# Ayodhya (Died) substituted by LRs v. D.D.C. & Ors

- **Citation:** (2021) 3 ILRA 849
- **Court:** High Court of Judicature at Allahabad
- **Decided:** 2021-03-22
- **Case number:** Consolidation No. 1877 of 1979
- **Bench:** Rajnish Kumar
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/allahabad-high-court/ayodhya-died-substituted-by-lrs-v-d-d-c-ors-46971
- **Pages:** 8

## Headnote

A. Civil Law - Consolidation - U.P.
Consolidation of Holdings Act, 1953 -
Section 9 - Uttar Pradesh Zamindari
Abolition And Land Reforms Act, 1950 -
Section 122-A - Code of Criminal
Procedure: Section 145 - One cannot
mature rights by adverse possession
on
Gaon
Sabha
land.
It
is
not
understandable as to how someone can
mature rights by adverse possession if his
name is not recorded continuously for a
period of ten years in the revenue records.
(Para 12)

In regard to the claim over the land in dispute
on the basis of alleged allotment by the Gaon
Sabha vide resolution dated 17.11.1963,
indicates that it is not an allotment. The Gaon
Sabha has only passed a resolution that it has
no objection in recording name of Shri
Ayodhya Prasad in 409, 410, 354, 353, 352
and there are trees of Aam, Mahua, Kathar,
Amrood and Babul etc. It does not indicate
even that these trees were planted by the
petitioners. Therefore it is not an allotment
and it is not approved by the Sub-Divisional
Officer also. (Para 14)

B. U.P. Panchayat Raj Act, 1947- Section 34
- The Gaon Sabha cannot allot it's any
property to anybody because the property
is vested in Gram Panchayat u/s 34 of U.P.
Panchayat Raj Act, 1947 in relation to
direction, management and control and it's
vesting in State is absolute. Therefore, the
Gram Panchayat cannot give it to anybody as
absolute right of ownership is not given to it.
(Para 15)

Writ petition dismissed. (E-3)

Precedent followed:

## Text

3 All. Ayodhya (Died) substituted by LRs Vs. D.D.C. & Ors.
849
vested in the party concerned to invoke the
revisional jurisdiction; rather Section 48
vests a jurisdiction in the Deputy Director
of Consolidation to call for or examine the
record of any case decided or proceedings
drawn. Thus for exercising of revisional
jurisdiction, a party aggrieved may or may
not
invoke
Section
48
and
in
an
appropriate case, the Deputy Director of
Consolidation can suo motu exercise his
powers of revisional jurisdiction."

21. The Revisional Authority after
considering the pleadings and evidence has
found that the land in dispute belongs to
Gram Samaj therefore even if the orders
passed by the lower authorities were not
sustainable and quashed, no fruitful purpose
would have been served by remanding the
case when the Revisional Authority itself has
authority to pass the order under the statute.

22. In view of above, this Court is of
the considered opinion that there is no
illegality or error in the impugned order
passed by Deputy Director of Consolidation.
The writ petitions are misconceived and
devoid of any merit.

23. Both the writ petitions, are,
accordingly, dismissed. No order as to costs.
----------
(2021)03ILR A849
ORIGINAL JURISDICTION
CIVIL SIDE
DATED: LUCKNOW 22.03.2021

BEFORE

THE HON'BLE RAJNISH KUMAR, J.

Consolidation No. 1877 of 1979

Ayodhya (Died) substituted by LRs
 ...Petitioner
Versus
D.D.C. & Ors. ...Respondents
Counsel for the Petitioner:
A.K. Verma, Ajay Sharma, D.K. Rastogi, S.C.
Misra, V. B. Singh

Counsel for the Respondents:
R.N. Srivastava, Dilip Kumar Pandey, Yogendra
Nath Yadav

A. Civil Law - Consolidation - U.P.
Consolidation of Holdings Act, 1953 -
Section 9 - Uttar Pradesh Zamindari
Abolition And Land Reforms Act, 1950 -
Section 122-A - Code of Criminal
Procedure: Section 145 - One cannot
mature rights by adverse possession
on
Gaon
Sabha
land.
It
is
not
understandable as to how someone can
mature rights by adverse possession if his
name is not recorded continuously for a
period of ten years in the revenue records.
(Para 12)

In regard to the claim over the land in dispute
on the basis of alleged allotment by the Gaon
Sabha vide resolution dated 17.11.1963,
indicates that it is not an allotment. The Gaon
Sabha has only passed a resolution that it has
no objection in recording name of Shri
Ayodhya Prasad in 409, 410, 354, 353, 352
and there are trees of Aam, Mahua, Kathar,
Amrood and Babul etc. It does not indicate
even that these trees were planted by the
petitioners. Therefore it is not an allotment
and it is not approved by the Sub-Divisional
Officer also. (Para 14)

B. U.P. Panchayat Raj Act, 1947- Section 34
- The Gaon Sabha cannot allot it's any
property to anybody because the property
is vested in Gram Panchayat u/s 34 of U.P.
Panchayat Raj Act, 1947 in relation to
direction, management and control and it's
vesting in State is absolute. Therefore, the
Gram Panchayat cannot give it to anybody as
absolute right of ownership is not given to it.
(Para 15)

Writ petition dismissed. (E-3)

Precedent followed:

1. Sumit Kumar Tyagi Vs St. of U.P. & ors., 2002
SCC OnLine All 399; 93 RD 623 (Para 12)
850 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
2. Rizwan & anr. Vs Deputy Director of
Consolidation, Saharanpur & ors., (2003) 6 AWC
5065; (2003) 95 RD 714 (Para 13)

3. Vinod Kumar Pandey & ors. Vs St. of U.P.,
2005 SCC OnLine All 641; (2005) 99 RD 490
(Para 15)

Present petition challenges judgment and
order
dated
06.03.1979,
19.07.1978,
09.09.1977, passed by opposite parties
no. 1 to 3 respectively.

(Delivered by Hon'ble Rajnish Kumar, J.)

1. Heard, Shri Ajay Sharma, learned
counsel for the petitioner, Sri Dilip Kumar
Pandey, learned counsel for the Gaon
Sabha/opposite party no.4 and learned
Standing Counsel. None appeared for the
private respondents.

2. This writ petition under Article 226
of the Constitution of India has been filed
challenging the judgment and order dated
06.03.1979, 19.07.1978 and 09.09.1977,
passed by opposite parties no.1 to 3
respectively.

3. The dispute relates to the plot
nos.352 and 353 which were recorded as
Talab in the basic year khatauni and plot
nos.351, 354, 409 and 410 recorded as Banjar
in basic year Khatauni. The land in question
is situated in village Palti Khera, Pargana
Sareni, Tehsil Dalmau, District Raebareli.
The consolidation proceedings initiated in the
year 1968. The petitioner i.e. late Ayodhya
had filed an objection under Section 9 of the
U.P. Consolidation of Holdings Act in
respect of the aforesaid plots claiming as his
grove on which more than 300 trees were
planted by him and his ancestors with the
consent of the landlord and he is in
possession over the same for the last over 50
years. Two more objections were filed by
Shri Anoop Singh and Shri Sheo Singh
claiming to be grove holders of the said plots,
in dispute. All the three objections were
forwarded to the Consolidation Officer, who
partly allowed the objection of late Ayodhya
vide judgment and order dated 28.07.1969.
Other two objections were rejected. Both the
parties preferred appeals which were decided
by a common judgment and order dated
30.04.1970 by means of which the appeal of
Sheo Singh and others was rejected while the
appeal of Late Ayodhya was allowed and the
case was remanded to the Consolidation
Officer for deciding afresh after making spot
inspection.
In
pursuance
thereof
the
Consolidation Officer made spot inspection
on 03.04.1972 and partly allowed the
objection of Late Ayodhya vide judgment
and order dated 22.04.1972.

4. Late Ayodhya as well as Gaon Sabha
challenged the judgment and order dated
22.04.1972 in appeal before the Settlement
Officer Consolidation. Both the appeals were
decided by a common judgment and order
dated 26.09.1974 and the order dated
22.04.1972 of the Consolidation Officer was
set aside. The case was remanded with a
direction that the Consolidation Officer shall
make an inquiry after spot inspection to
ascertain as to which of the trees were planted
prior to Zamindari Abolition and what was
their nature at that time. After remand the
Consolidation Officer decided the case afresh
by means of order dated 19.09.1977 after spot
inspection and rejected the objection of late
Ayodhya and directed that the entry of basic
year would continue. The Consolidation
Officer held that the land in question is of the
Gaon Sabha and late Ayodhya is not its
bhumidhar.

5. Late Ayodhya filed an appeal
against the order dated 19.09.1977. The
appeal was partly allowed by means of the
judgment and order dated 18.07.1978 after
3 All. Ayodhya (Died) substituted by LRs Vs. D.D.C. & Ors.
851
spot inspection made by the Assistant
Settlement Officer consolidation holding
late Ayodhya to be bhumidhar of plot
nos.409 and 410 and objection in respect of
remaining plots was rejected. Aggrieved by
the appellate order late Ayodhya preferred
a revision which was dismissed by the
Deputy Director of Consolidation by means
of judgment and order dated 06.03.1979.
Hence the present writ petition was filed.
During pendency of this writ petition
Ayodhya died, hence the present petitioners
were substituted.

6. Submission of learned counsel for
the petitioners was that after remand by the
appellate authority by means of order dated
26.09.1974
the
Consolidation
Officer,
without making local inspection and
without
giving
opportunity
to
the
petitioners, rejected the objection of the
petitioners against the direction issued by
the appellate authority, which could not
have been done. He further submitted that
the land in question was allotted to late
Ayodhya by means of resolution dated
17.11.1963
passed
by
the
Land
Management Committee. The petitioners
are in possession of the land in dispute
since long, which is in the nature of grove.
The trees planted by the predecessors in
interest of the petitioners are there on the
said land. Lastly learned counsel for the
petitioners
had
submitted
that
the
conclusions have been recorded contrary to
the observations. Therefore the impugned
orders are not sustainable and liable to be
quashed and writ petition is liable to be
allowed.

7. Learned counsel for the Gaon Sabha
had submitted that the petitioners have no
right on the land of Gaon Sabha as it was not
allotted. He had submitted that the land of
pond could not have been allotted on which
there is no right of the petitioners. In regard to
the land recorded as Banjar he had submitted
that unless the lease is granted no right or
hereditary right can be claimed. He had
further submitted that no documentary
evidence was adduced to show that the land
in question was allotted to late Ayodhya. He
had
also
submitted
that
the
Land
Management Committee has no right for
giving any land to anybody because it has
only right of management under Section 122A of the Zamindari Abolition Act. It was also
submitted that in case even if there was any
proposal
by
the
Land
Management
Committee, it was never accepted and
approved by the Sub-Divisional Officer, as
such the land was not allotted and no lease
was given to the predecessor in interest of the
petitioners. Therefore the petitioners cannot
claim any right over the land in question. If
the land in question was given on lease to the
petitioners and it was in the nature of grove
then it must have been recorded as such in the
revenue records before the date of vesting
and it should have also been recorded in the
remark column. But it is not recorded as
such, therefore also, the claim is not
sustainable. In regard to plot nos.409 and 410
learned counsel for the Gaon Sabha had
submitted that it could also not have been
given to the petitioners though he admitted
that the said part of the order has not been
challenged by the Gaon Sabha. On the basis
of above learned counsel for the Gaon Sabha
submitted that the writ petition has been filed
on misconceived and baseless grounds which
is liable to be dismissed.

8. I have considered the submissions
of the learned counsels for the parties and
perused the record.

9. Indisputably Gata no.352 and 353
are recorded as Talab and Gata Nos.351,
354, 409 and 410 are recorded as banjar in
852 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
the Khataui of the basic year. After
initiation of consolidation proceedings in
the year 1968 the petitioner i.e. Late
Ayodhya and two others namely Anoop
Singh and Sheo Singh had filed objections
separately under Section 9 of the U.P.
Consolidation of Holdings Act claiming
their rights over the land in Dispute
alleging that they are in possession with the
consent of the landlord and the land is in
the nature of grove. The claim of late
Ayodhya was that he and his predecessors
had planted about 300 trees on the land in
question. The objection of late Ayodhya
was partly allowed by the Consolidation
Officer after remand from the appellate
authority. It was again allowed partly by
means of judgment and order dated
22.04.1972 and the name of Ayodhya (now
deceased) was directed to be recorded as
grove
holder
and
sirdar.
On
being
challenged in appeal again by both the
parties, the appeals were allowed and the
matter was remanded by means
of
judgment and order dated 26.09.1974 to
decide afresh after inquiry by making spot
inspection and determining the age of the
trees.

10.

In
pursuance
thereof
the
Consolidation
Officer
considered
the
matter in detail and after considering the
oral and documentary evidence filed by the
petitioners and also the spot inspection
made by the predecessor of the officer
concerned and by himself, rejected the
claim of the petitioner by means of the
order
dated
19.09.1977.
Learned
Consolidation Officer, on the basis of spot
inspection, has recorded a categorical
finding that there is a passage in between
the land in question and pond also. It has
also been recorded that the villagers have
denied the possession of the petitioners. He
has further recorded that the nature and
manner of planting of trees does not
indicate that it is in the nature of grove.
Therefore the contention of the learned
counsel for the petitioners that the order has
been passed without spot inspection is
misconceived. The land in dispute is
recorded as banjar and Talab and in the
remark column the trees are recorded but
the possession of the petitioners is not
recorded. Here it is also pertinent to note
that during pendency of appeal the
Assistant Settlement Officer Consolidation
had also made an inspection of the plots in
question himself and it is recorded in the
order and allowed the appeal partly.
Therefore it can not be said that orders
have been passed without spot inspection.

11. The order was challenged by the
petitioners
in
appeal.
The
appellate
authority partly allowed the appeal in
regard to plot nos.409 and 410 and rejected
the claim in respect of rest of the plots by
means of the judgment and order dated
19.07.1978 and directed to record the name
of the petitioners in Gata nos.409 and 410
as on the basis of evidence it was found
that both the plots are adjacent to each
other and are in the nature of grove and late
Ayodhya and his father had planted the
trees on the said plots, though it is without
any basis. It has also been recorded that the
said land was also released in favour of the
petitioners under Section 145 of the Cr.P.C.
etc. On being challenged the revisional
authority also found that it has rightly been
recorded in the name of petitioners. Though
learned counsel for the respondents had
submitted that the Gata nos.409 and 410
also could not have been recorded in the
name of the petitioners but it has not been
challenged by the respondents for the
reasons best known to them. In regard to
rest of the plots learned revisional court
found that the plots are recorded as Banjar
3 All. Ayodhya (Died) substituted by LRs Vs. D.D.C. & Ors.
853
and Talab which was found in the spot
inspection made by the Settlement Officer
Consolidation also and accordingly rejected
the revision. This court does not find any
illegality or error in the findings recorded
by the courts' below. The petitioners have
failed to prove that the land or the trees
were ever recorded in the name of
predecessor in interest of petitioners.

12. It is settled proposition of law that
one cannot mature rights by adverse
possession on Gaon Sabha land. A Division
Bench of this court considered it in Sumit
Kumar Tyagi Versus State of U.P. and
others;2002 SCC OnLine All 399; 93 RD
623, the relevant paragraphs 11 and 12 of
which are extracted below:-

"11. It is not understandable as to how
some one can mature rights by adverse
possession if his name is not recorded
continuously for a period of ten years in the
revenue records. The judgment further
shows that the learned DGC (Revenue) had
argued that on account of the amendments
made in U.P.Z.A. & L.R. Act in 1976 and
1977, the period of limitation prescribed
thereunder for filing a suit against Gaon
Sabha had been removed altogether and,
consequently, no rights could accrue on
Gaon Sabha land by adverse possession.
Reliance had also been placed on a decision
rendered by the Allahabad High Court
in Chattar Singhv. Sahayak [ 1979 RD
226.] where this point had been examined
threadbare and it was held that on account
of amendments in the Act, no sirdari rights
can accrue over Gaon Sabha land by
adverse possession. However, the Board of
Revenue brushed aside this argument and
allowed the Second Appeal and decreed the
suit and declared the plaintiff to be
bhumbidar of the land in dispute. To say
the least, the Board of Revenue could not
have brushed aside an authority of High
Court
where
this
point
had
been
specifically
decided.
The
period
of
limitation for filing a suit by the Gaon
Sabha has been amended several times and
in such a manner that no one can mature
rights over the Goan Sabha land by adverse
possession. The last amendment which was
made by U.P. Land Laws (Amendment)
Act, 1976, before expiry of the period then
prescribed for filing of the suit, reads as
follows:

"For Section 210 of the principal Act,
the following section shall be substituted
andbe deemed always to have been
substituted, namely,

"210. If a suit for eviction from any
land under Section 209 is not instituted by
a bhumidhar, Sirdar or asami, or a decree
for eviction obtained in any such suit is not
executed by him, within the period of
limitation provided for the institution of
such suit or the execution of such decree, as
the case may be, the person taking or
retaining possession shall:--

(i) where the land forms part of the
holding of a bhumidhar or sirdar, become a
sirdar of such land, and the rights, title and
interest of an asami, if any, in such land
shall be extinguished;

(ii) Where the land forms part of the
holding of an asami, on behalf of the Goan
Sabha, become an asami thereof holding
from year to year."

12. The result of this amendment was
that the effect of non-filing of the suit by
the Gaon Sabha as contemplated in Section
209(1)(b) of the Act, which was provided
in sub-section (iii) of Section 210, was
taken away. It has been held by several
decisions of this court that after the
aforesaid
amendment
a
person
in
possession for 12 years over the property of
a Gaon Sabha would not acquire sirdari
rights. It has been further held that the
854 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
effect of amendment having been given
retrospective effect means that a trespasser
even from July, 1952, could not acquire
sirdari rights on the land belonging to Gaon
Sabha (See Bhurey v.Board of Revenue,
1984 Revenue Decision 294, and Chatar
Singh v. Sahayk
Sanchalak,
Chakbandi,
U.P. Lucknow, 1979 Revenue Decision
226.) It is, therefore, obvious that the
petitioner could not have matured any kind
of rights over the Goan Sabha land.
However, the Board of Revenue by a
strange process of reasoning held that the
petitioner had matured rights by adverse
possession and had consequently become
sirdar and thereafter bhumidar of the land."

13. Similar view has been taken by
this court in Rizwan and another Versus
Deputy
Director
of
Consolidation,
Saharanpur and others; (2003) 6 AWC
5065; (2003) 95 RD 714. The relevant
paragraphs 5, 6 and 7 are reproduced
below:-

"5. In the above fact-situation, the
questions that boil down for consideration
are (1) whether a person in unauthorised
possession of Gaon Sabha property could
acquire anybhumidhari right on grounds of
adverse possession, and (2) whether an
order passed by the authorities in a
proceeding under Section 122B of the
U.P.Z.A. and L.R. Act which culminated in
dropping of proceedings could amount to a
declaration of bhumidhari rights?

6. As regards the first question,
reference may be made to amendment in
Section 210 of the U.P.Z.A. and L.R. Act
made by the U.P. Land Laws (Amendment)
Act, 1976. The amendment having a
bearing on the answer of the first question,
may be excerpted below:

"For Section 210 of the Principal
Act, the following section shall be
substituted and be deemed always to have
been substituted, namely:

"210. If a suit for eviction from
any land under Section 209 is not instituted
by abhumidhar, sirdar or asami, or a decree
for eviction obtained in any such suit is not
executed by him, within the period of
limitation provided for the institution of
such suit or the execution of such decree, as
the case may be, the person taking or
retaining possession shall:

(i) where the land forms part of
the
holding
of
a bhumidhari or sirdari become
asirdar of
such land, and the rights, title and interest
of an asami. If any, in such land shall be
extinguished;

(ii) where the land forms part of
the holding of an asami, on behalf of the
Gaon Sabha, became an asami thereof
holding from year to year."

7. The amendment aforestated leaves
no manner of doubt that it has been given
retrospective
effect
the
necessary
Implication of which is that a person
having been in unauthorised possession
even from the date of enforcement of the
U.P.Z.A. and L.R. Act,i.e., since, 1st July,
1952,
would
not
acquire
any bhumidhari right
on
Gaon
Sabha
property. The necessary consequence that
flows from this amendment in essence is
that even if a person had been in actual
possession for 12 years or more and even if
suit under Section 209 of the U.P.Z.A. and
L.R. Act had not come to be filed, any
person
in
occupation
thereof
cannot
acquire bhumidhari rights
on
the
land
belonging
to
Gaon
Sabha.
In
the
perspective of the amendment aforestated
made in Section 210 of the U.P.Z.A. and
L.R. Act, the forceful contention pressed on
behalf of the petitioners who have not
adduced any documentary evidence to
bolster up their rights or possession prior to
3 All. Ayodhya (Died) substituted by LRs Vs. D.D.C. & Ors.
855
the date of vesting otherwise in accordance
with law and have merely relied upon varg
4 entry besides oral evidence in vindication
of their bhumidhari rights, will not have
any cutting edge and falls to the ground.
The view I am taking respecting question
No. 1 is fortified by a Division Bench of
this Court in Likhi Ram Moola v. State of
U.P., 2000 (1) AWC 521 : 2002 (93) RD
126, in which the question raised before the
Division Bench resembled the question
involved in the instant petition."

14. In regard to the claim over the
land in dispute on the basis of alleged
allotment by the Gaon Sabha vide
resolution dated 17.11.1963, the perusal
of copy of resolution annexed with the
affidavit dated 13.11.1986 indicates that
it is not an allotment. The Gaon Sabha
has only passed a resolution that it has no
objection in recording name of Shri
Ayodhya Prasad in 409, 410, 354, 353,
352 and there are trees of Aam, Mahua,
Kathar, Amrood and Babul etc. It does
not indicate even that these trees were
planted by the petitioners. Therefore it is
not an allotment and it is not approved by
the Sub-Divisional Officer also.

15. The Gaon Sabha can not allot
it's any property to any body because the
property is vested in Gram Panchayat
under Section 34 of U.P. Panchayat Raj
Act, 1947 in relation to direction,
management and control and it's vesting
in State is absolute. Therefore, the Gram
Panchayat cannot give it to anybody as
absolute right of ownership is not given
to it. The issue was considered in Vinod
Kumar Pandey and others Versus State
of
U.P.;2005
SCC
OnLine
All
641/(2005)
99
RD
490,
relevant
paragraphs 13, 14 and 15 are extracted
below:-

"13.This Court dwelled upon the
submissions made by the learned Counsels'
at length. The Additional Advocate General
invited the attention of the Courts to section
34 of the U.P. Panchayat Raj Act, 1947.
Section 34 of the said Act reads as under:

"34. Property vested in the (Gram
Panchayat).--(1) Subject to any special
reservation made by the State Government,
all public property situated within the
jurisdiction of a (Gram Panchayat) shall
vest in and before to the (Gram Panchayat)
and shall, with all other property which
may
become
vested
in
the
(Gram
Panchayat),
be
under
its
direction,
management and control."

14.A perusal of the aforesaid section
indicates that all public property shall vest
in and belong to the Gram Panchayat and
such property would be under its direction,
management and control. The question that
arises for consideration is, as to what kind
of vesting is contemplated under section
34. Whether such vesting is absolute or is
limited for such time as required by the
State Government? In my view, the
language used in the provision and the
context in which the vesting takes place has
to be understood. The task of the Court has
been reduced considerably, as in a similar
matter, the Supreme Court had the
opportunity to consider in a similar
situation with regard to the vesting of the
property in a Gaon Sabha. In the case of
Maharaj Singh v. State of U.P., [ 1977 (3)
ALR 12 (Sum) : 1977 (1) SCC 155.] the
Supreme Court, while interpreting the
provisions of section 117 of the U.P.Z.A. &
L.R. Act, held that the vesting in the State
was absolute, whereas the vesting in the
Gaon Sabha was limited and that it was
open to the State Government to divest the
said property from the Gaon Sabha at any
time. For an absolute vesting, there had to
be a transfer of property as well as of
856 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
vesting. I have perused the Government
Order dated 2.4.1999 as well as the
Government Order dated 1.7.1999, which
indicates that the State Government has
only transferred the property for its
management to the Gram Panchayat. There
is no whisper in the Government Orders'
that the property was to vest absolutely
with the Gram Panchayat. Further, section
34 of the Panchayat Raj Act, indicates that
vesting of the property to the Gram
Panchayat is in relation to "direction,
management and control". It is therefore,
clear, that there is no absolute right given to
the Gram Panchayat with regard to the
ownership of the property and that the
vesting is only confined to direction,
management and control and that too, till
such time as the State Government
requires.

15.The Supreme Court in the case
of Maharaj Singh (supra) held that the
word
"vesting"
connotes
different
meanings and has to be interpreted in the
manner and in the context as used in the
provision. Therefore, while interpreting
section 34 of the Act harmoniously, I am
of the opinion, that the word "vest", used
in section 34, means the enjoyment of the
property so long as it last and that it is
not an absolute vesting and is only a
transfer of the property for a limited
purpose, namely for a direction, control
and
management.
Thus,
the
State
Government was justified in issuing the
order for transferring the property back to
the parent department."

16. In view of above this court does
not find any illegality or error in the
impugned orders. The authorities have
passed the reasoned and speaking orders
on the basis of evidence and material on
record. The writ petition is misconceived
and lacks merit.

17. The writ petition is, accordingly,
dismissed. No order as to costs.
----------
(2021)03ILR A856
APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CRIMINAL SIDE
DATED: ALLAHABAD 08.02.2020

BEFORE

THE HON'BLE KAUSHAL JAYENDRA
THAKER, J.
THE HON'BLE GAUTAM CHOWDHARY, J.

Criminal Appeal No. 160 of 2011

Tejpal ...Appellant(In Jail)
Versus
State of U.P. ...Opposite Party

Counsel for the Appellant:
Sri Anil Srivastava, Sri Amit Mishra, Sri
Anadi Krishna Naraya, Sri D.K. Srivastava,
Sri Dina Nath Joshi, Sri H.K. Singh, Sri
Ramesh Pundir, Smt. Rekha Pundir.

Counsel for the Opposite Party:
A.G.A.

A.
Criminal
matter-Code
of
Criminal
Procedure,1973-Section 374(2) & Indian
Penal
Code,1860-Section
452,302challenge to-conviction- Contradictions in
deposition of PW-1 ,PW-2 & PW-3 - one
deceased received five fire arm injuries
and
anther
deceased
received
three
gunshot wounds-Though six persons were
involved, trial of
the
other
accused
brought acquittal to them- No other eye
witness has testified in favour of the
prosecution-
There
are
major
contradictions and no witness is testified
that it was accused alone who had fired
six times-The recovery of the pistol is also
not proved-The evidence is so scanty as
PW-6 cannot even recognise who had
fired on deceased- The witnesses have not
identified the accused- testimony of PW-1
though being a rustic villager does not
inspire
confidence-
The
incriminating