# Ashok Kumar & Ors v. Bhartiya Jeevan Beema Nigam Mandal Karyalaya & Ors

- **Citation:** (2025) 7 ILRA 753
- **Court:** High Court of Judicature at Allahabad
- **Decided:** 2025-07-03
- **Case number:** First Appeal No. 45 of 2007
- **Bench:** Shekhar Kumar Yadav
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/allahabad-high-court/ashok-kumar-ors-v-bhartiya-jeevan-beema-nigam-mandal-karyalaya-ors-53633
- **Pages:** 24

## Headnote

Manish Goyal, Siddharth Singhal

Issue for Consideration

Issue arose whether plaintiff-Life Insurance
Corporation of India (LIC) had any subsisting
title or possession over disputed plots in Kailash
Nagar Colony, so as to entitle it to seek a
declaration that subsequent sale deed dated
23.09.2000 executed by Bharat Stores Ltd. in
favour of defendants was void, and whether
suits were maintainable and within limitation in
view of provisions of Limitation Act, Specific
Relief Act, and Evidence Act.
754 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
Head Notes
Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 - O. 14. R.2 -
Specific Relief Act, 196 - ss. 34, 38, 41 -
Limitation Act, 1963 - s. 27, Article 65 -
Indian Evidence Act, 1872 - ss. 92, 110 -
U.P.
Zamindari
Abolition
and
Land
Reforms Act, 1950 - s.331 - The plaintiff,
Life Insurance Corporation of India (LIC),
instituted two suits seeking declarations
that sale deed dated 23.09.2000, executed
by M/s Bharat Stores Ltd. in favour of
defendants, was void and ineffective
insofar as it pertained to certain plots on
the ground that said land had already
been
transferred
to
its
predecessor,
Swadeshi Bima Company Ltd., through
sale deeds executed in 1949 and 1953 -
Defendants contested the claim, asserting
valid title and possession under 2000 sale
deed, and pleaded that LIC had neither
title nor possession, that alleged earlier
deeds were unproved and never acted
upon, and that suits were barred by
limitation and by provisions of Specific
Relief Act and U.P. Zamindari Abolition
and Land Reforms Act - Trial court partly
decreed suits, declaring impugned sale
deed void to a limited extent, whereafter
both
parties
preferred
first
appeals,
leading to present adjudication by High
Court to determine legality of trial court's
findings
regarding
title,
possession,
limitation, and maintainability.

Held: In view of findings, and overwhelming
evidence including admissions of Plaintiff's own
witnesses (P.W.-1 and P.W.-2) and supported by
cited Supreme Court judgments, Court finds
substantial merit in Defendants-Respondents'
arguments as articulated in their cross-objection
- Plaintiff-Appellant's suit is fundamentally
flawed due to non-identifiability of property,
absence of prayer for possession, improper
institution of suit, and trial court's erroneous
findings on key factual and legal issues - Trial
court failed to appreciate material facts and
wrongly invalidated a sale deed without clear
proof of LIC's physical possession or proper title
demarcation and erred by granting a declaration
in favor of LIC without proof of title, possession,
or defined property boundaries - It also erred by
presuming
an
unproduced
document
and
ignoring relevant legal bars - Although refusal to
grant injunction was legally sound, partial
decree
of
declaration
is
unsustainable
-
Judgment and decree of trial court are found
unsustainable and set aside to extent they
declare sale deed void and suit maintainable -
First Appeal No.

## Text

_Characters 0–39,856 of 82,282. This is a partial read: ask again with offset=39856 for what follows._

7 All. Ashok Kumar & Ors. Vs. Bhartiya Jeevan Beema Nigam Mandal Karyalaya & Ors.
753

34- The complainant-revisionist is not
a person deceived by respondent no. 2,
therefore, in view of Section 39 Cr.P.C, he
had no locus to move an application under
Section 156 (3) Cr.P.C. seeking direction to
register FIR regarding alleged offence of
cheating and forgery which are not covered
under Section 39 of Cr.P.C.

35- The wheels of criminal justice
system cannot be permitted to be clogged
by frivolous complaints where complainant
himself is not aggrieved or victim in any
manner.

36- The proceedings appear to be
prima facie initiated maliciously by the
revisionist with oblique motives with an
intention to gain some advantage or to
settle his score.

37- Under the facts of the case, the
prayer made by the revisionist for direction
to register an FIR against respondent no. 2
and investigate defy any logic or prudence.
Hence, in the backdrop of factual matrix of
the case as discussed above, allowing the
application under Section 156 (3) Cr.P.C of
the revisionist would amounts to travesty of
justice.

Conclusion

38- In view of the above, the
allegations of the complainant (revisionistDiwakar Nath Tripathi), who is admittedly
neither victim nor aggrieved with the
educational certificates of respondent no. 2
(Keshav Prasad Maurya, who is sitting
Deputy Chief Minister of State of U.P.) do
not disclose cognizable offence, hence this
criminal revision is liable to be rejected.

39- As a fall out and consequence of
above discussion and reasons, I find that
the impugned order dated 04.09.2021 is
based upon relevant considerations and
supported by cogent reasons, the same does
not suffer from any irregularity, illegality or
jurisdictional error, hence no interference is
required by this Court.

40- This Criminal Revision lacks merit
and stands rejected.

41- Office is directed to transmit the
original record to the concerned Court
below in a sealed cover.
----------
(2025) 7 ILRA 753
APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL SIDE
DATED: ALLAHABAD 03.07.2025

BEFORE

THE HON'BLE SHEKHAR KUMAR YADAV, J.

First Appeal No. 45 of 2007
Connected with
First Appeal Nos. 70 of 2007 & 71 of 2007

Ashok Kumar & Ors. ...Appellants
Versus
Bhartiya Jeevan Beema Nigam Mandal
Karyalaya & Ors. ...Respondents

Counsel for the Appellants:
Divakar Rai Sharma, Arvind Srivastava

Counsel for the Respondents:
Manish Goyal, Siddharth Singhal

Issue for Consideration

Issue arose whether plaintiff-Life Insurance
Corporation of India (LIC) had any subsisting
title or possession over disputed plots in Kailash
Nagar Colony, so as to entitle it to seek a
declaration that subsequent sale deed dated
23.09.2000 executed by Bharat Stores Ltd. in
favour of defendants was void, and whether
suits were maintainable and within limitation in
view of provisions of Limitation Act, Specific
Relief Act, and Evidence Act.
754 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
Head Notes
Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 - O. 14. R.2 -
Specific Relief Act, 196 - ss. 34, 38, 41 -
Limitation Act, 1963 - s. 27, Article 65 -
Indian Evidence Act, 1872 - ss. 92, 110 -
U.P.
Zamindari
Abolition
and
Land
Reforms Act, 1950 - s.331 - The plaintiff,
Life Insurance Corporation of India (LIC),
instituted two suits seeking declarations
that sale deed dated 23.09.2000, executed
by M/s Bharat Stores Ltd. in favour of
defendants, was void and ineffective
insofar as it pertained to certain plots on
the ground that said land had already
been
transferred
to
its
predecessor,
Swadeshi Bima Company Ltd., through
sale deeds executed in 1949 and 1953 -
Defendants contested the claim, asserting
valid title and possession under 2000 sale
deed, and pleaded that LIC had neither
title nor possession, that alleged earlier
deeds were unproved and never acted
upon, and that suits were barred by
limitation and by provisions of Specific
Relief Act and U.P. Zamindari Abolition
and Land Reforms Act - Trial court partly
decreed suits, declaring impugned sale
deed void to a limited extent, whereafter
both
parties
preferred
first
appeals,
leading to present adjudication by High
Court to determine legality of trial court's
findings
regarding
title,
possession,
limitation, and maintainability.

Held: In view of findings, and overwhelming
evidence including admissions of Plaintiff's own
witnesses (P.W.-1 and P.W.-2) and supported by
cited Supreme Court judgments, Court finds
substantial merit in Defendants-Respondents'
arguments as articulated in their cross-objection
- Plaintiff-Appellant's suit is fundamentally
flawed due to non-identifiability of property,
absence of prayer for possession, improper
institution of suit, and trial court's erroneous
findings on key factual and legal issues - Trial
court failed to appreciate material facts and
wrongly invalidated a sale deed without clear
proof of LIC's physical possession or proper title
demarcation and erred by granting a declaration
in favor of LIC without proof of title, possession,
or defined property boundaries - It also erred by
presuming
an
unproduced
document
and
ignoring relevant legal bars - Although refusal to
grant injunction was legally sound, partial
decree
of
declaration
is
unsustainable
-
Judgment and decree of trial court are found
unsustainable and set aside to extent they
declare sale deed void and suit maintainable -
First Appeal No. 45 of 2007 is allowed, holding
that sale deed dated 23.09.2000 executed by
M/s Bharat Stores Ltd. in favour of Defendants
Nos. 6 to 8 is valid and binding - LIC's claim
over 550 sq. yds. (Plot Nos. 33 & 34) and 1800
sq. yds. (Plot Nos. 37 & 38) stands dismissed as
unproved - First Appeals Nos. 70 and 71 of 2007
are dismissed, and Cross-Objection is disposed
of. [Paras 101, 102, 103] (E-13)

Case Law Cited
State of Andhra Pradesh and others v. D.
Raghukul Pershad (Dead) By Lrs and others,
(2012) 8 SCC 584 - relied on

Rishikesh v. Harikesh and Others, 2019 (1)
ADJ 678; Pawan Kumar Dutt and another v.
Shakuntala Devi and others, (2010) 5 SCC
601; Nahar Singh v. Harnak Singh (1996) 6
SCC 699; Vasantha (Dead) through L.R. v.
Rajalakshmi @ Rajam (Dead) through L.Rs.,
2024 INSC 109; Executive Officer, Arulmigu
Chokkanatha Swamy Koil Trust Virudhunagar v.
Chandran and others, (2017) 3 SCC 702; M.
K. Rappai and Others v. John and Others, 1969
(2) SCC 590 (para-10); Ram Saran and
Another v. Smt Ganga Devi, (1973) 2 SCC 60
(para-4); Meharchand Das v. Lal Babu Siddique
and others, (2007) 14 SCC 253 (para-12);
Union of India v. Ibrahim Uddin and another,
(2012) 8 SCC 148; Anathula Sudhakar v. P.
Buchi Reddy (Dead) By Lrs & Ors., 2008 (4)
SCC 594; Vinay Krishna v. Keshav Chandra,
1993 Supp (3) SCC 129; Shri Ram and
another v. Ist Addl. District Judge and others,
(2001) 3 SCC 24; Kamla Prasad and others v.
Kishna Kant Pathak and others, (2007) 4 SCC -
referred to

List of Acts
Code of Civil Procedure, 1908; Specific Relief
Act, 1963; Limitation Act, 1963; Indian Evidence
Act, 1872; U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land
Reforms Act, 1950

List of Keywords
Title and possession - Identification of property
- Resell - Predecessor - Unidentifiable property -
7 All. Ashok Kumar & Ors. Vs. Bhartiya Jeevan Beema Nigam Mandal Karyalaya & Ors.
755
Permanent injunction - Maintainability of suit -
Court fee - Limitation - Extinguishment of right
to property - Oral evidence - Term of the
contract - Sale deed - Proof of title - Plaint map
- Registered power of attorney - Property
register
not
produced
-
Co-ownership
-
Possession of one co-owner - Agricultural land -
Jurisdiction - Non-framing of issue on sale deed
validity - Perversity of findings - Bona fide
purchaser - Void and ineffective sale deed -
Proof of exclusive possession - Cause of action -
Delay - Adverse possession - Revenue entries -
Fiscal entries for declaration of title - Burden of
proof - Secondary evidence - Written statement
- Witness - Transfer - Survey - Mutation -
Demarcation.

Case Arising From
APPELLATE JURISDICTION: First Appeal No. -
45 of 2007

Connected with
First Appeal No. 70 of 2007 and First Appeal No.
71 of 2007

From the Judgment and Order dated 21.11.2006
of the Additional District Judge, Court No. 11
Aligarh, in Suit No. 1210 of 2004

Appearances for Parties
Advs. for the Appellant:
Divakar Rai Sharma, Arvind Srivastava

Advs. for the Respondent:
Manish Goyal, Siddharth Singhal
(Delivered by Hon'ble Shekhar Kumar
Yadav, J.)

Background of the Appeals

1. First Appeal No. 45 of 2007 has
been filed by the appellants-Defendants
No. 6, 7, and 8-while First Appeal No. 71
of 2007 has been preferred by the
appellant-Life Insurance Corporation of
India (LIC). Both appeals challenge the
judgment and decree dated November 21,
2006, passed by the learned Additional
District Judge, Court No. 11, Aligarh, in
Suit No. 1210 of 2004. By this judgment,
the trial court partly decreed the suit in
favor of the plaintiff-LIC, declaring the
sale deed dated September 23, 2000,
executed in favor of Defendants No. 6 to 8,
void and ineffective to the extent of 550
square yards.

2. First Appeal No. 70 of 2007 was
filed by the plaintiff-appellant LIC under
Section 96 of the Code of Civil Procedure,
1908. This appeal challenges the judgment
and decree dated November 21, 2006,
passed in Original Suit No. 1211 of 2004,
in which LIC sought a decree declaring the
sale deed dated September 23, 2000, void
with respect to Plot Nos. 12, 13, 14, and 15,
each having an area of 450 square yards,
carved out of Khasra No. 37 & 38. The
plaintiff seeks a reversal of the judgment
insofar as it dismissed its claim for
permanent injunction and prays that the suit
be decreed in its entirety with costs.
Separately,
Defendants
No.
1
to
5
(including
heirs)
have
filed
CrossObjection No. 128636 of 2007, challenging
the trial court's findings on Issues No. 1, 2,
3, 6, and 8.

3. Since all the aforementioned
appeals pertain to the same subject matter,
they are being decided together by this
common judgment.

4.

The
plaintiff-LIC
instituted
Original Suit No. 1210 of 2004 seeking a
declaration that the sale deed dated
September 23, 2000, executed by M/s
Bharat Stores Ltd. in favor of Defendants
No. 6 to 8, was void to the extent it
pertained to 550 square yards of land,
allegedly forming part of Khasra Nos. 33
and 34, Mauja Daulatabad, Aligarh. A
decree of permanent injunction was also
sought to restrain defendants-respondents
756 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
from interfering with the said land. The
trial court, by its judgment dated November
21, 2006, partly decreed the suit by
declaring the impugned sale deed dated
September 23, 2000, void to the extent of
550 square yards but declined to grant the
relief of permanent injunction. Aggrieved,
Defendants No. 6 to 8 filed First Appeal
No. 45 of 2007, while LIC filed First
Appeal No. 71 of 2007 against the denial of
the injunction.

5. Mr. Arvind Srivastava, learned
counsel for the respondents/defendants,
assisted by Mr. Vineet Vikram, Advocate;
Mr. Divakar Rai Sharma, learned counsel
appearing in the cross-objection; and Mr.
Shashi Nandan, learned Senior Counsel,
assisted by Ms. Divya Chaurasia, learned
counsel for the appellant (LIC), were heard,
and the record was perused.

6. The record discloses that the
dispute pertains to 550 square yards of land
forming part of the larger Khasra Nos. 33,
34, 37, and 38, situated within Kailash
Nagar Colony, Aligarh. The plaintiff-LIC
claimed
that
the
said
portion
was
previously transferred to its predecessor,
Swadeshi Insurance Company, through a
sale deed dated July 23, 1954, executed by
Lal Singh & Sons, who had acquired it
under a sale deed dated August 3, 1949,
from Bharat Stores Ltd. In contrast,
Defendants No. 6 to 8 contended that they
purchased the same land through a
registered sale deed dated September 23,
2000, from Bharat Stores Ltd., acting
through
its
attorney
Sanjeev
Kumar
Maheshwari. The trial court held that since
Bharat Stores had already divested itself of
title to the said land in 1949, it had no
authority to resell it in 2000, rendering the
later sale deed null and void to the extent of
550 square yards. Defendants No. 6 to 8,
however,
contended
valid
title
and
possession over the land, submitting that
there was a misappreciation of evidence,
title by adverse possession, and an
erroneous application of limitation law by
the trial court.

7. In First Appeal No. 70 of 2007,
LIC
averred
that
Defendant
No.
6
developed Kailash Nagar Colony over
Khasra Nos. 33 to 38 by carving out 181
residential plots. Of these, Plot Nos. 12, 13,
14, and 15, each measuring 450 square
yards (total 1800 square yards), were sold
to Swadeshi Bima Company Ltd. via a sale
deed dated December 5, 1953. After the
enactment
of
the
Life
Insurance
Corporation Act, 1956, Swadeshi Bima
Company Ltd. merged with LIC, and the
said plots vested in the plaintiff. LIC
alleged that the defendants had attempted
to interfere with its possession and
challenged the sale deed dated September
23, 2000, as illegal, void, and ineffective.

8. Both suits filed by the plaintiffLIC revolve around the title and possession
of plots within Kailash Nagar Colony,
allegedly developed by Bharat Stores Ltd.
LIC's claim is based on sale deeds in favor
of
its
predecessor,
Swadeshi
Bima
Company. The defendants denied these
claims.

Arguments
of
the
Parties
[Defendants' Arguments (Appeal No. 45
of 2007 & Cross Objection No. 128636 of
2007)]

9. In Appeal No. 45 of 2007, learned
counsel
for
Defendants
No.
6
to
8/appellants assailed the judgment on
several grounds. They argued that neither
LIC nor its predecessor, Swadeshi Bima
Company, nor the predecessor of Defendant
7 All. Ashok Kumar & Ors. Vs. Bhartiya Jeevan Beema Nigam Mandal Karyalaya & Ors.
757
No. 1, Sri Lal Singh and Sons Harmonium
Maker, took actual possession of the said
land since July 23, 1954 (the date of the
sale deed in favor of Swadeshi Bima
Company Ltd. by Sri Lal Singh), nor from
August 3, 1949 (the date of execution of
the sale deed by M/s Bharat Stores Ltd.,
Agra, in favor of Sri Lal Singh and Sons
Harmonium Maker). They also contended
that title was not asserted for more than
five decades, making Suit No. 1210 of
2004, instituted by the plaintiff for
declaration
of
the
sale
deed
dated
September 23, 2000, in favor of Defendants
No. 6, 7 & 8 by Defendant No. 9 as void,
not only barred by time but also not
maintainable in view of Section 34 of the
Specific Relief Act, 1963.

10. It was argued that LIC failed to
produce any conclusive evidence showing
either
legal
or
physical
possession.
Furthermore,
the
sale
deed
dated
September 23, 2000, was executed through
a registered power of attorney and is
presumed valid. It was also submitted that
the defendants have made constructions
and are in settled possession, which was
overlooked by the trial court.

11. It was further submitted that the
suit was barred by Section 331 of the
UPZA & LR Act, 1950, as Khasra Plot
Nos. 33, 34, 37, & 38 were agricultural
plots. The plaintiff's name was not recorded
in the revenue records, nor was the plaintiff
in possession of Khasra Plot Nos. 33, 34,
37, & 38. Therefore, the suit was barred by
Section 331 of the UPZA & LR Act, 1950,
as it amounted to a declaration of title of
the plaintiff, whose name was not recorded
over these Khasra plots.

12. It was argued that the trial court
proceeded with manifest illegality in
holding that, on account of the execution of
the sale deed dated July 23, 1954, by Sri
Lal Singh in favor of Swadeshi Bima
Company, it was not necessary for a
declaration of title, as revenue entries were
irrelevant and pertained to fiscal entries.
This view, they submitted, is contrary to the
law settled by the Hon'ble Apex Court and
the record.

13. A significant argument was that
the suit was filed by an incompetent
authority. Sri Suresh Kumar, who filed and
signed the suit on behalf of the LIC,
allegedly had no authority to present the
suit, and the Zonal Manager had no
authority to delegate any such power. It
was further submitted that the signatures of
the power of attorney, alleged to be the
Zonal Manager, were not proved by any
witnesses. Sri Suresh Kumar admitted that
LIC had three Directors, namely, D.K.
Mehrotra, George Mathew, and A.K. Das
Gupta, and none of them had executed any
power of attorney, nor had anyone seen any
document authorizing the Zonal Manager
to execute a power of attorney on behalf of
LIC authorizing Sri Suresh Kumar to sign
the plaint.

14. It was also argued that no issue
was framed challenging the sale deed dated
September 23, 2000, and in the absence of
such an issue, no decision could have been
made by the Trial Court about its validity.

15. Lastly, the appellants-defendants
No. 6 to 8 contended that M/s Bharat Stores
is admitted by the plaintiff to be the owner
of Khasra Plot Nos. 33, 34, 37, & 38
located at Mauja Daulatabad, District
Aligarh. The plaintiff stated that M/s Bharat
Stores carved out 181 plots over these
Khasra plots for Kailash Nagar Colony, but
no colony was ever constructed, nor was
758 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
Plot No. 1, having an area of 550 square
yards, allegedly sold to Lal Singh and Sons,
the predecessor of Defendant No. 1, ever
given effect to, nor was its location
identifiable over Khasra Plot Nos. 33, 34,
37, & 38. The sale deed dated August 3,
1949, executed by M/s Bharat Stores in favor
of the predecessor of Defendant No. 1, is not
on record despite being the basis of the suit.
Hence, Plot No. 1 located over Khasra Plot
Nos. 33, 34, 37, & 38 is not identifiable, and
since the plot is not identifiable, no decree
can be granted for unidentified plots, making
the suit not maintainable.

LIC's Arguments

16. Learned senior counsel appearing
for the LIC submitted that the non-framing of
the issue regarding the validity of the sale
deed dated September 23, 2000, is irrelevant
as no prejudice was caused to Defendants No.
6 to 8. It was further submitted that in view of
Section 92 of the Indian Evidence Act, once
the fact of transfer of possession is mentioned
in the sale deed dated July 23, 1954, it cannot
be contradicted by oral evidence. Since the
sale deed dated July 23, 1954, is the source of
LIC's title, there was no need for a separate
declaration of title by LIC. Counsel for LIC
submitted that once the sale deed dated July
23, 1954, was executed, the plaintiff became
the co-owner of Plot Nos. 33, 34, 37, & 38,
and the plaintiff has annexed a plaint map
along with the plaint which clearly shows the
plot numbers and their location; therefore,
there is sufficient identification of the plots.

Defendants'
Rebuttal
to
LIC's
Arguments

17. In rebuttal, learned counsel for
Defendants No. 6 to 8 argued that out of 181
plots allegedly carved out over Khasra Plot
Nos. 33, 34, 37, & 38, the location of Plot
No. 1, area 550 sq. yards, was not identifiable
after superimposing the map annexed with
the plaint over Khasra Plot Nos. 33, 34, 37, &
38. The map annexed with the plaint does not
provide any identification of Plot No. 1 over
these Khasra plots.

18. Secondly, it was submitted that no
evidence was led to prove the sale deed dated
August 3, 1949, which was the source of title
for executing the sale deed dated July 23,
1954, nor was the sale deed dated August 3,
1949, brought on record. Therefore, in the
absence of any evidence, severe prejudice is
caused when the trial court decides the
validity of the sale deed dated September 23,
2000, without any issue being framed. This
act of the Trial Court is contrary to the
provisions of Order 14 Rule 2 of CPC.

19. With respect to the submission
regarding Section 92 of the Indian Evidence
Act, it was argued that Section 92 is not
attracted to the plaintiff's case. The statement
in the sale deed that the predecessor of the
plaintiff was given possession of the plot is
not a "term of the contract" but merely a "fact
mentioned in the sale deed as a recital." Oral
evidence can, therefore, be given to prove the
contrary, which the defendant has done,
proving that possession was never given to
the plaintiff's predecessor.

20. It was further argued that the
subsequent conduct of Defendant No. 9 and
the predecessor of the plaintiff, by never
giving effect to the sale deed executed by
Defendant No. 9 in favor of the plaintiff's
predecessor, clearly demonstrates that there
was no intention to sell the property to the
plaintiff's predecessor, and oral evidence
can be given to demonstrate these facts.
Furthermore, Proviso (1) and (6) of Section
92 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872,
clearly give the defendants the right to
7 All. Ashok Kumar & Ors. Vs. Bhartiya Jeevan Beema Nigam Mandal Karyalaya & Ors.
759
prove additional facts mentioned in the sale
deed by means of oral evidence, which has
been done by the defendant. The parties to
the sale deed are not the same as Defendant
No. 9 has not sold the property to the
plaintiff; therefore, the provisions of
Section 92 of the Evidence Act are not
applicable to the facts of the case.

21. It was also submitted that the
appellant-plaintiff
relied
upon
the
provisions of Section 92 of the Indian
Evidence Act, 1872, for discarding the oral
evidence given in favor of the defendant,
proving that the sale deed allegedly
executed in favor of the predecessor of the
plaintiff was never given effect to. It is
submitted that the provisions of Section 92
of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872, are not
applicable to the facts of the present case.
Section 92 of the Indian Evidence Act,
1872, applies only to the terms of the
document and not to the facts mentioned in
the documents. The rule is therefore not
infringed by the introduction of parole
evidence contradicting or explaining the
instruments in some of its recitals of facts.
There is nothing in this section to exclude
evidence which is not a term of the contract
but a recital in the contract itself. A
document may contain a fact itself, and this
recital may be traversed by giving oral
evidence. It was further submitted that the
subsequent conduct of the parties signing
the
documents
and
the
surrounding
circumstances
are
also
relevant
for
determining the intention of the parties, and
oral evidence can be given to prove the
recitals in the documents.

22. The plaintiff's submission that
courts can adjudicate the validity of the sale
deeds despite no issue being framed with
respect to the challenge of the sale deed
executed in 2000 in favor of the defendant
is a misconceived submission.

23. It was further submitted that since
no issue was framed for adjudicating the
validity of the sale deed executed in 2000
in favor of the defendant, no evidence was
laid by the defendant to prove the sale deed
executed in 2000. Consequently, the sale
deed could not have been declared void by
the learned trial court. Learned counsel
relied upon the decision of the Apex Court
in State of Andhra Pradesh and others Vs
D. Raghukul Pershad (Dead) By Lrs and
others, reported in (2012) 8 SCC 584.

Arguments in Appeal No. 71 of 2007
(LIC vs. Defendants No. 6-8)

24. In Appeal No. 71 of 2007, learned
Senior
Counsel
appearing
for
LIC
reiterated the submission raised in Appeal
No. 45 of 2007.

25. In rebuttal, learned counsel for
Defendants No. 6 to 8 reiterated the
submission made in Appeal No. 45 of 2007.

Arguments in Appeal No. 70 of 2007
(LIC vs. Defendants No. 1-5)

26. In Appeal No. 70 of 2007, the
counsel for the LIC submitted that in view
of Section 92 of the Indian Evidence Act,
once the fact of transfer of possession is
mentioned in the sale deed dated December
5, 1953, it cannot be contradicted by oral
evidence. Therefore, the trial court erred in
relying upon oral evidence in holding that
the plaintiff was not in possession. It was
further submitted that since the sale deed
dated December 5, 1953, is the source of
LIC's title, there was no need for a
declaration of title by LIC. Counsel for LIC
submitted that once the sale deed dated
December 5, 1953, was executed, the
plaintiff became the co-owner of Plot No.
37 & 38, and the plaintiff has annexed a
760 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
plaint map along with the plaint which
clearly shows the plot numbers and their
location; therefore, there is sufficient
identification of the plots.

27. In rebuttal, learned counsel for
Defendants No. 1 to 5 submitted that
Section 92 of the Indian Evidence Act,
1972, is not attracted to the plaintiff's case
because the statement in the sale deed that
the predecessor of the plaintiff was given
possession of the plot is not a "term of the
contract" but only a "fact mentioned in the
sale deed as a recital." Oral evidence can be
given to prove the contrary, which has been
provided by the defendant, proving that
possession
was
never
given
to
the
predecessor of the plaintiff. It is further
argued that the subsequent conduct of
Defendant No. 6 and the predecessor of the
plaintiff, namely, Swadeshi Bima Company
Ltd., in never giving effect to the sale deed
executed by Defendant No. 6 in favor of
the predecessor of the plaintiff, clearly
demonstrates that there was no intention to
sell the property to the predecessor of the
plaintiff, and oral evidence could be given
to
demonstrate
these
facts.
Further
submission is that Proviso (1) and (6) of
Section 92 of the Indian Evidence Act,
1872, clearly give the defendants the right
to prove additional facts mentioned in the
sale deed by means of oral evidence, which
has been done by the defendant. The parties
to the sale deed are not the same as
Defendant No. 6 has not sold the property
to the plaintiff; therefore, the provisions of
Section 92 of the Evidence Act are not
applicable to the facts of the case.

Defendants'
Cross-Objection
Arguments (Appeal No. 70 of 2007)

28. In the cross-objection filed by
Defendants No. 1 to 5 in Appeal No. 70 of
2007, learned counsel for Defendants No. 1
to 5 assailed the judgment on the grounds
that neither LIC nor its predecessor,
Swadeshi Bima Company, ever took actual
possession of the said land since December
5, 1953 (the date of the sale deed in favor
of Swadeshi Bima Company Ltd.), nor
asserted title for more than five decades.
Hence, Suit No. 1211 of 2004, instituted by
the plaintiff for a declaration of the sale
deed dated September 23, 2000, with
respect to the title of Defendants No. 1 to 5
as void, was not only barred by time in
view of Section 27 of the Limitation Act
and Article 65 of the Limitation Act (and
the admission of the plaintiff that M/s
Bharat Stores Ltd. had sold the property to
the defendants and also handed over its
possession to Defendants No. 1 to 5) but
was also not maintainable in view of
Section 34 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963
and also not identifiable.

29. It was argued that LIC failed to
produce any conclusive evidence showing
either legal or physical possession. Further,
the sale deed dated September 23, 2000,
was executed through a registered power of
attorney and is presumed valid. It was also
submitted that the defendants have made
constructions and are in settled possession,
which was overlooked by the trial court. It
is further submitted that the suit was barred
by Section 331 of the UPZA & LR Act,
1950, as Khasra Plot No. 37 & 38 were
agricultural plots. The plaintiff's name was
not recorded in the revenue record, nor was
the plaintiff in possession of Khasra Plot
No. 37 & 38. Therefore, the suit was barred
by Section 331 of the UPZA & LR Act,
1950, as it amounted to a declaration of
title of the plaintiff whose name was not
recorded over Khasra Plot No. 37 & 38.

30. It was submitted that the trial
court proceeded with manifest illegality in
7 All. Ashok Kumar & Ors. Vs. Bhartiya Jeevan Beema Nigam Mandal Karyalaya & Ors.
761
holding that on account of the execution of
the sale deed dated December 5, 1953, by
Defendant No. 6 in favor of Swadeshi
Bima Company, it was not necessary for a
declaration of title as the revenue entries
were irrelevant and pertained to fiscal
entries. This view of the trial court is
contrary to the law settled by the Apex
Court and the record.

31. It was further submitted that the
suit was filed by an incompetent authority
as Sri Suresh Kumar, who filed and signed
the suit on behalf of the LIC, had no
authority to present the suit on behalf of the
LIC, and the Zonal Manager had no
authority to delegate any power. It was
further submitted that the signature of the
power of attorney, alleged to be the Zonal
Manager, was not proved by any witnesses.
Sri Suresh Kumar admitted that LIC had
three directors, namely, D.K. Mehrotra,
George Mathew, and A.K. Das Gupta, and
none of them had executed any power of
attorney,
nor
has
anyone
seen
any
document which authorized the Zonal
Manager to execute a power of attorney on
behalf of LIC authorizing Sri Suresh
Kumar to sign the plaint on behalf of LIC.

32. It was further submitted by the
appellant-defendants No. 6 to 8 that M/s
Bharat Stores is admitted to be the owner
of Khasra Plot No. 37 & 38 located at
Mauja Daulatabad, District Aligarh, by the
plaintiff. The plaintiff stated that M/s
Bharat Stores carved out 181 plots over
these Khasra Plot Nos. 33, 34, 37, & 38 for
the purpose of making Kailash Nagar
Colony,
but
no
colony
was
ever
constructed, nor were Plot Nos. 12, 13, 14,
& 15, each having an area of 450 sq. yards,
allegedly sold to Swadeshi Bima Company,
ever given effect to, nor was their location
identifiable over Khasra Plot No. 37 & 38.
Hence, Plot Nos. 12, 13, 14, & 15 located
over Khasra Plot Nos. 37 & 38 are not
identifiable, and since the plots are not
identifiable, no decree can be granted for
unidentified plots, making the suit not
maintainable. It was further submitted that
Defendants No. 1 to 5 were in possession
over Khasra Plot No. 37 & 38, and in view
of Section 110 of the Evidence Act, they
have title over it.

33. In rebuttal, learned counsel for the
LIC submitted that since the sale deed
dated December 5, 1953, is the source of
LIC's title, there was no need for a
declaration of title by LIC. It was submitted
by counsel for the LIC that once the sale
deed dated December 5, 1953, was
executed, the plaintiff became the co-owner
of Plot No. 37 & 38, and the plaintiff has
annexed a plaint map along with the plaint
which clearly shows the plot number and
its location; therefore, there is sufficient
identification of the plots.

Issues Framed by the Trial Court

34. In Suit No. 1210 of 2004, the
learned Trial Court framed the following
issues:

(I) Whether the plaintiff is the
owner and in possession of the disputed
property? If yes, what is its effect?

(II) Whether the sale deed dated
24.01.2004 is void and ineffective, as
alleged in the plaint?

(III) Whether the suit is barred by
the provisions of Section 27 of the
Limitation Act?

(IV) Whether the suit is barred by
the provisions of Sections 34, 38, and 41 of
the Specific Relief Act?
762 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES

(V) Whether the suit has been
undervalued and the court fee paid is
insufficient?

(VI) Whether this court lacks
jurisdiction to hear the suit, as stated in the
written statement? If yes, what is its effect?

(VII) Relief, if any, the plaintiff is
entitled to.

(VIII) Whether the person who
signed and verified the plaint has the
authority to file the suit? If not, what is its
effect?

35. In Suit No. 1211 of 2004, the trial
court framed the following issues:

(I) Whether the plaintiff is the
owner and in possession of the disputed
property? If yes, what is its effect?

(II) Whether the sale deed dated
23.09.2000 is liable to be cancelled on the
grounds stated in the plaint? If yes, what is
its effect?

(III) Whether the suit is barred by
the provisions of Section 27 of the
Limitation Act?

(IV) Whether the suit is barred by
the provisions of Sections 34, 38, and 41 of
the Specific Relief Act?

(V) Whether the suit has been
undervalued and the court fee paid is
insufficient?

(VI) Whether this court lacks
jurisdiction to hear the suit?

(VII) Relief, if any, the plaintiff is
entitled to.

(VIII) Whether the person who
signed the plaint has the authority to file
the suit? If not, what is its effect?

Analysis
of
Possession
and
Identification (Issues No. 1)

36. Issue No. 1: Whether the plaintiffLIC has title and possession over Plot No.
1, area 550 sq. yards over Khasra Plot No.
33 & 38, and Plot Nos. 12, 13, 14, & 15,
area 450 sq. yards each, over Khasra Plot
No. 33, 37 & 38, in Suit No. 1210 of 2004
& 1211 of 2004. Since issue no. 1 in both
the suits is common hence it is being dealt
with jointly.

37. Defendants No. 9 in Suit No.
1210 of 2004 who is also Defendant No. 6
in Suit No. 1211 of 2004, in its written
statements, admitted that it was the owner
of Khasra No. 34 to 38 and that a sale deed
dated September 23, 2000, was executed in
favor of Defendants No. 6, 7 & 8 of Suit
No. 1210 of 2004, and Defendants No. 1, 2,
3, 4, and 5 in Suit No. 1211 of 2004. It
categorically denied that any colony was
developed over Plot Nos. 33, 34, 37, & 38,
nor were any Plot Nos. 12, 13, 14, & 15
carved out over these plots. It denied the
existence of any developed colony with
roads or parks on the ground, asserting that
the colony was merely on paper. It
contended that the plots mentioned in the
sale deed dated August 3, 1949, and sale
deed dated December 5, 1953, were
unidentifiable due to lack of plotting and
demarcation on site, and that Swadeshi
Bima Nigam or LIC or the predecessor of
Defendant No. 1 in Suit No. 1210 of 2004
never obtained possession. It also stated
that any rights LIC might have had were
extinguished
by
Section
27
of
the
Limitation Act. The maintainability of the
suit was also challenged on various
grounds,
including
lack
of
proper
authorization to file the suit, and being
barred by Sections 34, 38, and 41 of the
Specific Relief Act, 1963, and Section 331
of the U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land
Reforms Act.

38. LIC's claim rested on the
assertion that Plot No. 1, measuring 550
7 All. Ashok Kumar & Ors. Vs. Bhartiya Jeevan Beema Nigam Mandal Karyalaya & Ors.
763
square yards, had been transferred in 1949
to Lal Singh & Sons and later auctioned to
Swadeshi
Bima
Company
in
1954.
However, no sale deed dated August 3,
1949, was brought on record. Furthermore,
material
evidence
of
ownership
and
possession
remained
unsubstantiated.
Crucially, P.W.-1, Suresh Kumar, a witness
for
the
plaintiff,
admitted
that
no
demarcation or survey had ever been
conducted over the property in dispute. He
deposed under cross-examination as under:

"LIC does not maintain any
record identifying Plot No. 1 on Khasra
Nos. 33, 34, 37, 38. I have not seen any
document showing that Plot No. 1 was
demarcated or occupied by LIC. I do not
know on which exact part of the Khasra
numbers Plot No. 1 is situated."

39. Similarly, P.W.-2, Rakesh Kumar,
deposed:

"I have no personal knowledge of
previous possession. No site verification
has been done by LIC. The property on site
is not demarcated."

40. The trial court observed that no
plotting or development had been done
over Khasra Nos. 33, 34, 37, and 38, and
that the alleged plots never came into
existence. The court remarked:

"This property is not demarcated
on site. The location of Plot No. 1, as they
state, also does not reveal that Plot No. 1
exists on site. Since they have failed to
prove the on-site situation according to the
lengths and widths of the boundaries shown
in the map."

41. The admissions of P.W.-1 and
P.W.-2, when read in conjunction with the
trial court's observations, strongly support
the defendants' plea that the property was
unidentifiable on the ground. The plaintiff's
own witnesses conceded the absence of
plot
numbers,
development,
or
any
possession.

42. The trial court failed to consider
that since the plaintiff had not proved the
sale deed dated August 3, 1949, nor the
identity of the land purportedly covered by
it. In the absence of cogent evidence
identifying the land covered by the 1949
and 2000 sale deeds as the same, the
findings of the court below declaring the
sale deed dated 23.09.2000 as void are
perverse.
A
decree
for
injunction
concerning an unidentifiable subject matter
is unexecutable and contrary to settled legal
principles. In Rishikesh v. Harikesh and
Others, 2019 (1) ADJ 678, this Court held
that a decree cannot be granted for property
that is not clearly identifiable. It was
observed
that
where
there
exists
a
discrepancy between the description of the
property in the plaint and that in the sale
deed relied upon by the plaintiff, rendering
the identity of the property uncertain, the
plaintiff cannot be said to have established
their title or possession. The Court further
emphasized that in the absence of clear
demarcation
or
reliable
evidence
establishing the boundaries or location of
the disputed property, the claim is liable to
fail. The judgment reinforces the wellsettled principle that no relief can be
granted
in
respect
of
vague
or
unidentifiable immovable property.

43. The Hon'ble Apex Court, in
Pawan Kumar Dutt and another Vs.
Shakuntala Devi and others, (2010) 5 SCC
601, and Nahar Singh vs. Harnak Singh
(1996) 6 SCC 699, held that the plaintiff is
not entitled to the relief of specific
764 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
performance
if
the
property
is
not
identifiable. The relevant paragraph from
Pawan Kumar Dutt is extracted below:

"10.3. In the decision of the
Hon'ble Supreme Court reported in [(2010)
15 SCC 601] (supra) it has been held as
follows:- 7. It is clear from the suit
agreement that no boundaries of the suit
property which was sold are specified in
the agreement. It is not clear from what
point the area is to be measured. It is also
not clear that these 4 bighas 2 biswas is a
portion of the land situated in the middle of
the total land or in one portion or at the
extreme end or at a particular place, in
other words, there is no clear identity of the
property agreed to be sold. The Courts are
not expected to pass a decree which is not
capable of enforcement in the courts of law.
If the argument of the learned Counsel for
the Appellants is to be accepted and if a
decree is to be granted for specific
performance, without identification of the
suit property, it will not be possible to
enforce such a decree. In a judgment
reported in (1996) 6 SCC 699 (supra), it
has been held that, if the property itself
cannot be identified, the relief of specific
performance cannot be granted."

44.

The
Trial
court
correctly
emphasized that the critical requirement for
relief was the establishment of identifiable
and
exclusive
possession.
The
oral
testimonies of PW-1 and PW-2 revealed
that LIC had neither conducted any survey
nor could identify the exact plots. The
discrepancy in maps (Papers 34G and 70G)
further cast doubt on the demarcation,
location, and identification.

45. In the absence of specific
identification and proof of exclusive
possession, mere co-ownership does not
entitle the plaintiff to an injunction or a
declaration voiding a sale deed executed by
another co-owner, especially when the
plaintiff's own possession is not clearly
established and his title and claim over the
plot in dispute is barred by time. The
burden of proving specific identity and
possession of the disputed plots lay on the
plaintiff, which was not discharged.

46. The trial court correctly concluded
that there was no proof of exclusive
possession.
The
principle
that
the
possession
of
one
co-owner
is
the
possession of all is settled; however, a coowner
seeking
an
injunction
must
demonstrate
unlawful
interference
or
ouster.