as to sustain
the conclusion drawn by the Appellate
Authority.

9. In this regard it would be apposite
to refer to the provisions contained under
sub-section (7) of Section 7 of the P.G.
Act, 1972 with regard to filing of an
appeal against an order passed under subsection (4) of Section 7. For ease of
reference sub-section (7) of Section 7 of
the P.G. Act, 1972 is being extracted
below:-

"7.
Determination
of
the
amount of Gratuity.-- x x x x x

(7) Any person aggrieved by an
order under sub-section (4), may, within
sixty days from the date of the receipt of
the order, prefer an appeal to the
appropriate Government or such other
authority as may be specified by the
appropriate Government in this behalf :

Provided that the appropriate
Government or the appellate authority, as
the case may be, may if it is satisfied that
the appellant was prevented by sufficient
cause from preferring the appeal within
the said period of sixty days, extend the
said period by a further period of sixty
days.

Provided further that no appeal
by an employer shall be admitted unless
at the time of preferring the appeal, the
appellant either produces a certificate of
4 All. Aryavart Bank Vs. Appel. Auth. Payment of Gratuity Act, 1972 & Dy. Chief Labour Commis. Kanpur & Ors. 1257
the controlling authority to the effect that
the appellant has deposited with him an
amount equal to the amount of gratuity
required to be deposited under sub-section
(4), or deposits with the appellate
authority such amount."

10. A plain reading of the
aforementioned provision indicates that
any person aggrieved by an order under
sub-section (4) of Section 7, may, within
60 days from the date of receipt of the
order, prefer an appeal to the appropriate
Government or such other Authority as
may be specified by the appropriate
Government in this behalf. In terms of the
first proviso the appropriate Government
or the Appellate Authority, as the case
may be, may if it is satisfied that the
appellant was prevented by sufficient
cause from preferring the appeal within
the said period of 60 days, extend the said
period by a further period of 60 days.

11. It is thus seen that as per terms
of sub-section (7) of Section 7 of the P.G.
Act, 1972 the prescribed limitation for
filing an appeal against an order order
under sub-section (4), is 60 days from the
date of receipt of the order, and in a case
where the appeal is preferred within the
aforesaid prescribed time period the same
would be held to be within limitation and
there would be no requirement for seeking
extension of the time period.

12. It is only the case where the
appeal has been filed beyond the
prescribed time period of 60 days from
the date of receipt of the order passed
under sub-section (4), that the first
proviso to sub-section (7) would be
required to be invoked by filing an
application for condonation of delay, and
the Appellate Authority would thereafter
be required to exercise its discretion in the
matter and in case it records its
satisfaction
that
the
appellant
was
prevented by sufficient cause from
preferring
the
appeal
within
the
prescribed period of 60 days, the said
period may be extended by a further
period of 60 days.

13. In this view of the matter, the
order dated 05/06.08.2019 having been
passed by the Appellate Authority without
consideration of the facts relevant for
deciding the issue of limitation the same
cannot be legally sustained and is thus set
aside.

14. The matter is remitted back to
the Appellate Authority for a fresh
decision in the light of the observations
made above.

15. It would be open to parties to
appear before the Appellate Authority and
make their submissions on the point of
limitation. The appeal, if found by the
Appellate
Authority
to
be
within
prescribed
period
of
limitation,
as
provided under sub-section (7) of Section
7 of the P.G. Act, 1972 may be heard and
decided on its merits thereafter.

16. It is made clear that this Court
has not expressed itself on the rival
contentions sought to be raised by the
parties, either on the point of limitation or
on merits.

17. The writ petition is allowed to
the extent indicated above.
----------
(2019)12 ILR A1257

ORIGINAL JURISDICTION
CIVIL SIDE
DATED: ALLAHABAD 23.10.2019