# Badshah @ Subhash v. State Of U.P

- **Citation:** (2016) 7 ILRA 627
- **Court:** High Court of Judicature at Allahabad
- **Decided:** 2016-07-18
- **Bench:** Pratyush Kumar
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/allahabad-high-court/badshah-subhash-v-state-of-u-p-44176
- **Pages:** 12

## Headnote

The instant appeal filed on behalf of accused-appellant under section 374(2) Cr.P.C., is directed against
judgment and orders dated 4th April, 2012/10th April, 2012, whereby he was convicted under sections 363,
366 & 376 IPC and sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment of five years and to pay fine of Rs.5,000/-,
rigorous imprisonment of seven years and to pay fine of Rs.7,000/-, rigorous imprisonment of ten years and
to pay fine of Rs.10,000/-, respectively. On the above counts, in default of payment of fine, he was further
directed to undergo six months' simple imprisonment, nine months simple imprisonment and one year's
simple imprisonment. All the sentences were directed to run concurrently.

The appeal is dismissed. Conviction and sentence awarded by the impugned judgment and order are
hereby affirmed. Since the appellant is in jail, he is directed to undergo the sentence awarded by the learned
trial Judge. Period already undergone by him in the present case, shall be adjusted in accordance with
provision contained in Section 428 Cr.P.C.

Held: Para-

Case Law discussed:
Ishvarbhai Fuljibhai Patni Vs. State of Gujarat [1995 Supreme Court Cases (Crl) 222];
628 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES

Lal Mandi, Appellant v. State of West Bengal, Respondent [1995 CRI.L.J.2659 (Supreme Court), 2659],
Ravindra Singh vs. State of U.P., 2016(93) ACC 690,
Krishna Kumar Malik vs. State of Haryana, 2011 (74) ACC 611,
Ramdas and others vs. State of Maharashtra, 2007 (57) ACC 471,
State of U.P. vs. Chhotey Lal, 2011 (73) ACC 429,
Maharasthra v. Chandraprakash Kewalchand Jain,
Punjab v. Gurmit Singh & Ors.,
Vijay @ Chinee v. State of Madhya Pradesh,

## Text

7 All. Badshah @ Subhash Vs State Of U.P.
627
18. In view of the above discussions, the impugned orders show that the courts below have
considered the correctness, legality and propriety of the matter and did not act with any irregularity
at the time of giving findings of fact relating to revisionist.

19. There is no illegality, perversity or infirmity in the impugned orders. The revision lacks
merits and is liable to be dismissed.

20. The revision is, accordingly, dismissed.

21. Interim order, if any, is vacated.
-----------
APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CRIMINAL SIDE
DATED: ALLAHABAD 18.07.2016

BEFORE

THE HON'BLE PRATYUSH KUMAR, J.

Criminal Appeal No.- 3025 Of 2015

Badshah @ Subhash ...Appellant
Versus
State Of U.P. ...Respondent

Counsel for the Appellant:
T.K. Mishra

Counsel for the Respondent:
Govt. Advocate

The instant appeal filed on behalf of accused-appellant under section 374(2) Cr.P.C., is directed against
judgment and orders dated 4th April, 2012/10th April, 2012, whereby he was convicted under sections 363,
366 & 376 IPC and sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment of five years and to pay fine of Rs.5,000/-,
rigorous imprisonment of seven years and to pay fine of Rs.7,000/-, rigorous imprisonment of ten years and
to pay fine of Rs.10,000/-, respectively. On the above counts, in default of payment of fine, he was further
directed to undergo six months' simple imprisonment, nine months simple imprisonment and one year's
simple imprisonment. All the sentences were directed to run concurrently.

The appeal is dismissed. Conviction and sentence awarded by the impugned judgment and order are
hereby affirmed. Since the appellant is in jail, he is directed to undergo the sentence awarded by the learned
trial Judge. Period already undergone by him in the present case, shall be adjusted in accordance with
provision contained in Section 428 Cr.P.C.

Held: Para-

Case Law discussed:
Ishvarbhai Fuljibhai Patni Vs. State of Gujarat [1995 Supreme Court Cases (Crl) 222];
628 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES

Lal Mandi, Appellant v. State of West Bengal, Respondent [1995 CRI.L.J.2659 (Supreme Court), 2659],
Ravindra Singh vs. State of U.P., 2016(93) ACC 690,
Krishna Kumar Malik vs. State of Haryana, 2011 (74) ACC 611,
Ramdas and others vs. State of Maharashtra, 2007 (57) ACC 471,
State of U.P. vs. Chhotey Lal, 2011 (73) ACC 429,
Maharasthra v. Chandraprakash Kewalchand Jain,
Punjab v. Gurmit Singh & Ors.,
Vijay @ Chinee v. State of Madhya Pradesh,

(Delivered by Hon'ble Pratyush Kumar, J.)

1. The instant appeal filed on behalf of accused-appellant under section 374(2) Cr.P.C., is
directed against judgment and orders dated 4th April, 2012/10th April, 2012, whereby he was
convicted under sections 363, 366 & 376 IPC and sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment of
five years and to pay fine of Rs.5,000/-, rigorous imprisonment of seven years and to pay fine of
Rs.7,000/-, rigorous imprisonment of ten years and to pay fine of Rs.10,000/-, respectively. On the
above counts, in default of payment of fine, he was further directed to undergo six months' simple
imprisonment, nine months simple imprisonment and one year's simple imprisonment. All the
sentences were directed to run concurrently.

2. Heard Sri Awadh Bihari Pandey, learned counsel for the appellant, learned AGA for the
State-respondent and perused the record.

3. The facts giving rise to the present appeal may be summarized as under:-

4. That on 2nd November, 2010, at 2.30 p.m. Pratap gave a written report at Police Station
Transport Nagar, Meerut, stating therein that his daughter Anjali was aged about 13-14 years. On
that day at about 8.30 a.m. she was enticed away by Badshah @ Subhash and taken to Military
Farm where he committed rape on her.

5. At this Check FIR was scribed, Case Crime No.748 of 2010 was registered under section
376 IPC and investigation was entrusted to S.I. Ashok Kumar Sharma, who immediately began the
investigation, examined the first informant, took into his possession clothes worn by the appellant.
He also recorded statement of the victim, inspected the spot, got the victim medically examined and
also took into possession clothes worn by the victim. After concluding the investigation, he
submitted the chargesheet against the present appellant.

6. The appellant stood for trial before the Court of Session, where he was charged under
section 376 IPC which he denied. Subsequently the appellant was further charged under sections
363 and 366 IPC to which he also denied. On these charges the appellant was tried, convicted and
sentenced, as above.
7 All. Badshah @ Subhash Vs State Of U.P.
629
7. On behalf of the appellant, in support of the grounds taken in the appeal, it has been
submitted that the impugned judgment is illegal, based on surmises and conjectures. FIR was
lodged with delay. Victim is aged about 16 years. After variation of two years, she should be
treated major and the learned trial Judge has not appreciated her evidence in proper perspective and
erroneously held the appellant guilty. The medical report does not support the factum of rape.
There are contradictions in the statement of the victim, her statement under section 164 Cr.P.C. was
not recorded. For these reasons, impugned judgment and orders are illegal and deserve to be set
aside.

8. On behalf of the State-respondent, these arguments have been repelled. It has been
submitted that findings recorded by the learned trial Judge are well substantiated from the record.
There is no delay in lodging the F.I.R. The impugned judgment does not suffer from any infirmity
and appeal is without merit.

9. In reference to my obligation as an appellate court hearing appeal against conviction, I
would like to refresh my mind by recalling the observation made by the Apex Court in the case of
Ishvarbhai Fuljibhai Patni Vs. State of Gujarat [1995 Supreme Court Cases (Crl) 222]. Para-4
of the judgment reads as under:

"4. Since, the High Court was dealing with the appeal in exercise of its appellate
jurisdiction, against conviction and sentence of life imprisonment, it was required to consider and
discuss the evidence and deal with the arguments raised at the bar. Let alone, any discussion of the
evidence, we do not find that the High Court even cared to notice the evidence led in the case. None
of the arguments of the learned counsel for the appellant have been noticed, much less considered
and discussed. The judgment is cryptic and we are at loss to understand as to what prevailed with
the High Court to uphold the conviction and sentence of the appellant. On a plain requirement of
justice, the High Court while dealing with a first appeal against conviction and sentence is
expected to, howsoever briefly depending upon the facts of the case, consider and discuss the
evidence and deal with the submissions raised at the bar. If it fails to do so, it apparently fails in
the discharge of one of its essential jurisdiction under its appellate powers. In view of the
infirmities pointed out by us, the judgment under appeal cannot be sustained."

10. In the case of Lal Mandi, Appellant v. State of West Bengal, Respondent [1995
CRI.L.J.2659 (Supreme Court), 2659], the Apex Court in para-5 of the report has given caution
to the High Court reminding its duty in the matter of hearing of appeal against conviction. It would
be gainful to reproduce the observation made in para-5 of the report, extracted below:

"5. To say the least, the approach of the High Court is totally fallacious. In an
appeal against conviction, the Appellate Court has the duty to itself appreciate the evidence on the
record and if two views are possible on the appraisal of the evidence, the benefit of reasonable
doubt has to be given to an accused. It is not correct to suggest that the "Appellate Court cannot
legally interfere with" the order of conviction where the trial court has found the evidence as
reliable and that it cannot substitute the findings of the Sessions Judge by its own, if it arrives at a
630 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES

different conclusion on reassessment of the evidence. The observation made in Tota Singh's case,
which was an appeal against acquittal, have been misunderstood and mechanically applied.
Though, the powers of an appellate court, while dealing with an appeal against acquittal and an
appeal against conviction are equally wide but the considerations which weigh with it while
dealing with an appeal against an order of acquittal and in an appeal against conviction are
distinct and separate. The presumption of innocence of accused which gets strengthened on his
acquittal is not available on his conviction. An appellate court may give every reasonable weight to
the conclusions arrived at by the trial court but it must be remembered that an appellate court is
duty bound, in the same way as the trial court, to test the evidence extrinsically as well as
intrinsically and to consider as thoroughly as the trial court, all the circumstances available on the
record so as to arrive at an independent finding regarding guilt or innocence of the convict. An
Appellate Court fails in the discharge of one of its essential duties, if it fails to itself appreciate the
evidence on the record and arrive at an independent finding based on the appraisal of such
evidence."

11. Before examining the merits of the respective arguments, it is the duty of the appellate
court to re-examine and re-assess the evidence adduced by the parties with the help of arguments
advanced before me.

12. On behalf of the prosecution, in support of the charges, in the documentary evidence
besides other papers, written report, Check FIR, recovery memo, copy of the report of the general
diary, medical examination report, pathological report, supplementary report, site plan and
chargesheet were filed. In the oral evidence, seven witnesses were examined. Brief summary of
their testimonies is as under:-

13. Pratap P.W.-1, is the first informant and the father of the victim. He has reiterated the
facts mentioned in the written report and further stated that after the occurrence appellant was
caught by the passersby and he was taken to the police station. He has proved written report Exhibit
Ka-2.

14. Victim P.W.-2 has stated that she does the work of house cleaning, 8-9 months ago at
8.30 a.m. she was going for her work. On her way she met the appellant, who asked her to
accompany him. When the victim denied, he took her forcibly at the military farm adjacent to the
railway line where he had forcible sexual intercourse with her. When he tried to rape her, she raised
hue and cry, the appellant had closed her mouth. When appellant was taking her back after rape,
several persons met them and caught the appellant. In the meantime, her father came and appellant
was taken to the police station where FIR was lodged by her father.

15. Rakesh Sharma, P.W.-3, is the scribe of written report. He has proved arrest memo
Exhibit Ka-3.

16. Dr. Anju Jodha, P.W.-4, is the doctor, who on 3rd November, 2010 at 12.40 p.m.
medically examined the victim. According to her, her hymen was torned and healed, vaginal smear
7 All. Badshah @ Subhash Vs State Of U.P.
631
was taken. She has proved medical examination report Exhibit Ka-4, pathology report Exhibit Ka-5
and supplementary report Exhibit Ka-6. According to her, no spermatozoa was found in the vaginal
smear. According to her, no opinion about rape can be given. In the supplementary report, she has
opined victim to be aged about 16 years.

17. Dr. Deepak Pant, P.W.5 is the radiologist. He has opined the age of the victim to be
about 16 years.

18. Constable Rakesh Kumar, P.W.-6 is the scribe. He has proved Check FIR Exhibit Ka-8
and copy of the report of the general diary Exhibit Ka-9.

19. S.I. Ashok Kumar Sharma, P.W.-7 is the investigating officer. He gave details of the
steps taken in the course of investigation. He has proved site plan Exhibit Ka-10, supurdginama
Exhibit Ka-11, memo of taking clothes of victim Exhibit Ka-12 and chargesheet Exhibit Ka-13. He
has identified the clothes material Exhibits 1 and 2.

20. Statement of the appellant was recorded under section 313 Cr.P.C., whereby he has
denied the facts stated by the prosecution witnesses. According to him, wrong chargesheet had
been submitted and he was falsely implicated. In the defence, no evidence was given.

21. On behalf of the appellant, the correctness of the impugned judgment has been assailed
on various grounds. The first and foremost ground is that the learned trial Judge has not appreciated
the evidence in proper perspective and erroneously believed the statement of the victim P.W.-2.
This ground involves re-examination and re-assessment of the evidence not only of the victim
P.W.-2 but all the evidence available on record. Since the star witness of the prosecution is victim
P.W.-2, I have gone through her testimony in detail with meticulous care.

22. On behalf of the appellant, several cases have been referred to show that uncorroborated testimony of victim alone would not be sufficient to sustain the conviction of the
appellant. They are as under:-

1. Ravindra Singh vs. State of U.P., 2016(93) ACC 690- Reliance has been placed
on Para 16 of the judgment wherein the Court has observed conduct of the victim and further
discussed the circumstances wherein on the face value testimony of the victim should not be
accepted.

2. Krishna Kumar Malik vs. State of Haryana, 2011 (74) ACC 611- Reliance has
been placed on Paras 15 to 23 of the report. In Para 23 of the report, the Hon'ble Apex Court after
noticing the facts, that where several rooms were available, two persons committed rape on the
victim in a room and four other remained sitting in that very room, names of the accused persons
were not known to the victim, link evidence was not adduced, no injury was found on the private
parts of the victim, her conduct in not raising alarm for help and her inability to identify the Kothi
632 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES

where she was allegedly raped concluded that on the uncorroborated testimony of the victim,
accused cannot be held guilty of the offence of rape and kidnapping.

3. Ramdas and others vs. State of Maharashtra, 2007 (57) ACC 471- In Para 23
of the report, the Hon'ble Apex Court has observed that no doubt in a case of rape, conviction can
be made solely on the testimony of the prosecutrix, provided Court is convinced about the
truthfulness of her testimony and no circumstance exist to cast a shadow of doubt over her
truthfulness.

4. State of U.P. vs. Chhotey Lal, 2011 (73) ACC 429- The Hon'ble Apex Court
after noticing various cases decided by it, has quoted with approval the observations made therein.
These observations read as under:-

"19. In the backdrop of the above legal position, with which we are in respectful
agreement, the evidence of the prosecutrix needs to be analysed and examined carefully. But,
before we do that, we state, as has been repeatedly stated by this Court, that a woman who is victim
of sexual assault is not an accomplice to the crime. Her evidence cannot be tested with suspicion as
that of an accomplice. As a matter of fact, the evidence of the prosecutrix is similar to the evidence
of an injured complainant or witness. The testimony of prosecutrix, if found to be reliable, by itself,
may be sufficient to convict the culprit and no corroboration of her evidence is necessary. In
prosecutions of rape, the law does not require corroboration. The evidence of the prosecutrix may
sustain a conviction. It is only by way of abundant caution that court may look for some
corroboration so as to satisfy its conscience and rule out any false accusations. In State of
Maharasthra v. Chandraprakash Kewalchand Jain, this Court at page 559 of the Report said:

"A prosecutrix of a sex-offence cannot be put on par with an accomplice. She is in
fact a victim of the crime. The Evidence Act nowhere says that her evidence cannot be accepted
unless it is corroborated in material particulars. She is undoubtedly a competent witness under
Section 118 and her evidence must receive the same weight as is attached to an injured in cases of
physical violence. The same degree of care and caution must attach in the evaluation of her
evidence as in the case of an injured complainant or witness and no more. What is necessary is that
the Court must be alive to and conscious of the fact that it is dealing with the evidence of a person
who is interested in the outcome of the charge levelled by her. If the court keeps this in mind and
feels satisfied that it can act on the evidence of the prosecutrix, there is no rule of law or practice
incorporated in the Evidence Act similar to illustration (b) to Section 114 which requires it to look
for corroboration. If for some reason the court is hesitant to place implicit reliance on the testimony
of the prosecutrix it may look for evidence which may lend assurance to her testimony short of
corroboration required in the case of an accomplice. The nature of evidence required to lend
assurance to the testimony of the prosecutrix must necessarily depend on the facts and
circumstances of each case. But if a prosecutrix is an adult and of full understanding the court is
entitled to base a conviction on her evidence unless the same is shown to be infirm and not
trustworthy. If the totality of the circumstances appearing on the record of the case disclose that the
7 All. Badshah @ Subhash Vs State Of U.P.
633
prosecutrix does not have a strong motive to falsely involve the person charged, the court should
ordinarily have no hesitation in accepting her evidence."

20. In State of Punjab v. Gurmit Singh & Ors., this Court made the following
weighty observations at pages 394-396 and page 403:

"The court overlooked the situation in which a poor helpless minor girl had found
herself in the company of three desperate young men who were threatening her and preventing her
from raising any alarm. Again, if the investigating officer did not conduct the investigation
properly or was negligent in not being able to trace out the driver or the car, how can that become a
ground to discredit the testimony of the prosecutrix? The prosecutrix had no control over the
investigating agency and the negligence of an investigating officer could not affect the credibility
of the statement of the prosecutrix.... The courts must, while evaluating evidence remain alive to
the fact that in a case of rape, no self- respecting woman would come forward in a court just to
make a humiliating statement against her honour such as is involved in the commission of rape on
her. In cases involving sexual molestation, supposed considerations which have no material effect
on the veracity of the prosecution case or even discrepancies in the statement of the prosecutrix
should not, unless the discrepancies are such which are of fatal nature, be allowed to throw out an
otherwise reliable prosecution case.... Seeking corroboration of her statement before replying upon
the same as a rule, in such cases, amounts to adding insult to injury.... Corroboration as a condition
for judicial reliance on the testimony of the prosecutrix is not a requirement of law but a guidance
of prudence under given circumstances.

The courts should examine the broader probabilities of a case and not get swayed
by minor contradictions or insignificant discrepancies in the statement of the prosecutrix, which are
not of a fatal nature, to throw out an otherwise reliable prosecution case. If evidence of the
prosecutrix inspires confidence, it must be relied upon without seeking corroboration of her
statement in material particulars. If for some reason the court finds it difficult to place implicit
reliance on her testimony, it may look for evidence which may lend assurance to her testimony,
short of corroboration required in the case of an accomplice. The testimony of the prosecutrix must
be appreciated in the background of the entire case and the trial court must be alive to its
responsibility and be sensitive while dealing with cases involving sexual molestations."

21. In Vijay @ Chinee v. State of Madhya Pradesh, decided recently, this Court
referred to the above two decisions of this Court in Chandraprakash Kewalchand Jain5 and Gurmit
Singh6 and also few other decisions and observed as follows :

"Thus, the law that emerges on the issue is to the effect that the statement of the
prosecutrix, if found to be worthy of credence and reliable, requires no corroboration. The court
may convict the accused on the sole testimony of the prosecutrix.".

22. The important thing that the court has to bear in mind is that what is lost by a
rape victim is face. The victim loses value as a person. Ours is a conservative society and,
634 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES

therefore, a woman and more so a young unmarried woman will not put her reputation in peril by
alleging falsely about forcible sexual assault. In examining the evidence of the prosecutrix the
courts must be alive to the conditions prevalent in the Indian society and must not be swayed by
beliefs in other countries. The courts must be sensitive and responsive to the plight of the female
victim of sexual assault. Society's belief and value systems need to be kept uppermost in mind as
rape is the worst form of woman's oppression. A forcible sexual assault brings in humiliation,
feeling of disgust, tremendous embarrassment, sense of shame, trauma and lifelong emotional scar
to a victim and it is, therefore, most unlikely of a woman, and more so by a young woman, roping
in somebody falsely in the crime of rape. The stigma that attaches to the victim of rape in Indian
society ordinarily rules out the leveling of false accusations. An Indian woman traditionally will not
concoct an untruthful story and bring charges of rape for the purpose of blackmail, hatred, spite or
revenge. This Court has repeatedly laid down the guidelines as to how the evidence of the
prosecutrix in the crime of rape should be evaluated by the court. The observations made in the
case of Bharwada Bhoginbhai Hirjibhai v. State of Gujarat8 deserve special mention as, in our
view, these must be kept in mind invariably while dealing with a rape case. This Court observed as
follows :

"9. In the Indian setting, refusal to act on the testimony of a victim of sexual
assault in the absence of corroboration as a rule, is adding insult to injury. Why should the evidence
of the girl or the woman who complains of rape or sexual molestation be viewed with the aid of
spectacles fitted with lenses tinged with doubt, disbelief or suspicion? To do so is to justify the
charge of male chauvinism in a male dominated society. We must analyze the argument in support
of the need for corroboration and subject it to relentless and remorseless cross-examination. And
we must do so with a logical, and not an opinionated, eye in the light of probabilities with our feet
firmly planted on the soil of India and with our eyes focussed on the Indian horizon. We must not
be swept off the feet by the approach made in the western world which has its own social milieu, its
own social mores, its own permissive values, and its own code of life. Corroboration may be
considered essential to establish a sexual offence in the backdrop of the social ecology of the
western world. It is wholly unnecessary to import the said concept on a turnkey basis and to
transplant it on the Indian soil regardless of the altogether different atmosphere, attitudes, mores,
responses of the Indian society, and its profile. The identities of the two worlds are different. The
solution of problems cannot therefore be identical.........." This Court went on to observe at page
225:

".........Without the fear of making too wide a statement, or of overstating the case,
it can be said that rarely will a girl or a woman in India make false allegations of sexual assault on
account of any such factor as has been just enlisted. The statement is generally true in the context
of the urban as also rural society. It is also by and large true in the context of the sophisticated, not
so sophisticated, and unsophisticated society. Only very rarely can one conceivably come across an
exception or two and that too possibly from amongst the urban elites. Because (1) A girl or a
woman in the tradition-bound non-permissive society of India would be extremely reluctant even to
admit that any incident which is likely to reflect on her chastity had ever occurred. (2) She would
be conscious of the danger of being ostracized by the society or being looked down by the society
7 All. Badshah @ Subhash Vs State Of U.P.
635
including by her own family members, relatives, friends, and neighbours. (3) She would have to
brave the whole world. (4) She would face the risk of losing the love and respect of her own
husband and near relatives, and of her matrimonial home and happiness being shattered. (5) If she
is unmarried, she would apprehend that it would be difficult to secure an alliance with a suitable
match from a respectable or an acceptable family. (6) It would almost inevitably and almost
invariably result in mental torture and suffering to herself. (7) The fear of being taunted by others
will always haunt her. (8) She would feel extremely embarassed in relating the incident to others
being overpowered by a feeling of shame on account of the upbringing in a tradition-bound society
where by and large sex is taboo. (9) The natural inclination would be to avoid giving publicity to
the incident lest the family name and family honour is brought into controversy. (10) The parents of
an unmarried girl as also the husband and members of the husband's family of a married woman,
would also more often than not, want to avoid publicity on account of the fear of social stigma on
the family name and family honour. (11) The fear of the victim herself being considered to be
promiscuous or in some way responsible for the incident regardless of her innocence. (12) The
reluctance to face interrogation by the investigating agency, to face the court, to face the crossexamination by counsel for the culprit, and the risk of being disbelieved, acts as a deterrent."

23. The case law referred on behalf of the appellant reflects the correct legal position. In
the case of Ravindra Singh (supra) in Para 11. This Court has noticed the legal position.

24. In Ramdas (supra) in Para 23 of the report, the Hon'ble Apex Court has stated the
normal rule that the accused in criminal case can be convicted on the basis of sole testimony of the
victim.

25. In view of principles laid down and deliberated up in all the cases referred above, it
may be safely stated that if the evidence of the victim is reliable and trustworthy, without any
suspicious circumstance, so as to cast a doubt on her truthfulness, a accused can be convicted on
the sole testimony of the victim. Her testimony does not require corroboration from other evidence
but as a rule of prudence, Court should subject her testimony with close scrutiny to find out
whether or not her testimony suffers from any infirmity or inconsistency which may reflect against
its trustworthiness.

26. Keeping in mind this principle, I propose to re-examine and re-appreciate the testimony
of victim P.W.-2.

27. As soon as Court begins to examine the testimony of the victim, it is also required to
determine her age for the reasons whether she was competent to be a consenting party of the sexual
intercourse.

28. Pratap, P.W.-1, father of the victim, has stated that at that time victim was aged about
13-14 years. In the medical evidence, she was found to be aged about 16 years. On the basis of this
opinion, the learned counsel for the appellant has submitted that addition of two years in the age of
the victim should be made by the Court to support his argument. He has referred the case of
636 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES

Chhotey Lal (supra). In Para 11 of the report, rather the Hon'ble Apex Court has disapproved
addition of two years in the age opined by the doctor.

29. In view of observation made by the Hon'ble Apex Court, in Para 11 of the said case, I
hold the age of the victim was 16 years. Thus, on the date of occurrence, victim was minor. She is
an illiterate girl doing menial job. On behalf of the appellant, her testimony has been impeached on
two grounds.

30. First ground is that in the examination-in-chief, she says that after raping her, appellant
was bringing her back. They were intercepted by many persons who caught the appellant and beat
him at the same time. Her father came there and took the appellant to the police station and lodged
the First Information Report. In her cross examination, according to the learned counsel, she says
that after the rape when she became conscious, she was being brought back by the appellant, near
railway line her employer Pappu met them who brought her to the house and after two days, FIR
was lodged.

31. On this inconsistent statement, it has been submitted that the victim was not raped. For
this reason, she could not give consistent account of her coming back to the house. Indicated
inconsistency between her two statements relate to events which are of post rape period. A young
girl who was raped must be in a state of trauma, her sense of perception and memory would be at a
standstill. Inability to narrate the post rape events does not discredit her testimony about the rape
stated by the victim. For these reasons, I do not think these inconsistencies would diminish
probative force of her statement.

32. The second ground for impeaching her testimony is the examination-in-chief, wherein
she says she was taken to the side of railway line in the military farm and she was raped. In the
cross examination, she has stated that she was raped in jungle near tubewell. On the strength of
these two statements on behalf of the appellant, it has been submitted that had the victim being
raped, she would not have fumbled about the place of occurrence.

33. I do not think the victim has changed the place of occurrence. Victim is an illiterate girl
and agricultural fields are also referred by such persons as jungle. She does not say that she was
raped inside the tubewell. Her assertion is that she was raped in the military farm. From perusal of
the site plan Exhibit Ka-10, her description of the place of occurrence appears to be consistent.
Military farm is adjacent to the railway line on the western side. She was raped in the field where
crop of Bhindi was grown. When the appellant and the victim were intercepted by the persons
searching for her, the appellant was caught near the bridge within the military farm. The victim has
not been asked during the cross examination that in the military farm that there is no tubewell.
Even this suggestion was not given to. For this reasons, I find the indicated inconsistency to be
groundless.

34. Had the victim was not raped by the appellant, she would not have deposed against
him. She had no enmity with the appellant. During cross examination, she had given reasons why
7 All. Badshah @ Subhash Vs State Of U.P.
637
she could not raise alarm when she was raped by the appellant. Thus, her testimony about the
occurrence is consistent. She is the victim, she knew the appellant and she had no reason to falsely
implicate him. I find her to be trustworthy witness and her testimony inspires confidence of the
Court.

35. The second point for consideration is whether there is any evidence to corroborate her
testimony or her un-corroborate testimony is sufficient to sustain the conviction. The first piece of
evidence which corroborates the testimony of the victim P.W.-2 is the arrest of the appellant. It is
not in dispute that when the FIR was lodged appellant was handed over to the police. According to
the victim P.W.-2, at the time of arrest, the public had beaten the appellant. On the remand file,
medical examination report of the appellant finds place. The appellant was medically examined on
the request of the investigating officer on 2nd November, 2010 and on his person six injuries were
found.

36. On behalf of the prosecution, arrest memo Exhibit Ka-3 has been filed and proved to
show that from the custody of first informant and several other persons, appellant was taken into
custody in an injured state. I think these facts are un-controverted. They go to show that what the
victim is deposing, is correct, therefore, from the public arrest of the appellant, statement of the
victim P.W.-2 is duly corroborated.

37. On behalf of the appellant it has also been submitted that FIR has been lodged with
delay. Occurrence had taken place at 8.30 a.m., FIR was lodged at 2.30 p.m. This ground was
rejected by the learned trial Judge.

38. In the case of rape, some delay is natural. Victim has to be taken care of. She has to be
consoled. She has to be asked what happen with her and when she regains some composer and
becomes coherent only then FIR can be lodged. In spite of arrest of the appellant, family members
of the victim had to calm down their daughter. They had to extract from her what happened with
her and after satisfying themselves, they could have lodged the First Information Report.

39. Taking into consideration these facts, I think the learned trial Judge has rightly rejected
the ground that delay in FIR creates a doubt about the truthfulness of the prosecution version. In
my opinion, the indicated delay can be said to be a peculiar phenomena of rape cases and such
phenomena cannot be made a ground to reject the testimony of the victim.

40. It is true that no spermatozoa was found from the vaginal smear taken during her
medical examination and no external mark of injury was found on her person. Absence of injuries
on her person is duly explained by the victim, where she says that before she was raped she was
administered to stupefying drug. Absence of spermatozoa is not determinative that the victim was
not raped vide Narayanamma vs. State of Karnataka;(1994) 5 SCC 728.

41. In view of above, from the perusal of entire evidence, I do not find any circumstance
which may reflect against the truthfulness of the testimony of victim P.W.-2. The learned trial
638 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES

Judge has appreciated evidence in correct legal manner. He has recorded findings of facts which
are well substantiated from the record. The appeal has no substance and deserves to be dismissed.

42. The appeal is dismissed. Conviction and sentence awarded by the impugned judgment
and order are hereby affirmed. Since the appellant is in jail, he is directed to undergo the sentence
awarded by the learned trial Judge. Period already undergone by him in the present case, shall be
adjusted in accordance with provision contained in Section 428 Cr.P.C.

43. Office is directed to communicate this order to the court concerned and to send back
the record to the court below.
---------
ORIGINAL JURISDICTION
CIVIL SIDE
DATED: LUCKNOW 13.07.2016

BEFORE

THE HON'BLE AJAI LAMBA, J.
THE HON'BLE RAVINDRA NATH MISHRA-II, J.

Misc. Bench No.- 3037 Of 2016

Santosh Kumar Sharma ...Petitioner
Versus
State of U.P. & Ors. ...Respondents

Counsel for the Petitioner:
Lalit Kishore Pandey

Counsel for the Respondents:
Govt. Advocate, Anoop Kumar Misra

Headnote:
Repayment of loan obtained on the basis of a forged sale deed does not erase criminal liability. Where prima
facie material shows that the accused fabricated and used a forged document to obtain bank loan, writ
jurisdiction under Article 226 cannot be invoked for quashing the FIR. Equity does not favour a person
indulging in forgery involving public money. Petition dismissed.
(Paras 11-19)

Case Law discussed:
State of Haryana vs. Ch. Bhajan Lal, AIR 1992 SC 604

Result: Petition dismissed.

(Delivered by Hon'ble Ajai Lamba, J.
&
Hon'ble Ravindra Nath Mishra- II, J.)