# Ascent Education Trust, Kanpur v. State of U.P. & Ors

- **Citation:** (2024) 8 ILRA 1041
- **Court:** High Court of Judicature at Allahabad
- **Decided:** 2024-08-23
- **Case number:** Writ - C No. 7092 of 2024
- **Bench:** Subhash Vidyarthi
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/allahabad-high-court/ascent-education-trust-kanpur-v-state-of-u-p-ors-52375
- **Pages:** 7

## Headnote

A. Revenue Law - Recovery and penalty
against payment of deficient stamp duty -
Indian Stamp Act,1899 - Section 56(1-A) -
According to generally accepted notions of
professional responsibility, lawyers should
follow the client's instructions rather than
substitute their judgment for that of the
client. In some cases, lawyers can make
decisions without consulting the client.
While in others, the decision is reserved
for the client. It is often said that the
lawyer can make decisions as to tactics
without consulting the client, while the
client has a right to make decisions that
can affect his rights. (Para 8)

Admissions of fact made by a counsel are
binding upon their principals as long as they are
unequivocal; where, however, doubt exists as to
a purported admission, the court should be wary
to accept such admissions until and unless the
counsel or the advocate is authorised by his
principal to make such admissions. Furthermore,
a client is not bound by a statement or
admission which he or his lawyer was not
authorised to make. (Para 8)

The admission in the present case was not
regarding a matter of law or legal conclusions. If
the lawyer assessed that there was no chance
1042 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
of success of the entire appeal and he decided
to restrict his prayer for waiver of the penalty, it
cannot be said that he acted absolutely without
any authority and that might be the reason as
to why the petitioner did not initiate any
proceedings against his Advocate who had given
the concession. (Para 14)

B. The principle is well settled that
statements of fact as to what transpired
at the hearing, recorded in the judgment
of the court, are conclusive of the facts so
stated and no one can contradict such
statements by affidavit or other evidence.
If a party thinks that the happenings in court
have been wrongly recorded in a judgment, it is
incumbent upon the party, while the matter is
still fresh in the minds of the Judges, to call the
attention of the very Judges who have made the
record to the fact that the statement made with
regard to his conduct was a statement that had
been made in error. That is the only way to
have the record corrected. If no such step is
taken, the matter must necessarily end there.
Of course, a party may resile and an
appellate court may permit him in rare
and appropriate cases to resile from a
concession
on
the
ground
that
the
concession
was
made
on
a
wrong
appreciation of the law and had led to
gross injustice; but, he may not call in
question the very fact of making the
concession as recorded in the judgment.
(Para 12)

The petitioner cannot be permitted to dispute
before this Court the correctness of the
happenings recorded by the appellant authority
i.e. Commissioner Lucknow Division, Lucknow in
the impugned order 09.05.2024 to the effect it
had been submitted by the learned counsel for
the petitioner that the petitioner was willing to
pay the deficient amount of stamp duty and he
was confining his prayer for waiver of the
penalty. However, it will be open for the
petitioner to move an appropriate application
before the Commissioner for disputing the
correctness of the averments recorded in the
impugned
order
and
in
case
any
such
application is filed by the petitioner, the
Commissioner
shall
decide
the
same
expeditiously, without granting any unnecessary
adjournment to any of the parties. (Para 15)
Writ petition disposed off. (E-4)

Precedent followed:

## Text

8 All. Ascent Education Trust, Kanpur Vs. State of U.P. & Ors.
1041
Ph.D. course and is bound to consider his
application for extension of period by one
year as per rules.

16. This Court further finds that the
country is making its best efforts to grow
from a developing nation to a developed
one. Repeatedly, it is said that to become a
developed nation huge research work is
required to be conducted within the
Country. Now, when the students are
pursuing their research work and are at the
verge of completion it is highly improper to
restrain
them
from
completing
their
research
on
legal
technicalities.
The
country is in dire need of research work.
Petitioner has put more than five years in
his Ph.D. course and is on the verge of
submitting the same. Now denial of benefit
of said research work to the nation in itself
would be a huge loss. In the said
circumstances also this Court is inclined to
exercise its discretionary jurisdiction in
favour of petitioner and against the
respondent University.

17.

In
the
given
facts
and
circumstances of the case, the writ petition
is allowed and the orders dated 13.12.2022
and 23.01.2023 passed by Research
Degree Committee and the Registrar,
respectively, are quashed and a mandamus
is issued to the respondent University to
consider the application of petitioner for
extension of one year after five years of
Ph.D. course and permit him to submit fees
in accordance with law. Such a decision
shall be taken and communicated to the
petitioner by the respondent University
within a period of 15 days and accordingly
petitioner shall be permitted to complete
his Ph.D. course in accordance with law.
----------
(2024) 8 ILRA 1041
ORIGINAL JURISDICTION
CIVIL SIDE
DATED: LUCKNOW 23.08.2024

BEFORE

THE HON'BLE SUBHASH VIDYARTHI, J.

Writ - C No. 7092 of 2024

Ascent Education Trust, Kanpur
 ...Petitioner
Versus
State of U.P. & Ors. ...Respondents

Counsel for the Petitioner:
Ram Raj, Gokul Seth, Hanumant Lal
Srivastava, Rishabh Raj

Counsel for the Respondents:
C.S.C.

A. Revenue Law - Recovery and penalty
against payment of deficient stamp duty -
Indian Stamp Act,1899 - Section 56(1-A) -
According to generally accepted notions of
professional responsibility, lawyers should
follow the client's instructions rather than
substitute their judgment for that of the
client. In some cases, lawyers can make
decisions without consulting the client.
While in others, the decision is reserved
for the client. It is often said that the
lawyer can make decisions as to tactics
without consulting the client, while the
client has a right to make decisions that
can affect his rights. (Para 8)

Admissions of fact made by a counsel are
binding upon their principals as long as they are
unequivocal; where, however, doubt exists as to
a purported admission, the court should be wary
to accept such admissions until and unless the
counsel or the advocate is authorised by his
principal to make such admissions. Furthermore,
a client is not bound by a statement or
admission which he or his lawyer was not
authorised to make. (Para 8)

The admission in the present case was not
regarding a matter of law or legal conclusions. If
the lawyer assessed that there was no chance
1042 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
of success of the entire appeal and he decided
to restrict his prayer for waiver of the penalty, it
cannot be said that he acted absolutely without
any authority and that might be the reason as
to why the petitioner did not initiate any
proceedings against his Advocate who had given
the concession. (Para 14)

B. The principle is well settled that
statements of fact as to what transpired
at the hearing, recorded in the judgment
of the court, are conclusive of the facts so
stated and no one can contradict such
statements by affidavit or other evidence.
If a party thinks that the happenings in court
have been wrongly recorded in a judgment, it is
incumbent upon the party, while the matter is
still fresh in the minds of the Judges, to call the
attention of the very Judges who have made the
record to the fact that the statement made with
regard to his conduct was a statement that had
been made in error. That is the only way to
have the record corrected. If no such step is
taken, the matter must necessarily end there.
Of course, a party may resile and an
appellate court may permit him in rare
and appropriate cases to resile from a
concession
on
the
ground
that
the
concession
was
made
on
a
wrong
appreciation of the law and had led to
gross injustice; but, he may not call in
question the very fact of making the
concession as recorded in the judgment.
(Para 12)

The petitioner cannot be permitted to dispute
before this Court the correctness of the
happenings recorded by the appellant authority
i.e. Commissioner Lucknow Division, Lucknow in
the impugned order 09.05.2024 to the effect it
had been submitted by the learned counsel for
the petitioner that the petitioner was willing to
pay the deficient amount of stamp duty and he
was confining his prayer for waiver of the
penalty. However, it will be open for the
petitioner to move an appropriate application
before the Commissioner for disputing the
correctness of the averments recorded in the
impugned
order
and
in
case
any
such
application is filed by the petitioner, the
Commissioner
shall
decide
the
same
expeditiously, without granting any unnecessary
adjournment to any of the parties. (Para 15)
Writ petition disposed off. (E-4)

Precedent followed:

1. Himalayan Coop. Group Housing Society Vs
Balwan Singh & ors., (2015) 7 SCC 373 (Para
8)

2. St. of Mah. Vs Ramdas Shrinivas Nayak,
(1982) 2 SCC 463 (Para 11)

3. Bhavnagar University Vs Palitana Sugar Mill
(P) Ltd., (2003) 2 SCC 111 (Para 12)

4. Roop Kumar Vs Mohan Thedani, (2003) 6
SCC 595 (Para 12)

Precedent cited:

1. Sree Surya Developers & Promoters Vs N.
Sailesh Prasad, (2022) 5 SCC 736 (Para 4)

2. B.L. Sreedhar & ors. Vs K.M. Munireddy
(Dead) & ors., (2003) 2 SCC 355 (Para 3)

3. Gurpreet Singh Vs Chatar Bhuj Goel, (1988) 1
SCC 270 (Para 6)

Present petition challenges the validity of
an order dated 12.12.2022 passed by the
Collector,
Unnao,
holding
that
the
petitioner has paid a deficient stamp-duty
on a sale-deed dated 17.07.2017 executed
in its favour and ordering recovery of a
sum of Rs. 15,24,220/- towards deficient
stamp-duty and an equal amount as
penalty. Also, challenges the validity of an
order dated 09.05.2024 passed by the
Commissioner,
Lucknow
Division,
Lucknow,
dismissing
the
petitioner's
appeal u/s 56 (1-A) of the Indian Stamp
Act filed against the aforesaid order
passed by the Collector.

(Delivered by Hon'ble Subhash Vidyarthi, J.)

1. Heard Sri Rishabh Raj Advocate,
the learned counsel for the petitioner and
Sri Hemant Kumar Pandey, the learned
Standing Counsel representing all the
opposite parties.
8 All. Ascent Education Trust, Kanpur Vs. State of U.P. & Ors.
1043
2. By means of the instant Writ
Petition filed under Article 226 of the
Constitution of India, the petitioner has
challenged the validity of an order dated
12.12.2022 passed by the Collector, Unnao,
holding that the petitioner has paid a
deficient stamp-duty on a sale-deed dated
17.07.2017 executed in its favour and
ordering recovery of a sum of Rs.
15,24,220/- towards deficient stamp-duty
and an equal amount as penalty. The
petitioner has also challenged the validity
of an order dated 09.05.2024 passed by the
Commissioner,
Lucknow
Division,
Lucknow,
dismissing
the
petitioner's
appeal under Section 56 (1-A) of the Indian
Stamp Act filed against the aforesaid order
passed by the Collector.

3. The learned Standing Counsel has
raised a preliminary objection that in the
order dated 09.05.2024 passed by the
Commissioner
Lucknow
Division,
Lucknow, it is recorded that it was stated
on behalf of the petitioner-appellant that
the penalty of Rs. 15,24,220/- imposed by
the Collector, Unnao be waived and the
appellant was ready to deposit the amount
of deficient stamp duty i.e. Rs. 15,24,220/-.
He has submitted when the order was
passed accepting the offer made on behalf
of the petitioner itself, it is not open for the
petitioner to turn around and challenge the
validity of the order. In support of his
support of his submission, the learned
Standing Counsel relied upon a judgment
of Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of B.
L. Sreedhar and others Vs. K.M.
Munireddy (Dead) and others: (2003) 2
SCC 355, wherein it has been held that: -

"13. Estoppel
is
a
rule
of
evidence and the general rule is enacted in
Section 115 of the Indian Evidence Act,
1872 (in short "the Evidence Act") which
lays down that when one person has by his
declaration, act or omission caused or
permitted another person to believe a thing
to be true and to act upon that belief,
neither he nor his representative shall be
allowed in any suit or proceeding between
himself
and
such
person
or
his
representative to deny the truth of that
thing. (See Sunderabai v. Devaji Shankar
Deshpande AIR 1954 SC 82.)

14. "Estoppel is when one is
concluded and forbidden in law to speak
against his own act or deed, yea, though it
be to say the truth" - Co Litt 352(a), cited
in Ashpitel v. Bryan [(1863) 3 B & S 474 :
122 ER 179 : 32 LJQB 91] B & S at p.
489; Simm v. Anglo American Telegraph
Co. [(1879) 5 QBD 188 : 49 LJQB 392 : 42
LT 37 (CA)] , per Bramwell, L.J. at p.
202; Halsbury, Vol. 13, para 488. So there
is said to be an estoppel where a party is
not allowed to say that a certain statement
of fact is untrue, whether in reality it be
true or not. Estoppel, or conclusion, as it is
frequently called by the older authorities,
may therefore be defined as a disability
whereby a party is precluded from alleging
or proving in legal proceedings that a fact
is otherwise than it has been made to
appear by the matter giving rise to that
disability. (Halsbury, Vol. 13, para 448)
The rule on the subject is thus laid down by
Lord Denman, in Pickard v. Sears [(1837)
6 Ad & El 469 : 112 ER 179] Ad & E at p.
474 : ER p. 181

 "But the rule of law is clear, that,
where one by his words or conduct wilfully
causes another to believe the existence of a
certain state of things, and induces him to
act on that belief, so as to alter his own
previous position, the former is concluded
from averring against the latter a different
state of things as existing at the same
time;"
1044 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES

"The whole doctrine of estoppel
of this kind, which is a fictitious statement
treated as true, might have been founded in
reason, but I am not sure that it was. There
is another kind of estoppel - estoppel by
representation - which is founded upon
reason and it is founded upon decision
also." Per Jessel, M.R. in General Finance
& Co. v. Liberator [(1878) 10 Ch D 15 :
(1874-80) All ER Rep Ext 1597 : 39 LT
600] , Ch D at p. 20.

See
also
in Simm v. Anglo
American Telegraph Co. [(1879) 5 QBD
188 : 49 LJQB 392 : 42 LT 37 (CA)] , QBD
at p. 202 where Bramwell, L.J. said "An
estoppel is said to exist where a person is
compelled to admit that to be true which is
not true, and to act upon a theory which is
contrary to the truth."

15. On the whole, an estoppel
seems to be when, in consequences of some
previous act or statement to which he is
either party or privy, a person is precluded
from showing the existence of a particular
state of facts. Estoppel is based on the
maxim allegans
contraria
non
est
audiendus (a party is not to be heard to
allege the contrary) and is that species of
presumption juries et de jure (absolute or
conclusive or irrebuttable presumption),
where the fact presumed is taken to be true,
not as against all the world, but against a
particular party, and that only by reason of
some act done, it is in truth a kind
of argumentum ad hominem."

4. The learned Standing Counsel has
also relied upon a decision in the case of
Sree Surya Developers & Promoters v.
N. Sailesh Prasad: (2022) 5 SCC 736,
wherein the Hon'ble Supreme Court
referred to some precedents and held that
the only remedy available to a party to a
consent decree to avoid such consent
decree, is to approach the court which
recorded the compromise and made a
decree in terms of it, and establish that
there was no compromise. In that event, the
court which recorded the compromise will
itself consider and decide the question as to
whether there was a valid compromise or
not. A party to a consent decree based on a
compromise to challenge the compromise
decree on the ground that the decree was
not lawful i.e. it was void or voidable has to
approach the same court, which recorded
the compromise and a separate suit
challenging the consent decree has been
held to be not maintainable.

5. Replying to the aforesaid objection
raised by the learned Standing Counsel, Sri.
Rishabh Raj, the learned counsel for the
petitioner has submitted that the aforesaid
observations were made by the Hon'ble
Supreme Court in the light of the factual
background where the validity of the
consent decree passed under Order XXIII
C.P.C. Rule 3 C.P.C. was under challenge,
which is not the case here.

6. Learned counsel for the petitioner
has relied upon a decision of Hon'ble the
Supreme Court in the case of Gurpreet
Singh Vs. Chatar Bhuj Goel: (1988) 1
SCC 270 wherein Hon'ble Supreme Court
held that: -

"10. Under Rule 3 as it now
stands, when a claim in suit has been
adjusted wholly or in part by any lawful
agreement or compromise, the compromise
must be in writing and signed by the parties
and there must be a completed agreement
between them. To constitute an adjustment,
the agreement or compromise must itself be
capable of being embodied in a decree.
When the parties enter into a compromise
during the hearing of a suit or appeal,
there is no reason why the requirement that
8 All. Ascent Education Trust, Kanpur Vs. State of U.P. & Ors.
1045
the compromise should be reduced in
writing in the form of an instrument signed
by the parties should be dispensed with.
The court must therefore insist upon the
parties to reduce the terms into writing."

7. Learned counsel for the petitioner
has submitted that in the present case,
neither was an agreement of compromise
signed between the parties, nor has any
decree been passed on the basis of any
compromise. Therefore, the decision in the
case of Sree Surya Developers and
Promoters (Supra) will not apply to the
facts of the present case. The learned
Counsel for the petitioner has submitted
that the petitioner has not given in writing
that it was foregoing the challenge to the
imposition of additional stamp-duty.

8. The learned Counsel for the
petitioner also relied upon a decision of
Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of
Himalayan
Coop.
Group
Housing
Society Vs. Balwan Singh and others:
(2015) 7 SCC 373 wherein Hon'ble
Supreme Court has held that: -

"32. Generally,
admissions
of
fact made by a counsel are binding upon
their principals as long as they are
unequivocal; where, however, doubt exists
as to a purported admission, the court
should be wary to accept such admissions
until and unless the counsel or the advocate
is authorised by his principal to make such
admissions. Furthermore, a client is not
bound by a statement or admission which
he or his lawyer was not authorised to
make. A lawyer generally has no implied or
apparent authority to make an admission
or
statement
which
would
directly
surrender or conclude the substantial legal
rights of the client unless such an
admission or statement is clearly a proper
step in accomplishing the purpose for
which the lawyer was employed. We hasten
to add neither the client nor the court is
bound by the lawyer's statements or
admissions as to matters of law or legal
conclusions. Thus, according to generally
accepted
notions
of
professional
responsibility, lawyers should follow the
client's instructions rather than substitute
their judgment for that of the client. We
may add that in some cases, lawyers can
make decisions without consulting the
client. While in others, the decision is
reserved for the client. It is often said that
the lawyer can make decisions as to tactics
without consulting the client, while the
client has a right to make decisions that
can affect his rights."

9. The learned Counsel for the
petitioner has submitted that the petitioner
had not instructed its Counsel to forego the
challenge to imposition of additional
stamp-duty and it is not bound by the
concession given by the Counsel.

10. I have considered the aforesaid
submissions
advance
by
the
learned
counsel for the parties and the case law
relied upon by them. I now proceed to refer
to some precedents which are relevant for
the present case.

11. In State of Maharashtra v.
Ramdas Shrinivas Nayak: (1982) 2 SCC
463, the High Court had recorded a
concession made by the learned Counsel
for the State of Maharashtra. The Counsel
intervened
and
protested
before
the
Hon'ble Supreme Court that he never made
any such concession and invited the
Hon'ble Supreme Court to peruse the
written submissions made by him in the
High Court. Rejecting this contention, the
Hon'ble Supreme Court held that: -
1046 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES

"4. ...We are afraid that we
cannot launch into an enquiry as to what
transpired in the High Court. It is simply
not done. Public policy bars us. Judicial
decorum restrains us. Matters of judicial
record are unquestionable. They are not
open to doubt. Judges cannot be dragged
into the arena. "Judgments cannot be
treated as mere counters in the game of
litigation."
[Per
Lord
Atkinson
in Somasundaram
Chetty v. Subramanian
Chetty, AIR 1926 PC 136] We are bound to
accept the statement of the Judges recorded
in their judgment, as to what transpired in
court. We cannot allow the statement of the
Judges to be contradicted by statements at
the Bar or by affidavit and other evidence.
If the Judges say in their judgment that
something was done, said or admitted
before them, that has to be the last word on
the subject. The principle is well-settled
that statements of fact as to what transpired
at the hearing, recorded in the judgment of
the court, are conclusive of the facts so
stated and no one can contradict such
statements by affidavit or other evidence. If
a party thinks that the happenings in court
have been wrongly recorded in a judgment,
it is incumbent upon the party, while the
matter is still fresh in the minds of the
Judges, to call the attention of the very
Judges who have made the record to the
fact that the statement made with regard to
his conduct was a statement that had been
made in error. [Per Lord Buckmaster
in Madhu Sudan Chowdhri v. Chandrabati
Chowdhrain, AIR 1917 PC 30] That is the
only way to have the record corrected. If no
such step is taken, the matter must
necessarily end there. Of course a party
may resile and an appellate court may
permit him in rare and appropriate cases to
resile from a concession on the ground that
the concession was made on a wrong
appreciation of the law and had led to
gross injustice; but, he may not call in
question the very fact of making the
concession as recorded in the judgment."

12. In Bhavnagar University v.
Palitana Sugar Mill (P) Ltd.: (2003) 2
SCC 111, the Hon'ble Supreme Court held
that: -

"61. ...We are bound to accept
the statement of the Judges recorded in
their judgment, as to what transpired in
court. We cannot allow the statement of the
Judges to be contradicted by statements at
the Bar or by affidavit and other evidence.
If the Judges say in their judgment that
something was done, said or admitted
before them, that has to be the last word on
the subject. The principle is well settled
that statements of fact as to what transpired
at the hearing, recorded in the judgment of
the court, are conclusive of the facts so
stated and no one can contradict such
statements by affidavit or other evidence. If
a party thinks that the happenings in court
have been wrongly recorded in a judgment,
it is incumbent upon the party, while the
matter is still fresh in the minds of the
Judges, to call the attention of the very
Judges who have made the record to the
fact that the statement made with regard to
his conduct was a statement that had been
made in error (Per Lord Buckmaster
in Madhu Sudan Chowdhri v. Chandrabati
Chowdhrain [AIR 1917 PC 30 : 21 CWN
897] .) That is the only way to have the
record corrected. If no such step is taken,
the matter must necessarily end there. Of
course a party may resile and an appellate
court may permit him in rare and
appropriate
cases
to
resile
from
a
concession
on
the
ground
that
the
concession
was
made
on
a
wrong
appreciation of the law and had led to
gross injustice; but, he may not call in
8 All. M/S Hi Tech Pipe Ltd. Vs. State of U.P. & Ors.
1047
question the very fact of making the
concession as recorded in the judgment."

12. The Hon'ble Supreme Court reiterated
the above mentioned principle in Roop Kumar
v. Mohan Thedani, (2003) 6 SCC 595 by
stating that: -

"11. ... It is to be noted that the parties
agreed before the High Court that instead of
remanding the matter to the trial court, it should
consider materials on record and render a
verdict. After having done so, it is not open to the
appellant to turn around or take a plea that no
concession was given. This is clearly a case of
sitting on the fence, and is not to be encouraged.
If really there was no concession, the only course
open to the appellant was to move the High
Court in line with what has been said in State of
Maharashtra v. Ramdas
Shrinivas
Nayak [(1982) 2 SCC 463 : 1982 SCC (Cri)
478] . In a recent decision Bhavnagar
University v. Palitana
Sugar
Mill
(P)
Ltd. [(2003) 2 SCC 111 : 2002 AIR SCW
4939]..."

13. So far as the petitioner's contention
based on the judgment in the case of Himalayan
Coop. Group Housing Society (Supra) is
concerned, in the aforesaid case it has been held
that generally, admissions of fact made by a
counsel are binding upon the client as long as
they are unequivocal but the client or the court is
not bound by the lawyer's statements or
admissions as to matters of law or legal
conclusions. The admission in the present case
was not regarding a matter of law or legal
conclusions. The Hon'ble Supreme Court has
held that in some cases, lawyers can make
decisions without consulting the client, while in
others, the decision is reserved for the client. The
lawyer can make decisions as to tactics without
consulting the client, while the client has a right
to make decisions that can affect his rights.
Therefore, if the lawyer assessed that there was
no chance of success of the entire appeal and he
decided to restrict his prayer for waiver of the
penalty, it cannot be said that he acted absolutely
without any authority and that might be the
reason as to why the petitioner did not initiate
any proceedings against his Advocate who had
given the concession.

14. In view of the aforesaid discussion,
I am of the considered view that the petitioner
cannot be permitted to dispute before this Court
the correctness of the happenings recorded by the
appellant authority i.e. Commissioner Lucknow
Division, Lucknow in the impugned order
09.05.2024 to the effect it had been submitted by
the learned counsel for the petitioner that the
petitioner was willing to pay the deficient
amount of stamp duty and he was confining his
prayer for waiver of the penalty. However, it will
be open for the petitioner to move an appropriate
application before the Commissioner Lucknow
Division, Lucknow for disputing the correctness
of the averments recorded in the impugned order
and in case any such application is filed by the
petitioner,
the
Commissioner,
Lucknow
Division, Lucknow shall decide the same
expeditiously, without granting any unnecessary
adjournment to any of the parties.

15. The writ petition is disposed off in light
of the aforesaid observations.
----------
(2024) 8 ILRA 1047
ORIGINAL JURISDICTION
CIVIL SIDE
DATED: ALLAHABAD 05.08.2024

BEFORE

THE HON'BLE SHEKHAR B. SARAF, J.
THE HON'BLE MANJIVE SHUKLA, J.

Writ - C No. 11037 of 2024

M/S Hi Tech Pipe Ltd. ...Petitioner
Versus
State of U.P. & Ors. ...Respondents