# Bala Shankar v. State of U.P

- **Citation:** (2025) 8 ILRA 893
- **Court:** High Court of Judicature at Allahabad
- **Decided:** 2025-08-13
- **Case number:** Criminal Appeal No. 2695 of 1986
- **Bench:** Vivek Kumar Birla, Jitendra Kumar Sinha
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/allahabad-high-court/bala-shankar-v-state-of-u-p-53827
- **Pages:** 19

## Headnote

A.G.A.

Issue for Consideration
Whether
the
conviction
of
the
surviving
appellants under Section 302 read with
Section 149 IPC was sustainable when the
deceased died eight days after the incident
due to septicaemia arising from antemortem injuries, and whether, in the facts
proved, the offence was liable to be altered to
Section 304 Part-II read with Section 149
IPC, along with appropriate modification of
sentence.

Headnotes
Indian Penal Code, 1860 - ss. 302/149,
304 Part-II/149, 147, 148, 323/149,
324/149 - Murder - Unlawful assembly
- Common object - Injured witnesses -
Evidentiary
value
-
Death
due
to
septicaemia - Intention and knowledge -
Alteration
of
conviction
-
Sentence
already
undergone
-
Fine
and
compensation.

Held:
Testimonies of PW-1 (informant) and PW-2
(injured witness) were natural, cogent and
trustworthy. Evidence of an injured witness
carries a higher evidentiary value and ordinarily
warrants reliance unless major contradictions
are shown. Their ocular version stood fully
corroborated
by
medical
evidence
and
894 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
contemporaneous documents. [Paras 10-14,
22-24]

Medical evidence established that the deceased
sustained
penetrating
injuries
caused
by
'ballam', which were sufficient in the ordinary
course of nature to cause death. However, the
deceased succumbed eight days after the
incident,
and
the
cause
of
death
was
septicaemia
resulting
from
ante-mortem
injuries, not instantaneous death. [Paras 26-28]

Applying the principles laid down in Virsa Singh
v. State of Punjab, intention to cause such
bodily injury as is likely to cause death was not
established to the extent required for Section
302 IPC. The facts disclosed knowledge that the
act was likely to cause death, attracting Section
304 Part-II IPC. [Paras 29-30]

Common object of the unlawful assembly to
assault was clearly proved; liability under
Section 149 IPC rightly attracted. Conviction
under Sections 147/148, 323/149 and 324/149
IPC was affirmed. [Paras 25, 31]

Considering that the incident occurred more
than 43 years ago, and the advanced age of the
surviving appellants (about 78 and 89 years),
sentence was modified to period already
undergone, with imposition of fine of ₹25,000
each, part of which was directed to be paid as
compensation to the legal heirs of the deceased.
[Paras 31-32]

Appeal partly allowed. (E-14)

Case Law Cited
Virsa Singh v. State of Punjab, AIR 1958
SC 465 - applied; Krishna Mochi v. State
of Bihar, (2002) 6 SCC 81 - relied on;
Masalti v. State of U.P., AIR 1965 SC 202
- referred; Appabhai v. State of Gujarat,
AIR 1988 SC 696 - relied on; Jarnail
Singh v. State of Punjab, (2009) 9 SCC
719 - referred; Neeraj Sharma v. State of
Chhattisgarh, (2024) 3 SCC 125 - relied
on; Dheer Singh and Others Vs. State of
U.P., 2025 (4) ADJ 791-relied on.

List of Acts / Statutes
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973; Indian Penal
Code, 1860.
List of Keywords
Murder; Culpable homicide; Section 302 IPC;
Section 304 Part-II IPC; Unlawful assembly;
Common object; Injured witness; Septicaemia;
Ante-mortem injuries; Ballam injury; Alteration
of
conviction;
Sentence
modification;
Compensation to victim's family.

Case Arising From
Judgment and order dated 24.08.1983 passed
by the XIth Additional Sessions Judge, Agra in
Sessions Trial No. 117 of 1982, arising out
of FIR dated 30.04.1980, Police Station Gwalior
(transferred to P.S. Etmadpur), District Agra.

Appearance for Parties
For the Appellants: Sri Deenanath
For the State: Sri S. S. R. Dwivedi

## Text

_Characters 0–39,996 of 64,616. This is a partial read: ask again with offset=39996 for what follows._

8 All. Bala Shankar Vs. State of U.P.
893
When there is documentary evidence
available on record, the medical opinion
with regard to age of the victim becomes
irrelevant. Thus, since the victim was
minor and she was enticed by the appellant
to watch cinema with him on the pretext
that her father has already given consent for
the same and thereafter she was threatened
to follow the appellant and she was taken to
Gwalior
and
was
kept
there
under
confinement. In view thereof in the
considered opinion of this court the
appellant is guilty of the offence under
Section 363 and 366 IPC. Accordingly, this
court do not find any illegality in the
impugned judgment and order dated
24.8.1983. Hence, the conviction as well as
the sentence awarded to the appellant by
the trial court is hereby affirmed.

22. The instant criminal appeal is
dismissed accordingly.

23. The appellant is on bail. The Cheif
Judicial Magistrate, Agra is directed to take
him into custody in the aforesaid case and
send him to jail to serve out the remaining
sentence as awarded by the trial court and
affirmed by this Court.

24. Office is directed to send a copy of
this order to the court concerned within a
week for compliance along with the Lower
Court Record. The compliance report shall
be sent by the court concerned to this court
within a further period of fifteen days.

25. This Court appreciate the able
assistance provided by Sri Deena Nath
Mishra, learned Amicus Curiae. He shall be
paid an honorarium of Rs. 10,000/- for
services rendered by him as per rules.
----------
(2025) 8 ILRA 893
APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CRIMINAL SIDE
DATED: ALLAHABAD 13.08.2025

BEFORE

THE HON'BLE VIVEK KUMAR BIRLA, J.
THE HON'BLE JITENDRA KUMAR SINHA, J.

Criminal Appeal No. 2695 of 1986

Bala Shankar ...Appellant
Versus
State of U.P. ...Respondent

Counsel for the Appellant:
Kamlesh Kumar, Deena Nath

Counsel for the Respondent:
A.G.A.

Issue for Consideration
Whether
the
conviction
of
the
surviving
appellants under Section 302 read with
Section 149 IPC was sustainable when the
deceased died eight days after the incident
due to septicaemia arising from antemortem injuries, and whether, in the facts
proved, the offence was liable to be altered to
Section 304 Part-II read with Section 149
IPC, along with appropriate modification of
sentence.

Headnotes
Indian Penal Code, 1860 - ss. 302/149,
304 Part-II/149, 147, 148, 323/149,
324/149 - Murder - Unlawful assembly
- Common object - Injured witnesses -
Evidentiary
value
-
Death
due
to
septicaemia - Intention and knowledge -
Alteration
of
conviction
-
Sentence
already
undergone
-
Fine
and
compensation.

Held:
Testimonies of PW-1 (informant) and PW-2
(injured witness) were natural, cogent and
trustworthy. Evidence of an injured witness
carries a higher evidentiary value and ordinarily
warrants reliance unless major contradictions
are shown. Their ocular version stood fully
corroborated
by
medical
evidence
and
894 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
contemporaneous documents. [Paras 10-14,
22-24]

Medical evidence established that the deceased
sustained
penetrating
injuries
caused
by
'ballam', which were sufficient in the ordinary
course of nature to cause death. However, the
deceased succumbed eight days after the
incident,
and
the
cause
of
death
was
septicaemia
resulting
from
ante-mortem
injuries, not instantaneous death. [Paras 26-28]

Applying the principles laid down in Virsa Singh
v. State of Punjab, intention to cause such
bodily injury as is likely to cause death was not
established to the extent required for Section
302 IPC. The facts disclosed knowledge that the
act was likely to cause death, attracting Section
304 Part-II IPC. [Paras 29-30]

Common object of the unlawful assembly to
assault was clearly proved; liability under
Section 149 IPC rightly attracted. Conviction
under Sections 147/148, 323/149 and 324/149
IPC was affirmed. [Paras 25, 31]

Considering that the incident occurred more
than 43 years ago, and the advanced age of the
surviving appellants (about 78 and 89 years),
sentence was modified to period already
undergone, with imposition of fine of ₹25,000
each, part of which was directed to be paid as
compensation to the legal heirs of the deceased.
[Paras 31-32]

Appeal partly allowed. (E-14)

Case Law Cited
Virsa Singh v. State of Punjab, AIR 1958
SC 465 - applied; Krishna Mochi v. State
of Bihar, (2002) 6 SCC 81 - relied on;
Masalti v. State of U.P., AIR 1965 SC 202
- referred; Appabhai v. State of Gujarat,
AIR 1988 SC 696 - relied on; Jarnail
Singh v. State of Punjab, (2009) 9 SCC
719 - referred; Neeraj Sharma v. State of
Chhattisgarh, (2024) 3 SCC 125 - relied
on; Dheer Singh and Others Vs. State of
U.P., 2025 (4) ADJ 791-relied on.

List of Acts / Statutes
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973; Indian Penal
Code, 1860.
List of Keywords
Murder; Culpable homicide; Section 302 IPC;
Section 304 Part-II IPC; Unlawful assembly;
Common object; Injured witness; Septicaemia;
Ante-mortem injuries; Ballam injury; Alteration
of
conviction;
Sentence
modification;
Compensation to victim's family.

Case Arising From
Judgment and order dated 24.08.1983 passed
by the XIth Additional Sessions Judge, Agra in
Sessions Trial No. 117 of 1982, arising out
of FIR dated 30.04.1980, Police Station Gwalior
(transferred to P.S. Etmadpur), District Agra.

Appearance for Parties
For the Appellants: Sri Deenanath
For the State: Sri S. S. R. Dwivedi

(Delivered by Hon'ble Jitendra Kumar
Sinha, J.)

1. The appeal stood abated in respect
of appellant Nos. 2 and 5 namely Nand Lal
and
Bhagirathi
vide
order
dated
14.05.2025. The appeal survives in respect
of appellant Nos. 1, 3 and 4 namely Bala
Shankar, Rajmani and Mangaru.

2. Heard Sri Deena Nath, learned
counsel for the appellants and Sri S.S.R.
Dwivedi, learned A.G.A. for the State and
perused the record.

3. The appellants have challenged
their conviction under Section 302/149,
323/149 and 324/149 I.P.C.. Further
appellant No.1 Bala Shankar has been
convicted under Section 148 I.P.C. and rest
of the appellants have been convicted under
Section 147 I.P.C. The appellants have
been sentenced to imprisonment for life
under Section 302/149 I.P.C. Appellant
No.1 Bala Shankar has been sentenced to
undergo one year rigorous imprisonment
under Section 148 I.P.C., whereas rest of
the appellants have been sentenced to
undergo one year rigorous imprisonment
8 All. Bala Shankar Vs. State of U.P.
895
for offence under Section 147 I.P.C.
Appellant Bala Shankar has been sentenced
to rigorous imprisonment for six months
under Section 323/149 I.P.C. and rest of the
appellants have been sentenced six months
rigorous imprisonment for the offence
under Section 323/149 I.P.C. Further all the
sentences have been ordered to run
concurrently.

4. Prosecution story in brief is that one
Ram Pyare @ Babau Mishra gave a written
report to the Police Station- Rampur,
District- Jaunpur stating therein that on
21.06.1982 at about 02:00 P.M. Bala
Shankar, Mangaru, Rajmani, Nand Lal and
Bhagirathi armed with 'ballam' and 'lathi'
(Bala Shankar was armed with 'ballam'
and other were armed with 'lathi') came to
his door and started abusing him. When he
stopped them from abusing, Bhagirathi
exhorted the other accused persons and on
the said exhortation they attacked his
brother Vidya Shankar and his mother
Sohagin and their neighbour Adya Prasad
Mishra by 'lathi' and 'ballam'. When
uproar was made, Murlidhar Mishra,
Shambhunath Mishra, Anil Kumar Mishra
reached there and intervened and saved
them. It is further stated that Bala Shankar
gave blows of 'ballam' to Vidya Shankar
and Vidya Shankar had received many
injuries. The informant has further stated
that he reached the police station along
with injured persons to lodge a report. On
the basis of the above written report, the
first information report was lodged under
Sections 147, 148, 323, 324 and 326 of the
I.P.C. against Bala Shankar, Mangaru,
Rajmani, Nand Lal and Bhagirathi. During
medical treatment, Vidya Shankar died and
case was converted into Section 304 I.P.C.
After investigation the charge sheet was
submitted under Sections 147, 148, 323,
324, 326 and 304 of I.P.C. on 01.07.1982.
The Magistrate took cognizance of the
offence and committed the case to the court
of sessions for trial. Trial stood transferred
to the court of Special Judge/Additional
Session Judge, Jaunpur. The then learned
Addition Sessions Judge, Jaunpur framed
charges under Section 147, 302/149,
307/149 of the I.P.C. against appellants
Mangaru, Rajmani, Nand Lal, Bhagirathi
vide order dated 18.07.1983, whereas the
appellant Bala Shankar has been charged
under Sections 147, 148, 302, 302/149,
307/149 I.P.C. vide order dated 18.07.1983.

5. The prosecution has examined
Pyare Lal Mishra as PW-1. Adya Prasad as
PW-2. Dr. Chandra Bhoosan Upaddhyay as
PW-3. Dr. R.K. Singh as PW-4. Sri Vidya
Dhar Tripathi (S.H.O.) as PW-5. Sri
Purushottam Das Sharma as PW-6. Sri
Jamwant Singh (Constable) as PW-7.

In documentary evidence, the
prosecution has proved written report as
Ext. Ka-1. Injury report of Adya Prasad as
Ext. Ka-2. Injury report of Pyare Lal @
Babau as Ext. Ka-3. Injury report of Smt.
Suhagin as Ext. Ka-4. Injury report of
Vidyadhar as Ext. Ka-5. Post mortem
report as Ext. Ka-6. Panchayatnama as Ext.
Ka-7. F.I.R. as Ext.-12. Charge sheet as
Ext. Ka-17.

6.
After
closure
of
prosecution
evidence
the
statement
of
appellants/accused persons were recorded
under Section 313 Cr.P.C. The appellants
denied their involvement in the commission
of offence and stated that they have been
implicated in this case due to enmity. The
defence has also produced two witnesses
DW-1 Mewa Lal and DW-2 Sri Sahab Lal.

7. After hearing the arguments of the
prosecution and defence, the learned trial
896 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
court has passed the judgment and order
impugned.

8. Learned counsel for the surviving
appellant Nos. 1, 3 and 4 states that the
learned trial court has erred in convicting
the appellants under Section 302/149 I.P.C.
as the charge sheet was submitted against
the appellants under Section 304 I.P.C. He
further submits that the incident took place
on 21.06.1982 and Vidya Shankar died on
29.06.1982 i.e. eight days after the incident.
He further submits that PW-4 Dr. R.K.
Singh., who conducted the postmortem of
the deceased Vidya Shankar on 29.06.1982
has categorically stated in his examinationin-chief and it was difficult for him to say
that the deceased died due to injuries
received in the incident that took place at
02:00 P.M. on 21.06.1982. Learned counsel
further submits that PW-4 in his crossexamination has stated that it is wrong to
say that he made cutting on 'not' in the post
mortem report in which it has been
mentioned that death is due to shock and
subsequent septicaemia. He further submits
that the Doctor has sated in his crossexamination that the cutting in the post
mortem report does not bear his initials.
Learned counsel further submits that from
the testimony of PW-4 Doctor, it is not
proved that the death of Vidya Shankar was
the result of injuries he received on
21.06.1982 at 02:00 P.M. as alleged by the
prosecution. He further submits that the
death of deceased Vidya Shankar was due
to septicaemia . He further submits that
septicaemia can be due to negligence of the
Doctor while treating the patient. Learned
counsel further submits that out of six
witnesses of fact as mentioned in the
charge sheet only two witnesses have been
examined by the prosecution which also
casts doubt on the prosecution case. There
is a cross case of the incident and it is not
clear that who was the aggressor in the
incident. Initially, the fight was started by
the informant side and the accused
appellants have acted in their self-defence.
Learned counsel further submits that even
if the case is found to be proved, the
offence does not fall under Section 302/149
I.P.C., at best it would fall under Part-II of
Section 304 I.P.C. He further submits that
the incident took place some 43 years ago
and now appellants Bala Shankar, Rajmani
are aged about 78 years and appellant
Mangaru is aged about 89 years. He further
submits that considering the above even if
the appeal is not successful then at best
they should be sentenced under Section 304
Part-II/149 for period of incarceration
already undergone by them.

9. On the other hand, learned A.G.A.
Sri S.S.R. Dwivedi has supported the
judgement of learned trial court and has
submitted that PW-1 and PW-2 are injured
witnesses and from the testimonies of the
witnesses, accused appellant Bala Shankar
gave two blows of 'ballam' to the deceased
Vidya Shankar. He further submits that it is
well settled law that testimonies of injured
witnesses stand on higher pedestal than any
other witnesses. Further contention of
learned A.G.A. is that from the evidence
available on record the case against the
surviving appellants Balashankar, Rajmani
and Mangaru does not fall under Section
304 I.P.C. and learned trial court was fully
justified in convicting them under Section
302/149 I.P.C. and other sections.

10. In a recent judgment of Dheer
Singh and Others Vs. State of U.P., 2025
(4) ADJ 791, a Co-ordinate Bench of this
Court, of which one of us (Vivek Kumar
Birla, J.) was a member has considered the
law as to why a realistic approach to be
adopted
by
criminal
courts,
which
8 All. Bala Shankar Vs. State of U.P.
897
appreciating evidence in criminal trial. The
law in respect of injured, related and
interested witness was also considered
extensively, paragraph nos. 22 to 35
whereof reads as under:-

"22. In Krishna Mochi and others
vs. State of Bihar, (2002) 6 SCC 81, the
Hon'ble Apex Court laid emphasis on
realistic approach to be adopted by the
criminal
courts
while
appreciating
evidence in criminal trial, paragraph 32
whereof is quoted as under:

"32. The court while appreciating
the evidence should not lose sight of these
realities of life and cannot afford to take an
unrealistic approach by sitting in an ivory
tower. I find that in recent times the
tendency to acquit an accused easily is
galloping fast. It is very easy to pass an
order of acquittal on the basis of minor
points raised in the case by a short
judgment so as to achieve the yardstick of
disposal. Some discrepancy is bound to be
there in each and every case which should
not weigh with the court so long it does not
materially affect the prosecution case. In
case discrepancies pointed out are in the
realm of pebbles, the court should tread
upon it, but if the same are boulders, the
court should not make an attempt to jump
over the same. These days when crime is
looming large and humanity is suffering
and the society is so much affected thereby,
duties and responsibilities of the courts
have become much more. Now the maxim
"let hundred guilty persons be acquitted,
but not a single innocent be convicted" is,
in practice, changing the world over and
courts have been compelled to accept that
"society suffers by wrong convictions and it
equally suffers by wrong acquittals". I find
that this Court in recent times has
conscientiously taken notice of these facts
from time to time........."
(Emphasis supplied)

23. In Masalti vs. State of U.P.,
AIR 1965 SC 202, Hon'ble Apex Court in
paragraph 14 observed as under:

"14. But it would, we think, be
unreasonable to contend that evidence
given by witnesses should be discarded
only on the ground that it is evidence of
partisan or interested witnesses. ... The
mechanical rejection of such evidence on
the sole ground that it is partisan would
invariably lead to failure of justice."
(Emphasis supplied)

24. In Darya Singh vs. State of
Punjab, AIR 1965 SC 328, the Hon'ble
Apex Court has also taken the view that
related witness does not necessarily mean
or is equivalent to an interested witness. A
witness may be called interested only when
he or she derives some benefit from the
result of litigation; a decree in a civil case,
or in seeing a person punished in a
criminal trial, paragraph 6 whereof is
quoted as under:

"6. On principle, however, it is
difficult to accept the plea that if a witness
is shown to be a relative of the deceased
and it is also shown that he shared the
hostility of the victim towards the assailant,
his evidence can never be accepted unless
it is corroborated on material particulars."

25. In Appabhai and another vs.
State of Gujarat, AIR 1988 SC 696, the
Hon'ble Apex Court in paragraph 11
observed as under:

"11.........Experience reminds us
that
civilized
people
are
generally
insensitive when a crime is committed even
in their presence. They withdraw both from
the victim and the vigilante. They keep
themselves away from the Court unless it is
inevitable. They think that crime like civil
dispute is between two individuals or
parties and they should not involve
themselves. This kind of apathy of the
898 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
general public is indeed unfortunate, but it
is there everywhere whether in village life,
towns or cities. One cannot ignore this
handicap with which the investigating
agency has to discharge its duties. The
court, therefore, instead of doubting the
prosecution case for want of independent
witness must consider the broad spectrum
of the prosecution version and then search
for the nugget of truth with due regard to
probability if any, suggested by the
accused. The Court, however, must bear in
mind that witnesses to a serious crime may
not react in a normal manner. Nor do they
react uniformly. The horror stricken
witnesses at a dastardly crime or an act of
egregious nature may react differently.
Their, course of conduct may not be of
ordinary type in the normal circumstances.
The Court, therefore, cannot reject their
evidence merely because they have behaved
or reacted in an unusual manner....."
(Emphasis supplied)

26. Similar view has been taken
in State of A.P. vs. S. Rayappa and others,
(2006) 4 SCC 512 wherein it has been
observed that it is now almost a fashion
that public is reluctant to appear and
depose before the court especially in
criminal cases and the cases for that
reason itself are dragged for years and
years, paragraph 6 whereof is quoted as
under:

"6......by now, it is a wellestablished principle of law that testimony
of a witness otherwise inspiring confidence
cannot be discarded on the ground that he
being a relation of the deceased is an
interested witness. A close relative who is a
very natural witness cannot be termed as
interested witness. The term interested
postulates that the person concerned must
have some direct interest in seeing the
accused person being convicted somehow
or the other either because of animosity or
some other reasons."
(Emphasis supplied)

27. In Pulicherla Nagaraju @
Nagaraja Reddy v. State of AP, (2006) 11
SCC 444, the Hon'ble Apex Court in
paragraph 16 has held as under:

"16. In this case, we find that the
trial court had rejected the evidence of
PW1 and PW2 merely because they were
interested witnesses being the brother and
father of the deceased. But it is well settled
that evidence of a witness cannot be
discarded merely on the ground that he is
either partisan or interested or closely
related to the deceased, if it is otherwise,
found to be trustworthy and credible. It
only requires scrutiny with more care and
caution, so that neither the guilty escape
nor the innocent wrongly convicted. If on
such careful scrutiny, the evidence is found
to be reliable and probable, it can be acted
upon. If it is found to be improbable or
suspicious, it ought to be rejected. Where
the witness has a motive to falsely implicate
the accused, his testimony should have
corroboration
in
regard
to
material
particulars before it is accepted."
(Emphasis supplied)

28. In Satbir Singh and others vs.
State of U.P., (2009) 13 SCC 790, the
Hon'ble Apex Court in paragraph 26 held
as under:

"26. It is now a well-settled
principle of law that only because the
witnesses are not independent ones may not
by itself be a ground to discard the
prosecution case. If the prosecution case
has been supported by the witnesses and no
cogent reason has been shown to discredit
their statements, a judgment of conviction
can certainly be based thereupon ...... "
(Emphasis supplied)

29. In Jayabalan vs. U.T. of
Pondicherry, 2010 (68) ACC 308 (SC), the
8 All. Bala Shankar Vs. State of U.P.
899
Hon'ble Apex Court in paragraph 21 held
as under:

"21. We are of the considered
view that in cases where the court is called
upon to deal with the evidence of the
interested witnesses, the approach of the
court, while appreciating the evidence of
such witnesses must not be pedantic. The
court must be cautious in appreciating and
accepting the evidence given by the
interested witnesses but the court must not
be suspicious of such evidence. The
primary endeavour of the court must be to
look for consistency. The evidence of a
witness cannot be ignored or thrown out
solely because it comes from the mouth of a
person who is closely related to the victim."
(Emphasis supplied)

30. In Dharnidhar vs. State of
U.P., (2010) 7 SCC 759, the Hon'ble Apex
Court held that there is no hard and fast
rule that family members can never be true
witnesses to the occurrence and that they
will always depose falsely before the Court.
It will always depend upon the facts and
circumstances of a given case, paragraphs
12 and 13 whereof is quoted as under:

"12. There is no hard and fast
rule that family members can never be true
witnesses to the occurrence and that they
will always depose falsely before the Court.
It will always depend upon the facts and
circumstances of a given case. In the case
of Jayabalan v. U.T. of Pondicherry
[(2010)1 SCC 199], this Court had
occasion to consider whether the evidence
of interested witnesses can be relied upon.
The Court took the view that a pedantic
approach cannot be applied while dealing
with the evidence of an interested witness.
Such evidence cannot be ignored or thrown
out solely because it comes from a person
closely related to the victim. The Court
held as under:

" 23. We are of the considered
view that in cases where the court is called
upon to deal with the evidence of the
interested witnesses, the approach of the
court, while appreciating the evidence of
such witnesses must not be pedantic. The
court must be cautious in appreciating and
accepting the evidence given by the
interested witnesses but the court must not
be suspicious of such evidence. The
primary endeavour of the court must be to
look for consistency. The evidence of a
witness cannot be ignored or thrown out
solely because it comes from the mouth of a
person who is closely related to the victim.

........

13. Similar view was taken by this
Court in Ram Bharosey v. State of U.P.
[AIR 2010 SC 917], where the Court stated
the dictum of law that a close relative of the
deceased does not, per se, become an
interested witness. An interested witness is
one who is interested in securing the
conviction of a person out of vengeance or
enmity or due to disputes and deposes
before the Court only with that intention
and not to further the cause of justice. The
law relating to appreciation of evidence of
an interested witness is well settled,
according to which, the version of an
interested witness cannot be thrown over-
board, but has to be examined carefully
before accepting the same.

14. In the light of the above
judgments, it is clear that the statements of
the alleged interested witnesses can be
safely relied upon by the Court in support
of the prosecution's story. But this needs to
be done with care and to ensure that the
administration of criminal justice is not
undermined by the persons, who are closely
related to the deceased. When their
statements find corroboration by other
witnesses,
expert
evidence
and
the
circumstances of the case clearly depict
900 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
completion of the chain of evidence
pointing out to the guilt of the accused,
then we see no reason why the statement of
so called `interested witnesses' cannot be
relied upon by the Court."
(Emphasis supplied)

31. In a very recent judgement
rendered by Hon'ble Apex Court in Baban
Shankar Daphal and others vs. The State of
Maharashtra, 2025 SCC Online SC 137 in
respect of testimony of witness which
should not be discarded merely because of
relation with victim, the Hon'ble Apex
Court has, in paragraphs 27 and 28, held
as under:

"27. One of the contentions of the
learned counsel for the appellants is that
the eyewitnesses to the incident were all
closely related to the deceased and for
prudence the prosecution ought to have
examined
some
other
independent
eyewitness as well who were present at the
time of the unfortunate incident. This was
also the view taken by the Trial Court, but
the High Court has correctly rejected such
an approach and held that merely because
there
were
some
more
independent
witnesses also, who had reached the place
of incident, the evidence of the relatives
cannot be disbelieved. The law nowhere
states that the evidence of the interested
witness should be discarded altogether.
The law only warrants that their evidence
should be scrutinized with care and
caution. It has been held by this Court in
the catena of judgments that merely if a
witness is a relative, their testimony cannot
be discarded on that ground alone.

28.
In
criminal
cases,
the
credibility of witnesses, particularly those
who are close relatives of the victim, is
often scrutinized. However, being a relative
does not automatically render a witness
"interested"
or
biased.
The
term
"interested" refers to witnesses who have a
personal stake in the outcome, such as a
desire for revenge or to falsely implicate
the accused due to enmity or personal gain.
A "related" witness, on the other hand, is
someone who may be naturally present at
the scene of the crime, and their testimony
should not be dismissed simply because of
their relationship to the victim. Courts must
assess the reliability, consistency, and
coherence of their statements rather than
labelling them as untrustworthy.
(Emphasis supplied)

32.
In
a
recent
judgement
rendered by Hon'ble Apex Court in Shahaja
@ Shahajan Ismail Mohd. vs. State of
Maharashtra, (2023) 12 SCC 558 has
observed that the appreciation of ocular
evidence is a hard task and has summed up
the
judicially
evolved
principles
for
appreciation of ocular evidence in a
criminal case, paragraphs 29 and 30
whereof is quoted as under:

"29. The appreciation of ocular
evidence is a hard task. There is no fixed or
straight-jacket formula for appreciation of
the ocular evidence. The judicially evolved
principles for appreciation of ocular
evidence in a criminal case can be
enumerated as under:

29.1
While
appreciating
the
evidence of a witness, the approach must
be whether the evidence of the witness read
as a whole appears to have a ring of truth.
Once that impression is formed, it is
undoubtedly necessary for the Court to
scrutinize the evidence more particularly
keeping in view the deficiencies, drawbacks
and infirmities pointed out in the evidence
as a whole and evaluate them to find out
whether it is against the general tenor of
the evidence given by the witness and
whether the earlier evaluation of the
evidence is shaken as to render it unworthy
of belief.
8 All. Bala Shankar Vs. State of U.P.
901

29.2. If the Court before whom
the witness gives evidence had the
opportunity to form the opinion about the
general tenor of evidence given by the
witness, the appellate court which had not
this benefit will have to attach due weight
to the appreciation of evidence by the trial
court and unless there are reasons weighty
and formidable it would not be proper to
reject the evidence on the ground of minor
variations or infirmities in the matter of
trivial details.

29.3
When
eye-witness
is
examined at length it is quite possible for
him to make some discrepancies. But courts
should bear in mind that it is only when
discrepancies in the evidence of a witness
are so incompatible with the credibility of
his version that the court is justified in
jettisoning his evidence.

29.4. Minor discrepancies on
trivial matters not touching the core of the
case, hyper technical approach by taking
sentences torn out of context here or there
from the evidence, attaching importance to
some technical error committed by the
investigating officer not going to the root of
the matter would not ordinarily permit
rejection of the evidence as a whole.

29.5. Too serious a view to be
adopted on mere variations falling in the
narration of an incident (either as between
the evidence of two witnesses or as between
two statements of the same witness) is an
unrealistic approach for judicial scrutiny.

29.6. By and large a witness
cannot
be
expected
to
possess
a
photographic memory and to recall the
details of an incident. It is not as if a video
tape is replayed on the mental screen.

29.7. Ordinarily it so happens
that a witness is overtaken by events. The
witness could not have anticipated the
occurrence which so often has an element
of surprise. The mental faculties therefore
cannot be expected to be attuned to absorb
the details.

29.8. The powers of observation
differ from person to person. What one may
notice, another may not. An object or
movement might emboss its image on one
person's mind whereas it might go
unnoticed on the part of another.

29.9. By and large people cannot
accurately recall a conversation and
reproduce the very words used by them or
heard by them. They can only recall the
main purport of the conversation. It is
unrealistic to expect a witness to be a
human tape recorder.

29.10. In regard to exact time of
an incident, or the time duration of an
occurrence, usually, people make their
estimates by guess work on the spur of the
moment at the time of interrogation. And
one cannot expect people to make very
precise or reliable estimates in such
matters. Again, it depends on the timesense of individuals which varies from
person to person.

29.11.
Ordinarily
a
witness
cannot be expected to recall accurately the
sequence of events which take place in
rapid succession or in a short time span. A
witness is liable to get confused, or mixed
up when interrogated later on.

29.12. A witness, though wholly
truthful, is liable to be overawed by the
court atmosphere and the piercing cross
examination by counsel and out of
nervousness mix up facts, get confused
regarding sequence of events, or fill up
details from imagination on the spur of the
moment. The sub- conscious mind of the
witness sometimes so operates on account
of the fear of looking foolish or being
disbelieved though the witness is giving a
truthful
and
honest
account
of
the
occurrence witnessed by him.
902 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES

29.13. A former statement though
seemingly inconsistent with the evidence
need not necessarily be sufficient to amount
to
contradiction.
Unless
the
former
statement has the potency to discredit the
later statement, even if the later statement
is at variance with the former to some
extent it would not be helpful to contradict
that witness.

[See
Bharwada
Bhoginbhai
Hirjibhai v. State of Gujarat, 1983 Cri LJ
1096 : AIR 1983 SC 753, Leela Ram v.
State of Haryana, AIR 1999 SC 3717, and
Tahsildar Singh v. State of UP, AIR 1959
SC 1012]

30. To put it simply, in assessing
the value of the evidence of the eye-
witnesses, two principal considerations are
whether, in the circumstances of the case, it
is possible to believe their presence at the
scene of occurrence or in such situations as
would make it possible for them to witness
the facts deposed to by them and secondly,
whether there is anything inherently
improbable or unreliable in their evidence.
In respect of both these considerations, the
circumstances either elicited from those
witnesses themselves or established by
other evidence tending to improbabilise
their presence or to discredit the veracity of
their statements, will have a bearing upon
the value which a Court would attach to
their evidence. Although in cases where the
plea of the accused is a mere denial, yet the
evidence of the prosecution witnesses has
to be examined on its own merits, where the
accused raise a definite plea or puts
forward
a
positive
case
which
is
inconsistent with that of the prosecution,
the nature of such plea or case and the
probabilities in respect of it will also have
to be taken into account while assessing the
value of the prosecution evidence."

(Emphasis supplied)

33. Paragraph 48 of Pahalwan
Singh and others vs. State of U.P., 2020 (6)
ALJ 166 is quoted under:

"48.
Thus,
in
view
of
aforementioned decisions of the Supreme
Court, it is now a settled position of law
that the statements of the interested
witnesses can be safely relied upon by the
court in support of the prosecution story.
But this needs to be done with care and to
ensure that the administration of criminal
justice is not undermined by the persons
who are closely related to the deceased.
When their statements find corroboration
by other evidence, expert evidence and the
circumstances of the case clearly depict
completion of the chain of evidence
pointing out to the guilt of the accused,
then there is no reason as to why the
statement of so-called 'interested witnesses'
cannot be relied upon by the Court. It
would be hard to believe that the close
relatives shall leave the real culprit and
shall implicate innocent persons falsely
simply because they have enmity with the
accused persons.
(Emphasis supplied)

34. Insofar as the testimony of
injured witness is concerned, this Court in
Kaptan Singh vs.
State of UP, 2020 (1) ADJ 106 (DB) has, in
paragraph 20, observed as under:

"20.
Close
scrutiny
of
the
evidence shows that the statements of (PW1) Vimla Devi and (PW-2) Ram Singar
Pandey are clear, cogent and credible.
Theyhave
been
subjected
to
crossexamination, but they remained stick to the
prosecution version and no such fact,
contradiction
or
inconsistency
could
emerge, so as to create any doubt about
their testimony. Keeping in view the fact
that after incident, deceased as well as
injured were taken to hospital and were
admitted there and that on the same night
8 All. Bala Shankar Vs. State of U.P.
903
deceased Ram Niwas Rao has succumbed
to injuries, it is apparent that the first
information report of the incident was
lodged without any undue delay. Version of
(PW-1) Vimla Devi finds corroboration
from testimony of (PW-2) Ram Singar
Pandey and is fully consistent with medical
evidence. It is also to be kept in mind that
(PW-2) Ram Singar Pandey has himself
sustained injuries in the same incident. In
Jarnail Singh v. State of Punjab, (2009)
9SCC 719, the Supreme Court reiterated
the special evidentiary status accorded to
the testimony of an injured accused. The
fact that the witness sustained injuries at
the time and place of occurrence, lends
support to his testimony that he was present
during the occurrence. In case, the injured
witness is subjected to lengthy crossexamination and nothing can be elicited to
discard his testimony, it should be relied
upon. Similar view was expressed in the
case of Krishan v. State of Haryana, (2006)
12 SCC 459. Hon'ble Supreme Court in
Criminal Appeal Nos. 513-514 of 2014
Baleshwar Mahto and another v. State of
Bihar and another, decided on 9.1.2017,
has reiterated the law as under :

''28. The question of the weight to
be attached to the evidence of a witness
that was himself injured in the course of the
occurrence has been extensively discussed
by this Court. Where a witness to the
occurrence has himself been injured in the
incident, the testimony of such a witness is
generally considered to be very reliable, as
he is a witness that comes with a built-in
guarantee of his presence at the scene of
the crime and is unlikely to spare his actual
assailant(s) in order to falsely implicate
someone.

''Convincing evidence is required
to discredit an injured witness.'' [Vide
Ramlagan Singh v. State of Bihar [(1973) 3
SCC 881:1973 SCC (Cri) 563:AIR 1972 SC
2593], Malkhan Singh v. State of U.P.
[(1975) 3 SCC 311 : 1974 SCC (Cri) 919 :
AIR 1975 SC 12], Machhi Singh v. State of
Punjab [(1983) 3 SCC 470 : 1983 SCC
(Cri) 681], Appabhai v. State of Gujarat
[1988 Supp SCC 241 : 1988 SCC (Cri) 559
: AIR 1988 SC 696], Bonkya v. State of
Maharashtra [(1995) 6 SCC 447 : 1995
SCC (Cri) 1113], Bhag Singh [(1997) 7
SCC 712 : 1997 SCC (Cri) 1163], Mohar v.
State of U.P. [(2002) 7 SCC 606 : 2003
SCC (Cri) 121] (SCC p. 606b-c), Dinesh
Kumar v. State of Rajasthan [(2008) 8 SCC
270 : (2008) 3 SCC (Cri) 472], Vishnu v.
State of Rajasthan [(2009) 10 SCC 477 :
(2010) 1 SCC (Cri) 302], Annareddy
Sambasiva Reddy v. State of A.P. [(2009)
12 SCC 546 : (2010) 1 SCC (Cri) 630] and
Balraje v. State of Maharashtra [(2010) 6
SCC 673 : (2010) 3 SCC (Cri) 211] 29.
While deciding this issue, a similar view
was taken in Jarnail Singh v. State of
Punjab [(2009) 9 SCC 719 : (2010) 1 SCC
(Cri) 107], where this Court reiterated the
special evidentiary status accorded to the
testimony of an injured accused and relying
on its earlier judgments held as under:
(SCC pp. 726-27, paras 28-29)

''28. Darshan Singh (PW 4) was
an injured witness. He had been examined
by the doctor. His testimony could not be
brushed aside lightly. He had given full
details of the incident as he was present at
the time when the assailants reached the
tubewell. In Shivalingappa Kallayanappa
v. State of Karnataka [1994 Supp (3) SCC
235 : 1994 SCC (Cri) 1694] this Court has
held that the deposition of the injured
witness should be relied upon unless there
are strong grounds for rejection of his
evidence
on
the
basis
of
major
contradictions and discrepancies, for the
reason that his presence on the scene
stands established in case it is proved that
904 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
he suffered the injury during the said
incident.

In State of U.P. v. Kishan Chand
[(2004) 7 SCC 629 : 2004 SCC (Cri) 2021]
a
similar
view
has been
reiterated
observing that the testimony of a stamped
witness has its own relevance and efficacy.
The fact that the witness sustained injuries
at the time and place of occurrence, lends
support to his testimony that he was present
during the occurrence. In case the injured
witness is subjected to lengthy crossexamination and nothing can be elicited to
discard his testimony, it should be relied
upon (vide Krishan v. State of Haryana
[(2006) 12 SCC 459 : (2007) 2 SCC (Cri)
214]). Thus, we are of the considered
opinion that evidence of Darshan Singh
(PW 4) has rightly been relied upon by the
Courts below.''

30. The law on the point can be
summarised to the effect that the testimony
of the injured witness is accorded a special
status in law. This is as a consequence of
the fact that the injury to the witness is an
inbuilt guarantee of his presence at the
scene of the crime and because the witness
will not want to let his actual assailant go
unpunished merely to falsely implicate a
third party for the commission of the
offence. Thus, the deposition of the injured
witness should be relied upon unless there
are strong grounds for rejection of his
evidence
on
the
basis
of
major
contradictions and discrepancies therein.''
In this very judgment, relationship between
the medical evidence and ocular evidence
was also discussed, based on number of
earlier precedents, as under: ''33. In State
of Haryana v.