# Awadhesh Kumar Pandey v. State of U.P. & Ors

- **Citation:** (2024) 5 ILRA 487
- **Court:** High Court of Judicature at Allahabad
- **Decided:** 2024-05-31
- **Case number:** Writ A No. 8437 of 2023
- **Bench:** Shree Prakash Singh
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/allahabad-high-court/awadhesh-kumar-pandey-v-state-of-u-p-ors-52129
- **Pages:** 9

## Headnote

A. Service Law - UP Secondary Education
Service Selection Board Act, 1982 -
Sections 33-C(2)(b) & 33-G - Teacher -
Regularization - Rejection order was
passed in cyclostyle manner and without
following procedure - Legality challenged
-
Held,
no
procedure
has
been
adopted/prescribed, as is provided u/s 33C(2)(b) of the Act, 1982, for considering
the regularisation of the petitioners. It fails
the very purpose and Scheme of the
Section 33-G of the Act, 1982 - Almost all
the rejection orders have been passed in a
cyclostyle manner - High Court quashed
the impugned order declaring it unlawful
and against the settled proposition of law.
(Para 16, 17, 30 and 31)

B. Service law - Constitution of India -
Principle of natural justice - Rule of audi
alteram
partem
-
Applicability
to
administrative proceeding - Opportunity of
hearing - Significance - Held, under the
Constitutional Scheme, one of the most
important ingredients which is to be taken
care of, is the rules of principle of natural
justice
-
Even
in
administrative
proceeding, the application of the rules of
'audi
alteram
partem',
is
must
-
Opportunity of hearing is a substantive
obligation, which is based on fundamental
principle
of
natural
justice
-
The
petitioners have not been associated while
considering their cases for regularisation,
u/s 33-G of the Act, 1982, as, neither any
notice is issued to the petitioner nor any
record was called from the Committee of
Management concerned, which, prima
facie, is a violation of rules of principle of
natural justice. (Para 19, 22 and 25)

Writ petition allowed. (E-1)

List of Cases cited:

## Text

5 All. Awadhesh Kumar Pandey Vs. State of U.P. & Ors.
487
the order impugned do not stand on its own
legs.

35. Ultimately this Court is of
considered opinion that, the appointment of
the petitioner is done under the provision of
the Rules, 1984 whereas, the provisions of
the Act, 1921 would apply to the institution
in question thus, in view of the settled
proposition of law, the whole proceedings of
the said appointment vitiates in the eyes of
law.

36. Consequently, the writ petition
lacks of merit, hence, the same is dismissed.

37. No order as to costs.
----------
(2024) 5 ILRA 487
ORIGINAL JURISDICTION
CIVIL SIDE
DATED: ALLAHABAD 31.05.2024

BEFORE

THE HON'BLE SHREE PRAKASH SINGH, J.

Writ A No. 8437 of 2023

Awadhesh Kumar Pandey ...Petitioner
Versus
State of U.P. & Ors. ...Respondents

Counsel for the Petitioner:
Manoj Kumar Pandey, Pt. S. Chandra

Counsel for the Respondents:
C.S.C.

A. Service Law - UP Secondary Education
Service Selection Board Act, 1982 -
Sections 33-C(2)(b) & 33-G - Teacher -
Regularization - Rejection order was
passed in cyclostyle manner and without
following procedure - Legality challenged
-
Held,
no
procedure
has
been
adopted/prescribed, as is provided u/s 33C(2)(b) of the Act, 1982, for considering
the regularisation of the petitioners. It fails
the very purpose and Scheme of the
Section 33-G of the Act, 1982 - Almost all
the rejection orders have been passed in a
cyclostyle manner - High Court quashed
the impugned order declaring it unlawful
and against the settled proposition of law.
(Para 16, 17, 30 and 31)

B. Service law - Constitution of India -
Principle of natural justice - Rule of audi
alteram
partem
-
Applicability
to
administrative proceeding - Opportunity of
hearing - Significance - Held, under the
Constitutional Scheme, one of the most
important ingredients which is to be taken
care of, is the rules of principle of natural
justice
-
Even
in
administrative
proceeding, the application of the rules of
'audi
alteram
partem',
is
must
-
Opportunity of hearing is a substantive
obligation, which is based on fundamental
principle
of
natural
justice
-
The
petitioners have not been associated while
considering their cases for regularisation,
u/s 33-G of the Act, 1982, as, neither any
notice is issued to the petitioner nor any
record was called from the Committee of
Management concerned, which, prima
facie, is a violation of rules of principle of
natural justice. (Para 19, 22 and 25)

Writ petition allowed. (E-1)

List of Cases cited:

1. Bharat Sanchar Nigam Limited & anr. Vs BPL
Mobile Cellular Ltd. & ors.; (2008) 13 SCC 597

2. Rajjan Lal Vs St. & anr.; AIR 1961 All 139 (FB)

3. St. Bank of India & ors.Vs Rajesh Agarwal &
ors.; (2023) 6 SCC 1

4. Mohindher Singh Gill & anr. Vs Chief Election
Commissioner, New Delhi & ors.; (1978) 1 SCC
405

(Delivered by Hon'ble Shree Prakash
Singh, J.)
488 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES

1. Heard learned counsels for the
petitioners, Sri Shailendra Kumar Singh,
learned Chief Standing Counsel, Sri Vivek
Kumar Shukla, learned Additional Chief
Standing Counsel for the State and perused
the records.

2. Notices to the concerned
respondents, other than the State, are hereby
dispensed with.

3. The bunch of petitions have been
preferred by the petitioners assailing their
respective rejection orders, mainly on the
ground that they were entitled to be
considered and to be regularised, under the
provision of Section 33-G of the UP
Secondary Education Service Selection
Board Act, 1982 (hereinafter referred to as
'Act, 1982') but the benefits under the
aforesaid provisions have been declined to
them.

4. The provision of Section 33-G of
the Act 1982 is extracted as under:-

 "33-G (1) Any teacher, other than
the Principal or the Head Master, who-

(a) was appointed by promotion or
by direct recruitment in the lecturer's grade
or trained graduate grade on or after August
7, 1993 but not later than January 25, 1999
against a short term vacancy in accordance
with paragraph 2 of the Uttar Pradesh
Secondary Education Services Commission
(Removal of Difficulties) (Second) order,
1981 as amended from time to time, and
such vacancy was subsequently converted
into a substantive vacancy;

(b) was appointed by promotion or
by direct recruitment on or after August 7,
1993, but not later than December 30, 2000
on adhoc basis against substantive vacancy
in accordance with Section 18, in the
Lecturer grade or Trained Graduate grade;

(c) possesses the qualifications
prescribed under, or is exempted from such
qualification in accordance with, the
provisions of the Intermediate Education
Act, 1921;

(d) has been continuously serving
the institution from the date of such
appointment up to the date of the
commencement of the Uttar Pradesh
Secondary Education Services Selection
Board (Amendment) Act, 2016:

(e) has been found suitable for
appointment in a substantive capacity by the
Selection Committee referred to in clause
(a) of sub-section (2) of Section 33-C in
accordance with the procedure prescribed
under clause (b) of the said sub-section;

Shall
be
given
substantive
appointments by the Management.

(2)(a) The names of the teachers
shall be recommended for substantive
appointment in order of seniority as
determined
from
the
date
of
their
appointment;

(b) if two or more such teachers
are appointed on the same date, the teacher
who is elder in age shall be recommended
first.

(3) Every teacher appointed in a
substantive capacity under sub-section (1)
shall be deemed to be on probation from the
date of such substantive appointment.
 (4) A teacher who is not found
suitable under sub- section (1) and a teacher
who is not eligible to get a substantive
appointment under the said sub-section
shall cease to hold the appointment on such
date as the State Government may by order
specify.

(5) Nothing in this section shall be
contrued to entitled any teacher to
substantive appointment if on the date of the
commencement of the Uttar Pradesh
Secondary Education Services Selection
Board (Amendment Act), 2016 such vacancy
5 All. Awadhesh Kumar Pandey Vs. State of U.P. & Ors.
489
had already been filed or selection for such
vacancy has already been made in
accordance with this Act.

(6) The services of the adhoc
teachers and the teachers who have been
appointed against short term vacancies
shall be regularised from the date of
commencement of the Uttar Pradesh
Secondary Education Services Selection
Board (Amendment Act), 2016.

(7) Reservation Rules shall be
followed in regularization of adhoc teachers
and teachers who are appointed against
short term vacancies.
 (8) Adhoc teachers, who have not
been appointed either in accordance with
the Uttar Pradesh Secondary Education
Services
Commission
(Removal
of
Difficulties) Order, 1981 or in accordance
with Section 18 of the Uttar Pradesh
Secondary Education Services Selection
Board Act, 1982 and are otherwise getting
salary only on the basis of interim/Final
orders of the court shall not be entitled for
regularization."

5. From bare reading of the
provisions of Section 33-G(a) of the Act,
1982, it is conspicuous that any teacher
other than Principal or Headmaster, who
was appointed by promotion or by direct
recruitment in the lecturer's grade or trained
graduate grade on or after August 7, 1993
but not later than January 25, 1999 against a
short term vacancy in accordance with
paragraph 2 of the Uttar Pradesh Secondary
Education Services Commission (Removal
of Difficulties) (Second) order, 1981 as
amended from time to time, and such
vacancy was subsequently converted into a
substantive vacancy.

Similarly,
Section
33-G(b)
provides that:- any Teacher other than
Principal
or
Headmaster,
who
was
appointed by promotion or by direct
recruitment, on or after 7th August 1993, but
not later than 30th December 2000, on adhoc basis on substantive vacancy, in
accordance with Section 18, in the Lecturer
Grade or Trained Graduate Grade and
possess the qualification prescribed under or
is exempted from such qualification in
accordance
with
the
provisions
of
Intermediate
Education
Act,
1921
(hereinafter referred to as 'Act 1921') and
has been continuously serving the institution
from the date of such appointment up till the
date of commencement of U.P. Service
Selection Board Act, 2016 and has been
found suitable for appointment in a
substantive capacity by the Selection
Committee referred to in Clause (a) of SubSection (2) of Section 33-C in accordance
with the procedure prescribed in the Clause
(b), shall be given substantive appointment.

6. Section 33-G(8) of the Act, 1982,
laid down condition, that ad-hoc Teachers
who have not been appointed either in
accordance with UP Secondary Education
Service
Commission
(Removal
of
Difficulties)
Second
Order,
1981
(hereinafter referred to as 'Order, 1981'), or
in accordance with Section-18 of the Act,
1982 or otherwise getting salary only on the
basis of interim/final order, shall not be
entitled for regularization.

The direct recruitment falls in two
categories as is envisaged under Section 33G of the Act, 1982; firstly, the concerned
Teacher has been appointed on or after 7th
August 1993, but not later than 25th January
1999 against a short term vacancy, in
accordance with paragraph 2 of the Removal
of Difficulties Order 1981 as amended from
time to time, and as such, the vacancy was
converted into a substantive vacancy and
secondly, the concerned Teacher has been
490 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
appointed on or after 7th August 1993, but
not later than 30th December 2000, on adhoc basis against substantive vacancies, in
accordance with the old Section 18 of the
Act, 1982 in the Lecturers' Grade and
Trained Graduate Grade.

7. The petitioners herein claims to
be appointed either under the Removal of
Difficulties
Order,
1981
or
under
unamended Section 18 of the Act, 1982, and
it was incumbent upon the Regional Level
Committee to thoroughly examine the case
of the petitioners while ensuring the records
from the Committee of Management of the
Institution as well as the District Inspector
of Schools concerned, prior coming to any
conclusion.

8. While going through the provision
of Section 33-G(e) of the Act, 1982, this
Court has noted two ingredients, which is to
be taken care of, by the Regional Level
Committee; one, that the Teacher is suitable
for appointment in a substantive capacity by
the Selection Committee referred to in
Clause (a)(2) of Section 33-C, in accordance
with the procedure proscribed; meaning
thereby,
that
a
procedure
must
be
prescribed, so far as, to look into the
suitability of appointment.

9. Section 33-C(2)(b) is extracted
hereinunder:-

 "(b) The procedure of selection
for substantive appointment under subsection (1) shall be such as may be
prescribed."

10. The Legislature in its conscious
wisdom,
has
provided
the
aforesaid
procedure of selection for substantive
appointment, which clearly indicates that
some procedure is to be 'prescribed' for
selection of substantive appointment. Time
and again, the Apex Court has interpreted
the word 'prescribed'.

11. In case of Bharat Sanchar
Nigam Limited and Another Vs. BPL
Mobile Cellular Limited and Others
reported in (2008) 13 SCC 597, it is held
that 'ordinarily, the word 'prescribed' would
mean prescribed by rules, meaning thereby,
that prescribed in accordance with law and
not otherwise.

12. Paragraph 45 of the abovesaid
judgement is referred hereinunder:-

 "45. For invoking clauses 4.1 and
19.5 of the licence agreement, we may notice
that the word `prescribed' is not defined. It
has not been defined even in the Indian
Telegraph Act. It has not been defined in the
licence. The said provision unlike clause
18.14 does not use the words `from time to
time'. A contract entered into by the parties,
it will bear a repetition to state, must be
certain. It must conform to the provisions of
the Indian Contract Act. Ordinarily, the
word `prescribed' would mean prescribed
by Rules. Section 7(2)(ee) of the Indian
Telegraph Act provides for the Rule making
power for the purpose of laying down the
tariff. We may not be understood to be
laying down a law that in absence of any
statutory rule framed under the Indian
Telegraph Act, no contract can be entered
into. In absence of any statutory Rule
governing the field, the parties would be at
liberty to enter into any contract containing
such terms and conditions as regards the
rate or the period stipulating such terms as
the case may be. The matter might have been
different if the parties had entered into an
agreement with their eyes wide open that the
circular letter shall form part of the
contract. They might have also been held
5 All. Awadhesh Kumar Pandey Vs. State of U.P. & Ors.
491
bound if they accepted the new rates or the
periods either expressly or sub silentio.
When on the basis of terms of the contract,
different rates can be prescribed, the same
must be expressly stated. When the word
`prescribed' is not defined, the same, in our
opinion, would mean that prescribed in
accordance with law and not otherwise."

13. A full Bench of Allahabad High
Court, in case of Rajjan Lal Vs. State and
another, reported in AIR 1961 All 139
(FB) has also categorically held that the
word prescribed in a general sense has a
meaning,
'prescribed
by
any
law,
whatsoever.'

14. Paragraph 33 of the abovenoted
judgement is reproduced as under:-

"33. It will be seen that Section 48
prohibits execution after the expiry of 12
years from the date of the decree. It was
contended by the decree-holders before the
Full Bench that by virtue of the provisions of
Section 15 of the Limitation Act, in
computing the time within which they were
entitled to execute the decree, the period
during which the execution of the decree had
been stayed should not be included. teo
questions were posed 'before the Full Bench,
One was whether Section 48 prescribed a
period of limitation within the meaning of
Section 15, Limitation Act, and the second
was whether Section 15 was not confined in
its operation to periods of limitation
prescribed by the Act or Schedule thereof.
 The Full Bench answered both the
questions on the affirmative. We are not
here concerned with the first question
because it is not contended before us that
Sub-section (4) of Section 417 does not
prescribe a period of limitation. The second
question which fell for consideration by the
Full Bench in Durga Pal Singh's case, AIR
1939 All 403, is very similar to the one
referred to this Bench for decision. Thom, C.
J., who delivered the principal judgment in
the case observed upon consideration of the
terms of Section 48, C. P. C., and Sections
15 and 29, of the Limitation Act, that the
general provisions of Section 15, Limitation
Act are intended to apply to periods of
limitation prescribed in the Civil Procedure
Code and are not confined in their operation
to periods prescribed by the Limitation Act
or by Schedule 1 thereof, Iqbal Ahmad, J.,
who concurred in the opinion of the learned
Chief Justice, after considering the relevant
provisions of the Limitation Act and the
Code of Civil Procedure and the course of
legislation on the subject came to the
conclusion that in the group of sections from
3 to 29 in Sections 3, 6 and 29, after the
word "Prescribed" reference has expressly
been made to the first Schedule. It was sheld
that the omission of this qualification in the
other sections was not without significance
and that the word "prescribed" has been
used in these sections to a general sense as
meaning
prescribed
by
any
law
whatsoever."

15. It culled out that if the word
'prescribed' is not given any meaning or
interpretation in the particular provision, the
meaning of the same would be, as provided
by the law. While examining the instant
matter, in view of the law laid down by the
Apex Court, it emerges that undisputedly,
no procedure was prescribed as it is
provided under Section 33-C(2)(b) of the
Act, 1982, though, the same is a mandate of
Section 33-G(e) for consideration, thus, the
whole proceeding of considering the cases
of the petitioners vitiates in the eyes of law.

16. This Court has also taken note
of the fact that since, no procedure has been
adopted/prescribed, as is provided under
492 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
Section 33-C(2)(b) of the Act, 1982, for
considering the regularisation of the
petitioners, it fails the very purpose and
Scheme of the Section 33-G of the Act,
1982.

17. From perusal of all the
rejection orders, there seems to be no
procedure followed, and the orders have
been passed in a cyclostyle manner, in
almost all the rejection orders. In this view
of the matter, this Court is of considered
opinion that the procedure prescribed
under Section 33-C(2)(b), have not been
adhered to, which demolished the scheme
of regularisation, inserted vide Section 33G of the Act, 1982.

18. Coming on the issue of
opportunity of hearing to the Committee of
Management as well as the persons
aggrieved, i.e., the petitioners, it is apparent,
that the Regional Level Committee while
proceeding with the consideration of
regularisation of the petitioners, did not
procure the records, either from the
Committee of Management or from the
District Inspector of Schools concerned,
whereas, fact remains that the District
Inspector of Schools is one of the co-opted
member of the Regional Level Committee.
It emerges from the rejection orders that
those are passed, in almost an identical
manner, which indicates that the same have
been passed, in a cursory and hasty manner
and lacks application of mind.

19.

Further,
under
the
Constitutional Scheme, one of the most
important ingredients which is to be taken
care of, is the rules of principle of natural
justice. The Apex Court, time and again has
held that even in administrative proceeding,
the application of the rules of 'audi alteram
partem', is must.
20. The Apex Court while
rendering the judgement and order in case of
State Bank of India and Others Vs.
Rajesh Agarwal and others reported in
(2023) 6 SCC 1, has held that Principles of
Natural Justice are not mere formalities, but
it constitute substantive obligations that
need to be followed by decision making and
adjudicating authorities. It is further held
that the 'principles of natural justice, has a
guarantee against arbitrary action, both in
terms of procedure and substance, by
judicial, quasi-judicial and administrative
authorities'.

21. Paragraph 36 of the above noted
judgement is quoted hereinunder:-

"36. We need to bear in mind that
the principles of natural justice are not mere
legal
formalities.
They
constitute
substantive obligations that need to be
followed
by
decision-making
and
adjudicating authorities. The principles of
natural justice act as a guarantee against
arbitrary action, both in terms of procedure
and substance, by judicial, quasi-judicial,
and
administrative
authorities.
Two
fundamental principles of natural justice
are entrenched in Indian jurisprudence: (i)
nemo judex in causa sua, which means that
no person should be a judge in their own
cause; and (ii) audi alteram partem, which
means
that
a
person
affected
by
administrative, judicial or quasi- judicial
action must be heard before a decision is
taken.
The
courts
generally
favor
interpretation of a statutory provision
consistent with the principles of natural
justice because it is presumed that the
statutory authorities do not intend to
contravene fundamental rights. Application
of the said principles depends on the facts
and circumstances of the case, express
language and basic scheme of the statute
5 All. Awadhesh Kumar Pandey Vs. State of U.P. & Ors.
493
under which the administrative power is
exercised, the nature and purpose for which
the power is conferred, and the final effect
of the exercise of that power." .

22. The Apex Court has, thus, held
that the opportunity of hearing is a
substantive obligation, which is based on
fundamental principle of natural justice.

23. This Court has also taken note
of the fact that the opportunity of personal
hearing to the concerned petitioners/
affected teachers have also not been
accorded so as to sub-serve the compliance
of the rules of principles of natural justice.
The matter, which is in hand to decide, is not
on
the
premises
that
there
is
no
regularisation
rules
prevailing
but
petitioners have been deprived of their
valuable rights without ensuring the due
opportunity of hearing and further prior
coming to the conclusion, the records were
not procured from the committee of
management as well as the District Inspector
of Schools concerned.

24. It is trite law that every order,
administrative or judicial must stand on its
own legs. The Constitutional Bench of
Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of
Mohindher Singh Gill and another Vs.
Chief Election Commissioner, New Delhi
and ohters, (1978) 1 SCC 405, has very
categorically held as under:-

"8. The second equally relevant
matter is that when a statutory functionary
makes an order based on certain grounds,
its validity must be judged by the reasons so
mentioned and cannot be supplemented by
fresh reasons in the shape of affidavit or
otherwise. Otherwise, an order bad in the
beginning may, by the time it comes to court
on account of a challenge, get validated by
additional grounds later brought out. We
may here draw attention to the observations
of Bose, J. in Gordhandas Bhanji2:
 "Public orders, publicly made, in
exercise of a statutory authority cannot be
construed in the light of explanations
subsequently given by the officer making the
order of what he meant, or of what was in
his mind, or what he intended to do. Public
orders made by public authorities are meant
to have public effect and are intended to
affect the actings and conduct of those to
whom they are addressed and must be
construed objectively with reference to the
language used in the order itself."

Orders are not like old wine
becoming better as they grow older."

25. Undisputedly, the petitioners
have not been associated while considering
their cases for regularisation, under Section
33-G of the Act, 1982, as, neither any notice
is issued to the petitioner nor any record was
called from the Committee of Management
concerned, which, prima facie, is a violation
of rules of principle of natural justice. It is
also a trite law that if any action is of civil
consequence and that affects someone, the
opportunity of hearing of the affected person
is must.

26. The State counsel during the
course of his argument has also failed to
substantiate that with what manner the
Regional Level Committee sought for the
records from the committee of management
and from the District Inspector of Schools,
when, the District Inspector of Schools
himself is the member of the Regional Level
Committee.

27. So far as the present petitioners
are concerned, their appointments were
made under certain exigencies provided
under Section 33-G of the Board Act, 1982
for imparting education, where the State
494 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
machinery was totally failed to make
appointment of teachers, which is the
paramount duty of a welfare State. The
petitioners
were
appointed
in
the
educational institutions, which are in the
remote areas of the Province and those are
fulfilling the aim and object of the
constitutional scheme, thereby imparting
education, which is the fundamental right.

28. In fact, the State, while looking into
the aforesaid Act No.7 of 1982 while
inserting provision 33-G, provided that
those teachers other than principal or
headmaster appointed under the condition
laid down in the statute, shall be given
substantive appointment, but the impugned
orders clearly show that Regional Level
Committee without the reports of the
Committee of Management and District
Inspector of Schools, has passed the orders,
which in fact failed the very purpose of
prescribing the scheme under section 33-G
of the Act 1982. The orders passed by the
Regional Level Committee are in a very
cursory manner and without ensuring the
records from the committee of management
and the District Inspector of Schools
concerned, which cannot be approved of.

29. Earlier also, the matter came up
for consideration before this Court in
Special Appeal (Defective) No. 103 of 2023
wherein the controversy is settled while
providing
that
it
is
the
duty
and
responsibility of the State authorities to
consider and adjudge the suitability of the
teachers for substantive appointment under
Section 33-G of the Act 1982 and their
continuation in the ad hoc capacity in the
institution concerned is subject to only such
consideration. Further, the order passed in
the aforesaid special appeal has also been
affirmed in Special Leave to Appeal (C)
No.13023 of 2023, vide order dated
17.7.2023. Thus, there remains no dispute so
far as the consideration of the petitioners/
teachers under section 33-G of the Act 1982,
is concerned."

30. In view of the above said
submissions and discussions, it is apparent
that the orders impugned in all the writ
petitions have been passed in a cyclostyle
manner, without associating the petitioners
in the proceeding and without ensuring the
records
from
the
Committee
of
Management/District Inspector of Schools
concern and further without following with
any procedure, as it is provided under
Section 33-C(2)(b) of the Act, 1982. Thus,
the impugned orders on its face, are
unlawful and against the settled proposition
of law.

31. Consequently, the orders of
rejection, assailed in the present bunch of
writ petitions are hereby quashed.

32. The writ petitions are allowed,
accordingly.

33. All the matters are relegated back
to the Regional Level Committees concerned
to pass order afresh within a period of three
months, after calling the records from the
committee of management as well as the
District Inspectors of Schools concern and by
verifying the same. It is further directed that
the petitioners shall also be provided the
opportunity of hearing, if so required. The
scheme provided under Section 33-G of the
Act, 1982 shall strictly be adhered to, keeping
in view of the requirement of procedure to be
adopted by the Committee so constituted.

34. In addition, it is further provided
that the petitioners of the present bunch of writ
petitions are entitled to continue in service and
shall be paid salary without any further break,
5 All. Parasnath Gupta Vs. State of U.P. & Ors.
495
till the decision so taken by the committee
concerned. The petitioners as well as the
Manager of the Committee of Management
shall ensure their presence and would cooperate with the Regional Level Committee,
as and when required.
----------
(2024) 5 ILRA 495
ORIGINAL JURISDICTION
CIVIL SIDE
DATED: ALLAHABAD 31.05.2024

BEFORE

THE HON'BLE J.J. MUNIR, J.

Writ A No. 10088 of 2020

Parasnath Gupta ...Petitioner
Versus
State of U.P. & Ors. ...Respondents

Counsel for the Petitioner:
Kunwar Bahadur Srivastava

Counsel for the Respondents:
C.S.C.

A. Service Law - UP Cooperative Societies
Act, 1965 - Sections 92-A & 92-B - UP Cooperative Collection Fund and the Amins
and Other Staff Service Rules, 2002 - Rule
29 - Post retiral benefit - Superannuation
from the post of Junior Clerk in the office
of Commissioner, Cooperative Society -
Pension was claimed by clubbing service
rendered as a Cooperative Collection Amin
and Junior Clerk - Permissibility - Held, a
Clerk engaged in connection with the
Cooperative Collection Scheme is not
entitled to pension, gratuity or other post
retiral benefits - Rules of 2002 cannot be
extended in their application, including
Rule 29, to a Clerk serving in connection
with the Cooperative Collection Scheme.
(Para 1, 34 and 35)

B. Interpretation of statute - Literal
interpretation - Application - Held, if the
provisions of a statute are unequivocal and
clear, the rule of literal interpretation
ought
be
adopted
and
the
statute
understood for what it means, giving effect
to every word of it. (Para 34)

C. Enforcement of statute - Prospective
effect - Applicability of Rules of 2016
enforced on 26.08.2016 to the petitioner,
who was retired on 31.10.2015 - Held, the
Rules have not been given retrospective
operation, either expressly or by necessary
intendment. These Rules are substantive
Rules and the well settled canon of
construction is that all substantive law is
deemed to be prospective, unless expressly
made retrospective. (Para 36)

Writ petition dismissed. (E-1)

List of Cases cited:

1. St. of U.P. & ors. Vs Chandra Prakash Pandey
& ors., (2001) 4 SCC 78

2. Writ Petition No. 3832 of 2012, UP Sahkari
Sangrah Karmchari Union Vs St. of U.P. &
ors.decided on 11.05.2015

3. St. of U.P. & ors.Vs Chandra Prakash Pandey
& ors.; (1995) 3 UPLBEC 1491

4. Jagmal Singh Vs St. of U.P. & ors.; 2009 (3)
AWC 2461

5. Ramsevak Vs St. of U.P. & ors., 2019 : AHC:
136501

(Delivered by Hon'ble J.J. Munir, J.)

1. his writ petition is directed against
an order dated 30.06.2020 passed by the
Additional Chief Secretary, Department of
Cooperatives, Government of Uttar Pradesh,
Lucknow and a circular dated 22.04.2019
issued by the Commissioner and Registrar,
Cooperatives, Uttar Pradesh, Lucknow. By
the order of 30th June, 2020, the petitioner's
claim for grant of pension, clubbing his
services as a Cooperative Collection Amin