# Ashish Revisionist v. Saleem

- **Citation:** (2016) 5 ILRA 1350
- **Court:** High Court of Judicature at Allahabad
- **Decided:** 2016-05-27
- **Bench:** Manoj Misra
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/allahabad-high-court/ashish-revisionist-v-saleem-43746
- **Pages:** 11

## Text

1350 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
7. I have heard learned Standing Counsel appearing on behalf of review petitioners and learned
Counsel for the writ petitioners/respondents.

8. A perusal of the order under review reveals that writ petition No. 286 of 2015 (S/S) was allowed
in terms of Bhuneshwar Rai (supra) on the submission of the learned Counsel for the writ petitioners that
controversy involved in the writ petition has already been settled by a Division Bench of this Court in
Bhuneshwar Rai (supra) and the learned Standing Counsel does not dispute the assertion of the Counsel for
the petitioner.

9. It is not in dispute that the issue involved in the writ petition was with respect to counting of
services rendered in the work charged establishment for the purpose of grant of ACP. This issue has already
been answered by the Full Bench of this Court in Babu @ Babu Ram (supra), wherein the Full Bench has
held as under :

"We therefore hold that the period of service spent in a work charged establishment is not
liable to be countenanced for the purposes of computing qualifying service. The law in this regard stands
correctly declared and elucidated in Jai Prakash, Navrang Lal Srivastava and Ram Nagina. The decision in
Panchu and the other judgments of this Court which have followed the line of reasoning adopted therein shall
accordingly stand overruled."

10. From perusal of the aforesaid judgment of the Full Bench of this Court, it is crystal clear that the
period of service spent in a work charged establishment is not liable to be countenanced for the purposes of
computing qualifying service. Therefore, the plea of the writ petitioners/ respondents is not sustainable and,
accordingly, the order under review is liable to be recalled.

11. For the reasons aforesaid, the review petition is allowed. The judgment and order dated
19.2.2015 is recalled. The writ petition lacks merit and is, accordingly, dismissed.

12. Costs easy.
---------
REVISIONAL JURISDICTION
CIVIL SIDE
DATED: ALLAHABAD 27.05.2016

BEFORE

THE HON'BLE MANOJ MISRA, J.

S.C.C. Revision No.- 111 Of 2016

Ashish
 ...Revisionist
Versus
Saleem ...Opposite Party
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Counsel for Revisionist:
Satish Mandhyan, B.D. Mandhyan, Om Prakash

Counsel for Opposite Party:
Tapan Kumar Mishra, Utpal Chaterji.

Transfer of Property Act, 1882 - Section 106 - Section 107 (as amended by U.P. Act No. 57 of
1976) - Registration Act, 1908 - Section 17(1)(d) - Evidence Act, 1872 - Section 116 -
Landlord and tenant - Eviction - Month-to-month tenancy - Unregistered rent agreement -
Admissibility - Joint tenancy - Notice to one joint tenant - Non-joinder of parties - Coowner's right to sue.

Suit for eviction, arrears of rent and damages - Decreed by trial court - Revision by tenant.

Held, where tenancy is month-to-month and not from year to year, nor for a term exceeding one year, nor
reserving yearly rent, a written rent agreement does not require compulsory registration in view of Section
107 of the Transfer of Property Act as amended by U.P. Act No. 57 of 1976 read with Section 17(1)(d) of the
Registration Act.

Held, mere clause providing for revision of rent after expiry of three years does not create a lease for a period
exceeding one year so as to attract compulsory registration.
Held, unregistered rent agreement creating a month-to-month tenancy, accompanied by delivery of
possession, is admissible in evidence and can be relied upon to establish relationship of landlord and tenant.

Held, tenant having admitted execution of rent agreement and payment of rent thereunder is estopped under
Section 116 of the Evidence Act from denying title of landlord.
Held, service of notice terminating tenancy under Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act on one of the
joint tenants is sufficient in law and suit against one joint tenant alone is not bad for non-joinder of remaining
joint tenants.

Held, suit by one co-owner/landlord for eviction of tenant is maintainable and notice issued by one co-owner
is valid, particularly when other co-owners had accepted such arrangement or tenant entered into agreement
with such co-owner.
Held, findings of trial court based on oral and documentary evidence do not suffer from perversity or legal
infirmity warranting interference in revision.

Revision dismissed - Time granted to tenant to vacate subject to deposit of decretal dues and
filing of undertaking - Default to render decree executable and liable for contempt.

Case Listed
Gurdayal Saran Prasad v. District Judge, Dehradun and others: 1997 (2) ARC 535
Board of Basic Education, U.P. Allahabad and another v. VIth Additional District & Sessions
Judge, Kanpur Nagar & Ors.: 2007 (3) JCLR 391 (All)
Zarif Ahmad and another v. Satish Kumar and another : 1983 ARC 422
Syed Ahmad Ali and others v. Shafiq Ahmad: 1991 (2) ARC 90
Ram Swarup Jain v. Sri Janki Devi Bhagat Trust : AIR 1974 All 424
Budh Sen v. Sheel Chandra Agarwal and others : 1977 ARC 384
Kasthuri Radhakrishnan & others versus M. Chinniyan & another : (2016) 3 SCC 296
Girraj Kishore V. Dr. Trilok Nath Vimal : 1988 (2) ARC 178
Smt. Ram Pyari & others v. VIth Addl. District Judge, Agra & others: 1997 (1) ARC 255.
1352 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
Sube Deen v.Satyawati Devi and another 1996 (28) ALR 415
Satish Kumar v. Zarif Ahmed, (1997) 3 SCC 679,

(Delivered by Hon'ble Manoj Misra, J.)

1. This is defendant's revision against the judgment and decree dated 05.02.2016 passed by the
Additional District Judge, Court No.18, Meerut in SCC Suit No. 10 of 2013 (hereinafter referred to
as the suit) by which the plaintiff's suit for possession after eviction of the defendant and for
payment of arrears of rent and damages has been decreed.

2. The suit was instituted, inter alia, for possession; recovery of arrears of rent for the period
up to 30.12.2012; and for damages at the rate of Rs. 150/- per day with effect from 31.12.2012 up
to the date of delivery of possession by the plaintiff-respondent against defendant-revisionist
alleging that the plaintiff was exclusive owner-landlord of the shop in dispute of which the
defendant was a tenant on rent of Rs. 2,500/- per month, inclusive of water tax and house tax. It
was pleaded that the tenancy was a month to month tenancy commencing from the first day of the
month and terminating on the last day of the month and as the rent was higher than Rs. 2,000/- per
month, the provisions of U.P. Act No. 13 of 1972 were not applicable. It was pleaded that the
defendant-revisionist had paid rent only up to the month of January, 2009 and, thereafter, the rent
was not paid despite repeated demand. It was pleaded that by a composite notice dated 29.11.2012
of demand as well as termination of tenancy, under Section 106 of Transfer of Property Act, which
was served on the defendant on 30.11.2012, the tenancy was terminated with effect from
30.12.2012 and, thereafter, the defendant was liable to pay damages with effect from 31.12.2012 at
the rate of Rs. 150/- per day. It was pleaded that upon receipt of notice, the defendant sent a wrong
reply dated 17.12.2012 which was replied by notice dated 24.01.2013.

3. The defendant contested the suit by filing written statement claiming that the plaintiff was
not the exclusive owner/landlord of the premises in dispute. The owners were Sabbir Ahmad
(father of the plaintiff), Irshad Ahmad and Amir Ahmad and that the defendant was a tenant on
their behalf on rent of Rs.2500/- p.m. inclusive of taxes. It was admitted that the tenancy was a
month to month tenancy, commencing from the first day of the English calender month and ending
on the last day of the month. It was claimed that the defendant had paid rent up to March, 2013 to
the co-owner Irshad Ahmad, who had also issued receipt to the defendant. It was claimed that the
plaintiff alone had no right to terminate the tenancy and as such the notice terminating tenancy was
invalid.

4. In the additional pleas, it was stated that Sabbir Ahmad, Amir Ahmad and Irshad Ahmad
had jointly let out the shop to the defendant initially on rent of Rs. 1,300/- per month and it was
agreed that Rs. 100/- per month would be payable towards house tax and water tax. It was claimed
that all the joint owners had agreed that the rent of the premises be paid to Saleem (the plaintiff)
and on the basis of such agreement, the rent up to the month of January, 2009 was paid by the
defendant to the plaintiff. Thereafter, the rent was agreed to be paid at the rate of Rs.2500/- p.m.
and it was also agreed between the co-owners that the defendant would pay rent to co-owner Irshad
5 All. Ashish Vs Saleem

1353
Ahmad, as a result the defendant had since been paying rent to Irshad Ahmad. In the additional
pleas, it was also stated that the shop in dispute was taken by the defendant and Sandeep Kumar
jointly and, therefore, the suit was bad for non-joinder of Sandeep Kumar who was a necessary
party. It was claimed that when the shop was taken on rent, Sabbir Ahmad, the father of the
plaintiff, was alive though, later, he died on 28.05.2012, and, on his death, the plaintiff (Saleem)
and his brother (Nasir) became owners in respect of his share. Likewise, the other co-owner Amir
Ahmad died and, on his death, his sons Akhlakh, Sartaz, Shahid and Iqbal became co-owners. In
the meantime, Iqbal also died, and, on his death, his wife Sanjida and sons Rashid, Sajid, Khalid,
Abid, Zahid and Haroon became co-owners, who, all nominated Irshad Ahmad to receive rent of
the accommodation in dispute. It was thus claimed that the suit was bad for non-joinder of the
remaining co-owners. It was also claimed that there was a dispute between the plaintiff and his
brother Nasir in connection with which Original Suit No. 26 of 2012 was instituted which was
pending.

5. On the pleadings of the parties, the trial court framed as many as seven points for
consideration:

(i) Whether there was a landlord-tenant relationship between the plaintiff and defendant?

(ii) Whether the defendant had been a defaulter in payment of rent for which he is liable
to be evicted?

(iii) Whether the notice terminating tenancy was valid and was duly served on the
defendant?

(iv) Whether U.P. Act No.13 of 1972 is applicable on the premises?

(v) Whether plaintiff had denied title of the landlord and the landlord had not condoned
the said conduct?

(vi) Whether the suit is bad for non-joinder of necessary party?

(vii) To what relief the plaintiff is entitled to?

6. The court below on point no. 1, by placing reliance on paper no. 26 Ga (Annexure No.SA-1
to the Second Supplementary Affidavit), which was a rent agreement entered into between the
plaintiff - Saleem Ahmad and the defendant Ashish Kumar along with his father Sandeep Kumar,
and the oral evidence led during the course of the trial came to a conclusion that there was
landlord-tenant relationship between the plaintiff and the defendant. It is noteworthy that the
defendant had admitted his signature on the said rent agreement. The court below further found that
Amir Ahmad and Irshad Ahmad who, according to the defendant, were co-owners of the
accommodation in dispute along with Sabbir Ahmad (father of the plaintiff), had signed at the
margin of the rent agreement by writing that they are bound by the rent agreement. The court below
1354 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
also found that the plaintiff was son of Sabbir Ahmad who died leaving plaintiff and his brother
Nasir as his heirs and that a compromise decree had been passed in Original Suit No. 1036 of 2011.
The court below further held that it was proved by the rent receipts 65 Ga/1 to 65 Ga/4 that initially
the rent was paid from 30.01.2004 up to 30.08.2005 to the plaintiff and that the rent receipts
produced by the defendant, showing payment to Irshad, were of the period 2014 onwards and few
receipts were of the period starting from July 2012 to January 2013. Accordingly, after
consideration of the entire evidence, the court below found that since inception of the tenancy the
defendant had paid rent to the plaintiff pursuant to the rent agreement, but from January 2009,
without any good reason, he started paying rent to Irshad Ahmad. It held that there was a landlordtenant relationship between the plaintiff and the defendant.

7. On the question of default, the court below found that there was no evidence to show that
from January, 2009, the defendant had paid rent to the plaintiff, accordingly, a finding was returned
that from January, 2009, the defendant had been a defaulter in payment of rent. In respect of
validity of notice, the court below found that the notice terminating tenancy was valid and its
service was never in dispute. With regard to the applicability of U.P. Act No. 13 of 1972, the Court
below observed that as admittedly the rent of the premises in question was higher than Rs. 2,000/-
per month, the U.P. Act No. 13 of 1972 was not applicable.

8. On point no.5, the court below found that the defendant had produced no reliable evidence
to show that Irshad Ahmad was the owner/landlord of the premises in question and since the
defendant had denied the title of the landlord and it had been found that there was landlord-tenant
relationship between the plaintiff and the defendant, the defendant was liable for eviction also on
ground of denial of title.

9. On point no.6, the court below found that the suit was not bad for non-joinder of necessary
party inasmuch as Ashish Kumar (the defendant) had admitted in his cross-examination that in the
rent receipts he alone was shown as a tenant because he alone was the tenant and not his father. The
court below further observed that the rent agreement created a joint tenancy, therefore, the suit,
even if instituted against one of the joint tenants, would not be bad for non-joinder of the other joint
tenant. After returning findings, as above, the suit was decreed.

10. Sri B.D. Mandhyan, learned senior counsel assisted by Sri Om Prakash, for the revisionist,
submitted that the plaintiff was not an exclusive owner/landlord therefore neither the notice
terminating tenancy nor the suit was lawful without joining other co-owners and the finding to the
contrary returned by the court below by placing reliance on the rent agreement (paper no. 26 Ga)
was not legally justified, because clause 8 of the rent agreement suggested that it created tenancy
for a period exceeding one year and since it was an unregistered document, the same was not
admissible in evidence. Therefore the findings returned by the court below, by placing reliance on
the said rent agreement, are vitiated in law. It was submitted in the alternative that if the rent
agreement is accepted, then the defendant Ashish Kumar and his father Sandeep Kumar were both
tenants in common therefore the suit instituted by impleading Ashish Kumar alone was bad for
non-joinder of necessary party and was liable to be dismissed. It was also submitted that mere
5 All. Ashish Vs Saleem

1355
receiving of rent on behalf of other co-owners would not confer the right of landlord on the plaintiff
and the rent agreement, even if accepted, would only confer a right to receive rent by the plaintiff
on behalf of other co-owners and, as such, in his individual capacity, the plaintiff neither had right
to terminate the tenancy nor to institute the suit without joining the other co-owners. In support of
the above submission, the learned counsel for the revisionist placed reliance on decisions of this
Court in the cases of Gurdayal Saran Prasad v. District Judge, Dehradun and others: 1997 (2)
ARC 535; Board of Basic Education, U.P. Allahabad and another v. VIth Additional District &
Sessions Judge, Kanpur Nagar & Ors.: 2007 (3) JCLR 391 (All). He further placed reliance on a
decision of a Division Bench of this Court in the case of Zarif Ahmad and another v. Satish
Kumar and another : 1983 ARC 422 so as to contend that where the lease agreement is in writing,
even if it is for a period of less than a year, it must be registered in view of Section 107 of the
Transfer of Property Act and if not so registered, it cannot be read in evidence other than for
collateral purposes. Relying on the same judgment, it has been contended that relationship of
landlord and tenant, the rate of rent, period for which the original lease had been granted, are not
the purposes which can be said to be collateral. A decision of this Court in the case of Syed Ahmad
Ali and others v. Shafiq Ahmad: 1991 (2) ARC 90 has also been relied to urge that an unregistered
agreement of lease is not admissible in evidence except for collateral purposes. Reliance has also
been placed on a decision of this Court in Ram Swarup Jain v. Sri Janki Devi Bhagat Trust : AIR
1974 All 424 so as to contend that document of lease for a period of twelve months or less, must be
registered and cannot be received in evidence unless it is registered. Reliance was also placed on a
Division Bench decision of this Court in the case of Budh Sen v. Sheel Chandra Agarwal and
others : 1977 ARC 384 so as to contend that non-joinder of a co-tenant and institution of suit only
against one of the tenants in common is bad in law.

11. Per contra, Sri Utpal Chatterji, learned counsel for the plaintiff-respondent, submitted that
the tenancy was evidenced by a rent agreement in which it was specifically provided that the first
party Saleem Ahmad son of Shabbir Ahmad, the plaintiff, had got the shops constructed by the
name of Chaudhary Market and that the second party had taken the premises on rent from the first
party on a rent of Rs. 1,300/- per month and, on the building, the provisions of U.P. Act No. 13 of
1972 were not applicable. In clause 1 of the rent agreement, it was specifically provided that the
tenancy was a month to month tenancy beginning from the first day of the month and terminating
on the last day of the month and as, by the rent agreement, no tenancy right for a term exceeding
one year was created, the rent agreement did not require compulsory registration. He further
submitted that it is well settled in law that notice terminating tenancy served on anyone of the joint
tenant is good enough to terminate the tenancy and likewise the suit against any one of the joint
tenant is not bad for non joinder of necessary party. It has been submitted by him that the decisions
which have been relied by the learned counsel for the revisionist that if a lease is in writing, even if
it is for a period of less than a year, it would require compulsory registration, do not deal with the
U.P. Amendment carried out by U.P. Act No. 57 of 1976, with effect from 01.01.1977, to the
second paragraph of section 107 of the Transfer of Property Act. It has been submitted that by U.P.
Amendment, the second paragraph, as it occurs in section 107 of the Transfer of Property Act, has
been substituted and therefore Section 107 of the Transfer of Property Act, as applicable in the
State of Uttar Pradesh, would read as follows:-
1356 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES

Section 107--" A lease of immovable property from year to year, or for any term
exceeding one year, or reserving a yearly rent, can be made only by a registered instrument.

All other leases of immovable property may be made either by a registered instrument or,
by an agreement, oral or written, accompanied by delivery of possession (substituted by U.P. Act
No. 57 of 1976, section 31, with effect from 01.01.1977)."

12. The second paragraph of section 107 of the Transfer of Property Act, before its
substitution by the U.P. Amendment, read as follows:-

"All other leases of immovable property may be made either by a registered instrument or
by oral agreement accompanied by delivery of possession."

13. It has been submitted that the decisions which have been cited by the learned counsel for
the applicant do not deal with U.P. Amendment which specifically provided that leases, other than
those contemplated by paragraph 1 of section 107 of the Transfer of Property Act, of immovable
property may be made either by a registered agreement or by an agreement, oral or written,
accompanied by delivery of possession meaning thereby that if a lease of immovable property is
not a lease from year to year, or for any term exceeding one year or reserving yearly rent, can be
made by a registered instrument, or by an oral agreement, or by a written agreement, accompanied
by delivery of possession. It has been submitted that since the term of the lease in question was not
for a period exceeding one year and it was a month to month tenancy without reserving yearly rent,
the rent agreement did not require compulsory registration under Section 107 of the Transfer of
Property Act.

14. Sri Utpal Chatterji further submitted that mere statement in the rent agreement that the rent
would be revisable after three years would not mean that the rent agreement confers lease hold
rights of a term exceeding one year and above, inasmuch as by the rent agreement, the tenancy was
specifically a month to month tenancy, without specifying any fixed term of the tenancy, which
was terminable, as would be clear from clause 10 thereof, therefore, the rent agreement did not
require compulsory registration in view of Section 107 of the Transfer of Property Act and, as such,
it was admissible in evidence and the court below rightly placed reliance on the same.

15. Sri Utpal Chatterji further submitted that so far as the dispute with regard to title is
concerned, the same cannot be raised at the instance of the defendant because he was bound by the
terms of the agreement in which it was specifically stated that the constructions of the premises
were raised by the plaintiff (first party in the agreement) and that the second party had demanded
the premises on lease from the first party which was leased by the first party on a month to month
tenancy therefore, by virtue of section 116 of the Indian Evidence Act, till the defendant vacated
the premises, he was estopped from denying the title of the landlord. It was further submitted that
from the rent agreement itself it was clear that the alleged other co-owners had signed on the
margin of the agreement stating that they were bound by the terms of the agreement. Meaning
5 All. Ashish Vs Saleem

1357
thereby that they had accepted the plaintiff to be landlord qua the defendant in respect of the
premises in question.

16. Sri Utpal Chaterji pointed out that the non-joinder of the father of the defendant as a
defendant in the suit would not have made any material difference inasmuch as the defendant
during his cross-examination had admitted that he alone was the tenant and had alone been paying
the rent to the landlord and, therefore, only his name was reflected in the rent receipt. It has also
been submitted that service of notice on anyone of the joint tenants is sufficient to terminate the
tenancy and a suit instituted against anyone of the joint tenants is not bad for non-joinder of the
remaining joint tenants. It was submitted that from the rent agreement, it is clear that there was
unity of title and possession and a joint tenancy was created and therefore the suit was not bad for
non-joinder of necessary party and that the findings returned by the court below are well considered
and they do not call for any interference inasmuch as the entire evidence on record has been
considered and discussed by the court below. He further submitted that assuming though not
admitting that there were other co-owners of the property, neither the notice issued on behalf of a
single co-owner nor the suit by any one of the co-owners would be bad in law. In support of his
contentions he placed reliance on decision of the apex court in the case of Kasthuri
Radhakrishnan & others versus M. Chinniyan & another : (2016) 3 SCC 296; and that of this
court in Girraj Kishore V. Dr. Trilok Nath Vimal : 1988 (2) ARC 178; and Smt. Ram Pyari &
others v. VIth Addl. District Judge, Agra & others: 1997 (1) ARC 255.

17. I have given thoughtful consideration to the submissions of the learned counsel for the
parties.

18. The first point that calls for consideration is whether the rent agreement (paper no. 26 Ga)
was admissible in evidence or not. According to the learned counsel for the revisionist, the rent
agreement was not admissible and therefore finding based on the said agreement is vitiated. He
claims that the rent agreement is not admissible for two reasons:

(a) that under paragraph 2 of section 107 of the Transfer of Property Act, all leases of
immovable property other than that mentioned in paragraph 1 of section 107 of the Transfer of
Property Act are to be made either by a registered agreement or by oral agreement accompanied by
delivery of possession and since the agreement in question was a written agreement and not an oral
agreement, therefore, it was inadmissible by virtue of Section 107 of the Transfer of Property Act;
and

(b) that as by clause 8 of the rent agreement, the rent payable was revisable after expiry of
three years, therefore, the lease would be deemed to be for a period exceeding one year, which
required compulsory registration.

19. The first ground taken by the learned counsel for the defendant to challenge the
admissibility of the lease agreement is not sustainable for the reason that by U.P. Act No. 57 of
1976, paragraph 2 of Section 107 of the Transfer of Property Act was substituted, with effect from
1358 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
01.01.1977, so as to provide that all other leases of immovable property, that is, other than those
covered by the first paragraph of section 107 of the Transfer of Property Act, may be made either
by a registered instrument or by an agreement oral or written, accompanied by delivery of
possession. Meaning thereby that if a lease of immovable property is not from year to year, or for
any term exceeding one year, or reserving yearly rent, can be made either: (a) by a registered
agreement; or (b) by an oral agreement; or (c) by a written agreement, accompanied by delivery of
possession. In Sube Deen v. Satyawati Devi and another 1996 (28) ALR 415, this court had the
occasion to deal with the correctness of the decision of the Division Bench of this court in the case
of Zarif Ahmad (supra). In paragraph 36 of the judgment in Sube Deen's case, as per the report,
it was observed as follows:

"36. Learned counsel for the appellant placed reliance on a division bench judgment of
this Court in Zarif Ahmad v. Satish Kumar, wherein it has held that if a lease-deed for letting out
immovable property for a period of less than one year was not registered same could not be read in
evidence and Section 107 of Transfer of Property Act was attracted to the same. A perusal of the
judgment in Zarif Ahmad would show that U.P. Amendment was not considered by the Court while
laying down the law on the point. The view to this effect was expressed by the Division Bench on a
reference of the question to it so as to resolve the conflict between earlier decisions rendered by
single Judges. In my opinion, in view of the U.P. Amendment of 1977 substituting para 2 of Section
107. it is not open for the learned counsel for the appellant to argue that lease agreement which
was executed between the parties was not admissible in evidence only because that it was not
registered under Section 17 of the Registration Act."

20. Even otherwise, the decision of this Court in the case of Zarif Ahmad (supra), cited by
the learned counsel for the revisionist, has been reversed by the apex court in Satish Kumar v.
Zarif Ahmed, (1997) 3 SCC 679, wherein it was held as under:

"The combined effect of all the provisions is that an unregistered lease deed executed
from month to month, for a period not exceeding 11 months, though reduced to writing and
possession is delivered thereunder to a tenant, is not a compulsorily registerable instrument and,
therefore, the prohibition contained in Section 49 of the Registration Act is inapplicable. Therefore,
the document is admissible in evidence to consider the effect of the immovable property contained
therein or to receive as an evidence of any transaction vis-Ã -vis such property.

The High Court, therefore, was not right in reaching the conclusion that an unregistered
document is inadmissible in evidence and cannot be looked into for the purpose of effecting the
rights as landlord and tenant created under the document."

At this stage, it would be apposite to refer to Section 17(1)(d) of the Registration Act
which provides that leases of immovable property from year to year, or for any term exceeding one
year, or reserving a yearly rent would require compulsory registration. A conjoint reading of the
provisions of section 107 of the Transfer of Property Act, as applicable in the State of U.P., and
section 17(1)(d) of the Registration Act would go to show that written lease agreement would not
5 All. Ashish Vs Saleem

1359
require compulsory registration if it is not a lease of immovable property from year to year, or for any term
exceeding one year, or reserving a yearly rent. Accordingly, the contention that being a written tenancy
agreement the rent agreement (Paper No. 26 Ga) required compulsory registration, is not acceptable.

21. The contention that since the rent agreement reserved a right to increase the rate of rent after expiry
of three years the term of the lease would be deemed to be in excess of one year cannot be accepted, because
the rent agreement specifically, in clause 1 thereof, provided that the tenancy shall be a month to month
tenancy, commencing from first day of the month and terminating on the last day of the month, without
mentioning that it is a tenancy from year to year or for any period exceeding one year or reserving a yearly
rent. Further, from clause 10 of the rent agreement, which provided that on termination of tenancy the second
party would have right to get back his security money from the first party, it was clear that the tenancy was
terminable. A conjoint reading of clause 10 with clause 1 of the terms and conditions of the rent agreement,
in absence of there being any provision in the rent agreement providing a fixed term to the lease, would go to
show that the tenancy was a month to month tenancy, which was terminable in accordance with law.
Accordingly, the clause in the rent agreement providing for revision of rent after expiry of three years does
not create a demise of one year or above, what it simply does is that if the tenancy continues for three years,
the rent will be enhanced. I am therefore of the considered view that there is nothing in the agreement which
may make it compulsorily registrable either under Section 107 of the Transfer of Property Act or under
section 17 (1)(d) of the Registration Act.

22. In view of the discussion made above, the contention of the learned counsel for the revisionist that
the court below had erred in law by placing reliance on the rent agreement (paper no. 26 Ga) is not acceptable
and is, accordingly, rejected.

]
23. So far as the contention that notice did not terminate the tenancy because it was served only on one
of the tenants in common is concerned, suffice to say that from the terms of the rent agreement it is clear that
both father and son, that is the defendant and his father, were conferred unity of title and possession thereby
making them joint tenants, as correctly found by the court below. Therefore, in view of the settled law that
service of termination tenancy notice on anyone of the joint tenants is sufficient to terminate the tenancy and
the suit instituted against anyone of the joint tenants, without impleading other joint tenants, is not bad for
non-joinder of necessary party, neither the notice nor the suit can be said to be bad in law. Further, from the
evidence brought on record, it has been found that the defendant alone was the tenant because he had
admitted during his cross-examination that the rent receipts disclosed only his name as tenant inasmuch as he
alone was the tenant, who was paying rent. Even otherwise, though his father had joined in signing the
tenancy agreement but his right would not be better than that of a joint tenant. I, therefore, find no error in the
finding returned by the court below that neither the notice terminating tenancy nor the suit was bad either for
non service on, or non joinder of, the other joint tenant.

24. The other contention of the learned counsel for the revisionist relates to the competence of the
plaintiff alone to institute the suit, being just a co-owner of the suit property. On this issue, the court below
has rendered a detailed finding that the rent agreement, which was admitted to have been signed by the
defendant, had clearly specified that the premises in question was built by the first party (the plaintiff) and the
second party (the defendant and his father) had demanded the said premises on rent from the first party. The
1360 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
court also found that the other persons, who the defendants claimed to be co-owners, had signed at the
margin of the rent agreement accepting the terms of the agreement. It further found that except that there
were pending civil disputes between alleged co-owners there was no reliable evidence led by the defendant to
show that there were other co-owners/ landlords of the premises in dispute, therefore, the plea taken by the
defendant was not acceptable. I do not find any error in the said finding. Even otherwise, once the defendant
is privy to the rent agreement, which discloses that the defendant took the premises on rent from the plaintiff,
in view of section 116 of the Evidence Act, he cannot deny the title and the right of the plaintiff to bring a suit
against him. Further, in view of the law {(Kasthuri Radhakrishnan (supra) and Girraj Kishore (supra)} cited
by the learned counsel for plaintiff respondent, the suit as well as notice terminating tenancy would not be
bad at the instance of anyone of the co-owners. Thus, this Court is of the view that the court below rightly
held the suit to be maintainable at the instance of the plaintiff alone.

25. No other point has been pressed.

26. For the reasons recorded above and having carefully perused the judgment passed by the court
below as also the material brought on record, I do not find any good ground to interfere with the order passed
by the court below.

27. However, considering the facts and circumstances of the case, this Court finds it appropriate that the
defendant be allowed time up to 31st August, 2016 to vacate the premises subject to deposit of entire decretal
amount as also damages, as awarded by the court below, payable up to 31st August 2016, by 15th of July,
2016. In addition to above, an undertaking must also be given by 15th July, 2016 that he shall vacate the
premises and hand over peaceful and vacant possession to the plaintiff by 31st August, 2016. It is provided
that in case of default in compliance of any of the conditions mentioned herein above, the decree shall
become executable. It is, further provided that if the defendant fails to vacate the premises by 31st August,
2016, after having furnished an undertaking as directed above, he shall also be liable for contempt of this
Court, apart from eviction through execution.

28. Subject to above, the revision is dismissed. There shall be no order as to costs.
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APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL SIDE
DATED: ALLAHABAD 30.05.2016

BEFORE

THE HON'BLE PRAMOD KUMAR SRIVASTAVA, J.

Second Appeal No.- 158 Of 2016

Smt. Surendra Bala ...Appellant
Versus
Smt. Bhagwan Devi & Ors. ...Respondents