# Ashok Kumar v. Tejveer Singh & Ors

- **Citation:** (2026) 3 ILRA 961
- **Court:** High Court of Judicature at Allahabad
- **Decided:** 2026-03-25
- **Case number:** First Appeal No. 563 of 1986
- **Bench:** Sandeep Jain
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/allahabad-high-court/ashok-kumar-v-tejveer-singh-ors-54352
- **Pages:** 29

## Text

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3 All. Ashok Kumar Vs. Tejveer Singh & Ors.
961
conviction i.e. either at the stage of pendency of the appeal or revision, if, there is no other
impediment to the compounding the offence.

10. Thus, considering the facts and circumstances of the case, particularly, the old relations
between the parties as well as the complainant's consent in favour of the accused-convict for
agreeing to compound it, this Court finds it to be a fit case for granting permission in this regard, as
it may not only eliminate the bitterness between the parties, but would also restore peace in their
relations.

11. Resultantly, the impugned judgment of conviction and order of sentence dated 19.12.2024
passed by the trial court, and affirmed by the appellate court vide impugned order dated 10.9.2025
are hereby set aside and the criminal complaint is rendered inconsequential.

12. The revision petition is allowed.
----------
(2026) 3 ILRA 961
APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL SIDE
DATED: ALLAHABAD 25.03.2026

BEFORE

THE HON'BLE SANDEEP JAIN, J.

First Appeal No. 563 of 1986

Ashok Kumar ...Appellant
Versus
Tejveer Singh & Ors. ...Respondents

Issues for Consideration
(i) Whether subsequent purchasers, who purchased the suit property during the pendency of a
suit for specific performance, could claim protection as bona fide purchasers for value without
notice under Section 19(b) of the Specific Relief Act, 1963, despite the applicability of the
doctrine of lis pendens under Section 52 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882?
(ii) Whether an agreement to sell executed by a person having no title or imperfect title to the
property becomes specifically enforceable when the vendor subsequently acquires title during
the subsistence of the contract, in view of Section 43 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 read
with Section 13(a) of the Specific Relief Act, 1963?
(iii) Whether the plaintiff, who was found ready and willing to perform his part of the contract,
was entitled to a decree for specific performance instead of the alternative relief of refund of
earnest money?

Headnotes
Transfer of Property Act, 1882 - s.52 - Specific Relief Act, 1963 - s.19(b) - Specific
Performance - Transfer pendente lite - Subsequent purchasers claiming to be bona fide
purchasers for value without notice - Doctrine of lis pendens - Applicability:

Held: Where a suit for specific performance had already been instituted and thereafter the suit property was
transferred by the vendor during pendency of the suit, the transfer became subject to the doctrine of lis
962 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
pendens embodied in Section 52 of the Transfer of Property Act. In such a situation, the protection available
to a transferee under Section 19(b) of the Specific Relief Act must yield to Section 52. Once the transfer is
pendente lite, the subsequent purchasers remain bound by the result of the litigation irrespective of their plea
of good faith, valuable consideration or absence of notice of the earlier agreement. The trial court therefore
erred in denying specific performance on the ground that defendants nos. 2 to 7 were bona fide purchasers.
[Paras 37, 61-65]

Transfer of Property Act, 1882 - s.43 - Specific Relief Act, 1963 - s.13(a) - Specific
Performance - Agreement executed by person having no title or imperfect title - Subsequent
acquisition of title by vendor - Enforceability of contract:

Held: Even where the vendor was not the owner of the property on the date of execution of the agreement
to sell, if he subsequently acquires title during subsistence of the contract, the purchaser is entitled to compel
performance of the contract out of the interest so acquired. The vendor, having represented himself
competent to transfer the property and having received consideration, cannot resist enforcement after
subsequently acquiring title. Since defendant no.1 acquired title on 07.09.1981 and the agreement dated
03.09.1981 continued to subsist, the plaintiff became entitled to enforce specific performance against him and
the subsequent transferees. [Paras 38, 66-68]

Specific Relief Act, 1963 - s.16(c) - Specific Performance - Readiness and willingness -
Registered agreement to sell - Vendor's default in obtaining statutory permission and appearing
for execution of sale deed - Entitlement to decree:

Held: The evidence established that the plaintiff continuously remained ready and willing to perform his
obligations under the agreement, issued notice to the vendor, attended the office of the Sub-Registrar on the
stipulated date with the balance consideration and took steps to mark his presence. The failure to obtain the
requisite Income Tax clearance and the failure to appear before the Sub-Registrar were attributable to
defendant no.1. The plaintiff having proved readiness and willingness throughout, denial of specific
performance was legally unsustainable. [Paras 59-60, 70]

Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 - s.96 - First Appeal - Trial court granting only alternative relief
of refund of earnest money - Findings on execution of agreement and readiness/willingness
attained finality - Specific performance decreed in appeal:

Held: The trial court had recorded findings in favour of the plaintiff regarding execution of the registered
agreement, payment of earnest money, readiness and willingness and absence of statutory bar. Those findings
were never challenged by the defendants through appeal or cross-objections and therefore attained finality.
Once the finding regarding bona fide purchase was found erroneous in law, the plaintiff became entitled to
the primary relief of specific performance and not merely return of earnest money with interest. [Paras 69-71]

Appeal allowed. Suit for specific performance decreed. (E-14)

Case Law Cited
Shingara Singh v. Daljit Singh, 2024 SCC OnLine SC 2823 - relied on; Guruswamy Nadar v. P.
Lakshmi Ammal (Dead) through LRs., (2008) 5 SCC 796 - relied on; Alka Shrirang Chavan v.
Hemchandra Rajaram Bhonsale, 2026 SCC OnLine SC 55 - relied on; Tanu Ram Bora v. Promod
Ch. Das (Dead) through LRs., (2019) 4 SCC 173 - relied on; Silla Chandra Sekharam v.
Ramchandra Sahu, 1964 SCC OnLine SC 345 - relied on; Usha Sinha v. Dina Ram, (2008) 7 SCC
144 - referred to; Sanjay Verma v. Manik Roy, (2006) 13 SCC 608 - referred to; R.K.
Mohammed Ubaidullah v. Hajee C. Abdul Wahab, (2000) 6 SCC 402 - referred to; am Pyare v.
Ram Narain, (1985) 2 SCC 162 - referred to; Jumma Masjid v. Kodimaniandra Deviah, AIR 1962
SC 847 - referred to.
3 All. Ashok Kumar Vs. Tejveer Singh & Ors.
963
List of Acts / Statutes
Code of Civil Procedure, 1908; Transfer of Property Act, 1882; Specific Relief Act, 1963.

List of Keywords
Specific performance; Registered agreement to sell; Readiness and willingness; Lis pendens; Transfer
pendente lite; Bona fide purchaser; Subsequent acquisition of title; Feeding the grant by estoppel; Section 43
T.P. Act; Imperfect title; Earnest money; Subsequent transferee.

Case Arising From
Judgment and decree dated 30.09.1986 passed by the Court of 7th Additional District Judge, Ghaziabad in
O.S. No. 200 of 1982, Ashok Kumar v. Tejvir Singh and others

Appearance for Parties
For the Petitioner: Sri Nipun Singh, Sri Ramendra Asthana, Sri Sumit Suri
For the Respondents: Sri Akhilesh Kumar Pandey

(Delivered by Hon'ble Sandeep Jain, J.)

1. The instant appeal under Section 96 CPC has been preferred by the plaintiff against the
impugned judgment and decree dated 30.9.1986 passed by the Court of 7th Additional District
Judge, Ghaziabad in O.S. No. 200 of 1982 Ashok Kumar vs. Tejvir Singh and others, whereby the
plaintiff 's suit for the relief of specific performance of agreement for sale and possession dated
03.9.1981 has been dismissed and the suit for the alternative relief, for the recovery of ₹ 41,000/- ,
i.e.earnest money paid by the plaintiff to the defendant no.1 along with an interest @17% per
annum has been decreed.

Plaint Case

2. The plaintiff/appellant filed O.S. No. 200 of 1982 against the defendant respondents with
the averments that the defendant no.1 Tejvir Singh is the bhumidhar of the disputed land, which
was agreed to be sold for a consideration of ₹ 79,500/- in favour of plaintiff and a registered
agreement to sell was executed on 03.9.1981 in favour of the plaintiff. The defendant no.1 accepted
₹ 36,000/- at the time of the execution of agreement to sell and ₹ 5,000/- at the time of registration
of the agreement to sell, before the concerned sub-registrar and the remaining amount of ₹ 38,500/-
was agreed to be paid by the plaintiff to the defendant no.1 at the time of execution of sale deed in
his favour.

3. It was further averred by the plaintiff that the defendant no.1 had undertaken to obtain
certificate from the income tax department, before the execution of sale deed and also undertaken
that till 02.11.1981 the sale deed would be executed in plaintiffs favour. It was further agreed
between the parties that if defendant no.1 did not execute the sale deed in favour of the plaintiff
after receiving the balance sale consideration then the plaintiff will have the right to get the sale
deed executed through court. It was further averred that within the agreed period of limitation, the
plaintiff requested the defendant no.1 many times to accept the balance sale consideration and
execute the sale deed but on one pretext or the other, the sale deed was not executed in favour of
the plaintiff.
964 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES

4. It was further averred by the plaintiff that in terms of the agreement to sell, he always
remained ready and willing to get the sale deed executed in his favour after paying the balance sale
consideration,and he was still ready and willing to do so. It was further averred by the plaintiff that
he gave a registered notice dated 25.9.1981 to the defendant no.1, to inform the plaintiff through
registered post, on which date he was ready and willing to execute the sale deed in favour of the
plaintiff after receiving the balance sale consideration, so as to enable him to reach the office of
sub-registrar, Hapur. This notice was received by the defendant no.1 on 30.9.1981, which was
neither replied to nor the sale deed was executed in favour of the plaintiff.

5. It was further averred by the plaintiff that orally also he requested defendant no.1 many
times to execute the sale deed in his favour on which, an assurance was given by the defendant, that
he will execute the sale deed in favour of the plaintiff on 02.11.1981 before the sub-registrar,Hapur
but when the plaintiff went to the office of the above sub-registrar on 2.11.1981, the defendant was
not present, but the plaintiff marked his attendance before the concerned sub-registrar. Ultimately,
the defendant no.1 refused to execute the sale deed in favour of the plaintiff.

6. During the pendency of the suit, with a malafide intention, in order to cause financial loss to
the plaintiff, the disputed land was illegally sold on 11.10.1982 by defendant no.1 through sale
deed executed in favour of defendants no. 2 to 7, which was barred under Section 52 of the
Transfer of Property Act, on the basis of which no right title and interest accrued in favour of
defendants no. 2 to 7. It was further averred by the plaintiff that the defendants no. 2 to 7 were not
bonafide purchasers of the disputed land, since they were fully aware of the registered agreement to
sell executed by defendant no.1, earlier in his favour. It was further averred by the plaintiff that the
subsequent purchasers were bound by the earlier agreement to sell executed by defendant no.1 in
his favour.

7. In view of the above backdrop, the plaintiff claimed the following reliefs:-

(i)By decree of the court, the defendants be directed to execute the sale deed of the
disputed land situated in khasra no. 611, area 4-10-17-17 situated in village Mamoodpur,Pargana
and Tehsil Hapur, District Ghaziabad, after receiving the balance sale consideration of ₹ 38,500/-
and the defendants be further directed to handover the actual possession of the disputed land to the
plaintiff and if the defendants failed to do so, then the sale deed of the disputed land be executed in
favour of the plaintiff by the court and the actual possession of the land be also handed over to the
plaintiff.

(ii)That the plaintiff be awarded annual damages @ ₹ 5,000/- from the date of filing of
the suit ,till the actual possession of the disputed land was handed to him by the defendants.

(iii)If for any legal reason, it was not possible to get the sale deed executed in favour of
the plaintiff, then the plaintiff be returned the earnest money of ₹ 41,000/- along with interest
@17% per annum during the pendency of the suit till the actual payment was made to the plaintiff.

(iv)The costs of the suit be also awarded to the plaintiff against the defendants.

(v)Any other relief as the court deems fit and appropriate be also awarded to the plaintiff
against the defendants.

Written Statement of defendant no.1 Tejvir Singh
3 All. Ashok Kumar Vs. Tejveer Singh & Ors.
965

8. The defendant in his written statement accepted that a registered agreement to sell was
executed on 3.9.1981 in favour of the plaintiff for a consideration of ₹ 79,500/-, out of which he
has received ₹ 41,000/-. He also accepted that he was required to obtain permission from the
income tax department and was also supposed to execute the sale deed till 2.11.1981 in favour of
the plaintiff, regarding the disputed land. The defendant also accepted that a registered notice was
sent by the plaintiff on 25.9.1981, which was received by him. The defendant also accepted that he
has executed a registered sale deed on 11.10.1982 in favour of defendants no. 2 to 7.

9. It was further averred by the defendant that he has not willingly executed the sale deed in
favour of defendants no. 2 to 7, regarding which he has not received any consideration from them,
which was void. It was further averred by the defendant that if any document has been fraudulently
got executed from him by defendants no. 2 to 7, then it was not binding on him. It was further
averred by the defendant that the defendants no. 2 to 7 were well aware that he had earlier executed
an agreement to sell regarding the disputed land, in favour of the plaintiff. It was further averred
that the plaintiff was not ready and willing to get the sale deed executed within the prescribed
period in his favour. It was further disclosed that the answering defendant was not able to obtain
the certificate from the income tax officer.

10. It was further averred that due to the above reasons the suit filed by the plaintiff was not
maintainable. The answering defendant always remained ready and willing to execute the sale deed
in favour of the plaintiff after receiving the balance sale consideration and he is still ready and
willing, but in the intervening period, due to some differences, he was not ready, now the
differences between him and the plaintiff have been resolved.

Written Statement of defendants no. 2 to 7

11. The defendants in their written statement has denied that any alleged agreement to sell was
executed by defendant no.1 in favour of the plaintiff, regarding the disputed land. The defendants
have averred that on 11.10.1982 after receiving appropriate consideration, the defendant no.1 has
executed the sale deed of the disputed land in their favour and its possession has also been handed
to them, as such, the plaintiff has got no right to get the sale deed of the disputed land executed in
his favour.

12. It was further averred by the defendants that fraudulently the plaintiff, Ravindra,
Narendra,Trilokchand, Kripal and Surendra have got executed the sale deed from defendant no.1 in
favour of his servant Jaggu and brothers on 4.3.1981, who belong to the same family, and after
getting the above information, the defendant no.1 filed O.S.no. 234 of 1981 Tejvir vs. Jaggu and
others before the Court of Civil Judge, Ghaziabad, during the pendency of which Ashok Kumar,
Ravindra, Narendra, Trilokchand, Kripal, Surendra and others, acted as mediators between
defendant no.1 and Jaggu and others, during which it was agreed that the agreement of the disputed
property be executed in favour of other persons, so as to bind them with the compromise.

13. It was further averred by the defendants, that acting upon the above compromise,
defendant no.1 executed the sale deed of his house on 07.8.1981 in favour of Kripal, thereafter,
Jaggu and his brother withdrew from the mediation, who refused to execute the document in favour
966 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
of Kripal, due to which the earlier document dated 07.8.1981 was got cancelled on 13.8.1981.
Thereafter, Jaggu and others, were willing to execute the agreement in favour of their family
members Dalchand, as such,an agreement was executed on 25.8.1981 in favour of Dalchand for a
consideration of Rs.68,175/-, of which Ravindra and Kripal were witnesses. It was further averred
that the mediators in order to force the defendant no.1 to get the matter compromised, forced the
defendant no.1 to get the agreement to sell executed in favour of the plaintiff without any
consideration, in which Trilokchand and Surendra were witnesses and on the other hand, the 2nd
document regarding a house was registered in favour of Kripal, in which Surendra and Ravindra
were witnesses.

14. It was further averred that on 3.9.1981 the defendant no.1 was neither the owner of the
disputed land nor had any right to execute any agreement to sell regarding it, as such, no question
arises of getting any consideration by defendant no.1. It was further averred that acting on the
advice of mediators, defendant no.1, Jaggu and others got the sale deed dated 4.3.1981 cancelled
through decree of the court on 7.9.1981, as such on 7.9.1981 the defendant no.1 became the owner
of the disputed land. It was averred that in view of the above facts, the defendant no.1 did not have
any right to execute the agreement of disputed land in favour of the plaintiff on 3.9.1981, which
was a void document.

15. It was further averred that on 25.9.1981 Jaggu and others and Dalchand, got cancelled the
agreement dated 25.8.1981, which was witnessed by Narendra, and as such, on 25.9.1981 the title
of defendant no.1 became clear in the disputed land.

16. It was further averred by the defendants that, they were not aware of the agreement to sell
executed in favour of the plaintiff and they bonafidely purchased the disputed land after paying
appropriate consideration to the defendant no.1 and also are in its possession since then.

17. It was further averred that the defendant no.1 got is right in the disputed land on 7.9.1981
after the cancellation of the sale deed executed in favour of Jaggu and others, subsequent to that, no
agreement to sell was executed by defendant no.1 in favour of plaintiff, and if any agreement to sell
has been executed prior to that, then the defendants are not bound by it nor they had any knowledge
of such agreement nor it can be presumed that they had any knowledge of the above agreement. It
was further averred that the agreement to sell dated 3.9.1981 is non-effective, which has been
fraudulently got executed by plaintiff, which has got no legal sanctity. It was further averred that
during litigation between defendant no.1 and the answering defendant's, the answering defendants
were never informed by the defendant no.1 that he has executed an agreement to sell in favour of
the plaintiff.

18. It was further averred by the answering defendants that after the month of July 1983, the
defendant no.1 has colluded with the plaintiff, in order to cause wrongful loss to the defendants,
who proclaimed that the agreement to sell was legal and has also challenged the validity of the sale
deed.It was further averred that in the mutation proceedings before the Court of Tehsildar, the
defendant no.1 has given testimony in support of the plaintiff, which proves the collusion and
conspiracy of the defendant no.1 with the plaintiff. It was further averred that the admission of
defendant no.1 has no adverse effect on the answering defendants legal rights.
3 All. Ashok Kumar Vs. Tejveer Singh & Ors.
967
Issues framed by the trial court

19. On the basis of the pleadings of the parties, the trial court framed the following issues:-

(i)Whether the defendant no.1 executed an agreement to sell dated 3.9.1981 in favour of
the plaintiff?

(ii)Whether the plaintiff has been ready and willing and still ready and willing to perform
his part of contract?

(iii)Whether the defendant no.1 executed the alleged sale deed in favour of defendants no.
2 to 7, as alleged in paragraph 11-A of the plaint? If so, its effect?

(iv)Whether the defendants no. 2 to 7 are the bonafide purchasers for value and without
notice? If so, its effect?

(v)Whether the suit is barred under Section 16 and 20 of the Specific Relief Act? If so, its
effect?

(vi)Whether the defendant no.1 executed an agreement to sell in the circumstances as
alleged in paragraph 18 to 21 and 31 of the WS of the defendants no. 2 to7? If so, its effect?

(vii)Whether the defendant no.1 was not competent to execute agreement to sell as
alleged in para 22 of the WS of the defendants no. 2 to7? If so, its effect?

(viii)Whether the defendant no.1 is in collusion with the plaintiff as alleged in para-33 of
the WS of the defendants no. 2 to 7? If so, its effect?

(ix)To what relief, if any, the plaintiff is entitled to?

Oral Evidence of the parties

20. The plaintiff Ashok Kumar examined himself as PW-1, Ravindra Singh as PW-2, Trilok
Singh as PW-3 and Dhirendra Singh as PW-4, whereas, defendant no.1 Tejvir Singh examined
himself as DW-1, defendants No. 2 to 7 examined Mahipal Singh as DW-2,Hetram as DW-3 and
Kripal Singh as DW-4.

Documentary evidence of the parties

21. The plaintiff has filed the original agreement to sell dated 3.9.1981, carbon copy of legal
notice, applications given to subregistrar Hapur to mark his attendance, carbon copy of the receipts
issued by the subregistrar,Hapur, postal receipts, acknowledgement AD.

22. The defendants No. 2 to 7 have filed copy of agreement to sell executed by Tejvir in
favour of Kripal dated 7.8.1981, copy of cancellation of agreement to sell executed by Kripal in
favour of Tejvir dated 13.8.1981, copy of agreement executed by Jaggu, Buddu and Sukhdev in
favour of Dalchand dated 25.8.1981, copy of sale deed executed by Tejvir in favour of Kripal dated
3.9.1981,copy of compromise in OS No. 334 of 1981 Tejvir vs.Jaggu dated 7.9.1981, copy of
decree in OS no. 334 of 1981,etc.

Reasoning of the trial court

Issue no.1,2,3,5,6,7,8:-
968 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES

23. On the basis of documentary and oral evidence, the trial court concluded that a registered
agreement to sell was executed by defendant no.1 in favour of plaintiff on 03.9.1981 for a
consideration of ₹ 79,500/-which was not a sham transaction, the plaintiff was always ready and
willing and was still ready and willing to perform his part of the agreement, the sale deed of the
disputed land was executed by defendant no.1 in favour of defendants no. 2 to 7 on 11.10.1982, the
suit was not barred under Section 16 and 20 of the Specific Relief Act, on 3.9.1981 the defendant
no.1 had no authority to enter into an agreement for sale with the plaintiff regarding the disputed
land and there was no collusion between the plaintiff and the defendant no.1.

Issue no.4 and 9:-

24. The trial court considered that the suit was filed on 25.3.1982 and the disputed property
was transferred by the defendant no.1 to defendant No. 2 to 7 on 11.10.1982, which was during the
pendency of the suit. The trial court concluded that in the above circumstances Section 52 of the
Transfer of Property Act was applicable instead of Section 19(b) of the Specific Relief Act,1963.
The trial court concluded that the defendants no. 2 to 7 had no knowledge of the agreement to sell
executed by defendant no.1 in favour of the plaintiff and they became aware of it for the 1st time
when they received a summons from the court. In view of the above reasoning, the trial court
concluded that defendants no. 2 to 7 purchased the property in good faith for consideration and
without notice of the agreement in question.

25. The trial court concluded that the defendant no.1 had no authority to enter into an
agreement of the disputed land on 3.9.1981, and the disputed land stood transferred in the name of
defendant no.1 on 7.9.1981,when the sale deed of the disputed property in the name of Jaggu and
others was cancelled. The trial court concluded that subsequently, the defendant no.1 became the
owner of the disputed land and due to this, the plaintiff could have compelled the defendant no.1 to
execute the sale deed of the disputed land in his favour. Since, the defendant no.1 had transferred
the disputed land to the defendants no. 2 to 7, who were held to be bonafide purchasers for valuable
consideration without notice, hence, the trial court did not grant the primary relief of specific
performance of agreement to sell in favour of the plaintiff but ordered the defendant no.1 to return
the earnest money of ₹ 41,000/- with interest @17% per annum, aggrieved against which, the
plaintiff has filed the instant appeal under Section 96 CPC.

Submissions of the learned counsel for the plaintiff-appellant

26. Sri Nipun Singh learned senior counsel for the plaintiff appellant submitted that except
issue no. 4 and 9, all the other issues have been decided in favour of the plaintiff appellant, which
has not been challenged by the defendants by filing any appeal before this Court, as such, the
finding in regard to the other issues have attained finality.

27. Learned counsel further submitted that from the documentary and oral evidence on record
it was proved that the defendants no. 2 to 7 were well aware of the agreement to sell, of the
disputed land executed earlier by defendant no.1 in favour of plaintiff, as such, the defendants no. 2
to 7 were not bonafide purchasers of the disputed property. Learned counsel submitted that since
the disputed property was purchased by the defendants no. 2 to 7 during the pendency of the suit, as
3 All. Ashok Kumar Vs. Tejveer Singh & Ors.
969
such, the provisions of Section 19(b) of the Specific Relief Act, 1963 were not applicable but
provisions of Section 52 of the Transfer of Property Act were fully applicable on the facts and
circumstances of the case.

28. Learned counsel further submitted that it is true that on 3.9.1981 the defendant no.1 was
not the owner of the disputed land, which he became subsequently on 7.9.1981, but the suit was
only filed on 31.3.1982 and on that date, the defendant no.1 was the owner of the disputed land, as
such the provisions of Section 13(a) of the Specific Relief Act, 1963 was attracted to the facts and
circumstances of the case, and in view of this, the trial court ought to have decreed the plaintiff 's
suit for the primary relief of specific performance of the agreement to sell dated 3.9.1981 and it has
erred in granting the alternative relief of return of earnest money with interest to the plaintiff, which
is legally unsustainable and is liable to be set aside. In support of his above contention learned
counsel has relied upon the case law:-

(i) Shingara Singh vs.Daljit Singh and Another 2024 SCC OnLine SC 2823.

(ii) Guruswamy Nadar vs. P.Lakhmi Ammal(Dead) through Lrs. and others (2008) 5 SCC
796.

(iii) Alka Shrirang Chavan and Another vs. Hemchandra Rajaram Bhonsale and others
2026 SCC OnLine SC 55.

(iv) Tanu Ram Bora vs.Promod Ch.Das(Dead) through LRS. and others (2019) 4 SCC
173.

(v) Silla Chandra Sekharam vs.Ramchandra Sahu 1964 SCC OnLine SC 345(By 3
Judges)

29. Service is sufficient on all the respondents but despite notice, none has appeared for the
respondents. It is apparent that the learned counsel for the respondents has not intentionally
appeared to counter the submissions of the learned counsel for the appellant.

30. I have heard the learned counsel for the appellant,perused the impugned judgment and the
record of the trial court.

31. On the basis of the submissions of the learned counsel for the appellant, the perusal of the
impugned judgment and the evidence on record, the following questions arise for determination in
this appeal :-

(1)Whether the defendants no. 2 to 7 were bona fide purchasers for valuable
consideration in good faith who had no notice of the earlier registered agreement to sell executed
by defendant no.1 in favour of plaintiff ?

(2)Whether the doctrine of lis pendens enunciated in Section 52 of the Transfer of
Property Act applies to the facts and circumstances of the case , which will prevail over Section
19(b) of the Specific Relief Act, 1963?

(3)Whether in terms of the provisions of Section 43 of the Transfer of Property Act read
with Section 13(a) of the Specific Relief Act,1963 the plaintiff can enforce the agreement to sell
against the defendant no.1 and subsequent purchasers i.e. defendants no. 2 to 7 ?
970 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES

(4)Whether the trial court has erred in not granting the primary relief of specific
performance of the agreement to sell in favour of the plaintiff ?

Analysis of case laws

32. The Apex Court in the case of Guruswamy Nadar (supra) was considering what is the
effect of the lis pendens on the subsequent sale of the same property by the owner to the 2nd
purchaser. It was held as under:-

"9. Section 19 of the Specific Relief Act clearly says subsequent sale can be enforced for
good and sufficient reason but in the present case, there is no difficulty because the suit was filed
on 3-5-1975 for specific performance of the agreement and the second sale took place on 5-5-1975.
Therefore, it is the admitted position that the second sale was definitely after the filing of the suit in
question. Had that not been the position then we would have evaluated the effect of Section 19 of
the Specific Relief Act read with Section 52 of the Transfer of Property Act. But in the present case
it is more than apparent that the suit was filed before the second sale of the property. Therefore,
the principle of lis pendens will govern the present case and the second sale cannot have the
overriding effect on the first sale.

10. The principle of lis pendens is still settled principle of law. In this connection, the Full
Bench of the Allahabad High Court in Ram Peary [AIR 1978 All 318] has considered the scope of
Section 52 of the Transfer of Property Act. The Full Bench has referred to a decision in Bellamy v.
Sabine [(1857) 44 ER 842] (ER at p. 847) wherein it was observed as under: (Ram Peary case
[AIR 1978 All 318] , AIR p. 319, para 4)

"4. ...It is scarcely correct to speak of lis pendens as affecting a purchaser through the
doctrine of notice, though undoubtedly the language of the courts often so describes its operation.
It affects him not because it amounts to notice, but because the law does not allow litigant parties
to give to others, pending the litigation, rights to the property in dispute, so as to prejudice the
opposite party.

Where a litigation is pending between a plaintiff and a defendant as to the right to a
particular estate, the necessities of mankind require that the decision of the court in the suit shall
be binding, not only on the litigant parties, but also on those who derive title under them by
alienations made pending the suit, whether such alienees had or had not notice of the pending
proceedings. If this were not so, there could be no certainty that the litigation would ever come to
an end."

11. Similarly, the Privy Council in Faiyaz Husain Khan v. Munshi Prag Narain [(190607) 34 IA 102] where the Court laid stress on the necessity for final adjudication and observed that
otherwise there would be no end to litigation and justice would be defeated.

12. The Full Bench of the Allahabad High Court further referred to the work of Story on
Equity, 3rd Edn., (Para 406) which expounded the doctrine of lis pendens in the terms as follows:
(Ram Peary case [AIR 1978 All 318] , AIR p. 319, para 6)

"6. ... Ordinarily, it is true that the judgment of a court binds only the parties and their
privies in representations or estate. But he who purchases during the pendency of an action, is held
bound by the judgment that may be made against the person from whom he derives title. The
litigating parties are exempted from taking any notice of the title so acquired; and such purchaser
need not be made a party to the action. Where there is a real and fair purchase without any notice,
3 All. Ashok Kumar Vs. Tejveer Singh & Ors.
971
the rule may operate very hardly. But it is a rule founded upon a great public policy; for otherwise,
alienations made during an action might defeat its whole purpose, and there would be no end to
litigation. And hence arises the maxim pendente lite, nihil innovetur; the effect of which is not to
annul the conveyance but only to refer it subservient to the rights of the parties in the litigation. As
to the rights of these parties, the conveyance is treated as if it never had any existence; and it does
not vary them."

13. Normally, as a public policy once a suit has been filed pertaining to any subjectmatter of the property, in order to put an end to such kind of litigation, the principle of lis pendens
has been evolved so that the litigation may finally terminate without intervention of a third party.
This is because of public policy otherwise no litigation will come to an end. Therefore, in order to
discourage that same subject-matter of property being subjected to subsequent sale to a third
person, this kind of transaction is to be checked. Otherwise, litigation will never come to an end.

14. Our attention was invited to a decision of this Court in R.K. Mohammed Ubaidullah
v. Hajee C. Abdul Wahab [(2000) 6 SCC 402 : AIR 2001 SC 1658] . In this case it was observed
that a person who purchased the property should have made necessary effort to find out with
regard to that property, whether the title or interest of the person from whom he is making
purchase was in actual possession of such property. In this case, the plaintiff filed the suit for
specific performance of contract and during the pendency of the suit, rest of the defendants brought
subsequent transaction of sale by the defendant in their favour claiming the title to the suit property
on the ground that they were the bona fide purchasers for value without notice of prior agreements
in favour of the plaintiff and they were also aware that the plaintiff was in possession of the suit
property as a tenant for last several years and that they did not make any inquiry if the plaintiff had
any further or other interest in the suit property on the date of execution of sale deed in their favour
apart from that he was in possession of the property as a tenant. In that context Their Lordships
observed that subsequent purchaser cannot be said to be bona fide purchaser of the suit property
for value without notice of suit agreement and the plaintiff would be entitled to relief of specific
performance. Their Lordships after considering the effect of Section 19 of the Specific Relief Act as
well as Section 52 of the Transfer of Property Act held that subsequent purchaser has to be aware
before he purchases the suit property.

15. So far as the present case is concerned, it is apparent that the appellant who is a
subsequent purchaser of the same property, has purchased in good faith but the principle of lis
pendens will certainly be applicable to the present case notwithstanding the fact that under Section
19(b) of the Specific Relief Act his rights could be protected."

33. The Apex Court in the case of Shingara Singh (supra) was again considering whether
doctrine of lis pendens applies to an alienation during the pendency of the suit whether such
alienees had or had no notice of the pending proceedings. It was held as under:-

"11. In Usha Sinha v. Dina Ram (2008) 7 SCC 144 this Court held that the doctrine of lis
pendens applies to an alienation during the pendency of the suit whether such alienees had or had
no notice of the pending proceedings. The following has been held I paras 18 & 23:

"18. Before one-and-half century, in Bellamy v. Sabine [(1857) 1 De G & J 566 : 44 ER
842], Lord Cranworth, L.C. proclaimed that where a litigation is pending between a plaintiff and a
defendant as to the right to a particular estate, the necessities of mankind require that the decision
of the court in the suit shall be binding not only on the litigating parties, but also on those who
972 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
derive title under them by alienations made pending the suit, whether such alienees had or had not
notice of the pending proceedings. If this were not so, there could be no certainty that the litigation
would ever come to an end.

23. It is thus settled law that a purchaser of suit property during the pendency of
litigation has no right to resist or obstruct execution of decree passed by a competent court. The
doctrine of "lis pendens" prohibits a party from dealing with the property which is the subjectmatter of suit. "Lis pendens" itself is treated as constructive notice to a purchaser that he is bound
by a decree to be entered in the pending suit. Rule 102, therefore, clarifies that there should not be
resistance or obstruction by a transferee pendente lite. It declares that if the resistance is caused or
obstruction is offered by a transferee pendente lite of the judgment-debtor, he cannot seek benefit
of Rules 98 or 100 of Order 21."

12. This Court in Sanjay Verma v. Manik Roy (2006) 13 SCC 608 was dealing with a suit
for specific performance. During pendency of the suit, a temporary injunction was granted in
favour of the plaintiff and different portions of the suit land were sold whereafter the purchasers
applied for impleadment, which was rejected by the Trial Court but allowed by the High Court
against which special leave to appeal was filed. In the above background, this Court observed the
following in para 12:

"12. The principles specified in Section 52 of the TP Act are in accordance with equity,
good conscience or justice because they rest upon an equitable and just foundation that it will be
impossible to bring an action or suit to a successful termination if alienations are permitted to
prevail. A transferee pendente lite is bound by the decree just as much as he was a party to the suit.
The principle of lis pendens embodied in Section 52 of the TP Act being a principle of public
policy, no question of good faith or bona fide arises. The principle underlying Section 52 is that a
litigating party is exempted from taking notice of a title acquired during the pendency of the
litigation. The mere pendency of a suit does not prevent one of the parties from dealing with the
property constituting the subject-matter of the suit. The section only postulates a condition that the
alienation will in no manner affect the rights of the other party under any decree which may be
passed in the suit unless the property was alienated with the permission of the court."

13. Guruswamy Nadar v. P.