# Ashok Kumar Pal v. State of U.P. & Anr

- **Citation:** (2024) 5 ILRA 586
- **Court:** High Court of Judicature at Allahabad
- **Decided:** 2024-05-06
- **Case number:** Application U/S 482. No. 1700 of 2024
- **Bench:** Arun Kumar Singh Deshwal
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/allahabad-high-court/ashok-kumar-pal-v-state-of-u-p-anr-51921
- **Pages:** 8

## Headnote

Law-Criminal
Procedure
Code,1973-Section 482-Food Safety and
Standards Act, 2006-Sections 51 & 59(i)-
Quashing
of
summoning
ordercomplaint
was
filed
against
the
applicant after collecting sample of
milk from his shop under the provision
of Prevention of Food Adulteration Act,
1954-in the present case the sample
was collected in the year 2010 and the
proceeding was initiated under the act,
1954 despite repealing the same-more
than three years has expired from the
date
of
commission
of
offence,
therefore, cognizance cannot be taken
by the concerned court, even on the
fresh complaint in view of the section
77 of the Act, 2006-The order is set
aside.(Para 1 to 19)

The application is allowed. (E-6)

List of Cases cited:

Hindustan Unilever Ltd. Vs St. of M.P. (2020) 10
SCC 751.

## Text

586 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES

(v) On such amendment being
effected, a fresh application filed under
Section 23 of the DV Act can be maintained
for seeking a protection order under Section
18.

(vi) The alienation of assets whether
moveable or immoveable in which the aggrieved
person has an interest or is entitled to use by
virtue of the domestic relationship or which may
be reasonably required by the aggrieved person
or her children or her 'stridhan' or any of the
other properties jointly or separately held by the
aggrieved person, may constitute 'economic
abuse' bringing it within the definition of
"domestic violence" under Section 3 of the DV
Act.

(vii) Adjudication of title of an
aggrieved person with regard to moveable or
immoveable properties sought to be alienated
cannot be made under the DV Act but can only
be made by a competent civil court. However, in
respect of such properties a protection order can
be passed by the Magistrate under Section 18 of
the DV Act on his prima facie satisfaction that
domestic violence has taken place or is likely to
take place.

(viii) The relief/s available under
Sections 18, 19, 20, 21 and 22 in an application
filed under Section 12 of the DV Act may also
be sought before the civil court before which the
suit filed by the petitioner against the respondent
no.2 is pending, in terms of Section 26 of the DV
Act.

29. In the present case, the protection order
sought in the application dated 30.10.2021 is
essentially in the nature of an interim relief. As
noted above, a civil suit pertaining to the
properties in dispute is pending, in which suit,
the reliefs available to the petitioner under the
DV Act can be well addressed in view of the
provisions of Section 26 of the DV Act.
Relegating the matter to the appellate court
would unnecessarily prolong the case under the
DV Act.

30. Therefore, under the facts and
circumstances of the present case, this petition is
disposed of leaving it open to the petitioner to
move appropriate application before the civil
court in which the aforesaid suit is pending
seeking appropriate temporary injunction or
protection order, as she may be advised. If such
an application is filed, the concerned court is
requested to decide the same in accordance with
law, preferably within a period of four months
from the date of filing of that application.

In the interest of justice it is provided
that for a period of five months from today, none
of the parties to the petition will create any third
party interest over any part of the properties as
mentioned in the Schedule to the application
dated 30.10.2021 filed by the petitioner in Case
No.829 of 2011 under the DV Act.

31. As far as the aforesaid application
under Section 340 Cr.P.C. is concerned, the
same is required to be registered and numbered
as a Criminal Miscellaneous case and, thereafter,
placed before the appropriate Court for its
consideration. The office is directed to do the
needful in this regard. All other pending
applications stand disposed of.
----------
(2024) 5 ILRA 586
ORIGINAL JURISDICTION
CRIMINAL SIDE
DATED: ALLAHABAD 06.05.2024

BEFORE

THE HON'BLE ARUN KUMAR SINGH
DESHWAL, J.

Application U/S 482. No. 1700 of 2024

Ashok Kumar Pal ...Applicant
Versus
State of U.P. & Anr. ...Opposite Parties

Counsel for the Applicant:
Sri Manish Kumar Tripathi
5 All. Ashok Kumar Pal Vs. State of U.P. & Anr.
587
Counsel for the Opposite Parties:
G.A.

A.
Criminal
Law-Criminal
Procedure
Code,1973-Section 482-Food Safety and
Standards Act, 2006-Sections 51 & 59(i)-
Quashing
of
summoning
ordercomplaint
was
filed
against
the
applicant after collecting sample of
milk from his shop under the provision
of Prevention of Food Adulteration Act,
1954-in the present case the sample
was collected in the year 2010 and the
proceeding was initiated under the act,
1954 despite repealing the same-more
than three years has expired from the
date
of
commission
of
offence,
therefore, cognizance cannot be taken
by the concerned court, even on the
fresh complaint in view of the section
77 of the Act, 2006-The order is set
aside.(Para 1 to 19)

The application is allowed. (E-6)

List of Cases cited:

Hindustan Unilever Ltd. Vs St. of M.P. (2020) 10
SCC 751.

(Delivered by Hon'ble Arun Kumar Singh
Deshwal, J.)

1. Heard learned counsel for the
applicant and Sri Anish Kumar Upadhyay,
learned AGA for the State.

2. The present 482 Cr.P.C. application
has been filed to quash the entire
proceedings of Complaint Case No.1340 of
2011 (State Vs. Ashok Kumar Pal), under
Sections-51, 59(i) of the Food Safety and
Standards Act, 2006 (hereinafter referred to
as 'the Act, 2006'), Police Station-George
Town, District-Allahabad (now Prayagraj),
pending in the court of Additional Chief
Judicial Magistrate, Court No.2, Allahabad
as
well
as
summoning
order dated
12.09.2023.

3. Facts giving rise to the present case
are that after collecting the sample of milk
from his shop on 02.11.2010, the complaint
was lodged against the applicant on
24.05.2011
under
the
provision
of
Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954
(hereinafter referred to as 'the Act, 1954'),
on which the Magistrate, after taking
cognizance, had issued a summon on
12.09.2023 to applicant. This cognizance
and summoning order was challenged by the
applicant before this court in Application
under Section 482 No. - 38175 of 2022 on
the ground that on the date of filing the
complaint, the provisions of the Act, 1954
were already repealed on 29.07.2010 and a
new act namely the Act, 2006 had come into
force. This application was allowed by the
Court vide order dated 03.07.2023 and
cognizance as well as summoning order
dated 12.09.2023 was set aside, with the
liberty to proceed against the applicant as
per the provisions of the Act, 2006.
Thereafter, learned court below again
passed an order dated 12.09.2023 on the
basis of same complaint filed against the
applicant and summoned the applicant under
Sections 51, 59(i) of the Act, 2006, which is
under challenge in the present application.

4. Contention of learned counsel for
the applicant is that once the earlier
summoning order dated 12.09.2023 was set
aside by this Court on the ground that that
summoning order was passed under the Act,
1954, which was already repealed by the
Act, 2006, therefore, fresh complaint should
have been filed as per the Act, 2006, but, in
the present case, the complaint filed under
the Act, 1954 was taken into consideration
and summoning order was passed on that
complaint as well as material available with
the complaint. Second contention of learned
counsel for the applicant is that as per
Section-77 of the Act, 2006, the prosecution
588 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
on the basis of fresh complaint under the
Act, 2006 is itself barred beyond three years
because the sample was collected on
02.11.2010 and if a fresh complaint is filed
under the Act, 2006, then the concerned
court cannot take cognizance over the same
in view of Section-77 of the Act, 2006,
because more than three years has already
expired from the date of commission of
offence i.e. on the date of collection of
sample of milk.

5. Per contra, learned AGA has
submitted incorrect mentioning of sections
in the complaint cannot make the complaint
illegal because of adulterated food (milk),
found in the shop of applicant, the complaint
was filed against him and on the basis of the
same complaint and material, learned
Magistrate has passed the order as per the
new Act, 2006. Therefore, there is no
illegality in the impugned summoning order.

6. After hearing the submission of
learned counsel for the parties and on
perusal of record, it appears that earlier
complaint dated 24.05.2011 was filed as per
the procedure of Section 20 of the Act, 1954
after taking sanction from the District
Magistrate. Section 20 of the Act, 1954 is
being quoted as under:

"20. Cognizance and trial of
offences.-(1) [No prosecution for an offence
under this Act not being an offence under
section 14 or section 14A] shall be instituted
except by, or with the written consent of,
[the Central Government or the State
Government or a person authorised in this
behalf, by general or special order, by the
Central
Government
or
the
State
Government:

Provided that a prosecution for an
offence under this Act may be instituted by a
purchaser
[or
recognised
consumer
association] referred to in section 12, [if he
or it produces] in court a copy of the report
of the public analyst along with the
complaint.

[(2) No court inferior to that of a
Metropolitan Magistrate or a Judicial
Magistrate of the first class shall try any
offence under this Act.

(3)
Notwithstanding
anything
contained in the Code of Criminal
Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), an offence
punishable under sub-section (1AA) of
section 16 shall be cognizable and nonbailable).]"

7. Under the new Act, 2006, the
procedure for launching the prosecution has
been mentioned in Section 42 of the Act,
2006. As per Section 42 of the Act, 2006 the
prosecution can be initiated only after the
designated authority's recommendation and
thereafter sanction of Commissioner of
Food Safety. Section 42 of the Act, 2006 is
being quoted as under:

"42. Procedure for launching
prosecution.-(1) The Food Safety Officer
shall be responsible for inspection of food
business, drawing samples and sending
them to Food Analyst for analysis.

(2) The Food Analyst after
receiving the sample from the Food Safety
Officer shall analyse the sample and send
the analysis report mentioning method of
sampling and analysis within fourteen days
to Designated Officer with a copy to
Commissioner of Food Safety.

(3) The Designated Officer after
scrutiny of the report of Food Analyst shall
decide as to whether the contravention is
punishable with imprisonment or fine only
and in the case of contravention punishable
with imprisonment, he shall send his
recommendations within fourteen days to
5 All. Ashok Kumar Pal Vs. State of U.P. & Anr.
589
the Commissioner of Food Safety for
sanctioning prosecution.

(4) The Commissioner of Food
Safety shall, if he so deems fit decide, within
the period prescribed by the Central
Government, as per the gravity of offence,
whether the matter be referred to,?

(a) a court of ordinary jurisdiction
in case of offences punishable with
imprisonment for a term up to three years;
or

(b) a Special Court in case of
offences punishable with imprisonment for a
term exceeding three years where such
Special Court is established and in case no
Special Court is established, such cases
shall be tried by a Court of ordinary
jurisdiction.

(5) The Commissioner of Food
Safety shall communicate his decision to the
Designated Officer and the concerned Food
Safety Officer who shall launch prosecution
before courts of ordinary jurisdiction or
Special Court, as the case may be; and such
communication shall also be sent to the
purchaser if the sample was taken under
section 40."

8. From the perusal of Section 20 of the
Act, 1954 as well as Section 42 of the Act,
2006, it is clear that for launching the
prosecution on the basis of complaint,
procedure is different in both the Acts. In the
Act, 1954 only the District Magistrate can
grant sanction for the prosecution, but in the
Act, 2006, it is the Commissioner of Food
Safety, who, after getting recommendation
of Designated Officer can grant sanction for
prosecution. Therefore, any complaint filed
under the Act, 1954 after the repeal of the
same, will not be a valid complaint for the
Act, 2006 unless same is filed as per
procedure of the Act, 2006.

9. Even the complaint filed under the
Act, 1954 after its repeal is not saved by
Section 97 of the Act, 2006 except in certain
circumstances. For ready reference Section
97 of the Act, 2006 is being quoted as under:

"97. Repeal and savings.-(1) With
effect from such date as the Central
Government may appoint in this behalf, the
enactment and orders specified in the
Second Schedule shall stand repealed:

Provided that such repeal shall
not affect:?

(i) the previous operations of the
enactment and orders under repeal or
anything duly done or suffered thereunder;
or

(ii) any right, privilege, obligation
or liability acquired, accrued or incurred
under any of the enactment or Orders under
repeal; or

(iii) any penalty, forfeiture or
punishment incurred in respect of any
offences committed against the enactment
and Orders under repeal; or

(iv) any investigation or remedy in
respect of any such penalty, forfeiture or
punishment,

and any such investigation, legal
proceedings or remedy may be instituted,
continued or enforced and any such penalty,
forfeiture or punishment may be imposed, as
if this Act had not been passed:

(2) If there is any other law for the
time
being
in
force
in
any
State,
corresponding to this Act, the same shall
upon the commencement of this Act, stand
repealed and in such case, the provisions of
section 6 of the General Clauses Act, 1897
(10 of 1897) shall apply as if such provisions
of the State law had been repealed.

(3) Notwithstanding the repeal of
the aforesaid enactment and Orders, the
licences issued under any such enactment or
Order, which are in force on the date of
590 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
commencement of this Act, shall continue to
be in force till the date of their expiry for all
purposes, as if they had been issued under
the provisions of this Act or the rules or
regulations made thereunder.

(4)
Notwithstanding
anything
contained in any other law for the time being
in force, no court shall take cognizance of
an offence under the repealed Act or Orders
after the expiry of a period of three years
from the date of the commencement of this
Act."

10. From the perusal of Section 97 of
the Act, 2006, it is explicit that only those
proceedings that commence or duly done
under the Act, 1954 are saved, but
proceeding done under the Act, 1954 after
its repeal cannot be said to be duly done
under the Act, 1954.

11. It is also clear from Section 97(ii)
of the Act, 2006, if sample of adulterated
food (including milk) is collected from a
food business operator during the existence
of the Act, 1954 then his liable acquired
under the Act, 1954 will not be affected by
the new Act, 2006, and despite repealing the
Act, 1954, legal proceeding may be
continued under the Act of 1954.

12. Section 6 of the General Clauses
Act, 1897 also does not save the proceeding
under the repeal Act if no cause of action
arises before the repeal of the Act. Section6 of General Clauses Act, 1897 is being
quoted as under:

"6. Effect of repeal.-Where this
Act, or any 33[Central Act] or Regulation
made after the commencement of this Act,
repeals any enactment hitherto made or
hereafter to be made, then, unless a different
intention appears, the repeal shall not"

(a) revive anything not in force or
existing at the time at which the repeal takes
effect; or

(b) affect the previous operation of
any enactment so repealed or any thing duly
done or suffered thereunder; or

(c) affect any right, privilege,
obligation or liability acquired, accrued or
incurred under any enactment so repealed;
or

(d) affect any penalty, forfeiture or
punishment incurred in respect of any
offence committed against any enactment so
repealed; or

(e) affect any investigation, legal
proceeding or remedy in respect of any such
right,
privilege,
obligation,
liability,
penalty,
forfeiture
or
punishment
as
aforesaid;
and
any
such
investigation,
legal
proceeding or remedy may be instituted,
continued or enforced, and any such
penalty, forfeiture or punishment may be
imposed as if the repealing Act or
Regulation had not been passed.?

13. Apex Court in the case of
Hindustan Unilever Limited. Vs. State of
Madhya Pradesh reported in (2020) 10
SCC 751 also discussed the effect of the
repeal Act in the light of Section-6 of
General Clauses Act, 1897. Paragraph no.16
of the Hindustan Unilever (supra) is being
quoted as under:

"16. In terms of Section 6 of the
General Clauses Act, 1897, unless different
intention appears, the repeal of a statute
does not affect any investigation, legal
proceeding or remedy in respect of any such
right,
privilege,
obligation,
liability,
penalty, forfeiture or punishment and any
such investigation, legal proceeding or
remedy may be instituted, continued or
enforced, and any such penalty, forfeiture or
5 All. Ashok Kumar Pal Vs. State of U.P. & Anr.
591
punishment may be imposed as if the
repealing Act or Regulation had not been
passed. But in the 2006 Act, the repeal and
saving
clause
contained
in
Sections
97(1)(iii) and (iv) specifically provides that
repeal of the Act shall not affect any
investigation or remedy in respect of any
such penalty, forfeiture or punishment and
the punishment may be imposed, ?as if the
2006 Act had not been passed?. The
question
as
to
whether
penalty
or
prosecution can continue or be initiated
under the repealed provisions has been
examined by this Court in State of Punjab v.
Mohar Singh [State of Punjab v. Mohar
Singh, AIR 1955 SC 84 : 1955 Cri LJ 254] ,
wherein this Court examined Section 6 of the
General Clauses Act which is on lines of
Section 38(2) of the Interpretation Act of
England. It was held as under : (AIR pp. 8789, paras 6 & 9)

"6. Under the law of England, as
it stood prior to the Interpretation Act of
1889, the effect of repealing a statute was
said to be to obliterate it as completely from
the records of Parliament as if it had never
been passed, except for the purpose of those
actions, which were commenced, prosecuted
and concluded while it was an existing law [
Vide Craies on Statute Law, 5th Edn., p.
323.] . A repeal therefore without any saving
clause would destroy any proceeding
whether not yet begun or whether pending at
the time of the enactment of the repealing
Act and not already prosecuted to a final
judgment so as to create a vested right [
Vide Crawford on Statutory Construction,
pp. 599-600w.] . To obviate such results a
practice came into existence in England to
insert a saving clause in the repealing
statute with a view to preserve rights and
liabilities already accrued or incurred
under the repealed enactment.

Later on, to dispense with the
necessity of having to insert a saving clause
on each occasion, Section 38(2) was
inserted in the Interpretation Act of 1889
which provides that a repeal, unless the
contrary intention appears, does not affect
the previous operation of the repealed
enactment or anything duly done or suffered
under it and any investigation, legal
proceeding or remedy may be instituted,
continued or enforced in respect of any
right, liability and penalty under the
repealed Act as if the repealing Act had not
been passed. Section 6 of the General
Clauses Act, as is well known, is on the same
lines as Section 38(2) of the Interpretation
Act of England.

9. The offence committed by the
respondent consisted in filing a false claim.
The claim was filed in accordance with the
provision of Section 4 of the Ordinance and
under Section 7 of the Ordinance, any false
information in regard to a claim was a
punishable offence. The High Court is
certainly right in holding that Section 11 of
the Act does not make the claim filed under
the Ordinance a claim under the Act so as to
attract the operation of Section 7.

Section 11 of the Act is in the
following terms:

"11. Repeal."The East Punjab
Refugees (Registration of Land Claims)
Ordinance 7 of 1948 is hereby repealed and
any rules made, notifications issued,
anything done, any action taken in exercise
of the powers conferred by or under the said
Ordinance shall be deemed to have been
made, issued, done or taken in exercise of
the powers conferred by, or under this Act
as if this Act had come into force on 3rd day
of March, 1948.""

" The truth or falsity of the claim
has to be investigated in the usual way and
if it is found that the information given by
the claimant is false, he can certainly be
punished in the manner laid down in
Sections 7 and 8 of the Act.
592 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES

If we are to hold that the penal
provisions contained in the Act cannot be
attracted in case of a claim filed under the
Ordinance, the results will be anomalous
and even if on the strength of a false claim a
refugee has succeeded in getting an
allotment in his favour, such allotment could
not be cancelled under Section 8 of the Act.
We think that the provisions of Sections 4, 7
and 8 make it apparent that it was not the
intention of the legislature that the rights
and liabilities in respect of claims filed
under the Ordinance shall be extinguished
on the passing of the Act, and this is
sufficient for holding that the present case
would attract the operation of Section 6 of
the General Clauses Act.

It may be pointed out that Section
11 of the Act is somewhat clumsily worded
and it does not make use of expressions
which are generally used in saving clauses
appended to repealing statutes; but as has
been said above the point for our
consideration is whether the Act evinces an
intention which is inconsistent with the
continuance of rights and liabilities accrued
or incurred under the Ordinance and in our
opinion this question has to be answered in
the negative."

14. So far as the second contention of
learned counsel for the applicant is that now
the prosecution is barred by Section-77 of
the Act, 2006 is concerned, for that, it is
clear from the perusal of Section-77 of the
Act, 2006 that even after the approval of
Commissioner of Food Safety, cognizance
of an offence by the court can be taken up to
three years. For ready reference, Section-77
of the Act, 2006 is being quoted as under:

"77. Time limit for prosecutions.-
Notwithstanding anything contained in this
Act, no court shall take cognizance of an
offence under this Act after the expiry of the
period of one year from the date of
commission of an offence:

Provided that the Commissioner
of Food Safety may, for reasons to be
recorded in writing, approve prosecution
within an extended period of up to three
years."

15. From the perusal of Section-77 of
the Act, 2006, it is explicit that the court can
take cognizance up to three years from the
date of commission of the offence. A
commission of an offence under the Act,
2006 can be considered on the date when the
sample was collected. In the present case,
the sample was collected on 02.11.2010 and
the proceeding was initiated under the Act,
1954, despite repealing the same. Therefore,
that proceeding was not saved u/s 97 of the
Act, 2006. Therefore, even if the fresh
complaint is filed under the Act, 2006 then
the concerned court cannot take cognizance
in view of the bar of Section-77 of the Act,
2006. Therefore, the contention of learned
counsel for the applicant is correct that now
the prosecution is barred u/s 77 of the Act,
2006 as the sample of the milk was collected
on 02.11.2010, therefore, cognizance cannot
be taken in a fresh complaint filed under the
Act, 2006.

16. In the present case, this court by the
order dated 03.07.2023 had set aside the
earlier summoning order dated 12.09.2023
on the ground that on the date of filing the
complaint under the Act, 1954, the Act,
2006 already repealed it and liberty was also
granted to proceed in accordance with the
Act, 2006 but the opposite party no.2 has not
initiated any proceeding as per the Act,
2006, even then, the learned Magistrate has
erroneously passed a fresh summoning order
dated 12.09.2023 on the basis of the same, a
complaint, which was filed as per the
procedure of the Act, 1954, even a sample of
5 All. Madhu Tiwari Vs. State of U.P. & Ors.
593
milk was collected on 02.11.2010, which
itself was after the repeal of the Act, 1954.
Therefore, not only the summoning order
dated 12.09.2023 is erroneous, but also the
entire proceeding of the Complaint Case
No.1340 of 2011 (State Vs. Ashok Kumar
Pal) is itself illegal as the same was initiated
on the basis of the complaint filed under the
Act, 1954 (Repealed Act), not as per the
procedure of the Act, 2006 which was
prevalent at the time of filing the complaint.

17. Therefore, the proceeding of
Complaint Case No.1340 of 2011 (State Vs.
Ashok Kumar Pal), under Sections-51, 59(i)
of the Act, 2006, Police Station-George
Town, District-Allahabad (now Prayagraj),
pending in the court of Additional Chief
Judicial Magistrate, Court No.2, Allahabad
as
well
as
summoning
order dated
12.09.2023 is hereby set aside.

18. As already observed hereinabove
that more than three years has expired
from the date of commission of offence,
therefore, cognizance cannot be taken by
the concerned court, even on the fresh
complaint in view of Section-77 of the
Act, 2006. Therefore, Food Safety Officer,
cannot be permitted to file a fresh
complaint under the Act, 2006 because the
court cannot take cognizance on that
complaint in view of Section-77 of the
Act, 2006.

19. With the aforesaid observations,
the present application is allowed.
----------
(2024) 5 ILRA 593
ORIGINAL JURISDICTION
CRIMINAL SIDE
DATED: LUCKNOW 07.05.2024

BEFORE

THE HON'BLE SHAMIM AHMED, J.
Application U/S 482. No. 4095 of 2023
&
Other Connected Cases

Madhu Tiwari ...Applicant
Versus
State of U.P. & Ors. ...Opposite Parties

Counsel for the Applicant:
Nadeem Murtaza, Aditya Vikram Singh

Counsel for the Opposite Parties:
G.A.

A.
Criminal
Law-Criminal
Procedure
Code,1973-Section 482-Indian Penal Code,
1860-Sections 307, 323, 504, 506 & 3⁄4 D.P.
Act-quashing of criminal proceedingsmutual settlement in matrimonial disputemultiple applications filed by both the
parties, later they reached a settlementHeld, in cases where the dispute is private
and
resolved
amicably,
quashing
of
criminal proceedings is justified to secure
the ends of justice-the court directed the
family court to expedite the proceedings
and waived the statutory cooling off
period, following the Supreme Court
judgment in Amardeep singh Vs Harveen
Kaur.(Para 1 to 17)

B. In the exercise of the power u/s 482 and
while dealing with the plea that the dispute
has been settled, the high court must have
due regard to the nature and gravity of the
offence. The High court may quash the
criminal proceeding if in view of the
compromise between the disputants, the
possibility of a conviction is remote and the
continuation of a criminal proceeding
would cause oppression and prejudice.
(Para 11)

The application is allowed. (E-6)

List of Cases cited:

1. Amardeep Singh Vs Harveen Kaur (2017) AIR
SC 4417

2. Shalini Massey Vs Neeraj Samuel Dass, FAPLD
No. 392 of 2019