# Banaras Hindu University, Varanasi Through its Registrar v. M/s Umang Cure Pvt. Ltd. & Ors

- **Citation:** (2025) 12 ILRA 1096
- **Court:** High Court of Judicature at Allahabad
- **Decided:** 2025-12-17
- **Case number:** Conciliation Act 1996 No. 289 of 2025
- **Bench:** Arun Bhansali, C.J. Kshitij Shailendra
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/allahabad-high-court/banaras-hindu-university-varanasi-through-its-registrar-v-m-s-umang-cure-pvt-54820
- **Pages:** 9

## Text

1096 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
dated 06.11.2024 and the award passed by
the Sole Arbitrator dated 31.12.2018 cannot
be sustained and is accordingly set aside. It
will be open for the parties to get the
disputes settled relating to the money
claims for the work done in the city of
Lucknow and arising out of the contract
dated 01.08.2016 through arbitration and in
so far as other money claims relating to the
work done in other districts of Uttar
Pradesh except Lucknow are concerned,
they can be agitated before an appropriate
forum, which needless to say shall be
decided in accordance with law, on its own
merits.

56. Accordingly, the appeal is allowed
in the aforesaid terms. There shall be no
order as to costs.
----------
(2025) 12 ILRA 1096
APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL SIDE
DATED: ALLAHABAD 17.12.2025

BEFORE

THE HON'BLE ARUN BHANSALI, C.J.
THE HON'BLE KSHITIJ SHAILENDRA, J.

Appeal Under Section 37 of Arbitration And
Conciliation Act 1996 No. 289 of 2025

Banaras
Hindu
University,
Varanasi
Through its Registrar ...Appellant
Versus
M/s Umang Cure Pvt. Ltd. & Ors.
 ...Respondents

Issue for Consideration
(i) Whether the arbitration clause contained in
the license deed survived after expiry of the
license period so as to maintain proceedings
under Section 9 of the Arbitration and
Conciliation Act, 1996; and
(ii) Whether the Commercial Court was justified
in granting interim protection under Section 9 of
the Act of 1996 restraining eviction and coercive
action without recording findings on prima facie
case, balance of convenience and irreparable
injury.

Headnotes
Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 -
Sections 9 and 37 - Survival of arbitration
clause - Expiry of license deed - Interim
protection - Parameters for grant of
injunction - Order lacking findings -
Remand.

Held:
Merely because the term of the license deed
had expired, the arbitration clause contained
therein did not perish. Where the respondent
continued in possession and the appellants
continued to accept license fee, the arbitration
clause survived for resolution of disputes arising
out of or in connection with the license deed.
The plea that the arbitration clause ceased to
exist on expiry of the license was rejected.
[Paras 19-25]

The Commercial Court, while allowing the
application under Section 9 of the Act of 1996,
failed to record any finding on the essential
requirements for grant of interim relief, namely
existence of a prima facie case, balance of
convenience and irreparable injury. The order,
though running into several paragraphs, did not
deal with the settled parameters governing
grant of injunction. [Paras 27-28]

Despite noticing that the respondent was willing
to enhance the license fee prospectively and
had
objection
only
to
retrospective
enhancement, no direction was issued in that
regard and a blanket order restraining eviction
and coercive measures was passed. The manner
in which interim protection was granted could
not be countenanced. [Paras 28-29]

The order dated 12.06.2025 passed by the
Commercial Court was set aside and the matter
was remanded for fresh consideration of the
application under Section 9 of the Act of 1996 in
accordance with law and in light of the
observations made. [Paras 30-31]

Till fresh decision, status quo as existing on the
date of the appellate order was directed to be
maintained. [Para 31] (E-14)
12 All. Banaras Hindu University, Varanasi Through its Registrar Vs. M/s Umang Cure Pvt. Ltd.
 & Ors.
1097
Case Law Cited
Anoop Maheshwari v. Thomas T. Kurian,
2024 SCC OnLine All 8893 - referred to;
Union of India v. Kishori Lal Gupta, AIR
1959 SC 1362 - referred to; Bharat
Petroleum
Corporation
Ltd.
v.
Great
Eastern Shipping Co. Ltd., (2008) 1 SCC
503 - relied on; Branch Manager, MAGMA
Leasing and Finance Limited v. Potluri
Madhavilata, (2009) 10 SCC 103 - relied
on; Raymond Limited v. Miltex Apparels
and others, 2025 SCC OnLine Bom 333 -
referred to.

List of Acts / Statutes
Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996

List of Keywords
Survival of arbitration clause; Expiry of license
deed; Interim injunction; Prima facie case;
Balance of convenience; Irreparable injury;
Remand; Status quo.

Case Arising From
Order
dated
12.06.2025
passed
by
the
Commercial Court, Varanasi in proceedings
under Section 9 of the Arbitration and
Conciliation Act, 1996.

Appearance for Parties
For the Appellant(s): Rahul Agarwal, Reema
Pandey, Ishan Mehta

For the Respondent(s): Manish Goyal, Senior
Advocate, Syed Fahim Ahmed

(Delivered by Hon'ble Arun Bhansali, C.J.)

1. This appeal under Section 37 of the
Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996
(the Act of 1996) is directed against
order
dated
12.06.2025
passed
by
Commercial Court, Varanasi, whereby
application filed by respondent under
Section 9 of the Act of 1996 has been
allowed and the appellants have been
restrained not to evict the respondent from
the property in dispute (indicated in the
license deed) and not to take any coercive
measures.
2.
The
appellants-University
manages
and
operates
Sir
Sunderlal
Hospital within its campus. On 24.09.2013,
the appellants entered into a license deed
with the respondent for operating a 24-hour
pharmacy within the hospital premises, the
arrangement was subsequently renewed in
the years 2014, 2015 and on 24.09.2016.
By the last renewal, the respondent was
granted a five year license to operate the
chemist shop with certain conditions
regarding continuation and termination. It
is indicated that the Hospital Management
Committee of the appellants in its meeting
dated 09.02.2022 decided against granting
any further extension to the respondent and
resolved to initiate new tender process for
24-hour pharmacy. The resolution was
approved by the Vice Chancellor of the
University. Though the term of the license
expired on 23.09.2021, the appellants
allowed the respondent to continue for a
further period of three months upto
23.12.2021.
Further
extensions
were
granted and by an order dated 20.01.2023,
the period from 23.09.2021 to 03.01.2023
was treated as deemed to have been
extended prior to which on 03.01.2023, an
extension for a period of three months was
granted.

3. Besides the 24-hours pharmacy
within the hospital premises, additionally
on 04.07.2022, a separate license deed with
the respondent was executed for operating
two new 24-hour pharmacies at the Trauma
Centre Hospital and Hospital OT Complex
under IMS system. The license was for a
period of three years subject to periodic
review.

4. The appellants after 31.03.2023
offered the respondent a fresh license deed
for
operating
pharmacies
at
various
locations within the hospital. The revised
1098 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
agreement containing terms and fees for
license was forwarded on 11.10.2023 fixing
license fee at Rs.1916.66 per sq. ft. It is
claimed that the respondent did not execute
the fresh license deed and persisted in
paying the license fee as per expired license
deed. The appellants issued an eviction
notice dated 21.11.2023 to vacate the
premises within 30 days and clear all the
dues failing which legal steps were
threatened. It is claimed that despite the
legal notices were issued through counsel
for the University dated 16.01.2025 and
17.02.2025, the respondent refused to
vacate and continued to run the shop
illegally.

5.
Apparently,
to
enforce
eviction/bring the respondent to terms, the
appellants initiated steps for electricity
disconnection and attempted to repossess
the premises, which was objected by the
respondent.

6. Aggrieved of the attempts
made
by
the
appellants,
the
respondent filed application under
Section 9 of the Act of 1996 before
the
Commercial
Court,
Varanasi
seeking interim protection in respect
of the shop premises. An ex-parte
injunction
dated
20.02.2025
was
passed restraining the appellants from
taking any coercive action. Reply to
the application under Section 9 of the
Act of 1996 was filed inter alia
claiming that the respondent has no
subsisting right to remain in the
possession of the premises.

7. After hearing the parties, the
Commercial Court vide its order dated
12.06.2025 passed an order as noticed
hereinbefore.
Feeling
aggrieved,
the
present appeal has been filed.
8.
Learned
counsel
for
the
appellants made submissions that the
Commercial Court fell in error in granting
protection under Section 9 though the
license deed between the parties had
expired on 31.03.2023 and no valid or
subsisting agreement existed on the date of
filing
of
the
application.
Further
submissions
were
made
that
the
Commercial Court fell in error in not
recording any finding on the essential
prerequisites for grant of interim relief, i.e.
prima facie case, irreparable injury and
balance of convenience, which vitiates the
order.

9. Learned counsel emphasized that
once the term of license deed and its
extension had expired on 31.03.2023, the
arbitration clause provided in the license
deed dated 24.09.2016 perished with the
expiry of the term of license and the
respondent could not have invoked the
jurisdiction of the Commercial Court under
Section 9 of the Act of 1996 and on that
count alone, the order impugned deserves
to be quashed and set aside. On the said
aspect, reliance was placed on Anoop
Maheshwari vs. Thomas T. Kurian :
2024 SCC OnLine All 8893.

10. Further submissions were made
that though the Commercial Court noticed
the fact/submission that the respondent was
willing to increase the license fee with
effect from 11.10.2023 and had only
objection
qua
the
retrospective
enhancement with effect from 01.04.2023,
however a blanket interim order has been
granted against eviction and any coercive
process, which is ex-facie illegal and
contrary to the indications made in the
order impugned. The respondent has been
given a nature of protection, to which he is
not at all entitled.
12 All. Banaras Hindu University, Varanasi Through its Registrar Vs. M/s Umang Cure Pvt. Ltd.
 & Ors.
1099
11.
Various
submissions
were
made seeking to justify to the enhanced
rent and the fact that the respondent was
seeking to be unreasonable, so as to refuse
the enhancement and was taking advantage
of the nature of order passed by the
Commercial Court and on that count, it is
prayed that the order be set aside.

12. Counsel for the respondent
made submissions seeking to contest the
allegations made. Submissions were made
that the respondent has been regularly
making payment of the license fee in terms
of the agreement and nothing is due to the
respondent. Submissions were made that
the plea raised pertaining to the arbitration
clause contained in the license deed
perishing with the purported expiry of its
term, has no substance inasmuch as the
respondent
has
been
continuing
in
possession of the license premises and is
regularly paying the license fee, which has
been accepted by the appellants. Further
submissions
have
been
made
that
irrespective of the expiry of the license and
the fact that the respondent was ready and
willing to execute a fresh license deed, the
action of the appellants being highhanded
in seeking to disconnect the electricity and
forcefully dispossessing the respondent, the
respondent has no option but to invoke the
jurisdiction of the Commercial Court.

13. Submissions have been made
that under no provisions of law, respondent
can forcefully dispossess the respondent
from the license premises. They are
required to only employ legitimate means
and therefore, the grant of injunction by the
Commercial Court cannot be faulted.

14. Qua the enhanced license fee,
submissions were sought to be made that
the enhancement cannot be unilateral and
the respondent is willing to negotiate with
the appellant for a reasonable enhancement
and, therefore, the order passed by the
Commercial Court cannot be faulted.
Reliance was placed in Branch Manager,
MAGMA Leasing and Finance Limited
and another vs. Potluri Madhavilata and
another : (2009) 10 SCC 103; Bharat
Petroleum Corporation Ltd. vs. Great
Eastern Shipping Co. Ltd. : (2008) 1 SCC
503 and Raymond Limited vs. Miltex
Apparels and others : 2025 SCC OnLine
Bom 333.

15.
We
have
considered
the
submissions made by counsel for the
parties and have perused the material
available on record.

16. The principal submission made
by counsel for the appellants, which was
neither raised before the Commercial Court
and nor in the present appeal, centers
around
the
maintainability
of
the
proceedings under Section 9 of the Act,
once the period of license is over wherein
the arbitration clause is contained. The
Arbitration Clause reads as under:

 "56) All questions, disputes and
differences arising under and out of, or in
connection with the License Deed, shall be
referred to the sole arbitration by an
arbitrator appointed under the provisions of
the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996
by the Vice-Chancellor, BHU whose
decision shall be final and binding, on both
the parties. The venue for the arbitration
proceedings shall be Varanasi and courts at
Varanasi shall have exclusive jurisdiction.
All the arbitration proceedings shall be
carried out in English language."

17. The plea which has been raised,
is apparently based on the judgement in
1100 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
Anoop Maheshwari (supra) wherein a
Single Judge of this Court, referring to
judgement in Union of India vs. Kishori
Lal Gupta : AIR 1959 SC 1362, came to
the conclusion that existence of a contract
is necessary for invocation of arbitration
clause prescribed under the agreement as
the clause would perish with the contract
and as the contract therein was only for a
period of 11 months, the moment the
contract perished, the lease ended and the
condition under lease also perishes with
such contract, suit would not be barred
under Section 8 of the Act of 1996 and
therefore suit for eviction would lie.

18. Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case
of Bharat Petroleum Corporation Ltd.
(supra) wherein the agreement called Time
Charter Party, was for a period of two years
from 22.9.1996 to 30.6.1997 and from 1.7.1997
to 30.6.1998, which period was extended till
31.8.1998, however, the vessel continued to be
chartered by BPCL till 31.8.1999, when
payment for the period 1.9.1998 to 31.8.1999
was not made, based on the arbitration clause,
an arbitral tribunal was constituted wherein
issue was raised pertaining to the jurisdiction of
the Tribunal to adjudicate dispute for the period
September, 1998 to August 1999. In those
circumstances, the Hon'ble Supreme Court
indicated the following issue:

 "17. Thus, the short question for
determination is whether on the expiry of
the extended period of charter hire on 31-81998, charter party dated 6-5-1997 came to
an end and the arbitration agreement
between the parties perished with it?"

19. The Hon'ble Court further
observed as under:

 "19. It is, no doubt, true that the
general rule is that an offer is not accepted
by mere silence on the part of the offeree,
yet it does not meant that an acceptance
always has to be given in so many words.
Under certain circumstances, offerees
silence, coupled with his conduct, which
takes the form of a positive act, may
constitute an acceptance-an agreement sub
silentio. Therefore, the terms of a contract
between the parties can be proved not only
by their words but also by their conduct.

20. In our view, the principle of sub
silentio is clearly attracted in the present
case. As noted above, after the extended
period of charter party dated 6-5-1997 had
come to an end on 31-8-1998 and the bids
received pursuant to fresh invitation were
pending finalisation, vide their letter dated
12-10-1998, the respondent had informed
the appellant that they were agreeable to
apply new rates for use of the vessel from
1-7-1998 provided all the nine vessels are
used.
However,
on
31-10-1998,
the
appellant faxed IOCs message informing
them of the extension of the existing
coastal tanker fleet for the month of
October 1998 at reduced rates viz. 80% of
the charter party rates prevailing till 30-81998. On receipt of the said letter, the
respondent vide their letter dated 5-11-1998
protested against the revision of the rates
for the vessel not being considered under
the new bid and stated in unequivocal terms
that it was not possible for them to accept
the proposal of the Oil Coordination
Committee, communicated to them vide
letter dated 12-10-1998. Yet again while
responding to the appellant's fax dated 3112-1998, whereby the respondent was
required to sign a provisional charter party
by 4-1-1999, vide their letter dated 4-11999, the respondent, pointed out to the
appellant that usual practice is that pending
finalisation of the new charter, the existing
terms and conditions of the charter party
12 All. Banaras Hindu University, Varanasi Through its Registrar Vs. M/s Umang Cure Pvt. Ltd.
 & Ors.
1101
continue to apply and, therefore, they were
willing
to
sign
the
agreement
as
contemplated by the appellant based on the
existing terms and conditions. It was
suggested that an agreement may be signed
between them for the period from 1-9-1998
until the matter was finally decided by the
appellant under the tender, on the existing
terms and conditions with the charter hire
being provisionally paid on ad hoc basis at
90% of the rate which was prevailing under
the existing charter party. As noted
hereinabove, there was no response by the
appellant to the respondent's letter dated 41-1999 though it appears that vide their
letter of even date, the appellant did
suggest to the respondent that as a token of
formal agreement the said letter may be
jointly signed by the charterers and the
vessel
owners.
Admittedly,
no
such
agreement was signed between the parties.
Indubitably, there was no further exchange
of correspondence between the parties
during the year. Nevertheless, the appellant
continued to use the vessel on hire with
them under the time charter dated 6-51997. The conduct of the parties, as
evidenced in the said correspondence and,
in particular the appellants silence on the
respondents letter dated 5-11.1998 and 41-1999, coupled with the fact that they
continued to use the vessel, manifestly goes
to show that except for the charter rate,
there was no other dispute between the
parties. They accepted the stand of the
respondent sub silentio and thus, continued
to bind themselves by other terms and
conditions contained in the charter party
dated 6-5-1997, which obviously included
the arbitration clause."

 23. We are, therefore, of the
opinion that though performance of the
charter party agreement dated 6-5-1997
may have come to an end on 31-8-1998 but
it was still in existence for some purposes
viz. the effect of vessels non-redelivery
as per the prescribed mechanism and its
continued use beyond the stipulated time
and, thus, the arbitration clause in the said
charter party operated in respect of these
and other allied purposes. Therefore, the
factual scenario in the instant case leads to
an
inescapable
conclusion
that
notwithstanding the expiry of the period
fixed in the time charter party dated 6-51997, the said charter party did not get
extinguished, inter alia, for the purpose of
determination of the disputes arising
thereunder and the arbitration clause
contained therein could be invoked by the
respondent.

 24. In view of the foregoing
discussion, we do not find any infirmity in
the view taken by the High Court that the
charter party dated 6-5-1997 had not come
to an end by efflux of time and it got
extended by the conduct of the parties,
warranting interference."

(emphasis supplied)

20. A perusal of the above
determination made by Honble Supreme
Court reveals that though the agreement
may have come to an end on expiry of its
term, the arbitration clause operated and for
the purpose of determination of the
disputes, the arbitration clause could be
invoked and that the agreement had not
come to an end by efflux time and the same
got extended on account of conduct of the
parties.

21. The present circumstances, as
noticed hereinbefore, are quite similar
wherein despite the expiry of the term in
the year 2021, the same was extended from
time to time till 31.03.2023 and thereafter
1102 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
also, the appellants had continued to
receive the license fee as paid by the
respondent, which is also a conscious
decision inasmuch the amount has not been
directly deposited in the accounts of the
appellants rather cheques/drafts were sent
which had been deposited by the appellants
in its Bank accounts.

22.
In
the
case
of
Branch
Manager, MAGMA Leasing and Finance
Limited (supra), after considering the
judgement in the case of Kishori Lal
Gupta (supra) also, in a case where the
agreement was terminated due to breach,
the Hon'ble Supreme Court came to the
following conclusion:

 "14.
The
statement
of
law
expounded by Viscount Simon, L.C. in
Heyman as noticed above, in our view,
equally applies to the situation where the
contract is terminated by one party on
account of the breach committed by the
other particularly in a case where the clause
is framed in wide and general terms.
Merely because the contract has come to an
end by its termination due to breach, the
arbitration clause does not get perished nor
is rendered inoperative; rather it survives
for resolution of disputes arising in
respect of or with regard to or
under the contract. This is in line with
the
earlier
decisions
of
this
Court,
particularly as laid down in Kishorilal
Gupta.

 15. In the instant case, Clause 22
of
the
hire-purchase
agreement
that
provides for arbitration has been couched
in the widest possible terms as can well be
imagined. It embraces all the disputes,
differences, claims and questions between
the parties arising out of the said agreement
or in any way relating thereto. The hirepurchase
agreement
having
been
admittedly entered into between the parties
and the disputes and differences have since
arisen between them, we hold, as it must
be, that the arbitration Clause 22 survives
for the purpose of their resolution although
the contract has come to an end on account
of its termination."

 (emphasis supplied)

23. The Bombay High Court in the
case of Raymond Limited (supra), relied
on judgement in the case of Bharat
Petroleum Corporation Ltd. (supra) and
came to the conclusion that all terms in the
agreement would stand extended sub
silentio and by necessary implication
including the arbitration clause.

24. Learned Single Judge in the
case of Anoop Maheshwari (supra) has
principally relied on the determination
made in the case of Kishori Lal Gupta
(supra) and did not take into consideration
the law which has developed subsequent to
the
said
judgment,
as
discussed
hereinbefore
and
as
such
the
said
judgement does not lay down good law.

25. In view of the law as laid down
by Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of
Bharat Petroleum Corporation Ltd.
(supra) and as discussed hereinbefore, the
plea sought to be raised for the first time
before this Court regarding non availability
of the arbitration clause, apparently has no
substance.

26. Coming to the merits of the
order passed by the Commercial Court, a
perusal of the order impugned dated
12.6.2025 reveals that though the Tribunal
has delivered a judgement running into 94
paras, the determination is indicated in 4
12 All. Banaras Hindu University, Varanasi Through its Registrar Vs. M/s Umang Cure Pvt. Ltd.
 & Ors.
1103
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which reads as under:

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fLFkfr foi{khx.k dh xSjdkuwuh] euekukiu ,oa
mRihM+ukRed izfdz;k dks nf'kZr djrk gSA

 94- bl izdkj ls Li"V gksrk gS fd tks
izkFkZuk&i= vkosnd }kjk izLrqar fd;k x;k gS]
mlesa cy izrhr gksrk gSA vr% izkFkZuk&i= 4d
Lohdkj fd;s tkus ;ksX; gSA

vkns'k

 vkosnd }kjk izLrqr Arbitration
Misc. Case No. 14@2025 izkFkZuk&i= dkxt
la[;k 4d vUrxZr /kkjk 9 ek/;LFke~ oa lqyg
vf/kfu;e 1996&Lohdkj fd;k tkrk gSA

 foi{khx.k dks fu"ksf/kr fd;k tkrk gS
fd ek/;LFke~ vf/kdj.k ds xBu ,oa vkosnd dh
rjQ ls mDr vf/kdj.k ds le{k izLrqr
izkFkZuk&i= ds fuLrkj.k rd vkosnd dks iz'uxr
lEifRr ykbZlsUl MhM esa vafdr ls u rks
csn[ky djsaxs vkSj u gh fdlh izdkj dh
mRihM+ukRed dk;Zokgh vey esa yk;saxsA

(emphasis supplied)

27. A perusal of the above
judgement
would
reveal
that
the
fundamental requirements of granting an
injunction under Section 9 of the Act of
1996 wherein existence of a prima facie
case,
balance
of
convenience
and
irreparable injury was required to be
determined by the Commercial Court, not a
1104 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
word has been indicated on the said aspects
of the matter.

28. The most outstanding feature
rather the deficiency of the judgement
impugned is that though at the end of para
91
(underlined
hereinbefore),
it
was
observed by the Commercial Court that the
respondent was prepared to enhance the
rent from 11.10.2023 and had only
objection
qua
the
retrospective
enhancement, no order has been passed for
paying the enhanced license fee, which as
noticed, was volunteered/offered to be paid
with effect from 11.10.2023 and a blanket
order has been granted not to evict the
respondent and further not to take any
coercive measures. The manner in which
the order has been passed, cannot be
countenanced/approved.

29. None of the settled parameters
have been complied with / adhered to and
to
top
it
all
despite
noticing
the
concession/offer/volunteering
enhanced
payment, no direction in this regard has
been issued which is wholly unjustified.

30. Consequently, the appeal is
partly allowed. The order dated 12.6.2025
passed by the Tribunal is set aside. The
matter is remanded back to the Commercial
Court to hear and decide the application
afresh, keeping in view the observations
made hereinbefore, complying with the
requirements for passing an order under
Section 9 of the Act of 1996 as well as
keeping in view the offer made by the
respondent, which aspect has not been
disputed by the respondent.

31. However, till such time that a
fresh order is passed by the Commercial
Court, status quo as it exists on the date of
passing of this order, shall be maintained.
The parties shall appear before the
Commercial Court on 5.1.2026 and the
Commercial Court is directed to pass a
fresh order after hearing the parties before
31.01.2026.
----------
(2025) 12 ILRA 1104
APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL SIDE
DATED: ALLAHABAD 16.12.2025

BEFORE

THE HON'BLE SANDEEP JAIN, J.

First Appeal No. 1276 of 2023
&
First Appeal No. 1274 of 2023

Rakesh Srivastava & Ors. ...Appellants
Versus
Smt. Sudha Srivastava (Since Dead) & Ors.
 ...Respondents

Issue for Consideration
Whether Parmanand Lal Srivastava (testator)
had validly revoked his registered Will dated
20.09.1996
by
executing
a
subsequent
unregistered Will dated 25.05.2002 in favour of
the appellants, and whether the subsequent Will
stood proved in accordance with law free from
suspicious circumstances?

Headnotes
Indian Succession Act, 1925 - Ss. 59, 63
- Evidence Act, 1872 - Ss. 67, 68 -
Probate - Proof of Will - Suspicious
circumstances - Revocation of earlier
registered Will - Subsequent unregistered
Will - Burden on propounder - Judicial
conscience
-
Active
participation
of
beneficiary - Non-disclosure in mutation
proceedings - Contradictions regarding
place of execution - Attesting witness
unreliable - Effect - Subsequent Will
held not proved - Earlier registered Will
upheld.

Held:
The earlier registered Will dated 20.09.1996
executed by the testator in favour of his