# Bahori Lal v. State of U.P. & Anr. Opp. Parties

- **Citation:** (2024) 2 ILRA 1099
- **Court:** High Court of Judicature at Allahabad
- **Decided:** 2024-02-07
- **Case number:** Application u/s 482 No. 780 of 2024
- **Bench:** Subhash Vidyarthi
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/allahabad-high-court/bahori-lal-v-state-of-u-p-anr-opp-parties-51237
- **Pages:** 14

## Headnote

(A) Criminal Law - The Code of Criminal
Procedure, 1973 - Section 482 - Inherent
power, Indian Penal Code, 1860 - Section
1100 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
376,
506
-
principles
regarding
the
inherent powers of High Courts under
Section 482 - High Courts have wide
powers to interfere in trials, inquiries, or
proceedings to prevent oppression or
harassment - powers must be exercised
judiciously and consciously - can quash
first information reports, investigations,
and criminal proceedings if there's clear
abuse
of
process
-
When
quashing
proceedings, courts must consider the
offence's
impact
on
society,
injury
severity, voluntary compromise, accused
conduct, and other factors - Courts should
be cautious when quashing proceedings
involving heinous offences, but can still
examine
evidence
-
can
quash
proceedings even after conviction for
heinous offences with life imprisonment, if
parties have settled - guiding principle is
to secure the ends of justice, with no hard
and fast rules restricting High Court
powers.(Para - 27)

Applicant sought quashing of summoning order
and proceedings of Compliant case - ground -
parties entered into a settlement - claiming for
closer of criminal proceedings instituted by
opposite party no.2 against him - during
investigation,
no
witnesses
supported
allegations - all stated that allegations made by
opposite party No. 2 were false.(Para - 2,29)

HELD: - Present case falls in the category of
exceptional cases, which warrants interference
of this court in exercise of power under Section
482 Cr.P.C by quashing the criminal proceedings
on the ground of compromise between the
parties. Summoning order and proceedings of
Compliant case quashed. (Para - 32,33)

Application u/s 482 Cr.P.C. allowed. (E-7)

List of Cases cited:

## Text

_Characters 0–39,912 of 47,207. This is a partial read: ask again with offset=39912 for what follows._

2 All. Bahori Lal Vs. State of U.P. & Anr.
1099
and the trial court may pass appropriate
order, but at least, the testimony of the
injured witness should not be ignored. In
support of his aforesaid arguments, Sri
Aniruddha
Kumar
Singh,
learned
Additional Government Advocate-I has
placed reliance upon the dictum of Apex
Court rendered in the case in re:
Yashodhan Singh and others vs. State of
U.P. and another reported in (2023) 9 SCC
108.

10. Having heard learned counsel for
the parties and having perused the material
available on record as well as having regard
to the dictums of Apex Court as considered
above, I find that the learned trial court
while passing the impugned order dated
15.12.2023 has not indicated its subjective
satisfaction as to why the petitioner should
be summoned under Section 319 Cr.P.C.
and under which sections the trial of the
petitioner would be required. To assign the
reason and giving subjective satisfaction
while passing any order is the first and for
most requirement of the order passed by
any Court or the Competent Authority
inasmuch as the reasons and satisfaction of
the court concerned is backbone of any
order, without which, such order may not
stand. At the same time, if the person
summoned under Section 319 Cr.P.C. is not
apprised as to what are those sections under
which his trial would be required, he would
be failed to defend himself properly and in
that case the principles of natural justice of
that person would be frustrated. Any order
bereft of the reasoning would be nullity in
the eyes of law. Therefore, on the aforesaid
ground alone the impugned order dated
15.12.2023 is not liable to be sustained,
hence, the same is set aside and quashed.

11. Since the aforesaid order has been
quashed for the reason that the impugned
order is bereft of the reasoning and the
subjective
satisfaction
of
the
court
concerned,
therefore,
the
matter
is
remanded back to the learned trial court to
pass a fresh order, strictly in accordance
with law and in the light of the aforesaid
dictums of Apex Court.

12. It is needless to say that if the
learned trial court wishes to invoke powers
under Section 319 Cr.P.C. in this case, he
may
pass
appropriate
order
with
expedition, preferably, within a period of
one month from the date of receipt of a
certified copy of this order, strictly in
accordance with law.

13. In view of the aforesaid
observations and directions, the instant
petition is allowed.

14. No order as to the costs.
----------
(2024) 2 ILRA 1099
ORIGINAL JURISDICTION
CRIMINAL SIDE
DATED: LUCKNOW 07.02.2024

BEFORE

THE HON'BLE SUBHASH VIDYARTHI, J.

Application u/s 482 No. 780 of 2024

Bahori Lal ...Applicant
Versus
State of U.P. & Anr. ...Opp. Parties

Counsel for the Applicant:
Rizwanul Haque Ansari, Santi

Counsel for the Opp. Parties:
G.A.

(A) Criminal Law - The Code of Criminal
Procedure, 1973 - Section 482 - Inherent
power, Indian Penal Code, 1860 - Section
1100 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
376,
506
-
principles
regarding
the
inherent powers of High Courts under
Section 482 - High Courts have wide
powers to interfere in trials, inquiries, or
proceedings to prevent oppression or
harassment - powers must be exercised
judiciously and consciously - can quash
first information reports, investigations,
and criminal proceedings if there's clear
abuse
of
process
-
When
quashing
proceedings, courts must consider the
offence's
impact
on
society,
injury
severity, voluntary compromise, accused
conduct, and other factors - Courts should
be cautious when quashing proceedings
involving heinous offences, but can still
examine
evidence
-
can
quash
proceedings even after conviction for
heinous offences with life imprisonment, if
parties have settled - guiding principle is
to secure the ends of justice, with no hard
and fast rules restricting High Court
powers.(Para - 27)

Applicant sought quashing of summoning order
and proceedings of Compliant case - ground -
parties entered into a settlement - claiming for
closer of criminal proceedings instituted by
opposite party no.2 against him - during
investigation,
no
witnesses
supported
allegations - all stated that allegations made by
opposite party No. 2 were false.(Para - 2,29)

HELD: - Present case falls in the category of
exceptional cases, which warrants interference
of this court in exercise of power under Section
482 Cr.P.C by quashing the criminal proceedings
on the ground of compromise between the
parties. Summoning order and proceedings of
Compliant case quashed. (Para - 32,33)

Application u/s 482 Cr.P.C. allowed. (E-7)

List of Cases cited:

1. Daxaben Vs The St. of Guj. & ors., 2022 SCC
OnLine SC 936

2. P. Ramachandra Rao Vs St. of Karn., (2002) 4
SCC 578

3. Narinder Singh Vs St. of Punj., (2014) 6 SCC
466
4. Parbatbhai Aahir Vs St. of Guj., (2017) 9 SCC
641

5. P. Dharamaraj Vs Shanmugam, 2022 SCC
OnLine SC 1186

6. St. of M.P. Vs Laxmi Narayan, (2019) 5 SCC
688

7. Ramgopal Vs St. of M.P., (2022) 14 SCC 531

8. Ramawatar Vs St. of M.P., (2022) 13 SCC 635

9. Kapil Gupta Vs St. (NCT of Delhi), 2022 SCC
OnLine SC 1030

10. K. Dhandapani v. St., 2022 SCC OnLine SC
1056

(Delivered by Hon'ble Subhash Vidyarthi,
J.)

1. Heard Sri Nishant Srivastava,
Advocate holding brief of Sri Rizwanul
Haque Ansari, the learned counsel for the
applicant and Sri Rishikesh Verma, the
learned A.G.A appearing on behalf of the
State.

2. By means of the instant application
filed under Section 482 Cr.P.C., the
applicant has sought quashing of the
summoning order dated 18.08.2022 and the
proceedings
of
Compliant
case
No.
100/2018, under Section 376, 506 I.P.C
(Sushila Devi Vs. Bahorilal) which is
pending in the Court of Additional Chief
Judicial Magistrate-I, District Kheri, on the
ground that the parties have entered into a
settlement claiming for closer of the
criminal proceedings instituted by the
opposite party no.2 against him.

3. The opposite party no.2 had filed
an application under section 156 (3) Cr.P.C
on 23.02.2016 alleging that when she had
gone to attend call of nature at about 6:00
am on 09.02.2016 towards in a grave
2 All. Bahori Lal Vs. State of U.P. & Anr.
1101
situated towards a north of a village, the
applicant assaulted her with a butt of a
pistol and raped her after threatening her.
When she got herself freed and raised a hue
and cry, Raja Ram and Lalla etc. reached
on the spot and thereafter the applicant ran
away. On the aforesaid application, an F.IR.
No. 160 of 2022 was registered on
8.03.2022.

4.

During
investigation,
the
investigating
officer
has
recorded
statements of several independent persons,
all of whom have stated that the allegations
levelled in the F.I.R are false and no such
incident had taken place. The complainant's
husband stated that he does not remember
the date of the incident but it took place
around the festival of Khichdi (which
normally falls around 15th January). He
stated that the complainant had told her
about some altercation only.

5. Lalla Ram, regarding whom the
informant had stated in the F.I.R that he had
reached on the spot, stated that when he
had reached the spot, the complainant was
alone there. She has suffered some injury
but he does not know as to how that injury
was caused. He did not state anything
further and he merely stated that he would
not give any false evidence against any
person. The complainant stated in her
statement that she has not raised any hue
and cry at the spot of occurrence and she
declined to get herself examined medically
as a long time has elapsed since the
incident.

6.

After
investigation,
the
investigating officer submitted a Final
Report on 03.07.2016. The opposite party
no.2 filed a protest on 30.03.2018, which
was allowed and the protest application
was registered as a complaint.

7. In her statement recorded under
section 200 Cr.P.C, the complainant stated
that the applicant had caught hold of her
and had shut her mouth but she did not
state that the applicant had assaulted her
with a butt of a pistol, which had been
alleged by her earlier. She stated that she
did not remember as to who had reached on
the spot but her husband had told
afterwards that he and his younger brother
Lalla Ram had brought her home and the
applicant had escaped before anybody
could reach there. This statement of the
complainant was at material variance with
her earlier version.

8. In his statement recorded under
section 202 Cr.P.C the complainant's
husband,
Rajaram
supported
the
complainant's allegations, although before
the investigating officer, he had stated that
he was present at the home at the time of
the incident and he did not even remember
the date of the incident.

9. Subsequently, on 20.03.2023 the
opposite party no.2 has entered into a
compromise with the applicant wherein she
stated that she had levelled the allegations
against the applicant because of ill advice
of some other persons. The parties live in
the same village and they have reconciled
their differences and no dispute remains
between them. She categorically stated that
she wants closure of the proceedings
initiated by her. The compromise has been
signed in presence of some witnesses and it
has been attested by a notary public.

10. The applicant had filed an
application under section 482 Cr.P.C. No.
12768 of 2023, which was disposed of by
means of an order dated 20.12.2023
directing the trial court to verify the
compromise. The compromise has been
1102 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
verified by means of an order dated
06.01.2024
passed
by
the
learned
Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate, Court
No. 1, Lakhimpur Kheri, a certified copy
whereof has been annexed with the
application.

11. Ms. Preeti Srivastava, the learned
counsel for the opposite party no. 2 has also
supported the factum of compromise and
has given her consent for proceedings
being quashed on the basis of the
compromise.

12. The learned A.G.A. has opposed
the application and he has submitted that
the present case involves allegation of
commission of rape which is a heinous
offence and in view of the law laid down
by Hon'ble the Apex Court in the case of
Daxaben Vs. The State of Gujarat and
others: 2022 SCC OnLine SC 936 the
proceedings of the criminal case cannot be
quashed on the basis of a compromise
between the parties.

13. In Daxaben (supra) an F.I.R. was
lodged under Section 306 I.P.C. by the cousin
of the deceased. The complainant and the
accused entered into a settlement and the
High Court of Gujarat at Ahamdabad
quashed the proceedings upon an application
filed under Section 482 Cr.P.C. on this
ground alone. The widow of the deceased
filed an application for recall of the order
which too was dismissed by the High Court
after recording that the original first
informant had pocketed a hefty amount from
the accused and he had gone totally out of
picture post allowing of the quashing petition,
therefore, the application for recall of order
was not maintainable.

14. In appeal the Hon'ble Supreme
Court has held that the High Court had erred
in declining the prayer of the widow of the
deceased for recalling an order passed
without hearing her only because the original
informant/complainant who was a cousin and
the employee of the deceased had been heard.
The Hon'ble Supreme Court further held that

"37. Offence under Section 306 of
the IPC of abetment to commit suicide is a
grave, non-compoundable offence. Of course,
the inherent power of the High Court under
Section 482 of the Cr.P.C. is wide and
can even
be exercised to quash
criminal proceedings relating to noncompoundable offences, to secure the
ends of justice or to prevent abuse of
the process of Court. Where the victim
and
offender
have
compromised
disputes essentially civil and personal
in nature, the High Court can exercise
its power under Section 482 of the
CrPC
to
quash
the
criminal
proceedings. In what cases power to
quash an FIR or a criminal complaint
or
criminal
proceedings
upon
compromise can be exercised, would
depend on the facts and circumstances
of the case.

38. However, before exercising its
power under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C. to
quash an FIR, criminal complaint and/or
criminal proceedings, the High Court, as
observed above, has to be circumspect and
have due regard to the nature and gravity
of the offence. Heinous or serious crimes,
which are not private in nature and have a
serious impact on society cannot be
quashed on the basis of a compromise
between the offender and the complainant
and/or the victim. Crimes like murder, rape,
burglary, dacoity and even abetment to
commit suicide are neither private nor civil
in nature. Such crimes are against the
society.
In
no
circumstances
can
prosecution be quashed on compromise,
2 All. Bahori Lal Vs. State of U.P. & Anr.
1103
when the offence is serious and grave and
falls within the ambit of crime against
society.

* * *

50. In our considered opinion, the
Criminal Proceeding cannot be nipped in
the bud by exercise of jurisdiction under
Section 482 of the Cr. P.C. only because
there is a settlement, in this case a
monetary settlement, between the accused
and the complainant and other relatives of
the deceased to the exclusion of the
hapless widow of the deceased. As held by
the three-Judge Bench of this Court in
Laxmi Narayan (supra), Section 307 of the
IPC falls in the category of heinous and
serious offences and are to be treated as
crime against society and not against the
individual alone. On a parity of reasoning,
offence under section 306 of the IPC would
fall in the same category. An FIR under
Section 306 of the IPC cannot even be
quashed on the basis of any financial
settlement with the informant, surviving
spouse, parents, children, guardians, caregivers or anyone else."

(Emphasis supplied)

15. The observations in Daxaben
(supra)
were
made
in
the
factual
background of the case that husband of the
appellant had committed suicide. The
deceased's cousin, who was also his
employee, had filed the F.I.R. and he had
taken hefty sum from the accused persons
to enter into a settlement and the
proceedings were quashed on the basis of
such settlement without hearing the widow
of the deceased. There is no evidence in
support of the allegation in the present
case. During evidence the Investigating
Officer had found the allegations to be false
and there is no evidence in support of the
allegations, except for the statement of the
victim herself and the victim herself has
resiled from the allegations and there is no
allegation of any monitory transaction
between
the
parties.
Therefore,
the
observations made in Daxaben (Supra) will
not apply to the present case.

16. The scope of jurisdiction of the
High Court under Section 482 Cr.P.C. was
explained by a Seven Judge Bench of the
Hon'ble
Supreme
Court
in
P.
Ramachandra
Rao
v.
State
of
Karnataka, (2002) 4 SCC 578, in the
following words: -

"21?.In
appropriate
cases,
inherent power of the High Court, under
Section 482 can be invoked to make such
orders, as may be necessary, to give effect
to any order under the Code of Criminal
Procedure or to prevent abuse of the
process of any court, or otherwise, to
secure the ends of justice. The power is
wide and, if judiciously and consciously
exercised, can take care of almost all the
situations where interference by the High
Court becomes necessary on account of
delay in proceedings or for any other
reason
amounting
to
oppression
or
harassment in any trial, inquiry or
proceedings. In appropriate cases, the
High
Courts
have
exercised
their
jurisdiction under Section 482 CrPC for
quashing of first information report and
investigation, and terminating criminal
proceedings if the case of abuse of process
of law was clearly made out?".

17. In Narinder Singh v. State of
Punjab, (2014) 6 SCC 466, the Hon'ble
Supreme Court had summed up and laid
down the following principles for guidance
of the High Courts in giving adequate
treatment to the settlement between the
parties and exercising its power under
1104 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
Section 482 of the Code while accepting
the
settlement
and
quashing
the
proceedings or refusing to accept the
settlement with direction to continue with
the criminal proceedings: -

"29.1. Power conferred under
Section 482 of the Code is to be
distinguished from the power which lies in
the Court to compound the offences under
Section 320 of the Code. No doubt, under
Section 482 of the Code, the High Court
has inherent power to quash the criminal
proceedings even in those cases which are
not compoundable, where the parties have
settled the matter between themselves.
However, this power is to be exercised
sparingly and with caution.

29.2. When the parties have
reached the settlement and on that basis
petition
for
quashing
the
criminal
proceedings is filed, the guiding factor in
such cases would be to secure:

(i) ends of justice, or

(ii) to prevent abuse of the
process of any court.

While exercising the power the
High Court is to form an opinion on either
of the aforesaid two objectives.

29.3. Such a power is not to be
exercised in those prosecutions which
involve heinous and serious offences of
mental depravity or offences like murder,
rape, dacoity, etc. Such offences are not
private in nature and have a serious
impact on society. Similarly, for the
offences alleged to have been committed
under special statute like the Prevention
of Corruption Act or the offences
committed by public servants while
working in that capacity are not to be
quashed
merely
on
the
basis
of
compromise between the victim and the
offender.

29.4. On the other hand, those
criminal cases having overwhelmingly and
predominantly civil character, particularly
those
arising
out
of
commercial
transactions or arising out of matrimonial
relationship or family disputes should be
quashed when the parties have resolved
their entire disputes among themselves.

29.5.
While
exercising
its
powers, the High Court is to examine as to
whether the possibility of conviction is
remote and bleak and continuation of
criminal cases would put the accused to
great oppression and prejudice and
extreme injustice would be caused to him
by not quashing the criminal cases.

29.6. Offences under Section 307
IPC would fall in the category of heinous
and serious offences and therefore are to
be generally treated as crime against the
society and not against the individual
alone. However, the High Court would not
rest its decision merely because there is a
mention of Section 307 IPC in the FIR or
the charge is framed under this provision.
It would be open to the High Court to
examine as to whether incorporation of
Section 307 IPC is there for the sake of it
or the prosecution has collected sufficient
evidence, which if proved, would lead to
proving the charge under Section 307
IPC. For this purpose, it would be open to
the High Court to go by the nature of
injury sustained, whether such injury is
inflicted on the vital/delicate parts of the
body, nature of weapons used, etc.
Medical report in respect of injuries
suffered by the victim can generally be the
guiding factor. On the basis of this prima
facie analysis, the High Court can
examine as to whether there is a strong
possibility of conviction or the chances of
conviction are remote and bleak. In the
former case it can refuse to accept the
settlement
and
quash
the
criminal
2 All. Bahori Lal Vs. State of U.P. & Anr.
1105
proceedings whereas in the latter case it
would be permissible for the High Court to
accept the plea compounding the offence
based on complete settlement between the
parties. At this stage, the Court can also be
swayed by the fact that the settlement
between the parties is going to result in
harmony
between
them
which
may
improve their future relationship.

29.7. While deciding whether to
exercise its power under Section 482 of the
Code or not, timings of settlement play a
crucial role. Those cases where the
settlement is arrived at immediately after
the alleged commission of offence and the
matter is still under investigation, the High
Court may be liberal in accepting the
settlement
to
quash
the
criminal
proceedings/investigation. It is because of
the
reason
that
at
this
stage
the
investigation is still on and even the
charge-sheet has not been filed. Likewise,
those cases where the charge is framed
but the evidence is yet to start or the
evidence is still at infancy stage, the High
Court can show benevolence in exercising
its powers favourably, but after prima
facie
assessment
of
the
circumstances/material mentioned above.
On the other hand, where the prosecution
evidence is almost complete or after the
conclusion of the evidence the matter is at
the stage of argument, normally the High
Court should refrain from exercising its
power under Section 482 of the Code, as
in such cases the trial court would be in a
position to decide the case finally on merits
and to come to a conclusion as to whether
the offence under Section 307 IPC is
committed or not. Similarly, in those cases
where the conviction is already recorded
by the trial court and the matter is at the
appellate stage before the High Court,
mere compromise between the parties
would not be a ground to accept the same
resulting in acquittal of the offender who
has already been convicted by the trial
court. Here charge is proved under Section
307 IPC and conviction is already recorded
of a heinous crime and, therefore, there is
no question of sparing a convict found
guilty of such a crime."

18. Although in Narinder Singh the
Hon'ble Supreme Court was dealing with
the question of permissibility of quashing
proceedings
involving
commission
of
offence under Section 307 I.P.C., it held
that offences under Section 307 IPC would
fall in the category of heinous and serious
offences and are to be generally treated as
crime against the society and not against
the individual alone. The Hon'ble Supreme
Court held that generally the power to
quash proceedings on the basis of a
compromise is not to be exercised in those
prosecutions which involve heinous and
serious offences of mental depravity or
offences like murder, rape, dacoity, etc., but
yet, this prohibition is not absolute and in
certain circumstances mentioned in the
portions of the judgment quoted above, the
Courts could quash the proceedings even in
cases
involving
heinous
and
serious
offences on the basis of a compromise in
the interest of justice. Thus, Narinder
Singh (Supra) does not lay down that there
is an absolute bar against quashing of
proceedings on the basis of compromise
where the offence is heinous and serious.

19. In Parbatbhai Aahir v.
State of Gujarat, (2017) 9 SCC 641, the
precedents on the subject were considered
and the broad principles which emerge
from the precedents, were summarised in
the following propositions: -

"16.1. Section 482 preserves the
inherent powers of the High Court to
1106 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
prevent an abuse of the process of any
court or to secure the ends of justice. The
provision does not confer new powers. It
only recognises and preserves powers
which inhere in the High Court.

16.2. The invocation of the
jurisdiction of the High Court to quash a
first information report or a criminal
proceeding on the ground that a settlement
has been arrived at between the offender
and the victim is not the same as the
invocation of jurisdiction for the purpose of
compounding
an
offence.
While
compounding an offence, the power of the
court is governed by the provisions of
Section 320 of the Code of Criminal
Procedure, 1973. The power to quash
under Section 482 is attracted even if the
offence is non-compoundable.

16.3. In forming an opinion
whether
a
criminal
proceeding
or
complaint should be quashed in exercise
of its jurisdiction under Section 482, the
High Court must evaluate whether the
ends of justice would justify the exercise
of the inherent power.

16.4. While the inherent power of
the High Court has a wide ambit and
plenitude it has to be exercised (i) to secure
the ends of justice, or (ii) to prevent an
abuse of the process of any court.

16.5. The decision as to whether
a complaint or first information report
should be quashed on the ground that the
offender and victim have settled the
dispute, revolves ultimately on the facts
and circumstances of each case and no
exhaustive elaboration of principles can
be formulated.

16.6. In the exercise of the power
under Section 482 and while dealing with a
plea that the dispute has been settled, the
High Court must have due regard to the
nature and gravity of the offence. Heinous
and serious offences involving mental
depravity or offences such as murder, rape
and dacoity cannot appropriately be
quashed though the victim or the family of
the victim have settled the dispute. Such
offences are, truly speaking, not private in
nature but have a serious impact upon
society. The decision to continue with the
trial in such cases is founded on the
overriding element of public interest in
punishing persons for serious offences.

16.7.
As
distinguished
from
serious offences, there may be criminal
cases which have an overwhelming or
predominant element of a civil dispute.
They stand on a distinct footing insofar as
the exercise of the inherent power to quash
is concerned.

16.8. Criminal cases involving
offences which arise from commercial,
financial,
mercantile,
partnership
or
similar transactions with an essentially
civil flavour may in appropriate situations
fall for quashing where parties have settled
the dispute.

16.9. In such a case, the High
Court may quash the criminal proceeding if
in view of the compromise between the
disputants, the possibility of a conviction is
remote and the continuation of a criminal
proceeding would cause oppression and
prejudice; and

16.10. There is yet an exception
to the principle set out in propositions 16.8.
and 16.9. above. Economic offences
involving the financial and economic wellbeing of the State have implications which
lie beyond the domain of a mere dispute
between private disputants. The High Court
would be justified in declining to quash
where the offender is involved in an activity
akin to a financial or economic fraud or
misdemeanour. The consequences of the act
complained of upon the financial or
economic system will weigh in the
balance."
2 All. Bahori Lal Vs. State of U.P. & Anr.
1107

20.

In
P.
Dharamaraj
v.
Shanmugam, 2022 SCC OnLine SC 1186,
the
Hon'ble
Supreme
Court
again
considered
the
precedents,
including
Parbatbhai Aahir (Supra) and explained
the true purport of the precedents in the
following words: -

"44. Thus it is clear from the
march of law that the Court has to go slow
even while exercising jurisdiction under
Section 482 Cr.PC or Article 226 of the
Constitution in the matter of quashing of
criminal proceedings on the basis of a
settlement reached between the parties,
when the offences are capable of having
an impact not merely on the complainant
and the accused but also on others."

21. In State of M.P. v. Laxmi
Narayan, (2019) 5 SCC 688, the Hon'ble
Supreme Court again considered the law on
the point and the other decisions of this
Court on the point and observed and held
as under: -

"15.1. That the power conferred
under Section 482 of the Code to quash the
criminal
proceedings
for
the
noncompoundable offences under Section 320
of the Code can be exercised having
overwhelmingly and predominantly the
civil character, particularly those arising
out of commercial transactions or arising
out of matrimonial relationship or family
disputes and when the parties have
resolved
the
entire
dispute
amongst
themselves;

15.2. Such power is not to be
exercised in those prosecutions which
involved heinous and serious offences of
mental depravity or offences like murder,
rape, dacoity, etc. Such offences are not
private in nature and have a serious impact
on society;

15.3. Similarly, such power is not
to be exercised for the offences under the
special statutes like the Prevention of
Corruption Act or the offences committed
by public servants while working in that
capacity are not to be quashed merely on
the basis of compromise between the victim
and the offender;

15.4. Offences under Section 307
IPC and the Arms Act, etc. would fall in
the category of heinous and serious
offences and therefore are to be treated as
crime against the society and not against
the individual alone, and therefore, the
criminal proceedings for the offence
under Section 307 IPC and/or the Arms
Act, etc. which have a serious impact on
the society cannot be quashed in exercise
of powers under Section 482 of the Code,
on the ground that the parties have
resolved their entire dispute amongst
themselves. However, the High Court
would not rest its decision merely because
there is a mention of Section 307 IPC in
the FIR or the charge is framed under this
provision. It would be open to the High
Court
to
examine
as
to
whether
incorporation of Section 307 IPC is there
for the sake of it or the prosecution has
collected sufficient evidence, which if
proved, would lead to framing the charge
under Section 307 IPC. For this purpose,
it would be open to the High Court to go
by the nature of injury sustained, whether
such injury is inflicted on the vital/delicate
parts of the body, nature of weapons used,
etc. However, such an exercise by the
High Court would be permissible only
after the evidence is collected after
investigation and the charge-sheet is
filed/charge is framed and/or during the
trial. Such exercise is not permissible
when
the
matter
is
still
under
investigation.
Therefore,
the
ultimate
conclusion in paras 29.6 and 29.7 of the
1108 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
decision of this Court in Narinder Singh
should be read harmoniously and to be
read as a whole and in the circumstances
stated hereinabove;

15.5. While exercising the power
under Section 482 of the Code to quash the
criminal proceedings in respect of noncompoundable offences, which are private
in nature and do not have a serious impact
on society, on the ground that there is a
settlement/compromise between the victim
and the offender, the High Court is required
to consider the antecedents of the accused;
the conduct of the accused, namely,
whether the accused was absconding and
why he was absconding, how he had
managed with the complainant to enter into
a compromise, etc."

22. Thus it is clear that Laxmi
Narain (Supra) also does not lay down that
although the proceedings involving heinous
and serious offences should not ordinarily
quashed on the basis of a compromise
between the parties, this bar is not absolute.
High Court would not rest its decision
merely because there is a mention of a
Section of a heinous and serious offence in
the FIR or the charge is framed under this
provision. It would be open to the High
Court
to
examine
as
to
whether
incorporation of the offence is there for the
sake of it or the prosecution has collected
sufficient evidence. For this purpose, it
would be open to the High Court to go by
the nature of allegations and evidence
collected during investigation and the
charge-sheet is filed/charge is framed
and/or during the trial.

23. In Ramgopal v. State of M.P.,
(2022) 14 SCC 531, the appellants had
abused and assaulted the complainant on
account of certain monetary disputes.
Appellant no. 1 had struck the complainant
with a pharsa, which resultantly cut off the
little finger of his left hand. Appellant 2
also struck lathi-blows on the body of the
complainant. The appellants were thereafter
committed for trial under Sections 294, 323
and 326 read with Section 34 IPC and
Section 3 of the Scheduled Castes and the
Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities)
Act, 1989. The Magistrate had convicted
the appellants under Sections 294, 323 and
326 read with Section 34 IPC. During
pendency of the appeal filed against
conviction, the parties had reconciled their
disputes
and
sought
quashing
of
proceedings under Section 482 Cr.P.C. on
this ground. The High Court dismissed the
application. While allowing the appeal, the
Hon'ble Supreme Court held that: -

"12. The High Court, therefore,
having regard to the nature of the offence
and the fact that parties have amicably
settled their dispute and the victim has
willingly consented to the nullification of
criminal proceedings, can quash such
proceedings in exercise of its inherent
powers under Section 482CrPC, even if the
offences are non-compoundable. The High
Court
can
indubitably
evaluate
the
consequential effects of the offence
beyond the body of an individual and
thereafter adopt a pragmatic approach, to
ensure that the felony, even if goes
unpunished, does not tinker with or
paralyse
the
very
object
of
the
administration of criminal justice system.

13. It appears to us that criminal
proceedings involving non-heinous offences
or where the offences are pre-dominantly of
a
private
nature,
can
be
annulled
irrespective of the fact that trial has
already been concluded or appeal stands
dismissed against conviction. Handing out
punishment is not the sole form of
delivering justice. Societal method of
2 All. Bahori Lal Vs. State of U.P. & Anr.
1109
applying laws evenly is always subject to
lawful exceptions. It goes without saying,
that the cases where compromise is struck
post-conviction, the High Court ought to
exercise such discretion with rectitude,
keeping
in
view
the
circumstances
surrounding the incident, the fashion in
which the compromise has been arrived
at, and with due regard to the nature and
seriousness of the offence, besides the
conduct of the accused, before and after
the
incidence.
The
touchstone
for
exercising the extraordinary power under
Section 482 CrPC would be to secure the
ends of justice. There can be no hard-andfast line constricting the power of the
High Court to do substantial justice. A
restrictive construction of inherent powers
under Section 482CrPC may lead to rigid
or specious justice, which in the given
facts and circumstances of a case, may
rather lead to grave injustice. On the other
hand, in cases where heinous offences have
been proved against perpetrators, no such
benefit ought to be extended, as cautiously
observed by this Court in Narinder Singh v.
State of Punjab (2014) 6 SCC 466 and
State of M.P. v. Laxmi Narayan, (2019) 5
SCC 688.

14. In other words, grave or
serious offences or offences which involve
moral turpitude or have a harmful effect on
the social and moral fabric of the society or
involve matters concerning public policy,
cannot
be
construed
betwixt
two
individuals or groups only, for such
offences have the potential to impact the
society at large. Effacing abominable
offences through quashing process would
not only send a wrong signal to the
community but may also accord an undue
benefit to unscrupulous habitual or
professional offenders, who can secure a
settlement through duress, threats, social
boycotts, bribes or other dubious means. It
is well said that let no guilty man escape,
if it can be avoided .

* * *

19. We thus sum up and hold that
as opposed to Section 320 CrPC where the
Court
is
squarely
guided
by
the
compromise between the parties in respect
of offences compoundable within the
statutory framework, the extraordinary
power enjoined upon a High Court under
Section 482CrPC or vested in this Court
under Article 142 of the Constitution, can
be invoked beyond the metes and bounds of
Section
320
CrPC.
Nonetheless,
we
reiterate that such powers of wide
amplitude ought to be exercised carefully in
the
context
of
quashing
criminal
proceedings, bearing in mind: -

19.1. Nature and effect of the
offence on the conscience of the society;

19.2. Seriousness of the injury, if
any;

19.3
Voluntary
nature
of
compromise between the accused and the
victim; and

19.4 Conduct of the accused
persons, prior to and after the occurrence
of the purported offence and/or other
relevant considerations."

(Emphasis supplied)

24. Thus the Supreme Court had
reversed the order of the High Court
rejecting the prayer for quashing of the
proceedings and had quashed the criminal
proceedings on the basis of a compromise
between the parties even after conviction of
the appellant for offence under Section 326
I.P.C.,
which
is
punishable
with
imprisonment which may extend up to life.

25. In Ramawatar v. State of M.P.,
(2022) 13 SCC 635, the FIR lodged under
Section 3(1)(x) of the Scheduled Castes
and the Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of
1110 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
Atrocities Act), 1989 read with Section 34
IPC alleged that the appellant threw a brick
on the complainant and also made filthy
and slur remarks on her caste. There was a
civil dispute between the parties. The
appellant was convicted under Section
3(1)(x) of the SC/ST Act. The appeal filed
against his conviction was dismissed by the
High Court of Madhya Pradesh, Jabalpur
Bench. During pendency of further appeal
before the Hon'ble Supreme Court, the
complainant filed an application that the
parties had settled their disputes through a
compromise. The Hon'ble Supreme Court
held that: -

"17? where it appears to the
Court that the offence in question, although
covered under the SC/ST Act, is primarily
private or civil in nature, or where the
alleged offence has not been committed on
account of the caste of the victim, or where
the continuation of the legal proceedings
would be an abuse of the process of law,
the Court can exercise its powers to quash
the proceedings. On similar lines, when
considering a prayer for quashing on the
basis of a compromise/settlement, if the
Court is satisfied that the underlying
objective of the Act would not be
contravened or diminished even if the
felony in question goes unpunished, the
mere fact that the offence is covered under
a special statute would not refrain this
Court or the High Court, from exercising
their respective powers under Article 142
of the Constitution or Section 482CrPC."

(Emphasis supplied)

26. Kapil Gupta v. State (NCT of
Delhi), 2022 SCC OnLine SC 1030, is a
judgment passed by the Hon'ble Supreme
Court in an appeal filed against a judgment
and order passed by an Hon'ble Single
Judge of the High Court of Delhi,
dismissing the application filed under
Section 482 Cr.P.C. for quashing the
proceedings under Section 376 of the Penal
Code, 1860 ('IPC') on the ground that the
parties had entered into a settlement. While
allowing the appeal, the Hon'ble Supreme
Court held that: -

"13. It can thus be seen that this
Court has clearly held that though the
Court should be slow in quashing the
proceedings wherein heinous and serious
offences are involved, the High Court is
not foreclosed from examining as to
whether
there
exists
material
for
incorporation of such an offence or as to
whether there is sufficient evidence which
if proved would lead to proving the charge
for the offence charged with. The Court
has also to take into consideration as to
whether the settlement between the parties
is going to result into harmony between
them which may improve their mutual
relationship.

14. The Court has further held
that it is also relevant to consider as to
what is stage of the proceedings. It has
been observed that if an application is
made at a belated stage wherein the
evidence has been led and the matter is at
the stage of arguments or judgment, the
Court should be slow to exercise the power
to quash the proceedings.