# Ashutosh Bhat alias Tipu (in jail) v. Union of India &Ors

- **Citation:** (2019) 1 ILRA 941
- **Court:** High Court of Judicature at Allahabad
- **Decided:** 2018-12-05
- **Case number:** Civil Misc. Habeas Corpus Writ Petition No. 391 of 2019
- **Bench:** Manoj Misra, Mrs. Manju Rani Chauhan
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/allahabad-high-court/ashutosh-bhat-alias-tipu-in-jail-v-union-of-india-ors-44505
- **Pages:** 8

## Headnote

A. Writ of Habeas Corpus - Article 22(5)
of the Constitution of India - Detention
in exercise of power u/s 3(3) of National
Security Act, 1980 - Delay of 8 days in
transmission
of
representation
by
detaining
authority
to
the
State
942 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
government-Principal
to
uphold
detention illegal is not the time taken in
dealing
with
representation
but
is
explanation for delay - Words 'as soon as
may be' occurring in Article 22 (5) of the
Constitution explained - Ordinarily 3 to 5
days may be considered reasonable - In
case of delay, there must be explanation
- 8 days delay is inordinate requiring
explanation - No explanation - Detention
rendered illegal.

Petition allowed. (E-1)

## Text

1 All. Ashutosh Bhat alias Tipu Vs. Union of India & Ors.
941
21 days prior to the detention order but in
the reply, as contained in paragraph 15 of
the
counter
affidavit,
the
detaining
authority stated that the bail application
was pending. Further, if the detaining
authority had cared to consider/ peruse the
common bail order passed in all the three
bail applications including that of coaccused Arun Yadav he sure would have
found that the petitioner has also been
granted bail because the order itself
indicates that it related to all the three
accused. This clearly signifies that at the
time of issuance of the detention order
neither the detaining authority was aware
that the petitioner has been granted bail in
case crime no.751 of 2017 (supra) nor he
had applied his mind to the order granting
bail to the petitioner. The second issue is
decided accordingly.

32. Consequently, due to non
application of mind on the relevant
material, the subjective satisfaction of the
detaining authority stood vitiated in the
light of the law already noticed above.
Once that is so, the detention order is
rendered vulnerable and is liable to be
quashed. The third issue is decided
accordingly.

33. At this stage, we may also
observe that in the grounds of detention
there is reference of other cases also but
those cases have not been referred to as
grounds for the order of detention but for
the purpose of disclosing the background
of the detenue. Moreover, case crime
no.378 of 2018, P.S. Bisrakh, District
Gautambudh Nagar, under sections 2/3 of
the U.P. Gangsters (Prevention of AntiSocial Activities) Act, 1986, which has
also been cited as one of the other cases
against the petitioner, has been lodged by
referring to previous involvement in other
cases including case crime no.751 of
2017, therefore, it can safely be held that
the detention order was based on a
solitary ground pertaining to the activity
of the petitioner concerning case crime
no.751 of 2017. Thus, if satisfaction on
that ground gets vitiated, due to nonapplication of mind on relevant material
relating to it, the detention order cannot
be saved by applying the principle laid
down in Section 5-A of the Act, 1980.

34. For all the reasons detailed
above,
this
habeas
corpus
petition
deserves
to
be
allowed
and
is,
accordingly, allowed. The detention order
dated 05.12.2018 is hereby quashed. The
petitioner shall be set at liberty forthwith
unless wanted in any other case.
------
ORIGINAL JURISDICTION
CIVIL SIDE
DATED: ALLAHABAD 19.08.2019

BEFORE
THE HON'BLE MANOJ MISRA, J.
THE HON'BLE MRS. MANJU RANI
CHAUHAN, J.

Civil Misc. Habeas Corpus Writ Petition No. 391
of 2019

Ashutosh Bhat alias Tipu...Petitioner (in jail)
Versus
Union of India &Ors. ...Respondents

Counsel for the Petitioner:
Sri Avinash Mani Tripathi, Sri Abhishek
Mani Tripathi
Counsel for the Respondents:
A.S.G.I., G.A., Sri Thakur Azad Singh

A. Writ of Habeas Corpus - Article 22(5)
of the Constitution of India - Detention
in exercise of power u/s 3(3) of National
Security Act, 1980 - Delay of 8 days in
transmission
of
representation
by
detaining
authority
to
the
State
942 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
government-Principal
to
uphold
detention illegal is not the time taken in
dealing
with
representation
but
is
explanation for delay - Words 'as soon as
may be' occurring in Article 22 (5) of the
Constitution explained - Ordinarily 3 to 5
days may be considered reasonable - In
case of delay, there must be explanation
- 8 days delay is inordinate requiring
explanation - No explanation - Detention
rendered illegal.

Petition allowed. (E-1)

(Delivered by Hon'ble Manoj Misra, J.
& Hon'ble Mrs. Manju Rani Chauhan, J.)

1. We have heard Sri Abhishek
Mani Tripathi for the petitioner; the
learned A.G.A. for respondents 2, 3, 4 and
5; Sri Thakur Azad Singh for the Union of
India; and have perused the record.

2. This habeas corpus petition has
been filed by Ashutosh Bhatt alias Tipu,
currently under detention at District Jail,
Gorakhpur, questioning his detention
under the National Security Act, 1980 (for
short the Act, 1980) pursuant to the
detention order dated 07.10.2018 passed
by the District Magistrate, Gorakhpur in
exercise of powers conferred upon him by
Section 3(3) of the Act, 1980 read with
Section 3(2) thereof. A prayer has also
been made to set the petitioner at liberty.

3. A resume of essential facts would
be apposite. While the petitioner was in
jail in connection with case crime no.89
of
2018,
P.S.
Gorakhnath,
District
Gorakhpur, under sections 302, 396, 412
IPC
and
section
7
Criminal
Law
Amendment Act and section 30 of the
Arms Act, he was served with detention
order dated 7.10.2018 passed by the
District
Magistrate
Gorakhpur.
The
grounds of detention referred to direct
involvement of the petitioner in an
incident dated 12.02.2018 relating to
murder of a person by use of firearm
during the course of a ceremony which
gave rise to case crime no.89 of 2018
(supra). By alleging that the incident
disturbed public order and that there was
likelihood of the petitioner being released
on bail, where after he would indulge in
repeat of such activity that would disturb
public order, with a view to prevent him
from doing so, the order of detention was
passed.

4. At the outset, the learned counsel
for the petitioner has submitted that
although there are several grounds for him
to press and agitate in this petition but
since the continued detention of the
petitioner has been rendered illegal on
account of unexplained inordinate delay
in transmission of the representation by
the detaining authority to the State
Government, he would advance his
submissions on that point only.

5. It has been submitted that against
the order of detention, the petitioner had
submitted representation at District Jail,
Gorakhpur in five sets on 18.10.2018. The
State
Government
received
the
representation
along
with
para-wise
comments and the letter of the District
Magistrate
dated
01.11.2018
on
06.11.2018, which was rejected by it on
19.11.2018. The Central Government
received the representation along with
para-wise
comments
of
the
District
Magistrate on 26.11.2018 through letter
dated 12.11.2018 of the Deputy Secretary,
Government of U.P., which was rejected
by the Central Government on 30.11.2018.
It has been urged that from the return filed
by the Jail Authorities it is clear that the
representation of the petitioner against the
1 All. Ashutosh Bhat alias Tipu Vs. Union of India & Ors.
943
order of detention was submitted in five
sets at District Jail, Gorakhpur on
18.10.2018 and from there it was sent to
the office of the District Magistrate,
Gorakhpur through Special Messenger on
18.10.2018 itself. The District Magistrate,
Gorakhpur, however, sent it to the State
Government vide letter dated 01.11.2018.
There is no cogent explanation for the
delay in onward transmission of the
representation for the period between
19.10.2018 and 31.10.2018.

6. In his return, the District
Magistrate, Gorakhpur sought to explain
the delay in onward transmission of the
representation by stating that after receipt
of the representation, on 19.10.2018
comments were called from Senior
Superintendent of Police, Gorakhpur (for
short SSP) and those comments were
received in his office on 31.10.2018.
Immediately, thereafter, on 01.11.2018,
the representation was forwarded to the
State Government.

7. As in the return there was no
explanation as to why 12 days were taken
by the SSP in submitting his comments,
on 06.08.2019, this Court had passed a
detailed order requiring the District
Magistrate, Gorakhpur to file his personal
affidavit dealing with all the aspects
mentioned in the said order. The order
dated 06.08.2019 is extracted below:

"In this habeas corpus petition, the
return
filed
by
the
fifth
respondent
(Superintendent, District Jail, Gorakhpur)
indicates that the petitioner submitted his
representation in five sets at District Jail,
Gorakhpur on 18.10.2018 which was sent to
the office of District Magistrate, Gorakhpur
through Jail Authorities on 18.10.2018
through special messenger.

In the return filed by the State
Government, from paragraph 6 thereof, it
appears that the return dated 18.10.2018
was received in the concerned section of the
State Government on 06.11.2018 along with
the letter of District Magistrate, Gorakhpur,
dated 01.11.2018.

In the return filed by the District
Magistrate,
namely,
K.
Vijayendra
Pandiyan, in paragraphs 9 and 19, he has
stated as follows:-

"9. That the contents of paragraphs
no.8, 9 and 10 of the writ petition are denied
being incorrectly stated. In reply thereto, it is
stated that the petitioner submitted his
representation dated 18.10.2018 in five (05)
sets at District Jail, Bulandshahar on
18.10.2018, which was sent to the office of
District Magistrate, Bulandshahar through
Jail Authorities on the very same day i.e. on
18.10.2018. Thereafter, on 19.10.2018, the
deponent called for the report from the
Senior Superintendent of Police, Gorakhpur,
whereupon the Senior Superintendent of
Police, Bulandshahar has submitted its
report to the office of the deponent on
31.10.2018. After perusing the same, the
parawise reply of the representation was
prepared and thereafter, the representation
of the petitioner was rejected by the District
Magistrate, Gorakhpur / deponent on
01.11.2018 and the communication of the
rejection of said representation along with
the order, was communicated to the
petitioner through Jail Authorities on the
very same day i.e. on 01.11.2018. It is apt to
mention herein that the prescribed procedure
has been followed and there is no inordinate
delay
in
deciding
the
petitioner's
representation, as the time taken is due to
procedural necessities.

19. That it is most humbly submitted
that
the
petitioner
submitted
his
representation dated 18.10.2018 in five
(05) sets at District Jail, Bulandshahar on
944 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
18.10.2018, which was sent to the office
of District Magistrate, Bulandshahar
through Jail Authorities on the very same
day i.e. on 18.10.2018. Thereafter, on
19.10.2018, the deponent called for the
report from the Senior Superintendent of
Police, Gorakhpur, whereupon the Senior
Superintendent of Police, Bulandshahar
has submitted its report to the office of the
deponent on 31.10.2018. After perusing
the same, the parawise reply of the
representation
was
prepared
and
thereafter, the representation of the
petitioner was rejected by the District
Magistrate, Gorakhpur / deponent on
01.11.2018 and the communication of the
rejection of the said representation
alongwith the order, was communicated
to the petitioner through Jail Authorities
on the very same day i.e. 01.11.2018.

It is apt to mention herein that the
prescribed procedure has been followed
and there is no inordinate delay in
deciding the petitioner's representation,
as the time taken is due to procedural
necessities."

From the averments made in
paragraphs 9 and 19 of the affidavit
filed
by
the
District
Magistrate,
Gorakhpur what concerns the Court is
that there is complete non application
of mind on the part of the District
Magistrate in signing the return on
oath. He refers himself, though being
District Magistrate, Gorakhpur as
District
Magistrate,
Bulandshahar
and, not only that, he addresses Senior
Superintendent of Police, Gorakhpur
as Senior Superintendent of Police,
Bulandshahar.
Further,
he
has
referred to District Jail, Gorakhpur as
District Jail, Bulandshahar. It is not
expected of such a responsible officer
to file an affidavit in such a casual
manner.

Further, we find that there is no
disclosure in the affidavit filed by the
District Magistrate as to what took so
long for the Senior Superintendent of
Police, Gorakhpur in submitting his
report, which was called from him on
19.10.2018. The counter affidavit also
does
not
disclose
whether
any
reminder was sent from the office of
the District Magistrate prompting the
Senior
Superintendent
of
Police
concerned to submit his report.

In view of the above, we deem it
appropriate to call upon the District
Magistrate,
Gorakhpur
to
file
his
personal affidavit dealing with all the
aforesaid aspects.

Put up this matter on 19th August,
2019.

Let a copy of this order be supplied
to the learned A.G.A. for information and
compliance."

8. Pursuant to the order dated
06.08.2019,
the
District
Magistrate,
Gorakhpur has filed two affidavits today. In
the first affidavit he has disclosed about the
extension of detention period to the maximum
permissible, that is of 12 months starting from
the date of detention. In the second affidavit
he has expressed regret and apology for
typographical mistakes in his earlier return
and has sought to explain the delay in onward
transmission of the representation by claiming
that the delay in receiving comments from the
SSP was because the Station House Officer,
P.S. Gorakhnath, Gorakhpur (for short SHO)
had provided comments to the SSP on
29.10.2018. In paragraph 10 of the second
affidavit it is stated that the SSP called for
comments from the SHO on 20.10.2018.

9. Why it took 8 days for the SHO
concerned to provide his comments is not
1 All. Ashutosh Bhat alias Tipu Vs. Union of India & Ors.
945
explained in the affidavit. Further, there is
no explanation offered by the District
Magistrate as to whether he had issued a
reminder to the SSP or the SSP had issued
reminder to the SHO for the comments.

10. The learned counsel for the
petitioner submitted that in the case of
Rajmamal vs. State of Tamil Nadu and
another, (1999) 1 SCC 417, continued
detention was declared illegal in absence
of explanation for delay of five days in
dealing with the representation. The
learned counsel for the petitioner has also
placed reliance on decisions of the Apex
Court in Pebam Ningol Mikoi Devi vs.
State of Manipur: (2010) 9 SCC 618,
paras 33 to 37; Abdul Nasar Adam
Ismail vs. State of Maharashtra, (2013)
4 SCC 435, para 19 so as to contend that
unexplained delay in onward transmission
of
the
representation
vitiates
the
continued detention of the detenue as it
violates the fundamental right of a
detenue guaranteed under Article 22 (5)
of the Constitution of India.

11. Per-Contra, the learned A.G.A.
has submitted that the explanation for
delay, if any, in onward transmission of
the representation at the level of the D.M.
has
been
provided
as,
ordinarily,
comments on the representation are called
from police authorities and, therefore, if
the D.M. had called for comments from
the S.S.P., it cannot be said that the D.M.
deliberately
delayed
the
onward
transmission of the representation. He
further submitted that few days are always
taken in submitting para-wise comments
therefore the delay of about 8 days in
submitting comments will not be fatal.

12. The learned counsel for the
Union of India submitted that the Central
Government took only few days in
deciding the representation after it was
received in the office.

13. We have considered the rival
submissions.

14. In Rajammal v. State of T.N.,
(1999) 1 SCC 417, a three judges bench
of the apex court, after noticing the
judgement of the Constitutional Bench of
the Apex court rendered in K.M. Abdulla
Kunhi v. Union of India (1991) 1 SCC
476, in paragraphs 7 and 8 of its
judgment, as reported, held as follows:

7. It is a constitutional obligation of
the
Government
to
consider
the
representation forwarded by the detenu
without any delay. Though no period is
prescribed
by
Article
22
of
the
Constitution for the decision to be taken
on the representation, the words "as soon
as may be" in clause (5) of Article 22
convey
the
message
that
the
representation should be considered and
disposed of at the earliest. But that does
not mean that the authority is pre-empted
from explaining any delay which would
have occasioned in the disposal of the
representation. The court can certainly
consider
whether
the
delay
was
occasioned due to permissible reasons or
unavoidable causes. This position has
been well delineated by a Constitution
Bench of this Court in K.M. Abdulla
Kunhi v. Union of India. The following
observations of the Bench can profitably
be extracted here:

"It is a constitutional mandate
commanding the authority concerned
to whom the detenu submits his
representation
to
consider
the
representation and dispose of the same
946 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
as expeditiously as possible. The
words ''as soon as may be' occurring in
clause (5) of Article 22 reflects the
concern
of
the
Framers
that
the
representation should be expeditiously
considered and disposed of with a sense
of urgency without an avoidable delay.
However, there can be no hard and fast
rule in this regard. It depends upon the
facts and circumstances of each case.
There is no period prescribed either under
the Constitution or under the detention
law
concerned,
within
which
the
representation should be dealt with. The
requirement, however, is that there should
not be supine indifference, slackness or
callous
attitude
in
considering
the
representation. Any unexplained delay in
the disposal of representation would be a
breach of the constitutional imperative
and it would render the continued
detention impermissible and illegal."

8. The position, therefore, now is that
if delay was caused on account of any
indifference or lapse in considering the
representation, such delay will adversely
affect further detention of the prisoner. In
other words, it is for the authority
concerned to explain the delay, if any, in
disposing of the representation. It is not
enough to say that the delay was very
short. Even longer delay can as well be
explained. So the test is not the duration
or range of delay, but how it is explained
by the authority concerned.

15. Thereafter, the apex court
proceeded to notice the facts of the case
and held that unexplained delay of 5 days
in between 9.12.1988 and 14.2.1988 has
vitiated the continued detention. The
relevant paragraphs 9 and 11 of the
judgement in Rajammal's case (supra),
as reported, is being extracted below:

9. What happened in this case was
that the Government which received remarks
from different authorities submitted the
relevant files before the Under-Secretary for
processing it on the next day. The UnderSecretary forwarded it to the Deputy
Secretary on the next working day. Thus
there is some explanation for the delay till 92-1998. Thereafter the file was submitted
before the Minister who received it while he
was on tour. The Minister passed the order
only on 14-2-1998. Though there is
explanation for the delay till 9-2-1998, we
are unable to find out any explanation
whatsoever as for the delay which occurred
thereafter. Merely stating that the Minister
was on tour and hence he could pass orders
only on 14-2-1998 is not a justifiable
explanation when the liberty of a citizen
guaranteed
under
Article
21
of
the
Constitution is involved. Absence of the
Minister at the Headquarters is not sufficient
to justify the delay, since the file could be
reached
the
Minister
with
utmost
promptitude in cases involving the vitally
important fundamental right of a citizen.

11. We are, therefore, of the
opinion that the delay from 9-2-1998 to
14-2-1998 remains unexplained and such
unexplained delay has vitiated further
detention of the detenu. The corollary
thereof is that further detention must
necessarily be disallowed. We, therefore,
allow this appeal and set aside the
impugned judgment. We direct the
appellant-detenu to be set at large
forthwith.

16. From the decision noticed
above, the deducible legal principle is that
the duration or the length of the time
taken in deciding or dealing with the
representation is not what is the deciding
factor as to uphold the detention or to
declare it illegal. The deciding factor is
1 All. Ashutosh Bhat alias Tipu Vs. Union of India & Ors.
947
the explanation for the delay, if any. In
other words, whenever there appears
inordinate delay, at any stage of dealing
with the representation, it is for the
authority concerned to explain the delay.
It is not enough to say that the delay was
very short. Even longer delay can well be
explained. So the test is not the duration
or range of delay, but how it is explained
by the authority concerned.

17. It is equally well settled by a
catena of decisions that an unexplained
delay in transmission of representation
against a preventive detention order
violates the fundamental right of the
detenue guaranteed under Article 22(5) of
the
Constitution
of
India
thereby
rendering the continued detention illegal
(vide Pebam Ningol Mikoi Devi v. State
of Manipur: (2010) 9 SCC 618, paras
33 to 37; Abdul Nasar Adam Ismail v.
State of Maharashtra, (2013) 4 SCC
435, para 19). The rationale behind the
above view is, if the representation is not
promptly sent to the authority competent
to decide, to whom it is addressed, the
phrase "shall afford him (detenue) the
earliest
opportunity
of
making
representation against the order", as found
in Article 22(5) of the Constitution of
India, would be rendered nugatory.

18. In Abdul Nasar's case (supra)
in paragraph 19 of the judgment it was
held as follows:

"19. In Pebam Ningol Mikoi
Devi, seven days' unexplained delay in
forwarding the representation to the
Central Government was held to be
fatal.
In
Aslam
Ahmed
Zahire
Ahmed Shaik, the detenu had handed
over
his
representation
to
the
Superintendent of Jail on 16-6-1998
for onward transmission to the Central
Government. It was kept unattended
for a period of seven days and, as a
result, it reached the Government 11
days' after it was handed over to the
Superintendent
of
Jail.
The
Superintendent
of
Jail
had
not
explained the delay. Relying on Vijay
Kumar v. State of J&K, the continued
detention of the detenu was set aside.
At the cost of repetition, we must note
that in this case, the Superintendent of
Jail
has
not
filed
any
affidavit
explaining the delay. Therefore, this
delay,
in
our
opinion
renders
continued detention of the detenu,
illegal."

19. In Jaggu v. State of U.P., 2008
SCC OnLine All 1348 : (2008) 70 AIC
491 : (2008) 5 All LJ (NOC 1037), a
Division Bench of this court found that
long unexplained delay in submitting
report by police authorities, which results
in delay in onward transmission of
representation, vitiates the continued
detention. The relevant extracts from the
judgment of this Court in the case of
Jaggu (supra) are reproduced below:

"3. The detenu made a representation
dated 13.9.2007 to the State Government,
which was handed over to the jail
authorities
on
14.9.2007.
The
jail
authorities sent the representation to the
office of District Magistrate on 15.9.2007.
On the same day, the District Magistrate
called for comments from the Senior
Superintendent of Police, Ghaziabad and
the report of Senior Superintendent of
Police was received by the District
Magistrate on 1.10.2007. Thereafter, the
District
Magistrate
transmitted
the
representation to the Central Government,
the State Government and the Advisory
Board on 2.10.2007.
948 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES

4. Learned Counsel for the petitioner
has urged that there is no explanation of 15
days' delay i.e. from 16.9.2007 to
30.9.2007, as to why the report was sent by
the Senior Superintendent of Police after
15 days. One could understand that the
report could be sent by the Senior
Superintendent of Police within a day or
two, but he could not sit over the matter for
15 days and send his report to the District
Magistrate after 15 days. Further, from the
counter affidavit of the District Magistrate,
it is dear that there is no explanation given
in the counter affidavit for the delay from
16.9.2007 to 30.9.2007.

5. The Apex Court in Rajammal v.
State of Tamil Nadu, has held that unexplained delay of five days was fatal
and the decision order would bad in law
and
contrary
to
the
constitutional
obligation on the Central Government to
consider and decide the representation
of the detenu without any delay.

6. In Harish Pahwa v. State of U.P.
the Supreme Court has taken the similar
view.

7. Similar view has been taken by the
Supreme Court in the case of Union of
India v. Harish Kumar, relied upon by the
learned Counsel for the petitioner.

8. For the aforesaid reasons, further
detention of the petitioner under the
National Security Act is held to be
illegal."

20. From the law noticed above, it is
clear that there should not be inordinate
delay in submitting comments on the
representation. Although, no specific time
limit can be fixed in that regard but,
ordinarily, 3 to 5 days may be considered
reasonable. However, when the delay
appears to be inordinate then explanation
must be offered by the authorities
concerned.

21. We find that the SHO concerned
took eight days to submit comments on
29.10.2018 when they were called from him
by the SSP on 20.10.2018. Taking eight
days to submit comments, particularly, by a
police station which had been the base
station from where recommendations for
detention emanated, in our view, is
inordinate for which an explanation was
necessary. As we find that there is no
explanation for this delay, despite this
Court's
order
dated
06.08.2019,
the
continued detention of the petitioner has
been rendered illegal. The petition is
therefore allowed. The petitioner shall be set
at liberty forthwith unless wanted in any
other case. There is no order as to costs.
---------
ORIGINAL JURISDICTION
CIVIL SIDE
DATED: ALLAHABAD 15.07.2019

BEFORE
THE HON'BLE MANOJ MISRA, J.
THE HON'BLE VIRENDRA KUMAR SRIVASTAVA, J.

Civil Misc. Habeas Corpus Writ Petition No. 672
of 2019

Saurabh Pandey &Anr. ...Petitioners
Versus
State of U.P. &Ors. ...Respondents

Counsel for the Petitioners:
Sri Raj Kumar Singh, Sri Sunil Kumar
Singh

Counsel for the Respondents:
G.A.

A. Age of juvenile - Principles to
determine - Section 2(14), 37(1)(c) and
94
of
Juvenile
Justice
(Care
and
Protection of Children) Act, 2015 -
Primacy to be given to birth certificate
from school or matriculation certificate,
in absence thereof to certificate of
corporation/municipality/panchayat and