# Ashok Pandey v. Sri Rahul Gandhi & Ors

- **Citation:** (2025) 12 ILRA 300
- **Court:** High Court of Judicature at Allahabad
- **Decided:** 2025-12-04
- **Case number:** Writ C No. 11593 of 2025
- **Bench:** Shekhar B. Saraf, Manjive Shukla
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/allahabad-high-court/ashok-pandey-v-sri-rahul-gandhi-ors-52838
- **Pages:** 8

## Text

300 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES

15. For cancellation of lease deed
executed under Section 94 of Code, 2006,
petitioner has to show his locus first which
is totally missing in present case in light of
observations
made
here-in
above.
Therefore, Sub Divisional Officer has
rightly
rejected
the
application
of
petitioner, which was also affirmed by the
Revisional Court.

16. Once, the Court has held that
petitioner is having no locus to challenge the
private lease deed executed under Section 94
of Code, 2006, provisions of Rule 186 of
Rules, 2016 would not come in the rescue of
petitioner as it can only be seen once the
petitioner is having locus to challenge the
private lease deed in question.

17. Therefore, I have found no
infirmity or illegality in the impugned
orders dated 10.07.2025 and 28.05.2025.

18. Accordingly, writ petition is
dismissed.

19. No order as to costs.
----------
(2025) 12 ILRA 300
ORIGINAL JURISDICTION
CIVIL SIDE
DATED: LUCKNOW 04.12.2025

BEFORE

THE HON'BLE SHEKHAR B. SARAF, J.
THE HON'BLE MANJIVE SHUKLA, J.

Writ C No. 11593 of 2025

Ashok Pandey ...Petitioner
Versus
Sri Rahul Gandhi & Ors. ...Respondents

ISSUE FOR CONSIDERATION
Whether a person whose conviction has been
stayed by a higher court continues to suffer
disqualification
under
Article
102
of
the
Constitution of India read with Section 8(3) of
the Representation of the People Act, 1951.

HEADNOTE
Constitution of India - Art. 102 - Representation
of the People Act, 1951 - S. 8(3) - Writ petition
under Art. 226 seeking writ of quo warranto
against a sitting Member of Parliament -
Conviction under Section 499 IPC and sentence
of two years - Stay of conviction granted by the
Supreme Court pending appeal - Contention
that
disqualification
under
Section
8(3)
continues notwithstanding stay of conviction -
Distinction between stay of execution of
sentence and stay of conviction - Effect of stay
of conviction on statutory disqualification -
Maintainability of writ of quo warranto.

HELD:
Once an order of conviction is stayed, the
bar
under
Section
8(3)
of
the
Representation of the People Act would
not apply. A stay of execution of sentence
is not synonymous to stay of conviction; in
the former case the bar under Section 8(3)
would apply, but in the latter case, since
the conviction has been stayed, the bar
would not apply. The moment a higher
court stays a conviction, the anathema of
conviction goes out of the window and the
person against whom such conviction is
stayed, though not absolved, cannot be
stated to be a convicted person. It is only
when the appeal is decided that it could
be ascertained whether he would be a
convicted person or an acquitted person.
Disqualification under sub-sections (1),
(2)
or
(3)
of
Section
8
of
the
Representation of the People Act will not
operate from the date of the order of stay
of conviction passed by the appellate
court or the High Court. The writ petition
was accordingly dismissed.
[Paras 13, 16, 17, 18 & 19] (E-5)

CASE LAW CITED
Lily Thomas v. Union of India, (2013) 7 SCC 653;
Ravikant S. Patil v. Sarvabhouma S. Bagali,
(2007) 1 SCC 673;
B.R. Kapur v. State of Tamil Nadu, (2001) 7 SCC
231.
12 All. Ashok Pandey Vs. Sri Rahul Gandhi & Ors.
301
List of Acts
Constitution of India;
Representation of the People Act, 1951;
Indian Penal Code, 1860;
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973.

List of Keyword
Quo warranto; Disqualification of Member of
Parliament; Stay of conviction; Section 8(3);
Article
102;
Conviction
versus
sentence;
Electoral disqualification; Res integra.

CASE ARISING FROM
Challenge to the continuance in office of a
Member of Parliament

Appearances for Parties
Advs For Petitioner: Ashok Pandey (In person)
Advs For Respondents: A.S.G.I., Anupriya
Srivastava.

(Delivered by Hon'ble Shekhar B. Saraf, J.
&
Hon'ble Manjive Shukla, J.)

1. Heard Shri Ashok Pandey, the
petitioner appearing in person, Shri Surya
Bhan Pandey, learned Senior Advocate
assisted by Shri Anand Dwivedi, learned
counsel appearing on behalf of Opposite
Party No. 2, that is Union of India and Shri
O.P. Srivastava, learned Senior Advocate
assisted by Ms. Anupriya Srivastava, learned
counsel appearing for Opposite Party No. 3,
that is Election Commission of India.

2. This is a petition under Article 226
of the Constitution of India where the writ
petitioner appearing in person is seeking a
writ of quo warranto against a Member of
Parliament. The prayers in the writ petition
have been delineated below:-

"(I.) Issue a writ, order or
direction in the nature of Quo Warranto
thereby asking the Respondent No. 1 Sri
Rahul Gandhi as to under what authority of
law, he is holding the office of Member of
Lok Sabha from Raibareli in spite of the
fact that because of conviction and
sentence of two years recorded by Surat
court, he was disqualified to be chosen as
member of Parliament in view of the
provision contained in article 102 r/w
section 8 (3) of R.P. Act 1951.

(II.)To direct the speaker of Lok
Sabha to recover the penalty from Sri
Rahul
Gandhi
as
provided
in
the
constitution as he participated in the
proceedings of Lok Sabha without being a
valid member of it.

(III.) Issue a writ in the nature of
Mandamus
directing
the
Election
Commission of Bharat to declare Sri
Dinesh Kumar Singh as the elected member
of Lok Sabha from Raibareli Lok Sabha
seat as the returned candidate Sri Rahul
Gandhi was disqualified to be chosen as
Member of Lok Sabha on the date of the
election impugned."

3. The petitioner appearing in person
has submitted that Mr. Rahul Gandhi was
convicted by the trial court for an offence
punishable under Section 499 of the Indian
Penal Code, 1860, for which there is simple
imprisonment of two years or fine or both.
This order was subsequently challenged in
the higher courts and the Gujarat High
Court dismissed the revision petition of Mr.
Rahul Gandhi and accordingly rejected the
prayer for stay of conviction. When the
matter went up before the Supreme Court
by way of a Special Leave Petition bearing
number S.L.P. (Cri.) No. 8644 of 2023, the
Supreme Court passed the following order:-

"1. Leave granted.

2. Heard Dr. Abhishek Manu
Singhvi, learned senior counsel for the
302 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
appellant and Shri Mahesh Jethmalani,
learned senior counsel for the respondent
No. 1, on the question of interim protection.

3. The present appeal challenges
the judgment and order passed by the
learned Single Judge of the High Court
dismissing the revision petition, which was
in turn filed challenging the order of the
learned Sessions Judge, thereby rejecting
the prayer for stay of conviction.

4. The appeal filed by the present
appellant
challenging
the
order
of
conviction and sentence passed by the
leaned Trial Judge is pending before the
Appellate Court. The arguments advanced
by both Dr Abhishek Manu Singhvi, and
Shri Mahesh Jethmalani, learned senior
counsel, touch the merits of the matter. We,
therefore, refrain from observing anything
about the said arguments, inasmuch as it
may adversely affect the rights of either of
the parties in the appeal which is pending
before the learned Appellate Court.

5. Insofar as grant of stay of
conviction
is
concerned,
we
have
considered certain factors. The sentence
for an offence punishable under Section
499 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (for
short "IPC") is simple imprisonment for
two years or fine or both. The learned Trial
Judge, in the order passed by him, has
awarded
the
maximum
sentence
of
imprisonment for two years. Except the
admonition given to the appellant by this
Court in contempt proceedings (Contempt
Petition (Crl) No.3/2019 in Yashwant Sinha
and
Others
v.
Central
Bureau
of
Investigation through its Director and
another, reported in (2020) 2 SCC 338) no
other reason has been assigned by the
learned Trial Judge while imposing the
maximum sentence of two years. It is to be
noted that it is only on account of the
maximum sentence of two years imposed by
the learned Trial Judge, the provisions of
sub-section (3) of Section 8 of the
Representation of the People Act, 1950 (for
short, "the Act") have come into play. Had
the sentence been duen a day lesser, the
provisions of sub-section (3) of Section 8 of
The Act would not have been attracted.

6. Particularly, when an offence
is
non-cognizable,
bailable
and
compoundable, the least that the Trial
Judge was expected to do was to give some
reasons as to why, in the facts and
circumstarices, he found it necessary to
impose the maximum sentence of two years.

7. Though the learned Appellate
Court and the learned High Court have
spent voluminous pages while rejecting the
application for stay of conviction, these
aspects have not even been touched in their
orders.

8. No doubt that the alleged
utterances by the appellant are not in good
taste. A person in public life is expected to
exercise a degree of restraint while making
public speeches. However, as has been
observed by this Court while accepting
affidavit
of
the
appellant
herein
in
aforementioned contempt proceedings, the
appellant herein ought to have been more
careful while making the public speech. May
be, had the judgment of the Apex Court in the
contempt proceedings come prior to the
speech made by the appellant, the appellant
would have been more careful and exercised
a degree of restraint while making the
alleged remarks, which were found to be
defamatory by the Trial Judge.

9. We are of the considered view
that the ramification of sub-section (3) of
12 All. Ashok Pandey Vs. Sri Rahul Gandhi & Ors.
303
Section 8 of the Act are wide-ranging. They
not only affect the right of the appellant to
continue in public life but also affect the
right of the electorate, who have elected
him, to represent their constituency.

10. We are of the considered
view,
taking
into
consideration
the
aforesaid aspects and particularly that no
reasons have been given by the learned
Trial Judge for imposing the maximum
sentence which has the effect of incurring
disqualification under Section 8(3) of the
Act, the order of conviction needs to be
stayed, pending hearing of the present
appeal.

11. We, therefore, stay the order
of conviction during the pendency of the
present appeal.

12. However, we clarify that the
pendency of the present appeal would not
come in the way of the Appellate Court in
proceeding further with the appeal. The
appeal would be decided on its own merits,
in accordance with law.

13. The parties would be at
liberty to approach the learned Appellate
Court for expeditious disposal of the
appeal, which request would be considered
by it, on its own merits."

4. The petitioner appearing in person
submits that the stay of order of conviction
does not allow the Respondent No. 1 to
contest in elections because Article 102 of the
Constitution of India read with Section 8(3) of
the Representation of Peoples Act, 1951,
creates a disqualification for being chosen as
or for being a Member of Parliament.

5. Mr. Ashok Pandey further submits
that the Supreme Court in Criminal Appeal
No. 3838 of 2023 (Arising out of Special
Leave to Appeal (Crl.) No. 11129 Of
2023), also stayed the conviction of Afzal
Ansari but in the order passed in that case,
the Supreme Court in specific words
permitted Mr Ansari to contest the
elections which is clear from Para 24 (iv)
of the judgment. The relevant part of the
order passed by the Supreme Court in the
matter of Afzal Ansari is being quoted
below for ready reference:-

"The appellant shall not be
disqualified to contest future election (s)
during the pendency of his criminal appeal
before the high court and if he is elected,
such election will be subject to outcome of
the first criminal appeal."

6. He further submitted that in view of
the above mentioned position of facts and
law it is clear that Rahul Gandhi and Afzal
Ansari, both were disqualified to be chosen
as MP but as the Supreme Court had
permitted Mr Ansari to contest the
elections and so Mr Afzal Ansari can
contest the elections in spite of being
disqualified but Mr Rahul Gandhi cannot as
in his matter, the Supreme Court has not
permitted him to contest the election (s) as
in the case of Afzal Ansari. The submission
is that in case merely the stay conviction
entitles a person, who is otherwise
disqualified, to contest the election(s), then
the specific order to Afzal Ansari was not
required.

7. That in view of above mentioned
position of facts and law, the submission of
the petitioner is that Mr Rahul Gandhi was
disqualified to be chosen as MP and so his
nomination paper was wrongly accepted
and his name was wrongly put for voting
amongst the voters of Wayanad and
Raibareli Lok Sabha seats.
304 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES

8. That subsequently, on 4th June
2024, the Returning Officer, Raibarelly
went ahead and declared the election
results whereby declaring the Sri Rahul
Gandhi
as
winner
candidate
from
Raibarelly.

9. That after being declared elected,
Sri Rahul Gandhi started working as the
member of Lok Sabha and because of being
a member of Lok Sabha, he was also
nominated as Leader of Opposition and is
working as such till date.

10. That in this view of the matter, it is
clear that Mr Rahul Gandhi, in spite of
being disqualified to be chosen as MP, was
chosen as such and so the petitioner
submits that he is holding the office created
by the Constitution without any authority
of law and is accordingly usurping a public
office created by the Constitution without
any authority of law.

11. Per contra, Shri O.P. Srivastava,
learned Senior Advocate appearing for
Respondent No. 3 submits that since there
is a stay of conviction of the Respondent
No. 1, there is no bar under Section 8(3) of
the Representation of Peoples Act, 1951 for
him to contest in the elections or to remain
as a Member of Parliament. He relies on
the judgment of the Supreme Court of India
in Lily Thomas Vs. Union of India
reported in (2013) 7 SCC (LS) 811, to
contend that in the event a conviction is
stayed by a higher Court, the bar under
Section 8(3) would not apply. He relies on
Paragraph 21 of the judgment to buttress
his argument which is delineated below:-

"21. We do not also find merit in
the submission of Mr. Luthra and Mr.
Kuhad that if a sitting member of
Parliament or the State Legislature suffers
from a frivolous conviction. by the trial,
court for an offence given under Subsection (1), (2) or (3) of Section 8 of the
Act, he will be remediless and he will suffer
immense hardship as he would stand
disqualified on account of such conviction
in the absence of Sub-section (4) of Section
8 of the Act. A three-Judge Bench of this
Court in Rama Narang v. Ramesh Narang
and Ors. [ MANU/SC/0623/1995 (1995) 2
SCC 513] has held that when an appeal is
preferred Under Section 374 of the Code of
Criminal Procedure [for short 'the Code']
the appeal is against both the conviction
and sentence and, therefore, the Appellate
Court in exercise of its power Under
Section 389(1) of the Code can also stay
the order of conviction and the High Court
in exercise of its Inherent jurisdiction
Under Section 482 of the Code can also
stay the conviction if the power was not to
be found in Section 389(1) of the Code. In
Ravikant S. Patil v. Sarvabhouma S. Bagali
[MANU/SC/8600/2006 (2007) 1 SCC 673],
a three-Judge Bench of this Court,
however, observed

"It deserves to be clarified that an
order granting stay of conviction is not the
rule but is an exception to be resorted to in
rare cases depending upon the facts of a
case. Where the execution of the sentence is
stayed, the conviction continues to operate.
But where the conviction itself is stayed,
the effect is that the conviction will not be
operative from the date of stay. An order of
stay, of course, does not render the
conviction non-existent, but only nonoperative. Be that as it may. Insofar as the
present case is concerned, an application
was filed specifically seeking stay of the
order
of
conviction
specifying
the
consequences if conviction was not stayed,
that is, the Appellant would incur :
disqualification to contest the election. The
12 All. Ashok Pandey Vs. Sri Rahul Gandhi & Ors.
305
High Court after considering the special
reason, granted the order staying the
conviction. As the conviction itself is stayed in
contrast to a stay of execution of the sentence,
it is not possible to accept the contention of the
Respondent that the disqualification arising
out of conviction continues to operate even
after stay of conviction."

In
the
aforesaid
case,
a
contention was raised by the Respondents
that the Appellant was disqualified from
contesting the election to the Legislative
Assembly under Sub-section (3) of Section
8 of the Act as he had been convicted for an
offence punishable Under Sections 366 and
376 of the Indian Penal Code and it was held
by the three-Judge Bench that as the High
Court for special reasons had passed an order
staying the conviction, the disqualification
arising out of the conviction ceased to operate
after the stay of conviction. Therefore, the
disqualification under Sub-section (1), (2) or
(3) of Section 8 of the Act will not operate
from the date of order of stay of conviction
passed by the Appellate Court Under Section
389 of the Code or the High Court Under
Section 482 of the Code."

12. We have heard learned counsels
appearing on behalf of the parties and
analyzed the position of law. Before going
into the issue, it would be apt to lay down
the relevant provisions of law in relation to
the present issue. Accordingly, Article 102
of the Constitution of India and Section
8(3) of the Representation of Peoples Act,
1951 are provided below:-

"Article-102.
Disqualifications
for membership

(1)A person shall be disqualified
for being chosen as, and for being, a
member of either House of Parliament-

(a) if he holds any office of profit
under the Government of India or the
Government of any State, other than an
office declared by Parliament by law not to
disqualify its holder;

(b) if he is of unsound mind and
stands so declared by a competent court,

(c) if he is an undischarged
insolvent,

(d) if he is not a citizen of India,
or has voluntarily acquired the citizenship
of a foreign State, or is under any
acknowledgement
of
allegiance
or
adherence to a foreign State,

(e) if he is so disqualified by or
under any law made by Parliament.

Explanation.--For the purposes
of this clause a person shall not be deemed
to hold an office of profit under the
Government of India or the Government of
any State by reason only that he is a
Minister either for the Union or for such
State.

(2) A person shall be disqualified
for being a member of either House of
Parliament if he is so disqualified under the
Tenth Schedule.

Section-8 Disqualification on
conviction for certain offences.

8(3) A person convicted of any
offence and sentenced to imprisonment for
not less than two years other than any
offence referred to in sub-section (1) or
sub-section (2) shall be disqualified from
the date of such conviction and shall
continue to be disqualified for a further
period of six years since his release.
306 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES

13. Upon a perusal of the above
provision and after sifting through the
judgments of the Supreme Court relied
upon by the parties, it is clear that once an
order of conviction is stayed, the bar under
Section 8(3) of the Representation of
Peoples Act would not apply. The reason
behind the same is very simple -- a person
convicted of an offence and sentenced to
imprisonment for not less than two years is
the bar provided under Section 8(3) of the
Representation of Peoples Act. However,
when such a conviction has been stayed by
a higher court, the indelible mark of a
convict cannot be assigned to such a person
till the appeal is decided. It may be noted
that in several cases, the higher court does
not stay the conviction of a person but
merely may stay the execution of the
sentence and may even grant bail to the
petitioner. Such a stay of the execution is
not synonymous to stay of conviction. In
the former case, the bar under Section 8(3)
would apply but in the latter case, since the
conviction has been stayed, the bar would
not apply.

14. The petitioner has also relied on
the judgment of a Constitutional Bench of
the Supreme Court in B.R. Kapur Vs. State
of Tamil Nadu & others reported in (2001)
7 SCC 231, and specifically relied on
Paragraph 40 to buttress his argument.
Paragraph 40 of the said judgment is
delineated below:-

"40. In much the same vein, it
was submitted that the presumption of
Innocence
continued
until
the
final
judgment affirming the conviction and
sentence was passed and, therefore, no
disqualification operated as of now against
the second Responderit. Before we advert
to the four judgments relied upon in
support of this submission, let us clear the
air. When a lower court convicts an
accused
and
sentences
him,
the
presumption that the accused is innocent
comes to an end. The conviction operates
and the accused has to undergo the
sentence. The execution of the sentence can
be stayed by an appellate court and the
accused released on bail. In many cases,
the accused is released on ball so that the
appeal is not rendered infructuous, at least
in part, because the accused has already
undergone imprisonment. If the appeal of
the accused succeeds the conviction is
wiped out as cleanly as if it had never
existed and the sentence is set aside. A
successful appeal means that the stigma of
the offence is altogether erased. But that it
is not to say that the presumption of
innocence continues after the conviction by
the trial court. That conviction and the
sentence it carries operate against the
accused in all their rigour until set aside in
appeal, and a disqualification that attaches
to the conviction and sentence applies as
well."

15. The petitioner has specifically
placed great emphasis on the last three lines
of the said paragraph that states as follows:-
"That conviction and the sentence it carries
operate against the accused in all their
rigour until set aside in appeal, and a
disqualification
that
attaches
to
the
conviction and sentence applies as well." It
is the argument of the petitioner that a
conviction unless set aside would continue
to operate, and therefore, the bar under
Section 8(3) of the Representation of
Peoples Act, 1951 would continue to apply.

16. With great humility and respect,
we would submit that we are not at
consensus ad idem with the argument
raised, as we are of the view that the
statement made in the said paragraph was
12 All. Akanksha & Anr. Vs. State Of U.P. & Ors.
307
in reference to a factual matrix wherein
execution of the sentence had been stayed
and not where there has been a stay of
conviction. The moment a higher court
stays a conviction, the anathema of
conviction goes out of the window and the
person against whom such conviction is
stayed, though not absolved, cannot be
stated to be a convicted person. It is only
when the appeal is decided that it could be
ascertained as to whether he would be a
convicted person or an acquitted person.

17. Our opinion is also fortified by the
judgment in Lily Thomas (Supra) wherein
the Division Bench of the Supreme Court
has
categorically
held
that
the
disqualification under Sub-section (1), (2)
or (3) of Section 8 of the Representation of
Peoples Act will not operate from the date
of order of stay of conviction passed by the
Appellate Court under Section 389 of the
Code or the High Court under Section 482
of the Code.

18. In light of the same, we are of the
view that the present writ petition is devoid
of merit. The petitioner has also sought
from us a certificate for appeal to the
Supreme Court under Article 134-A of the
Constitution of India.

19. On consideration of the said
prayer, we are of the view that no
substantial question of law arises in the
present matter, as the matter has been
categorically settled by the Supreme Court
and is no longer res integra, as discussed
above. Accordingly, the said prayer is also
rejected.

20. The writ petition is dismissed in
the aforesaid terms.
----------
(2025) 12 ILRA 307
ORIGINAL JURISDICTION
CIVIL SIDE
DATED: ALLAHABAD 17.12.2025

BEFORE

THE HON'BLE VIVEK KUMAR SINGH, J.

Writ C No. 35171 of 2025
&
Connected With Other Cases

Akanksha & Anr. ...Petitioners
Versus
State Of U.P. & Ors. ...Respondents

Issue for Consideration
The main issue was whether major consulting
adults living together in a live-in-relationship are
entitled to protection of their life and personal
liberty from interference by family members or
the state,even if such a relationship is not
socially accepted or is considered immoral by
society.

Headnotes
Constitution of India,1950-Article 226Bhartiya Shaksya Adhiniyam,2023-section
119(1)-Legality of live-in relationshipsWhile live in relationships may be viewed
as immoral or a social taboo in India, they
are not prohibited by any law-Once
individuls attain the age of majority, they
are sui juris and have the right to choose
their partner-notions of social morality are
subjective and cannot be used by criminal
law to interfere with personal autonomysection 119(1) of BSA states that if
couples live together for a significant
amount of time as husband and wife, they
will presumed to be married-writ petition
allowed.(Para 42 to 53) (E-6)

Held
The court established that a live in relationship
between two consenting adults of heterogenic
sex
does
not
amount
to
any
offenceFurthermore, the legislature has recognized
such relationship through the Protection of
women
from
domestic
violence
Act,2005,
treating them as "relationship in the nature of
marriage."